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The  dissertation  brings   together  approaches  across   the   fields  of  physics,   critical  
theory,   literary   studies,   philosophy   of   physics,   sociology   of   science,   and   history   of  
science  to  synthesize  a  hybrid  approach  for  instigating  more  rigorous  and  intense  cross-­‐‑
disciplinary   interrogations   between   the   sciences   and   the   humanities.   I   explore   the  
concept   of   speculation   in   particle   physics   and   science   fiction   to   examine   emergent  
critical   approaches   for   working   in   the   two   areas   of   literature   and   physics   (the   latter  
through  critical  science  studies),  but  with  the  expectation  of  contributing  new  insights  to  
media  theory,  critical  code  studies,  and  also  the  science  studies  of  science  fiction.    
There   are   two   levels   of   conversations   going   on   in   the   dissertation;   at   the   first  
level,   the   discussion   is   centered   on   a   critical   historiography   and   philosophical  
implications  of  the  discovery  Higgs  boson  in  relation  to  its  position  at  the  intersection  of  
old  (current)  and  the  potential  for  new  possibilities  in  quantum  physics;  I  then  position  
my   findings   on   the   Higgs   boson   in   connection   to   the   double-­‐‑slit   experiment   that  
represents   foundational   inquiries   into   quantum   physics,   to   demonstrate   the   bridge  
between   fundamental  physics   and  high  energy  particle  physics.  The   conceptualization  
of   the   variants   of   the   double-­‐‑slit   experiment   informs   the   aforementioned   critical  
comparisons.  At  the  second  level  of  the  conversation,  theories  are  produced  from  a  close  
study  of  the  physics  objects  as  speculative  engine  for  new  knowledge  generation  that  are  
    
v  
then  reconceptualized  and  re-­‐‑articulated  for  extrapolation  into  the  speculative  ontology  
of   hard   science   fiction,   particularly   the   hard   science   fiction   written   with   the   double  
intent   of   speaking   to   the   science   while   producing   imaginative   and   socially   conscious  
science  through  the  literary  affordances  of  science  fiction.     The  works  of  science  fiction  
examined   here   demonstrate   the   tension   between   the   internal   values   of   physics   in   the  
practice  of  theory  and  experiment  and  questions  on  ethics,  culture,  and  morality.  
Nevertheless,   the   dissertation   hopes   to   show   the   beginnings   of   a   possibility,  
through   the   contentious   but   generative   space   provided   by   speculative   physics,   to  
produce  more  cross-­‐‑collaborative  thinking  between  physics  as  represented  by  the  hard  
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1. Prolog: the Science Studies of High Energy Particle 
Physics and Hard Science Fiction 
This  dissertation  extends  the  discourse  of  previous  generation’s  engagement  
coming   out   of   various   philosophical,   anthropological,   sociological,   historical,   and  
cultural  studies  of  particle/quantum  physics  from  multi-­‐‑faceted  perspectives,  with  a  
majority   of   the   studies   centered   on   epistemic   cultures,   historical   development   and  
representation,   laboratory   practices,   and   globally   networked   collaborations.   The  
story   I   am   interested   in   presenting   takes   on   a   multi-­‐‑faceted,   and   theoretical,  
transdisciplinary   engagement  with  physics   that   is  not  merely   focused  on  physics’s  
narrative,   but   also   on   the   relevance   of   that   story   to   other   disciplines,   even   if   that  
story  is  not  an  easy  tale  to  tell,  and  one  that  is  filled  with  pitfalls.  From  a  humanistic  
angle,   I   am   interested   in   what   the   discursive   elements   of   the   intellectual   projects  
situated   in   other   disciplines   can   contribute   in   terms   of   the   description   of   certain  
aspects  of  quantum  physical  epistemology,  and  particle  physics  more  specifically.    
Before   sociologists   and   anthropologists   became   interested   in   the  
epistemology   of   particle   physics,   especially   from   the   1980s,   philosophers   and  
historians  of  physics  have  been  considering  the  implications  of  developments  in  the  
subfield  of  particle  physics  because  of   the   latter’s   close   connection   to   foundational  
inquiries  within  quantum  physics.  In  addition,  particle  physics  also  expands  into  the  
realm  of  astrophysics,  and   therefore,   cosmology.  Cosmology  has   real  philosophical  
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significance  that  is  not  only  limited  to  the  immediate  questions  within  philosophy  of  
science,   but   also   implicated   within   the   broader   perspectives   of   the   philosophy   of  
nature  in  relation  to  ethics  and  morality.  
However,   to   consider   the   topic   from   the   view   of   publishing   and   PhD  
dissertation   history,   the   publication   of   Sharon   Traweek’s   seminal   work   Beamtimes  
and   Lifetimes:   the   World   of   Higher   Energy   Physics   (originating   from   her   dissertation  
project),   in   1988,   has   opened   up   the   way   for   studying   the   culture   of   physicists,  
including   the   differences   between   theorists   and   experimentalists;   hence,   particle  
physics   is  no   longer   just  of   interest   to  philosophers  of  physics  but  has  also  entered  
the  critical  embrace  of  critical  and  cultural  studies  of  science.  It  started  with  a  trickle  
that   has   turned   into   a   more   regular   flow,   as   other   publications   are   produced.  
Dissertations   that   consider   the   sociological,   historical,   and   ethnographical  
implications  of  big  laboratory  sciences  that  also  include  high-­‐‑energy  particle  physics,  
or  use  the  methodologies  developed  out  of  such  studies  to  consider  other  related  and  
not-­‐‑so-­‐‑related  fields  of  science,  have  also  began  to  mushroom,  as  one  will  discover  
from  the  database  searches.    
Traweek   had   conducted   an   ethnographic   and   observer-­‐‑participation   study  
into   the   ‘masculine’   labor   of   high-­‐‑energy   physics   in   the   1970s   that   compared  
between   the   national   laboratories   in   Japan   (National   Laboratory   for   High-­‐‑energy  
physics  or  KEK),  Stanford  Linear  Accelerator  at  Stanford,  and  Fermilab  in  Chicago.  It  
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so   happens   that   her   fieldwork   was   taking   place   at   about   the   same   time   as   when  
exciting  ‘new’  discoveries  were  made  and  a  revolution  in  epistemic  paradigms  was  
taking  place.    
However,   for   all   the   explosive   excitement   heralding   a   generation   of   new  
scientific  knowledge,  Traweek  carefully  unveils   the   ‘big-­‐‑boys’  attitude  prevalent   in  
the  social  climate  surrounding  big  science  and  their  apparatuses.  She  also  highlights  
another  important  feature  of  her  role  as  a  fieldworker:  to  not  be  enticed  into  siding  
with  the  physicists  and  merely  reproduce  the  latter’s  epistemic  priorities  and  sense  
of   selves   even   as   she   takes   stock   of   her   position   as   an   ‘impartial’   observer   and  
outsider.   This   standpoint   must   be   heeded   by   researchers   (and   other   interested  
readers)  who  are  wading  through  the  internal  and  public  discourse  of  science;  with  
the   rise   in   science   communication   and   the   application   of   scientific   rhetoric   by   the  
scientists   themselves   (not   just   scholars   studying   their  work),   perception   about   the  
audience   and   assumptions   about   their   capabilities   propel   the   types   of   knowledge  
that  get  transmitted  to  the  public.  Humanistic  and  social  science  researchers  who  are  
not   insider   to   the   knowledge-­‐‑making   enterprise  would   have   to   keep   in  mind,   the  
theory-­‐‑ladenness   that   is   present   in   their   ‘interdisciplinary’   interactions   with  
scientists,   just   as  much   as   the   researcher  with   insider   connections   and   knowledge  
(such  as  a  trained  physicist  who  later  becomes  a  historian  or  sociologist  of  physics)  
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must   be   wary   of   the   assumptions   about   the   culture   he/she   might   have   already  
imbibed.  
Although  Traweek  is  not  the  first  scholar  to  have  written  about  the  social  life  
of  experiments  and   the  relationships   that  physicists  have  with   their  apparatuses  of  
work  in  relation  to  the  construction  of  scientific  knowledge  (we  can  think  of  earlier  
relevant  works  on  the  subject  by  scholars  such  as  Michel  Serres,  Bruno  Latour,  Harry  
Collins  and  Andrew  Pickering),   she  could  be  considered  as   the   first   to  address   the  
non-­‐‑universal  values  and  localized  politics  that  shape  the  physicists’  social  life  at  the  
laboratories,   in   relation   to   their   work,   while   also   attending   to   gendered   nuances.  
Unlike   Latour,   she   makes   a   distinction   between   the   human   subject   and   the   non-­‐‑
human  actor  by  emphasizing  how  the  reproduction  of  social  norms  in  the  scientific  
world  plays  a  big  role  in  shaping  the  actual  science  being  produced.  In  other  words,  
Traweek  does  not  take  privilege  to  be  the  default  even  as  she  remains  aware  of  her  
privileged   position   stemming   from   her   personal   interactions   at   the   sites   of   her  
fieldwork.  
Before   Beamtimes,   Andrew   Pickering   had   published   a   tour   de   force   on   the  
world  of  particle  physics,  Constructing  Quarks:  a  Sociological  History  of  Particle  Physics1.  
                                                                                                             
1  While   visiting   the  CERN   library   during  my   short   stint   of   fieldwork   back   in   the   summer   of   2010,   I  
found  this  book  by  Pickering  prominently  displayed  in  an  area  of  high  visibility  to  grab  the  attention  of  
physicists  usually  too  busy  just  catching  up  on  the  immediate  literature  of  their  work,  let  alone  read  the  
sociological  tracts  on  their  work!  
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However,   the   book   concentrates  mainly   on   the   epistemic   turns   that   separate   ‘old’  
standard   physics   from   the   new   ones,   the   latter   represented   by   the   pivotal   year   of  
1974.  1974,  known  also  as  the  year  of  the  ‘November  Revolution’  that  saw  the  first  in  
a  series  of  discoveries  of  “unusual  elementary  particles”  such  as  the  J/psi  meson  (an  
example   of   the   hadronic   particle   constituting   two   quarks)   that   marked   the  
establishment  of  a  new  physics  not  perceived  as  possible  under   the  old  model;   the  
‘new’  physics  at  the  time  were  electron-­‐‑positron  collisions,  neutrinos,  and  the  quark  
composite   model   of   hadronic   particles.      In   a   sense,   it   also   marks   the   revival   of  
quantum   field   theory   from   its   almost  decrepit   existence,   and  becomes   in   itself,   the  
first   sign   that   theory  and  experiment   in  particle  physics   are  beginning   to   reconcile  
that  previously  irreconcilable  differences  that  had  been  part  of  the  crisis  in  the  field.  
Pickering   situates   old   physics   within   the   advancement   of   quantum  
electrodynamics   that   ushered   the   beginnings   of   a   formal   system   for   representing  
particles   in   space-­‐‑time   such   as   was   developed   by  Heisenberg,   Schrödinger,   Pauli,  
Dirac,   and   Born;   and   the   founding   of   the   ‘Eightfold-­‐‑way,’   which   is   a   group  
theoretical  pre-­‐‑Standard  Model  (to  be  further  explained  in  chapters  two,  three,  and  
Appendix   A)   representation   of   the   strong   interaction   of   quarks.   He   then  
differentiates   all   of   the   aforementioned   entities   from   the   new   physics   of   theories  
comprising   electroweak   and   strong   interactions,   and   the   different   categories   of  
subatomic   particles.   For   Pickering,   the   establishment   of   ‘new’   physics   stems   from  
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discoveries   in   the   areas   of   mesonic   theory   (two   quarks   combined),   heavy   leptons  
(electrons,  positrons,  muons,  and  neutrinos),   and  new  generations  of  quarks   (three  
are  known  at  the  time  of  writing).    
According  to  Pickering,  the  ‘new  physics’  is  a  new  paradigm  for  explicating  
phenomena  not  easily  described  under  older   theoretical  models.  He  also   traces   the  
dynamics   of   practices   involved   in   achieving   epistemic   evolution,   gesturing   to   the  
still   speculative   possibility   of   the   grand   unification   of   nature’s   forces.   I   consider  
Pickering’s  work  as  providing  a  more  organized,  critical,  and  systematic  approach  to  
the   various   personal   scientific   essays   collected   in   The   Rise   of   the   Standard   Model:  
Particle   Physics   in   the   1960s   and   1970s   that   chronicle,   though   not   always   in   a  
chronological   fashion,   the   contributions   of   the   experimentalists   and   theorists   in  
manufacturing   the   products   structuring   the   Standard  Model.  However,   the   essays  
are  written   in   a  way   that   assumes   the   reader   as  having  general   sophistication  and  
background  knowledge  on  the  topic.  
While  Pickering’s  work  concentrates  on  the  sociological  aspects  of  knowledge  
transmission  and  transference  that  enable  some  theories  to  continue  while  others  to  
dissipate,   from   reasons   ranging   from   the   lack   of   effective   ways   for   measuring  
predictions   to   errors   (or   misdirections)   in   calculations,   Peter   Galison’s   Image   and  
Logic:   A   Material   Culture   of   Microphysics,   published   in   1997,   is   interested   in   the  
material   culture   of   particle   physics   experiments   by   tracing   its   prehistory   through  
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radiation  and  nuclear  physics.  Galison  details  the  development  of  particle  physics  in  
terms   of   instrumental   design   and   the   endgame   involved,   all   the  while   setting   his  
analyses  against  the  background  of  real-­‐‑world  politics  that  can  affect  the  direction  of  
knowledge  production  in  high-­‐‑energy  physics.    
His   discussion   of   the   politics   of   big   science   considers   social   constructivism  
(and   its   limits)   and  how   that   could  be   connected  with   the   epistemic  materiality   of  
modern   physics:   the   relationships   between   scientific   valuation/ideologies   and  
instruments  of  choice,  academic  structures  that  promote  the  advancement  of  certain  
research  areas,  and  the  contestation  of  objectivity  in  knowledge  production.  He  does  
not   shy   away   from   engaging   in   an   interrogation   between   internal   and   external  
values   to   demonstrate   how   they   converge   into   a   dominant   narrative   strain   in  
physics.      He   also   considers   how   experiments   and   theoretical   predictions   (or  
speculations)   are   able   to   complement   each   other,   and   how   these   could   be  
communicated  within  a  ‘trading  zone’  where  a  common  goal  is  aspired  to  even  if  the  
‘language’   of   communication   is   fraught  with   ambivalence,   linguistic   fractures,   and  
incommensurability.    
Possibly  taking  a   leaf  out  of   the  work  of  Traweek,  Karin  Knorr-­‐‑Cetina,  who  
had  performed  comparative  ethnography  in  the  sociology  of  science,  wrote  Epistemic  
Cultures:  How   the  Sciences  Make  Knowledge   (1999)   that   considers   the  differences  and  
similarities  between  experiments  in  molecular  biology  with  detection  work  in  high-­‐‑
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energy   physics   at   CERN.   While   these   scientific   fields   work   with   objects   at   a  
microscopic   scale   that   requires   many   levels   of   mediation,   she   highlights   the  
differences  in  their  practices  stemming  from  the  different  prerogatives  of  their  fields’  
various   scientific   inquiries   (such   as   microbiology   versus   physics)   that   therefore  
shape  the  development  of  their  praxis,  signature-­‐‑representations,  and  relationship  to  
their   experimental   instruments.   Knorr-­‐‑Cetina’s   study   takes   up   the   sociological  
practices   in   high-­‐‑energy   physics   raised   by   Traweek,   Pickering,   and   Galison   by  
finding  common  traits  between  particle  physics  and  microbiology,  therefore  raising  
some   important   questions   regarding   transdisciplinary   interrogations   within   the  
sciences  that  are  foundationally  different.    
However,  at  a  different  end  of  a  spectrum,  and  with  influences  less  direct,  are  
the  critical  works  relating  to  interpretations  in  quantum  theory,  including  the  history  
of  such  interpretations,  by  scholars  such  as  David  Bohm,  Karen  Barad,  Mara  Beller,  
and  Arkady  Plotnitsky,  who  had  influenced  my  interest  in  exploring  the  possibility  
of   real-­‐‑time   implications   and   impact   of   quantum   mechanical   interpretations   on  
pragmatic   questions   in   physics,   especially   experimental   particle   physics.   While  
taking   a   different   epistemic   direction   from   these   scholars,   I   have   deployed   the  
discussions   they   began   with   regard   to   developments   in   ordinary   quantum  
mechanics   and   quantum   field   theories   to   query   some   of   the   ontological   problems  
that  have  arisen  in  both  Standard  Model  particle  physics  and  in  the  consideration  of  
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as   yet   undetected,   new   physics.   In   fact,   their   discussions   into   the   workings   of  
interpretations   allow   me   to   make   the   necessary   connections   to   earlier   history   of  
physics,  which  I  then  relate  to  the  conceptualization  and  development  of  the  Higgs  
boson.   I  went   as   far   back   as   the   early  nineteenth   century  development   in   classical  
electrodynamics   to   better   understand   the   confluence   of   a   multiplicity   of   scientific  
and   ideological   events   involved   in   shaping   the   course   of   modern   theoretical   and  
experimental  physics.  
However,   what   had   most   directly   informed   the   coalescing   of   my   project  
around   the   topic   of   speculation   is   the   publication   of   a   work   that   considers  
speculation  as  enacted   in   the  history  of  physics.  Helge  Kragh’s  Higher  Speculations:  
Grand   Theories   and   Failed   Revolutions   in   Physics   and   Cosmology   (2011)   attempts   to  
explicate   problems   relating   to   how   novel   theories   are   constructed   until   the  
emergence  of  new  empirical  evidence,  or  theories  that  pass  the  test  of  scientific  rigor,  
render   them  obsolete.  The  book  considers   the  different  ways   in  which   the   theories  
are  considered  as  speculative  since  the  nineteenth  century  such  as  theories  of  fields  
(and  vortices)  right  up  to  twenty-­‐‑first  century  questions  on  cosmological  constants,  
quantum  gravity,  and  astrobiology.    
However,   he   does   not   attempt   to   unpack   what   speculation   means  
philosophically,   nor   produce   more   than   a   thematic   core   of   engagement   for  
connecting   the   different   cases   of   physical   sciences   in   the   past   two   centuries.   His  
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deployment  of  speculation  positions  him  as  a  materialist;  he  deploys  speculation  to  
demonstrate   the   epistemic   nebulousness   of   scientific   theories   anchored   in  
metaphysical   conceptualizations/mathematical   formalisms   that   do   not   have  
counterparts   in   empirical  data.   Further,   he   cautions   ebullience   over   ambitious   and  
theoretically  sophisticated  ideas  that  are  inadequately  confirmed  by  experiments,  or  
that   are   resistant   to   more   pragmatic   engagements.   It   is   both   my   contention   (and  
agreement)  with  his  assessment  of  some  of  the  history  of  physics  cases,  as  well  as  my  
dissatisfaction   with   how   speculative   knowledge   has   been   conceptualized   in   the  
book,   that   had   spurred  me   to   recuperate   speculation   towards   a  more   constructive  
approach   for   engaging   with   swathes   of   knowledge   and   facts   that   are   never   as  
ontologically  stable  as  they  might  appear  above  ground.  
In   addition,   there   has   been   ongoing   work   relating   to   the   ontology   and  
epistemology   of   the   LHC,   and   its   experimental   searches,   conducted   by   a   group  
based   at   Wuppertal   Universität   (http://www.lhc-­‐‑epistemologie.uni-­‐‑wuppertal.de/)  
and   their   external   collaborators.   They   are   particularly   interested   in   how  physicists  
(experimentalists,   theoreticians,   phenomenologists   who   are   experts   at   creating  
models   at   the   intersection  of   theory  and  experiment)  have  developed  a   conceptual  
understanding   and   relationship   with   the   different   theoretical   models   in   particle  
physics.  One  of  the  collaboration’s  members  recently  gave  a  talk  on  the  result  of  their  
work  at  CERN  in  Feb  14,  2013  (http://cds.cern.ch/record/1516534).      I   take  cognizant  
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of   their   work   in   progress   to   trace   how   our   inquiries   intersect   and   diverge,   while  
using   their  access   to  physicists   in  Europe   to  help  me   track   the  differences  between  
the  discourses  emerging  out  of  Europe  and  North  America,   though  mostly   to  help  
me  extend  from  the  ideas  proposed  within  this  dissertation  into  future  projects.  
Beyond   the   important   abovementioned   works   that   help   situate   the  
conversation   whence   my   dissertation   takes   up,   there   have   also   been   interesting  
scholarship   at   the   intersection   of   science   and   literature,   particularly   physics   and  
literature,   which   enriched   the   literary   aspect   of   my   work,   even   if   we   consider  
different   epistemic   objects,  with   their   different   hierarchies   and   issues.     One   of   the  
more  incisive  is  Sean  Miller’s  Strung  Together:  The  Cultural  Currency  of  String  Theory  
as  a  Scientific  Imaginary.  Miller’s  work  considers  how  string  theory  is  understood  in  
popular  culture  and  characterized  in  various  works  of  fictions.    
Some   of   these   works   of   fictions   he   examines   take   advantage   of   the   rich  
scientific   imagery  (and  imaginary)  underlying  the  constitution  and  development  of  
string  theory  while  others  are  merely  content  to  engage  with  cartoon  representations  
of   the   scientific   model.   He   also   considers   the   rhetorical   strategies   and   popular  
metaphors  appropriated  by  physicists  writing  to  a  general  audience  in  an  attempt  to  
convey   the   wonder   and   beauty   of   the   science,   including   strategies   that   could   be  
misleading  when   the   reader   does   not   understand   the   context   behind   the   rhetoric.  
Miller’s   close   reading   of   the   works   of   fiction   in   juxtaposition   with   the   technical  
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knowledge  base  of   the   science  behind   string   theory  provides  me  with  a  model   for  
thinking  how  I   can  best   integrate   the  discussion  of   science   fiction   that  provides  an  
imaginative  prototype  for  considering  the  ideas  and  concepts  in  physics  expansively,  
with  science;  both  the  physics  and  the  works  of  fiction  act  as  counterpoints  to  each  
other   while   feeding   on   each   side   of   the   epistemic   divide   to   obtain   a   more  
aesthetically  enriching  interpretation  of  literature  and  physics.  In  the  process,  I  have  
also  discovered  just  how  such  a  contrapuntal  interrogation  of  physics  with  literature,  
and   vice-­‐‑versa,   has   provided   a   richer   philosophical   reading   than   a   mere  
straightforward   approach.   Nevertheless,   the   reading   itself   has   to   be   a   case   of  
demonstration  rather  than  pure  argument.  
In   light   of   the   above,   my   dissertation   attempts   to   explore   the   concept   of  
speculation   in   particle   physics   and   science   fiction   to   investigate   non-­‐‑linear  
approaches  to  innovative  conceptualizations  in  physics  and  literature,  with  the  hope  
of   creating   new   insights   that   can   relate   to   knowledge   systems   in   these   two   areas  
more   specifically,   and   the   sciences   and   humanities   more   broadly.   I   hope   to  
demonstrate  how  speculative  physics  could  potentially  be  useful  as  a  philosophical  
and   fictionalizing  device,   especially   as   it   is   used   to  disrupt   epistemic   assumptions  
believed  to  be  foundationally  strong.  In  other  words,  through  a  confluence  of  science  
fiction   and   the   ‘edgy’   representations   of   scientific   knowledge   at   the   frontier   as  
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epitomized   by   particle   physics,   I   hope   to   show   how   literary   aesthetics   can   be  
enriched  even  as  interpretive  scientific  insights  are  extended.  
In  the  preliminary  stages  of  the  dissertation  research  in  spring  2010,  I  began  
making   contact   with   the   particle   physics   experimental   collaboration,   ATLAS,   at  
Duke   so   that   I   could   sit   in   during   their   meetings,   as   well   as   get   to   know   the  
physicists  and  their  epistemic  priorities.  In  the  summer  of  2010,  I  was  able  to  conduct  
a   field   visit   of   CERN   and   interviewed   a   number   of   leading   physicists   who   were  
involved   in   the   collaborations,   while   observing,   firsthand,   how   data-­‐‑taking   takes  
place  (including  the  problems  that  arise  from  data-­‐‑taking).  With  my  limited  security  
access,  I  was  able  to  tour  the  various  control  rooms  and  relevant  facilities  that  gave  
me   insight   into   how   everything   is   connected.   Later   in   Spring   2013,   I   was   able   to  
conduct  a  more  involved  interview  with  an  experimental  particle  physicist  based  at  
Duke  who   is   also  part  of   the   collaboration  of   interest   to  my   research.   I   asked  very  
specific  questions  about  work  relating   to   the  search   for  new  physics,   including   the  
continuous  work  that  is  still  being  done  since  the  announcement  of  the  discovery  of  
the  Higgs  boson,  including  the  internal  and  external  challenges  faced.      
At   the   same   time,   I   had   also   conducted   a   survey   with   a   small   group   of  
physicists   that   include   experimentalists   and   a   theorist   to   gain   insight   into   their  
attitudes  in  relation  to  the  physics  they  work  with,  specifically  in  relation  to  the  act  
of   discovery,   while   also   attempting   to   gauge   their   estimation   of   the   status   of   the  
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theoretical,  and  experimental,  models  that  shape  their  work.  I  have  also  asked  them  
questions  about   the  role  of   inter-­‐‑,   trans-­‐‑  and  cross-­‐‑disciplinarity   in  relation   to   their  
science,   that   could,   or  not,   inform   their  work.  Their   responses  have  been  useful   in  
allowing   me   to   consider   the   role   of   the   imagination   and   creative   insight   more  
specifically,   and   humanities   more   broadly,   for   informing   epistemic   attitudes,  
including   the  manner   in  which   the   scientific   epistemology   is   formulated.  The   case  
studies   and   observations   I   performed   are   supplemented   by   extensive   archival  
research  across  multiple  institutions  such  as  the  Niels  Bohr  Library,  CERN’s  internal  
library,  the  History  of  Science  Special  Collections  at  Oregon  State  University,  and  of  
course,   the  CERN  users   database   I  was   able   to   access  with   the   help   of   one   of  my  
advisors,   Professor   Mark   C   Kruse,   and   by   reason   of   my   earlier   research   visit   to  
CERN.   I   thank   Niels   Bohr   Library   and   Oregon   State   University   Library   for   their  
generous  grants-­‐‑in-­‐‑aid  that  had  allowed  me  to  do  the  necessary  archival  work.  
My   intended   readers   for   the   chapters   are   interested   physicists   (including  
particle  physicists  who  might  appreciate  a  different  than  usual  spin  on  the  subject  of  
their   study),   historians   of   physics,   philosophers   of   science,   sociologists   of   science,  
literary  scholars,  media  theorists,  and  other  science  and  technology  studies  scholars  
in   general.   As   such,  while   strenuous   attempts   have   been  made   to   ensure   that   the  
chapters   can   cater   to   the   varying   backgrounds   of   the   readership,   some   of   the  
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chapters,  especially  those  pertaining  to  the  theoretical  and  experimental  narratives  of  
the  Higgs  boson,  are  primarily  aimed  at  readers  with  more  physics  background.    
Given  the  technicality  of  the  scientific  subjects  I  am  addressing,  and  my  need  
to  do  them  proper  justice  in  order  to  provide  sufficiently  rigorous  demonstrations  in  
my  critique,  chapters  three  and  five  are  aimed  more  at  physicists  or  humanists  and  
social   scientists   who   are   used   to   engaging   with   the   hard   sciences,   particularly  
physical  sciences.  Despite  that,  other  readers  should  not  be  prevented  from  reading  
these  chapters  because  each  chapter  has  been  constructed  as  such  that  one  can  still  
understand   the   arguments   made   without   needing   full   comprehension   of   all   the  
scientific  references.    
Chapter   seven,   while   drawing   its   material   from   another   technical   area   in  
scientific  computation,  is  addressed  as  much  to  the  primary  readers  of  chapters  three  
and  five  as  to  literary  and  media  theorists  interested  in  seeing  how  the  philosophy  of  
the  science  of  Monte  Carlo  simulations  can  contribute  to  their  own  areas  of  interest,  
such   as   in   digital   theory,   theories   of   the   cinema,   and   even   critical   code   studies.  
Therefore,   even  more   pains   have   been   taken   to  make   the   chapter   as   accessible   to  
readers  with  limited  or  no  scientific  background  as  is  possible.    
As   supplementary   background   reading   to   bring   readers   with   limited  
technical   background   to   speed   with   the   science,   while   providing   the   more  
technically   savvy   reader   with   a   survey   of   the   critical   historiography   of   particle  
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physics,   I   have   included   Appendix   A   as   a   supplement   to   both   chapters   two   and  
three.  I  cannot  emphasize  enough  the  importance  of  reading  Appendix  A  to  be  able  
to   be  more   completely   immersed   in   what   I   hope   are   interesting   and   illuminating  
critical   narratives   that   demonstrate   the   capaciousness   of   the   speculative   physics   I  
have  envisioned.  
The  second  chapter,  which  is  the  ‘actual’  first  chapter  of  the  story,  targets  all  
of   the   abovementioned   readers   as   it   provides   the   intellectual   motivation   to   the  
dissertation   while   also   introducing   the   concept   of   speculative   physics.   After   an  
overview   of   the   philosophy   and   critical   theories   of   speculative   physics,   I   then  
venture  into  more  directed  examination  of  the  constitution  of  speculative  theory  and  
experiment  through  the  various  historical  examples  representing  the  development  of  
the  Standard  Model.  At  the  same  time,  I  also  demonstrate  how  ‘experimentation’  is  
performed   in   fiction   through  Alan   Lightman’s  Einstein’s   Dreams   that   entwines   the  
life  of  the  scientist  with  the  scientific  theory  he  (Einstein)  proposed.  This  is  in  itself,  a  
demonstration  to  the  argument  of  how  theory  and  experiment  are  embodied  and  not  
merely  pure   abstractions,   even   if   the   illustration   of   that   embodiment   is   in   abstract  
terms.  
The  next  five  chapters  are  then  divided  into  three  sections  (measurement  and  
interpretation,   observation,   and   modeling).   Chapters   three   and   four   take   on   the  
theme  of  measurement  and  interpretation.  Chapter  three  introduces  the  Higgs  boson  
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through  an  analytic  description  of   the  prediction  of   the  Standard  Model  by  way  of  
the   speculative   theory  explicated   in   chapter   two,  beginning   from   the  early  days  of  
the  predictions  on  the  Higgs  in  the  1960s  to  May  2014.  The  Higgs  is  a  potent  entity  
for  working  out  the  demarcation  problem  of  measurement  at   the  experimental  and  
theoretical   level,   and   some   of   the   arguments   I   intend   to   make   are   highlighted  
through  the  invocation  of  the  variants  of  the  double-­‐‑slit  experiment,  all  of  which  are  
meant   to   symbolize   the   crucial   influence   of   quantum   interpretation   over   how  
physics   is   done   even   though   this   connection   is   mostly   neglected   in   the   everyday  
grind  of  doing  physics.    
Henceforth,   in   this   chapter,   I   will   also   be   exploring   the   relevant   questions  
that   emerge   out   of   foundational   inquiries   into   quantum   theories,   as  well   as   larger  
scale   connections   between   consciousness   and   materialist-­‐‑realist   determinism   and  
indeterminism,  particularly   since   such  questions  will   emerge   in   the  novel   I  will  be  
discussing  in  the  next  chapter.  Chapter  four  takes  some  of  the  conceptual  arguments  
developed  in  chapter  three,  but  with  minimal  technical  dressing,  and  revisits  them  in  
relation  to  a  close  reading  of  Greg  Egan’s  Quarantine.  While  this  chapter  is  aimed  at  
literary   scholars   and   philosophers   of   science   who   are   curious   over   how  
interpretations  in  quantum  theory  are  modeled  in  and  through  hard  science  fiction,  
it   should   come   as   no   surprise   that   the   critical   intervention   made   involves   the  
application   of   not   only   a   continental   philosophical   understanding   of   capital   and   a  
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philosophical   understanding   of   science   fiction,   but   also   the  deployment   of   a   small  
area  in  the  philosophy  of  quantum  mechanics  to  understand  the  narrative  intent  of  
the   novel,   which   I   propose   to   be   divided   into   three   epochs   for   reasons   that   will  
become  obvious  later.  
The   theme   of   the   following   section,   covering   chapters   five   and   six,   is  
observation.  Chapter  five  continues  the  discussion  started  in  chapter  three  but  with  
focus  on  the  meaning  of  observation  in  relation  to  speculative  experiment.  Therefore,  
I  will  be  concentrating  on   the  experimental  developments   that  confirmed,  within  a  
range   of   probability,   the   discovery   of   the  Higgs   boson,   and   the   epistemic   politics  
involved.  This  is  also  the  chapter  where  I  will  be  entering  deeply  into  the  discussion  
of   the   role   of   observation   in   building   the   case   of   the  Higgs   boson,   as  well   as   the  
development   of   other   candidate   theories   such   as   supersymmetry   that   could  
supersede  the  delimitations  and  constraints  of  the  Standard  Model  Higgs  boson,  or  
prove  that  our  interpretation  of  the  Higgs  boson  is  erroneous.  I  also  explicate  on  the  
role  of  speculative  experiment  in  the  different  sub-­‐‑experiments  performed  to  obtain  
sufficient  data  for  building  a  composite  profile  of  the  Higgs  boson.    
In   chapter   six,   I   will   look   into   two   short   stories   by   physicist   and   science  
fiction  writer,  Gregory  Benford,  and  also  a   three-­‐‑part  serialized  novella  by  Richard  
and  Nancy  Carrigan,  that  were  published  by  Analog:  Fact  and  Fiction  in  the  summer  
of  1976.  This  chapter  continues  some  of   the  critical  readings  I  have  begun  with  the  
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thought   experiments   of   Quarantine   but   in   terms   of   how   theory   bridges   into  
experiment.   This   chapter   is  where   the   historical   turns   that   created   the   qualities   of  
hard  science  fiction,  as  well  as  the  ethics  and  moral  implications  of  experimental  and  
observational  practices,   are   read  with   a  mind   to  how   critical   science   studies   could  
speak   to   the   epistemic   (and   political)   problematics   generated   in   works   of   fiction.  
Moreover,  what   is   interesting  for  both  chapters  four  and  six,  when  considered  side  
by   side,   is   the   deployment   of   a   range   of   hard   science   fiction   works   to   deal   with  
abstract  ethical  issues  and  speculative  transdisciplinary  relationships  of  the  different  
sciences,  and  in  the  process,  is  able  to  amplify  some  of  the  issues  that  neither  literary  
scholars,  philosophers  of   science,  nor  physicists  have  been  able   to   find   satisfactory  
answers  to.  
Chapter   seven,  which   is   the   only   chapter   on  modeling   in   this   dissertation,  
concentrates   on   another   angle   of   speculative   physics   by   positioning   speculative  
theory  in  unison  with  speculative  experiment  through  the  cybernetic  constitution  of  
the  Monte  Carlo  method.  The  Monte  Carlo  refers  to  the  heuristics  of  simulating  the  
data   produced   by   experiments   to   obtain   approximations   for   comparisons   to  
experimental   data,   as   well   as   to   build   a   fit   between   theory   and   experiment.   The  
chapter  intends  to  demonstrate  how  the  coding  of  information,  which  extends  from  
the  actual  to  the  virtual  and  back,  is  integral  to  producing  a  composite  representation  
of  the  Higgs  boson.  The  hermeneutics  of  the  data  generated  against  that  of  the  ‘real’  
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data   are   explicated   and   discussed   throughout   the   chapter.   Simultaneously,   I  
consider  how   the  promulgation  of   the  philosophy  of  Monte  Carlo   can   also  benefit  
other   areas   of   studies   that   have   no   direct   physical   relevance   yet   share   certain  
conceptual  connections,  such  as  critical  code  studies  and  digital  media  studies.  
The   concluding   chapter   eight   brings   together   all   the   issues   that   had   been  
raised  earlier  to  explain  what  have  been,  or  not,  achieved  thus  far,  before  concluding  
with   an   evaluation   of   speculative   physics’s   contribution   to   critical   science   studies.  
After  all,  the  dissertation  aspires  to  demonstrate,  more  broadly,  how  the  two-­‐‑prong  
approach   to   knowledge,   as   represented   by   concepts   in   physics   and   science   fiction  
prototype,  parallels  the  generation  and  dissemination  of  knowledge  through  media-­‐‑
constituted  technology,  and  the  political   implications  of  such  epistemic  mediations.  
This  chapter  also  considers  the  potential  that  speculative  physics  can  make  to  critical  
science  studies.  
Finally,  Appendix  A  provides   a   critical   historical   overview  of   the   Standard  
Model  of  quantum  theory  and  particle  physics  that  are  crucial  to  helping  the  reader  
understand   the   intellectual   and   scientific   processes   that   produce   the   Higgs   boson  
while   demonstrating   how   speculative   knowledge-­‐‑construction   is   inevitable   to   the  
scientific  enterprise.  
What   you   will   find   in   the   chapters   to   come,   given   that   three   years   is   an  
insufficient  time  to  produce  a  polished  product  of  such  an  ambitious  project  that  has  
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undergone  unexpected  twists  and  turns  due  to  unforeseen  connections  that  decide  to  
emerge  beyond  the  direct  control  of  the  author,  an  experimentation  with  attempts  to  
bring   into   conversations,   knowledges   of   disparate   disciplines   that   go   beyond  
‘borrowing  from  the  disciplinary’  to  an  encounter  that  will  bring  to  head  the  limits  of  
interdisciplinary  intercourse,  the  assumptions  that  a  discipline  could  have  on  others,  
the   place   of   theoretical   interventions   in   the   process   of   the   historicization   of  
knowledge,   and   the   disruptions   to   the   neat   logics   of   flow   in   any   encounters   that  
cannot  be  reconciled  without  much  difficulties.    
Speculative  physics  is  an  epistemic  driven  medium  that  attempts  to  provide  
space  for  the  logics  and  illogics  of  such  interrogations;  however,  speculative  physics  
is  a  methodology  that  is  honest  about  its  own  interrogative  limitations  and  the  self-­‐‑
reflexivity  that  is  informed  by  the  ineluctable  precedence  of  a  priori  knowledge.  What  
this  dissertation  offers  is  not  the  beginning  of  a  book,  but  rather,  a  blueprint,  or  user  
guide,   for   producing   more   of   such   cross-­‐‑disciplinary,   inter-­‐‑learning   translations,  
ruptures,   disruptions,   and   potential   collaborations   among   other   seemingly  
incommensurable   disciplines.   At   the   same   time,   it   intends   to   demonstrate   the  
difficulties  encountered  by  humanistic  critical  theory  when  it  came  in  direct  contact  
with   physical   theories;   they   might   share   the   same   linguistic   syntaxes   but   are  
operating  under  very  different  cognitive  maps.  In  a  sense,  this  dissertation,  its  failure  
in  achieving  thorough  synthesis  and  commensurabilities,  also  demonstrates  that  the  
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true  model  of  interdisciplinary  work  across  the  sciences  and  the  humanities  have  not  
yet   been   successfully   achieved   and   that   changes   of   attitudes   from   within   the  
academy  must  first  take  place  before  any  of  such  work  can  truly  be  done.    
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The  partially  successful  philosophic  generalization  will,  if  derived  from  physics,  find  
applications  in  fields  of  experience  beyond  physics.  It  will  enlighten  observation  in  those  
remote  fields,  so  that  general  principles  can  be  discerned  as  in  process  of  illustration,  which  in  
the  absence  of  the  imaginative  generalization  are  obscured  by  their  persistent  exemplification.  
(Alfred  North  Whitehead  –  Process  and  Reality) 
2. What is Speculative Physics: Between Theory and 
Experiment 
On   July   4,   2012,   the   world   was   abuzzed   with   the   news   of   an   event   of   a  
spectacular   nature:   evidence   of   the   much-­‐‑vaunted   elementary   particle,   the   Higgs  
boson.   In   the   months   leading   to   its   imminent   discovery,   there   were   active  
speculations   about   how   this  would  unlock   the  door   to   the   secrets   of   the  universe,  
therefore   filling   the   blanks   with   details   of   how   the   different   elements   and   forces  
interact   to   form   our   universe;   we   can   finally   understand   the   properties   and  
mechanics   that   produce   certain   types   of   physical   behavior,   including   how  we   can  
interpret   the   ethics   of   life.   Such   an   understanding   can   be   deployed   to   our  
technological  and  even  moral  advantage.  Presentations  and  media  conferences  were  
given  at  CERN,  the  particle  and  nuclear  physics  facility  at  the  border  of  Switzerland  
and  France,  and  champagnes  were  popped  in  exhilaration.  
Upon   closer   examination,   one   is   struck   by   the   careful   packaging   of   the  
language  of   speculation   (in   terms  of   the  measurement,  observation,  and  modeling)  
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that  is  used  to  parlay  an  event  with  aspirations  towards  ‘recognition’  of  a  discovery  
that  resembles  the  desirable  confirmation  of  an  important  prediction.  At  the  time  of  
the   announcement,   unequivocal   confirmation   was   still   about   three   standard  
deviations  away,  placing   the  discovered  particle   some  distance   from   its   theoretical  
version.  Since  then,  physicists  have  managed  to  decrease  the  range  of  deviations  as  
more  data  are  analyzed  for  theory-­‐‑to-­‐‑experiment  fitting.  The  pronouncement  on  the  
Higgs1   discovery   involves   much   behind-­‐‑the-­‐‑scenes   intensive   analysis   through   a  
hybrid   of   related   statistical   calculus:   distributions,   Bayesian   probabilities   of  
likelihoods   and   priors,   and   frequentism.   The   physicists   hope   that   the   calculations  
and  knowledge  derived  from  this  Higgs-­‐‑like  boson  will  set  the  stage  for  a  range  of  
possibilities   that   can   later   be   extended,   extrapolated,   and   verified   for   the  
examination  of  other  still  speculative,  and  not  quite  demonstrated,  theories  in  high-­‐‑
energy  particle  physics.    
It  is  the  desire  of  this  dissertation  to  produce  an  interdisciplinary  framework  
for  tackling  the  implications  of  the  abovementioned  developments  that  have  shaped  
the   framework   of   speculative   physics,   which   could   then   be   applied   towards  
                                                                                                             
1  There  are  also  problems  raised  with  regard  to   the  nomenclature  of   this  scalar  boson  because,  as   the  
arguments  go,  to  merely  name  the  boson  Higgs  is  to  erase  the  contributions  of  others  who  had  made  its  
theoretical   prediction,   and   subsequent   discovery,   possible.   Therefore,   it   is   not   uncommon   to   see  
variations   of   the   nomenclature   in   different   high-­‐‑level   physics   textbooks   that   make   references   to  
quantum   field   theories.  While   I  will   not   be  delving   into   this   aspect   in  my  dissertation,   one   can   read  
more  about  the  history  of  naming  the  Higgs  boson  in  Sean  M  Carroll’s  Particle  at  the  End  of  the  Universe  
and  “A  Historical  Profile  of  the  Higgs  Boson”  by  Ellis  et.al.
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finessing   the   ontology   of   theory   and   experiment.   However,   such   an   attempt   will  
remain  a  work  in  progress  in  this  dissertation,  to  be  carried  forward  and  improved  
upon  (or  even  transformed)  through  further  and  other  work.  Speculative  physics  is  a  
theoretical   framework   (and   potential   methodology)   not   only   for   producing   a  
coherent  and  cohesive  epistemic  device   for   the  production  of   the   ‘new’   in  physics,  
including   the   constitution   of   what   is   the   new,   but   also   for   retheorizing   existing  
philosophical  concepts  within  the  disciplinary  matrix  of  scientific  understanding:  the  
underdetermination   of   theory,   probabilistic   thinking,   indeterminism,   stochastic  
processes,  physical   laws  (and  rules!),  as  well  as  metaphysics  and   its  connections   to  
similar  perspectives  within  philosophy,  media  theory,  and  literature.    
The   ‘new,’   in   this   instance,   refers   to   advances   in   the   standard   theory   of  
quantum   physics   that   attempt   to   account   for   various   difficulties   within   existing  
theoretical  franeworks.  The  ‘new’  also  represents  a  more  sophisticated  interpretation  
of   the   role   of   played   by   phenomena   as   our   knowledge   of   quantum   mechanical  
properties  and  its  stratum  of  action  is  consolidated  against  emergent  qualities.  These  
qualities   are   produced   from   newly   ‘materialized’   entity   (an   object/subject   with  
corporeal  quality   and  mathematical   representation)  due   to   the  act  of  discovery:   an  
observable-­‐‑made-­‐‑tangible  that  either  affirms  or  contradicts  our  previous  speculative  
predictions,  predictions  based  on  best  guesses  and  estimates  through  extrapolations  
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of  the  known,  with  margins  of  errors  that  could  be  rehabilitated  for  the  emergence  of  
the  unknown.    
But  as  Stiegler  notes,  the  achieving  of  a  synergistic  coherence  (and  unity)  that  
achieves   reciprocal   causality   is   sufficiently   unpredictable   that   one  must   anticipate  
object  limits  while  remaining  aware  that  “the  technical  object  is  more  than  the  sum  
of   the   scientific  principles   that   it   implements”   (78).   Speculative  physics,   as  we  will  
see   in   the   next   few   chapters,   intends   to   grow   a   narrative   structure   for   connecting  
between,  and  understanding,   the  meaning  of  prediction,   the  role  of  metaphysics   in  
scientific   thinking,   and   the   configurations   of   entities   at   micro-­‐‑   and  macrophysical  
scales.  
The  Standard  Model,  the  object  of  our  discussion  in  this  work,  is  an  outcome  
of  observations  in  quantum  physics  phenomena  and  materiality.  The  construction  of  
the  Model   is  mostly  ad-­‐‑hoc,  with  group   theoretical  mathematics   for  describing   the  
relationships  of  subatomic  entities;   the  theories  reveal  the  ontological  pitfalls  of  the  
model   through   its   overdetermined   dependence   on   epistemologically   derived  
descriptions.  At  the  same  time,  the  Standard  Model  also  draws  from  theories  that  are  
still  speculative,  however  convincing  the  theory’s  logic  might  be  due  to  an  ability  to  
apply  empirically  unconfirmed  theory  to  the  production  of  the  most  ingenious  and  
elegant   resolutions   to   the   puzzles   of   nature;   one   such   theory   of   note   is   the  
supersymmetry,  to  be  further  discussed  in  chapter  five.  The  Standard  Model  is  best  
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summed  up   by  Andrew  Pickering   in  The  Mangle   of   Practice  as   representing   “…the  
link   between   existing   culture   and   the   future   states   that   are   the   goals   of   scientific  
practice,  but  the  link  is  not  a  causal  or  mechanical  one:  the  choice  of  any  particular  
model  opens  up  an  indefinite  space  of  modeling  vectors,  of  different  goals”  (56).    
In   the   history   of   philosophy   and   history   of   physics,   the   reference   to  
speculative  physics  originated   in  post-­‐‑Enlightenment  natural  philosophy  interested  
in  what  went   into   the   composition  of  physical  properties.   Speculative  physics   as   a  
concept   was   first   explicitly   detailed   by   Schelling,   during   the   18th   century,   in   the  
Introduction  to  the  Outlines  of  a  System  of  Natural  Philosophy,  or  Speculative  Physics  and  
the   Internal   Organization   of   a   System   of   Science.   His   exposition   on   the   concept   of  
speculation  and  nature’s  organism  considers   the   limits  of  knowability   in   epistemic  
schema;   the   bounded   constraints   that   determine   the   degrees   of   observability   of  
nature’s  phenomena,  the  division  between  empiricism  and  theory,  and  the  reciprocal  
(though  not  always  unequivocally  determined)  differences  between  the  product  and  
productive.    
Centuries   later,  Helge  Kragh,   in  his  book  Higher  Speculations:  Grand  Theories  
and   Failed   Revolutions   in   Physics   and   Cosmology,   sees   speculation   in   physics   as  
representative  of  that  moment  when  theories  were  derived  of  assumptions  without  
empirical   legitimacy,   or   based   primarily   on   beliefs   arising   from   the   philosophical  
and   ideological   framework   that   the   scientist/theorist   subscribes   to.   Many   of   the  
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‘speculative’  forms  of  knowledge  that  Kragh  discusses  consist  of   theories  proposed  
for   the   unification   of   diremptive   and   heterogenous   epistemic   identities.   While  
readily   explaining   the   phenomenal   aesthetic   of   nature,   these   speculative   concepts  
contain  unproven  (and  often  unquantifiable)  conjectures.    
However,   Kragh   does   not   attempt   to   qualify   his   usage   of   ‘speculation’  
beyond  the  mundane;  he  merely  offers  case  histories  that,  for  him,  illustrate  the  sort  
of  theories  that  lack  empirical  evidence,  or  physics  interpretations  that  did  not  stand  
the   test   of   time,   especially   when   the   latter’s   most   ardent   supporters   fall   away.2  
Hence,   it   appears   that   speculation,   for   Kragh,   concerns   how   an   object-­‐‑theory   of  
choice   (such   as   string   theory   or   a   cosmological   theory)   can   be   subject   to   the  
interpretations   produced   from   the   epistemological   persuasions   of   the   physicist;  
aesthetics  might   trump  empirical   veracity.  Moreover,   speculation   in   this   sense   can  
include  the  deployment  of  theoretically  unwieldy  and  scientifically  ‘dubious’  ideas,  
the   latter   of   which  might   only   be   realized   in   hindsight   as   evidence   of   the   latter’s  
scientific  ‘legitimacy’  accumulates.    
However,   I   am   taking   a   more   complex   approach   to   the   motif   of   the  
speculation  in  speculative  physics,  one  that  goes  beyond  Schelling’s  conception  and  
Kragh’s  analyses.  My  conception  of   speculative  physics  overlaps  partially  with   the  
                                                                                                             
2  Some  of  these  physics  theories  and  interpretations  have  re-­‐‑emerged  in  the  latter  day,  but  in  a  form  that  
is  a  specter  of  the  historical  version.  An  example  of  such  a  case  is  the  aesthetical,  even  if  not  epistemic,  
connection  that  the  vortex  field  has  to  quantum  field  theory.  
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position  of  Gabriel  Catren’s  as  articulated  in  his  “Outland  Empire:  Prologomena  to  
Speculative  Absolutism.”  He  argues  against  subsuming  theoretical  knowledge  under  
the   ‘ruse’   of   philosophical   idealism   and   the   kind   of   overt   metaphysicalism   that  
displaces  theory  from  the  ‘real’  space  of  physics.  Therefore,  in  anchoring  speculative  
epistemology  on  material  subjects  at  the  initial  stage  of  exploration,  it  becomes  easier  
for  one  to  identify  the  primary  and  secondary  features  that  arise  from  the  becoming  
of  knowledge,  including  the  approximations  of  knowability  and  unknowability,  thus  
allowing  us   to  prioritize,  more   effectively,   the   choices   for  dealing  with   speculative  
knowledge  in  a  research  program.  
Speculative   physics   is   not   merely   about   the   lack   of   empirical   proofs   or  
material  evidence  for  verifying  theories  and  models.  Instead,  speculative  physics  can  
be  constituted  as  a  methodology  for  comparing  between  more  established  forms  of  
knowledge   that   could   then   be   destabilized   as   new   and   unexpected   information  
comes   to   light.   In   other   words,   knowledge   that   is   validated   through   long-­‐‑term  
application  can  still  undergo  epistemic   transformation  because  of   the  shifts  needed  
to  accommodate  new  information  as  they  arise.    
For   example,   the   raw   and   unreconstructed   data   from   the   Large   Hadron  
Collider  (LHC)  detectors  are  rebuilt  with  the  aid  of  algorithms  constructed  out  of  the  
best  epistemic  understanding  of  the  scientific  knowledge.  The  raw  datum  (ontology)  
is  what   it   is,  but  our   interpretation  of   it  changes  as  our  attitudes  with  regard  to   its  
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potential   changes   (epistemology).   One   has   to   understand   the   difference   between  
ontology  (the  being  or  a  priori  constitution  of  the  most  foundational  structure)  and  
epistemology   (represented  here   as   a   theory  of  knowledge  and  a  way  of  knowing).  
The   piling   of   epistemology   onto   ontology   activates   speculation   because   ontology  
cannot  be  directly  measured  and  observed.  The  problem  of  direct  measurability  has  
also   afflicted   quantum  mechanics   as   the   latter   depends   on   apparatuses   shaped   by  
classical  physics  to  achieve  macro-­‐‑observability.  
Speculative  physics  takes  up  the  argument  that   the  physical  sciences  can  be  
ontologically   complete   (because   the   latter’s   ontology  persists   independently   of   the  
knowledge  producer)  while   remaining   epistemologically   imperfect   (because   access  
to   epistemology   is   dependent   on   the   state   of   relationship   between   the   knowledge  
and   the   knowledge   producer).   Speculative   physics   recognizes   imperfection   in   the  
construction   of   facts   because   observers   cannot   attain   perfect/complete   scientific  
knowledge   (epistemology)  with   phenomenological   certainty   (phenomenological   in  
the   Husserlian   sense   of   thought-­‐‑experiences   and   logical   judgment   whence   pure  
intuition  is  derived).  The  process  of  knowledge  acquisition  is  always  at  the  point  of  
becoming   and   striving  unto   completion,   but   never   attaining   an   endpoint   since   the  
certainty  of  a  finale  presupposes  omniscience.    
Speculative  physics  can  be  constituted  as  a  paradigm  that  cannot  be  definitely  
concluded.   To   be   open   to   speculative   physics   is   to   be  willing   to   disown  what  we  
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thought  we  knew,   and  be  open   to   the   implausible,   including   implausibility   that   is  
the   product   of   epistemic   rupture   between   theory   and   experiment.   It   also   means  
reconstituting   the   idea   of   prediction   as   narrating   the   delimitations   of   a   boundary  
whence  an  event  can  take  place  while  remaining  attentive  to  potential  singularities,  
singularity   as   representing   poles   of   exceptions,   failures,   and   the   unspeakable.  
Metaphysics,  on  the  other  hand,  is  read  as  the  modeling  of  cause-­‐‑and-­‐‑effect  between  
the  states  of  the  imaginary  (also  the  fictive)  and  the  material  real  that  also  includes  
queries  into  the  role  of  physical  laws  involved  in  inscribing  a  physical  system.  
A  perfect  case  study  of   the  unequal   relationship  between  epistemology  and  
ontology  is   the   ‘paradox’  of  wave-­‐‑particle  duality   in  a  double-­‐‑slit  experiment,  with  
the  paradox  as  representative  outcome  connected  to  the  materiality  of  the  atom.  An  
intuitive  way  to  think  about  the  ‘form’  constituting  subatomic  particles  would  be  to  
imagine  tiny  ball  bearings.  In  reality,  the  concept  of  the  particle  is  way  more  complex  
than  what   a   ball-­‐‑bearing  model   can   represent,   and   this   is   amply  demonstrated   by  
experiment.   Additionally,   conceptualizing   subatomic   particles   as   ball   bearings   is  
merely   a   method   for   describing   the   properties   that   differentiates   between   the  
microscopic   and   macroscopic.   This   method   attempts   to   fit   the   determinacy   of  
Galilean/Newtonian  physics  into  an  indeterminate  and  uncertain  quantum  world.3  
                                                                                                             
3  Quantum  mechanics  may   have   an   ontological   continuum  with   classical  mechanics,  mathematically  
speaking,  because  of  the  porting  over  of  mathematical  functions  (operators,  complex  numbers,  vectors,  
and  scalars)  used  in  the  practice  of  classical  mechanics  onto  the  mathematical  physics  of  the  quantum  as  
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During  the  double-­‐‑slit  experiment,  a  beam  of  electrons  is  directed  through  two  
narrow  slits  onto  a  screen,  producing  patterns  of  intensities.  At  the  same  time,  these  
patterns  also  produce  variations  of  ordered   intensity,  a   fringe  of   light  and  shadow  
that   could   only   be   explained   by   considering   interferences   as   containing  wave-­‐‑like  
properties.  Paradoxically,  the  wave-­‐‑particle  duality  problem  might  not  have  existed  
if   an   observer   attempting   to   formulate   a  measurement   of   the   experimental   system  
has  been  able  to  access  all  of  the  variables  involved  at  the  same  time.  However,  this  
is   made   impossible   because   of   the   constraints   imposed   by   the   Heisenberg’s  
Uncertainty  Principle,  which  states   that   the  position  and  momentum  of  a  quantum  
level   object   cannot   be   simultaneously   known   due   to   the   probabilistic   spread   in  
uncertainty.   The   principle   points   to   an   equivalence   between   the   waves   and   the  
particles  given  that  they  share  similar  representations  in  equations  and  are  derived  
from  a  single  source;  additionally,  there  are  also  constraints  in  the  linguistic  medium  
used  to  describe  physical  indeterminism.  The  descriptive  constraints  are  the  outcome  
of   applying   a   verbal   style   of   communication   that   is   linearly   progressive   and  
determininistic  to  embody  non-­‐‑linear  and  non-­‐‑causal,  indeterministic  epistemics.    
                                                                                                             
  
a   result   of   their   shared   ontology   in   kinematics,   dynamics,   and   statics.  An   example   of   such   practices  
would   be   in   the   use   of   the   Lagrangian   and   Hamiltonians,   in   going   from   ordinary   to   relativistic  
quantum  mechanics.  
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The   double-­‐‑slit   experiment   is   a   rich   demonstration   of   the   importance   of  
fictive   modeling   for   apprehending   the   incomprehensible.   The   narration   that  
embodies  the  analytics  of  the  experiment  parallels  the  story-­‐‑building  world  of  fiction  
because   of   how   the   tweaking   of   initial   parameters   could   change   the   potential  
outcomes;   the   outcomes   that   emerge   are   probabilistically   represented   and   open   to  
different   strategies   of   informational,   and   therefore   plot,   distribution   and   sub-­‐‑
narratives.  Moreover,  the  theoretical  models  of  physics  and  fiction  occupy  the  same  
state   of   the   imaginary   as   that   of   speculative   physics:   their   different   imaginaries  
super-­‐‑positioned   and   superimposed   upon   each   other   produce   an   interference   of  
individual   events.   Fiction   occupies   the   space   where   physical   and   cognitive  
dissonance   and   estrangement   can   merge.   The   fictional   space,   which   can   oscillate  
between  high  literary  value  and  the  poetics  of  the  mundane,  is  built  to  be  receptive  
of  speculative  practices.    
  Another   good   example   of   epistemology’s   uncertain   relation   to   ontology   is  
gravity.   Gravity,   despite   the   existence   of   a   variety   of   ways   for   quantifying   and  
calculating   its  presence,   and   the  best   efforts   of   scientists   from  Newton   to  Einstein,  
remains   very   much   a   mystery.   While   General   Relativity   is   successful   in  
demonstrating  all  the  properties  of  gravity  known  in  classical  physics,  what  works  in  
classical   physics   does   not   fare   as   well   in   quantum   theory   despite   the   efforts   of  
Matvei   Bronstein   and   other   physicists   studying   the   potential   in   quantum   gravity.  
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Physicists   have   yet   to   succeed   in   making   direct   correlations   between   gravity   and  
quantum  mechanics,   or   to   conclude   with   certainty   as   to   whether   they   would   (or  
should)  be  able  to  do  so,  thereby  rendering  existing  models  of  gravity  on  the  side  of  
speculative  even  when  there  is  no  question  of  gravity’s  technological  utility.  In  other  
words,  the  Standard  model  of  quantum  physics,  as  it  stands,  is  unable  to  provide  the  
framework  for  integrating  gravity.    
The  story  of  gravity  parallels  the  story  of  the  Higgs  boson  up  to  2012,  when  
commensuration   between   theory   and   experiment   was   realized   for   the   latter.  
However,   the  main  difference   is   that   the  situation  of   the  Higgs  boson   is   resolvable  
within  the  scales  of  electromagnetic,  weak,  and  strong  interactions  that  are  referred  
to   as   the   gauge   interactions   of   the   Standard   Model.   All   of   these   interactions   are  
further  described  in  Appendix  A.  
My  specification  of  speculative  physics  is  an  attempt  at  locating  the  point  of  
speculation   through   the   locus   of   interpretive   practices   that   go   hand   in   hand  with  
demonstration   through   a   plethora   of   data;   speculative   physics   is   situated   at   the  
cutting-­‐‑edge   of   theory   construction   and   experiments   in   quantum   theory,   and   on  
unstable  ground  due  to  the  continuous  coupling  and  decoupling  of  knowledge  and  
concepts,  with  unions  made,  unmade,  and  remade  with  each  new  insight,  discovery,  
and  more  developed  mathematical   formulation.  Speculative  physics  wends   its  way  
around   unfamiliar   ground   with   the   goal   of   breaking   out   from   the   shackles   of  
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epistemic  comfort,  bringing  about  revisions  to  one’s  scientific  presuppositions  while  
maintaining  logical  rigor.    
By   being   attentive   to   how   knowledge   is   always   at   that   point   of   becoming,  
what  appears  factual  can  be  dissolved,  reversed,  and  then  re-­‐‑produced  as  a  leap  into  
the  ontological,  as  Peter  Gaffney  notes  in  his  introduction  to  The  Force  of  the  Virtual:  
Deleuze,   Science   and   Philosophy.   This   comes   about   through   the   making   of   new  
judgment  as  attendant  comprehension  increases.  Gaffney  goes  on  to  add,  in  the  same  
manner  of  argument  I  made  in  the  preceding  paragraph,  that  science  does  not  escape  
the   logic   of   becoming   because   its   object   is   not   a   static   world,   but   one   always  
undergoing  qualitative  change  (6-­‐‑7).  The  laws  in  physics  are  not  separable  from  the  
epistemology  governing  the  physics,  and  in  fact,  enable  the  categorical  schemes  that  
allow  the  classification  of  physics  objects  and  interactions.    
While  there  are  correlations  between  speculative  physics  and  the  concept  of  
mangle  of  practice  advanced  by  Pickering,  I  insist  on  the  importance  of  emphasizing  
the   epistemic   distinction   between   theory   and   experiment   that   I   do   not   think  
Pickering   recognizes,   even   if   I   share   in   his   principle   of   accommodation   and  
resistance   as   the   dialectic   of   interactions   between  material   and   human   agency.   In  
fact,  this  interaction  between  theory  and  experiment,  which  is  taken  to  another  level  
by   Karen   Barad   in   Meeting   the   Universe   Halfway:   Quantum   Physics   and   the  
Entanglement   of   Matter   and   Meaning   through   her   invocation   of   the   inseparable  
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relationship  between  the  real  and  agential,  is  intrinsic  to  the  discourse  of  speculative  
physics   since   the   interaction   involves   the   narration   of   fact-­‐‑building   that   can   be  
altered  and  dismantled  through  the  dialectical  relationship  between  the  material  and  
their  human  tinkerers.  
A  theory,  as  it  stands,  is  always  partial  in  the  perspective  it  inscribes.  This  has  
to  do  with  the  fictitiousness  of  theories,  theories  that  represent  an  extended  narration  
of   models   built   from   a   physical   phenomenon   that   may   exclude   other   existing  
elements   not   already   part   of   an   advancing   body   of   theorems,   laws,   or   principles.  
According   to   Collins   and   Pinch   in   The   Golem,   there   is   a   need   to   understand   the  
different   strands   of   thinking   and   configurations   that   go   into   the   constructions   of  
theories   and   experiments   for   the   manifestation   of   certain   properties.   The   authors  
were  looking  to  examples  across  the  physical  and  biological  sciences,  and  discussed  
what  were  presumed  to  be  controversial  aspects  of  all  the  experiments  examined  (in  
the  case  of  physics,  examples  such  as  relativity,  cold  fusion,  gravitational  waves,  and  
solar  neutrinos  are  used  as   illustrations),   the  stakes   involved,   the  players  and   their  
standing  in  the  scientific  community,  and  the  flaws  in  the  results  of  the  experiments.    
Nevertheless,  given  that  the  demarcation  of  our  knowledge  is  imperfect,  the  
outcome   of   the   experiment   is   also   imperfect.   The   experiment   may   embody   a  
constrained   access   to   ontology,   with   whatever   data   present,   subject   to   constant  
denaturing   and   reconstruction.   The   scientific   method   does   not   determine   what  
  37  
should  be  the  object  of  an  investigation.  Instead,  the  choice  is  for  the  investigator  to  
make  a  compelling  case  for  further  scientific  exploration.  
By   the   premise   of  The   Golem,   the   theoretical   foundation   of   the   science   can  
only  be  as  complete  as  the  observables  and  measurables  that  go  into  the  construction  
of  the  science,  if  only  because  the  foundation  is  built  of  knowledge  that  has  achieved  
a   measure   of   recognition,   is   somewhat   established,   and   experimentally   verified.  
Anything   that   lies   outside   the   measurable   is   undetectable,   and   therefore  
epistemically  void.    
On  the  other  hand,  in  the  area  where  the  detection  of  the  material  evidence  is  
possible,  the  testing  of  various  ‘strands’  of  the  theories,  such  as  the  different  forms  of  
experimental   confirmation,   falsification,   and   re-­‐‑testing   are   what   contribute   to   the  
“strong   rope”   of   epistemic   coherence.   The   data   is   there   but   our   interpretation   is  
represented  by  what  we  can  perceive  from  the  data.  Even  our  experimental  controls,  
such   as   data   produced   through   parameterized   simulations   (the   Monte   Carlo),  
operate   through   the   extrapolations   and   interpolations   provided   by   the   scientists.    
This   is  where   I   suggest   the   reconfiguration   of   the   role   (and   capability)   of   existing  
experimental  practices  through  more  speculative  interrogation.  
For   instance,   let   us   consider   a   high-­‐‑energy   physics   experiment,   ATLAS   (A  
Toroidal   LHC   Apparatus).   A   slight   variation   in   the   apparatus,   such   as   in   its  
detecting  sensitivity,  can  make  a  difference  in  the  instrument’s  ability  to  measure  the  
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different   striations   and   demarcations   of   a   physical   phenomenon.   Therefore,   the  
sensitivity  of  the  detector  plays  a  role  in  obtaining  or  obviating  the  epistemological  
(though  not   the  ontological)  existence  of  a  physical  entity   through  the  collection  of  
measurable  and  observable  evidence.4  The  data  could  later  be  used  for  defining  the  
parameters   of   a   simulation   used   as   comparative   control   and   for   generating  
theoretical   predictions   that   can   be   reconfigured   again   after   further   analysis.   The  
detector,  indirectly,  becomes  the  source  that  would  influence  the  decision  to  be  made  
with   regard   to   the   aspects   or   segments   of   the   data   chosen   for   further   review.   The  
CMS   (Compact  Muon   Solenoid)   experiment,   a   direct   counterpart   to  ATLAS,   has   a  
similar  setup  and  goal,  but  with  some  differences  in  the  design  of  the  sub-­‐‑detectors,  
thereby   producing   variations   in   how   data   selections   are   procured   at   the   point   of  
collection.    
Each  of  these  experiments  takes  a  different  strand  of  the  data,  with  the  sub-­‐‑
strands   representing   the   cross-­‐‑sections   being   analyzed.   From   these   factors,   the  
different  cross-­‐‑sections  of  a  collision  are  determined  by  analyzing  the  data  collected  
through   the   different   channels   enabled   by   a  multitude   of   sub-­‐‑detector   trackers   in  
each  of   the   experiment’s  detectors.  Cross   checking  between   these   two  experiments  
                                                                                                             
4   In   a   quantum   system,   observables   are   not   necessarily   measurable   if   we   intend   to   constrain   the  
measurement  to  the  parameters  of  a  particular  framework  that  may  not  be  able  to  articulate  the  range  of  
properties  required  for  the  measurement  of  a  particular  event,  or  to  produce  quantization  of  the  event.  
Gravity  has  been  articulated  as  just  such  a  case  in  the  Standard  Model  of  particle  physics.  
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produces  a  more  ‘complete’  picture  of  the  same  events  that  were  initially  measured  
individually.      All   the   different   ‘live’   and   simulated   data   analyzed   would   then  
converge  to  create  the  metaphorical  ‘strong’  rope  referred  to  by  Collins  and  Pinch.    
At   the   other   end   of   the   ‘experimentation’   spectrum,   in   specialized   fiction  
genres   such   as   science   fiction,   are   conflicting   views   of   how   far   one   can   push  
experimental  boundaries,  and  if  the  process  of  estrangement  itself  should  not  deplete  
the   constraints   of   natural   logic,   as   is   found   in   the   opinion   pieces/essays   of   hard  
science   fiction   journals   such   as  Analog   Science   Fiction   and   Fact   and   the   book   Time  
Machines:   Time   Travel   in   Physics,   Metaphysics,   and   Science   Fiction   by   Paul   J   Nahin,  
regardless  of   the  amount  of  defamiliarization   the  writer  employs.  Therefore,   if  one  
desires   to   produce   a   series   of   speculations   (or   forecasts)   that   approximate   most  
plausibly   what   can   happen   in   the   future   as   long   as   certain   conditions   are   met,  
whatever   the   level   of   difficulties   one   encounters   in   meeting   those   parameters,  
science   fiction,   in  whatever  medium  or   form   it   takes,   is   the   engine   for   speculating  
about  science.    
I  argue  for  the  importance  of  considering  speculative  theory  as  separate  from  
speculative   experiment.   While   speculative   theory   can   be   the   point   of   origin   for  
theories,   conjectures,   and   lawful   (or   law-­‐‑like)5   explanations   to  develop,   speculative  
                                                                                                             
5   In   Laws   of   Nature:   Essays   on   the   Philosophical,   Scientific,   and   Historical   Dimensions,   edited   by   Friedel  
Weinert,  he  provides  a  comprehensive  introduction  to  how  one  would  classify  laws,  such  as  real  laws  
and   ‘pseudo’   laws,  demarcating   the   ‘lawful’  as   representing   true  natures  of   laws  and   the   ‘lawlike’  as  
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experiment  focuses  on  the  negotiation  of  a  predictive  theory,  regardless  of  the  formal  
outcome,  while  building  on  experiment-­‐‑based  theorization  that  brings  about  its  own  
set  of  predictions.  The  Higgs  boson  of  the  Standard  Model  that  supposedly  provides  
the  verification  needed   for   the  validity   and   justification  of   the  model   catalyzes   the  
relationship   between   speculative   theory   and   speculative   experiment   so   that   these  
critical  methodologies  can  converge  to  a  richer  description  of  speculative  physics.6    
However,   to   speak   of   speculative   physics   in   generality  without   accounting  
for   the   differences   one   can   find   in   theory   and   experiment  would   be   to   ignore   the  
important  factors  permeating  their  differences,  including  the  necessity  of  describing  
the   methodology   of   speculative   physics   from   the   individual   frameworks   of  
speculative   theory   and   speculative   experiment   in   order   to   produce   a   complete  
picture   of   the   role   of   speculative   physics   for   elucidating   the   subjects   discussed,   as  
well   as   the   goals   of   trans/interdisciplinary   thinking,   for   rigorous   interpolations  
between   the   humanities   and   the   sciences.   The   next   sections   will   build   on   what  
                                                                                                             
  
having   the   appearance   of   exemplifying   the   essence   of   nature   but   are   merely   manifesting   certain  
‘accidental’  qualities  in  a  regular  fashion,  a  form  of  ‘pseudo-­‐‑law.’  
6  For  a  comprehensive  and  concise  historical,  and  scientific,  overview  of  the  Standard  Model,  interested  
readers   are   encouraged   to   read   Appendix   A.  While   I   will   reference   relevant   details   concerning   the  
elementary  particles  of  the  Standard  Model  throughout  the  dissertation,  I  will  not  delve  too  deeply  into  
their   backgrounds   as   I   intend   to   let   the   ensuing   critical   arguments   illustrate   the   relevant   physics.  
Appendix  A  contains  all  the  technical  information  underlying  this  work  and  should  provide  adequate  
background  information  to  the  reader.  
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speculative   theory   and   speculative   experiment   are   about.   Then,   we   will   consider  
how   the   conceptual   thinking   behind   speculative   experiment   is   applicable   to  
speculative  science  fiction.    
Recently,   I   conducted   a   survey  with   a   small   posse   of   particle   physicists   to  
assess  their  relationship  to  the  Standard  Model  through  questions  on  the  unification  
of  forces,  potentials  beyond  the  Standard  Model,  and  the  influence  of  external  push-­‐‑
factors  on  their  work  with  physics.  Most  importantly,  the  purpose  of  the  survey  is  to  
venture   into   their   cognitive   space   and   understand   better   how   they   think   about  
concepts  such  as  precision  and  ambiguity,  certainty  and  uncertainty,  potentiality  and  
constraints,  theory  and  experiment;  as  well  as  the  language  used  to  articulate  these  
dichotomous   continuum;   bringing   about   investigations   into   the   sociology,   history,  
and   philosophy   of   physics   that   unveil   the   nature   of   knowledge-­‐‑construction.      I  
include  summarized  analyses  of  responses  that  are  relevant  to  the  discussion  in  this  
dissertation.  
Foremost,   language   is   very   important   to   a   physicist   as   it   marks   the   main  
differences   between   new   age   spiel   and   scientific   rigor.   Physicists   are   particularly  
insistent   that   the   choice   of   descriptors   used   to   portray   their   thinking   and   work  
should  present  a  physics  that  is  delimited  by  the  scientific  method:  a  euphemism  for  
taming   unruly   and   capricious  Nature.   Just   as   we   need   rules   and   routines   to   give  
sufficient   calm   and   order   to   an   otherwise   frenetic   life,   physicists   need   to   have   the  
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right   language   to   organize   the   data   they   collect,   and   to   work   out   the   expanse   of  
uncertainty  in  relation  to  what   is  known.  They  want  precision  in  the  terms  used  to  
deal   with   the   malleability   and   ever-­‐‑changeability   of   knowledge   at   the   frontier.  
Moreover,   they  do  not   like   to  be  perceived  as   ideologues,  and  are   thus  ambivalent  
over  the  use  of  words  such  as  “belief.”    For  at  least  one  of  the  respondents,  “belief”  
has  a  connotation  of  “faith”  rather  than  “fact.”    
When  queried  about   the   range  of   speculative  contingencies,   for  most  of   the  
physicists,   the   speculative  aspects  of  any  part  of  a  knowledge  merely   illustrate   the  
need  for  more  direct  evidence  to  justify  the  available  theories,  including  corrections  
that  are   to  be  added  to  the  original   theories   for  closer  approximation  to   ‘real’  data.    
The  accounts  of  the  speculative,  and  the  multiple  experimental  triggers  that  are  the  
outcome   of   significant   choices,   are   all  wrapped   around   the   symbolic   signification,  
and   delimitations,   produced   by   telling   the   story   of   the   particles   of   the   Standard  
Model   through   abstract   algebra   and   algebraic   geometry   (group   theory   included):  
what  mathematical   terms  get  extended  and  what  get  dropped  whenever  physicists  
consider  what  it  is  to  move  ‘beyond’  the  Standard  Model.  Even  the  new  physics  they  
envision   is   shaped   by   the   status   of   the  mathematics   deployed   for   representational  
purposes,   including   the   implementation   of   particular   mathematical   subfields   for  
resolving  long-­‐‑standing  paradoxes  or  unresolved  cul-­‐‑de-­‐‑sacs.    
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Additionally,   physicists   are   not   always   the   most   united   when   it   comes   to  
believing  in  what  is  possible  among  the  not-­‐‑yet-­‐‑existing,  even  if  they  might  possess  
the   same   basic   knowledge   of   their   fields.   This   lack   of   unity   can   be   attributed   to  
differences   in   how   rules   and   laws   are   applied   to   solve   a   problem   (and  we   know  
solutions   to   the   same   problems   are   far   from   homogenous),   and   how   one   thinks  
philosophically  about  the  problem.  For  example,  when  asked  about  the  meaning  of  
subjectivity,  one  gets  answers  ranging  from  interpretational  preferences,  expectation  
biases,  forms  of  contextualization,  to  the  method  of  decision-­‐‑making;  all  governed  by  
external   factors   other   than   the   science.   Seldom  do   the  physicists   consider   the  data  
they  work  with  as  inherently  subjective  (even  if  the  constitution  of  the  data  itself  is  
not)   despite   the   preference   for   the   logic   of   one  model   over   that   of   another   due   to  
myriad  circumstances  that  are  not  usually  logically  linear.  
But,   in   the   case   of   objectivity,  most   of   the   answers   appear   standard   on   the  
surface  until   one  digs  deeper;   then,   one   finds   responses   such   as   the   application  of  
clear  and  inclusive  criteria  to  the  acceptance  or  rejection  of  data  before  applying  that  
same  data  to  the  testing  of  a  hypothesis,   the  repeatability  (or  as  some  philosophers  
would   say,   the   cycle   of   falsification   and   justification)   and   duplication   of   that  
experiment,   as   well   as   the   exclusion   of   bias   in   the   decision-­‐‑making   process.   The  
attainment  of  objectivity  is  a  recursive  move  for  the  first  two  instances,  even  if  their  
starting  points  can  have  a  range  of  subjective  possibilities.  As  for  the  third  instance,  
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one   finds   that   there   is   no   clear  way   for  measuring   bias   other   than   by   tracing   the  
entire  process   from  hypothesis   to   the   final   interpretation  of  analysis.  However  one  
might  reason,  bias  does  not  cease  to  exist  even  after  an  experimental  fit  to  theory,  nor  
after  an  experimental  setup  is  found  to  be  replicable.    
Finally,   there   are   the  different   backgrounds   and   trainings   of   the   physicists,  
boiling   down   to   whether   they   are   experimentalists,   theoreticians,   or  
phenomenologists  (the  latter  third  being  the  group  bridging  the  divide  between  the  
first   two   groups).   While   they   emphasize   the   importance   of   locating   empirical  
evidence   to  support  whatever  predictive   theories   there  are,   they  do  not  necessarily  
have   the   same   level   of   investment   when   dealing   with   more   speculative   forms   of  
physical   theories.  While   a   theorist   is  more  willing   to  wait   until   the   boundaries   of  
knowledge   broaden   while   continuing   to   work   on   theories   that   have   not   yet  
demonstrated   experimental   promise,   experimentalists   tend   to   be   more   skeptical,  
even   if   not   necessarily  dismissive,   because   of   the  need   for   attention   to   expediency  
and  practicability  in  order  to  succeed  in  everyday  science.  However,  both  sides  agree  
that  experimentalists  and  theoreticians  are  able  to  find  middle  ground  to  work  from.7    
                                                                                                             
7  As  the  initial  survey  done  is  merely  a  test  in  preparation  for  an  actual  field-­‐‑survey  to  be  performed  as  
a  postdoctoral  project,  I  will  not  be  including  the  former  as  a  material  reference  in  this  dissertation.    
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2.1 Speculative Theory 
Before   going   further,   I   need   to   clarify   the   crucial   differences   between  
speculative   theory   and   other   theories   that   appear   similar,   on   the   surface.   Firstly,  
speculative  theory  is  more  than  a  hypothesis,  with  the  latter  based  on  the  idea  that  
theory-­‐‑induced  predictions  are  made  of   axioms   that   combine  established   facts   and  
theoretical   presuppositions.   Even   if   a   speculative   theory   has   begun   life   as   a  
hypothesis,  it  will  later  develop  a  more  extensive  narrative  life,  and  a  more  complex  
explicatory   model,   for   constructing   mechanisms   that   can   produce   scientifically  
causal  explanations  about   the  spatio-­‐‑temporal  structure  of   the  model.  Moreover,   in  
speculative  theory,  alternatives  to  available  explanations  are  considered  so  that  one  
is  not  fixated  on  a  single  hypothetical  problem.  The  best  way  to  sum  up  the  meaning  
of   hypothesis   in   relation   to   speculative   theory   would   to   think   of   the   level   of  
convolutedness   (or   messiness)   that   each   is   expected   the   hold,   with   speculative  
theory  being  more  complexly  constructed.  
A  hypothesis  may   be   falsified   after   different   attempts   have  proven   it   to   be  
impossible  or  unverifiable.  Or,  a  hypothesis  can  become  a  speculative  theory  after  a  
series   of   examples   either   falsify   or   justify   the   former   due   to   either   the   theory’s  
underdetermination   or   evident   potential   for   connecting   to   other   established   or  
equally   speculative   theories.   However,   the   underlying   ontology   of   a   speculative  
theory   is   not  materially   reconfigured.   In   speculative   theory,   the   reconfiguration   of  
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epistemology  means  getting,  as  close  to  ontology  as  possible,  and  for  getting  to  the  
bottom  of  theoretical  proofs  within  existing  frameworks  while  keeping  in  mind  that  
serendipity   can   open   doors   to   the   unexpected.   ‘Exotic’   predictive  models   such   as  
string   theory,   the   supersymmetry,   and   dark   matter   are   examples   of   actors   in  
speculative   theory   with   attributes   that   can   only   be   partially   explained   within   the  
currently  knowable  while  waiting   for   the   emergence  of  paradigms   that   can   finally  
unveil  what  was  hidden.  The  abovementioned  exotic  candidates  have  origin  stories  
similar   to   that   of   Higgs   boson,   only   that   the   latter’s   narrative   is   more   developed  
despite   containing   degrees   of   indeterminacy.   Nonetheless,   each   of   them   occupies  
different  levels  of  relationality,  and  narrative  depth,  within  speculative  theory.    
Speculative   theory   can   be   viewed   as   a   stage   ready-­‐‑made   with   props   and  
designs,  and  cast  members  waiting  at  the  wings  to  make  their  way  center-­‐‑stage.  The  
stage   is   set   to   perform   the   script   even   when   the   plot   does   not   appear   to   be  
progressing  linearly.  But  such  is  the  nature  of  speculative  theory:  the  narrative  of  the  
subjects  and  objects  are  reconfigured,  with  roles  switched  around,  and  original  cast  
members   and   props   (differently   predicted   features   of   a   theory)   potentially  
eliminated   or   substituted.   For   a   hypothesis,   the   plot   is   underdeveloped   without  
identifiable   protagonists   (or   antagonists).   There   is   a   greater   degree   of   similarity  
between  speculative   theory  and  underdetermined  theory,  whereas   the  difference   is  
related  to  speculative  theory’s  strong  connection  to  the  uncanny  and  the  unfamiliar  
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(with   a  will   towards   defamiliarization)   that   an   underdetermined8   theory   does   not  
possess,   because   the   latter   mostly   represents   that   point   of   explicit   connection  
between  physical  cause  and  effect.    
Speculative   theory   differs   from   an   underdetermined   theory   because   the  
former  is  less  about  the  uncertainty  of  correlation  between  cause  and  effect;  rather  it  
is  about  linking  cause-­‐‑and-­‐‑effect  with  epistemically  malleable  ‘placeholders’  that  can  
temporarily   hold   hidden   variables   as   the   latter’s   level   of   significance   to   the  
epistemology  is  assessed.    Nevertheless,  an  elegant  universal  theory  to  explain  away  
the   physical   paradoxes   is   not   yet   attainable   given   that   there   is   no   open   access   to  
ontology.    
Above   and   beyond   the   concept   of   underdetermination,   speculative   theory  
overlaps   into  speculative  model  even  when  the   former  exceeds   the   latter;  one  does  
not   prove   definitively   the   success   or   failure   of   a   theory   until   better   alternatives  
embodying   the   successes   while   also   accounting   for   the   failures   are   unequivocally  
demonstrated.   The   epistemics   of   the   Standard   Model   is   such   that   it   interleaves  
between  underdetermined  theory  and  speculative  theory.  Regardless  of  the  current  
                                                                                                             
8  In  the  theory  of  underdetermination,  it  is  suggested  that  the  evidence  available  to  us  with  regard  to  the  
verification  and  proof  of  any  scientific  theory  cannot  provide  sufficient  answers  to  the  scientific  beliefs  
that  we  should  adhere  to.  Pierre  Duhem,  a  French  physicist  and  philosopher,  and  W.V.O.  Quine,  one  of  
the  philosophers   from   the  Vienna  Circle,   had  been   the  pioneers   of   the  work  done   in   this   area.   For   a  
general   overview,   check   out   the   entry   at   the   Stanford   Encyclopedia   of   Philosophy  
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-­‐‑underdetermination/>.    
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state   of   the   model’s   causal   ontology,   there   is   sufficient   evidence   to   assure   the  
physicists  that  the  model  is  formulating  some  sort  of  prediction.  
Speculative   theory   can   be   developed   to   a   level   that   is   able   to   provide  
contingent   explanations   to   observable   phenomena   or   objects   with   indeterminate  
provenance,   at   least   until   further   evidence   emerges   to   provide   more   extensive  
explication  of  the  objects.  Even  experimental  verification  can  only  be  partial  because  
the   development   of   a   new   paradigm   to   account   for   the   inexplicable   takes   time   to  
surface,   and   existing   technologies   are   limited   in   their   capacity   for   producing  
conclusive   demonstrations.   Above   all,   the   resilience   of   speculative   theory   is   not  
dependent  on  a  single  or  a  series  of  ‘short-­‐‑lived’  experimental  proofs,  as  resilience  is  
determined   by   how   long   a   theory   remains   as   the   best   explanation   for   a   particular  
event  or  phenomena.    
However,   one  has   to  be   aware   that   resilience   is  not   the   same  as   stability;   a  
theory   can   be   resilient   while   unstable   at   the   same   time,   which   is   the   underlying  
premise  of   speculation.  To  draw  again   from   the   example  of   the  Standard  Model,   I  
argue   for   the   importance   of   resiliency   in   the  model   for   predicting   the   existence   of  
particles  that  can  later  be  verified  empirically  despite  the  lack  of  ontological  clarity,  
and   that   the   recovery   of   initially   undetectable   physical   clues   will   destabilize   its  
dominant   epistemological   structure.   In   other   words,   the  model   should   be   flexible  
enough  to  accommodate  major  revisions  should  new  discoveries  render  the  current  
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model  too  messy  and  complicated.  We  can  think  of  a  model  as  theory  in  the  making  
that  has  not  been  pushed  to  the  maximum  of  its  descriptive  powers.  
I  have  discussed  the  double-­‐‑slit  experiment  and  the  paradox  that  is  exposed  
in   terms   of   the   ontological   framework   of   theorizations   when   making   the   choice  
between   a   field   and   particle   for   representing   quantum   events.   The   preference   for  
either  framework  can  inform  the  perception  on  the  paradox  of  wave-­‐‑particle  duality,  
as  well   as   foreground   the   phenomenological   and   hyletic   events   that   implicate   the  
choice.9  The  decision  will  impact  the  measurement  of  objects  being  theorized;  either  
way,   there   would   still   be   common   factors   that   connect   them   even   if   each   of   the  
factors   follow  different   paths   depending   on   how   their   interpretive   preferences   are  
shaped.   Each   path   converges   into   a   composite   representation   of   the   factish   (an  
extension   to   the   definition   of   the   ‘factual’   developed   by   Stengers   that   exists  
autonomously   regardless   of   the   changes   in   its   externalities   because   the   factish  
departs  from  the  concept  of  facts  being  never  absolute;  in  a  manner  of  speaking  it  is  
                                                                                                             
9  Here,  I  am  taking  from  Husserlian  phenomenology  that  posits  structures  of  consciousness  stemming  
from   the   sense   perception   and   intentionality   of   the   first-­‐‑person   observer.  As  Husserl   himself   puts   it  
most   succinctly   in   The   Crisis   of   European   Sciences   and   Transcendental   Phenomenology   (Evanston:  
Northwestern   University   Press)   1970,   p.   76   “The   lowest   stratum   of   all   objective   knowledge,   the  
cognitive  ground  of  all  hitherto  existing  sciences,  all  sciences  of  ‘the’  world,  is,  what  we  can  say,  for  the  
first  time,  called  into  question  in  the  manner  of  a  ‘critique  of  knowledge.’  It  is  experience  in  the  usual  
sense  which  is  thus  called  into  question,  ‘sense’  experience  –  and  its  correlate,  the  world  itself,  as  that  
which  has  sense  and  being   for  us   in  and   through   this  experience,   just  as   it   is   constantly  valid   for  us,  
with  unquestioned  certainty,  as  simply  there  [vorharden],  having  such  and  such  a  content  of  particular  
real  objects  [Realitäten],  and  which  is  occasionally  devaluated  as  doubtful  or  as  invalid  illusion  only  in  
individual   details.”   Hyletic   here   refers   to   that   form   of   raw,   pre-­‐‑processed   data   that   precedes   any  
intentional  acts  related  to  it.  
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Stengers  way   of   laying   out   experimental   and   theoretical   facts   such   as   I   am   doing  
with   speculative   theory   and   experiment),   where   agency   and   dependence   on  
interpretations  occur  simultaneously,   thereby  composing  the  material  profile  of   the  
entity,  which  is  the  scientific  subject  of  interest.  
Another  crucial  factor  to  account  for  is  realism.  Realism,  in  the  philosophy  of  
physics,   contains   multiple   levels   of   explication,   with   its   qualities   the   subject   of  
exhaustive  debates  among  eminent  philosophers   from   Isabelle  Stengers   to  Bernard  
d’Espagnat.   However,   there   are   two   points   on   realism   that   are   vital   to   the  
interrogation  of  theory’s  materiality,  including  speculative  theory;  realism,  which  is  
the  existence  of  an  object/subject   independent  of  any   thought  or  acknowledgement  
of   its   existence   that   is   external   to   our   perception   and   epistemic   frameworks;   and  
realism  that  is  a  mathematical  simulacrum  that  influences,  within  defined  epistemic  
positions   (operational,   empirical,   subjective,   or   objective),   what   interactions   are  
useful  for  providing  ontological  clues.  Moreover,  investigation  into  realism  begins  at  
that   intersection   between  macro   and  microphysics,   mainly   because   the   familiar   is  
rendered  alien  in  microphysical  reality.    
In  entering   the  world  of  quantum  objects,   the   language  of   the  real  becomes  
anti-­‐‑real,   and   one   encounters   difficulties   in   forming   a   clear   distinction   between  
representation   and   reality.   Language   becomes   the   epistemic   translator   between   an  
actual   being   (scientific   subject)   and   its   representation   (mathematics   and   symbolic  
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logic).   Therefore,   it   becomes   the   physicists’   prerogative   to   decide   if   they   prefer  
instrumentalism  (that  is  anti-­‐‑realist  in  its  approach)  or  realism.    
Nevertheless,  at  the  level  of  the  interpretive,  there  is  always  a  choice:  a  choice  
of  whether  realism  should  be  closely  connected  to  an  operation  that  attributes  value  
and  meaning  to  it,  or  if  it  has  to  be  independent  of  any  recognition  to  its  value.  This  
becomes  crucial  when  we  take  into  account  the  intervention  undertaken  through  acts  
of  measurement   and   observation.  How  do  we  decide   on   the   level   of   precision   for  
quantifying   that   observation:   how   is   the   measure   of   precision   dependent   on   the  
theoretical  framework;  does  the  ultimate  objective  of  measurement  define  the  means  
or  are  the  means  more  important  than  the  end?  For  realism  to  have  a  definable  role  
for  exacting  precision  during  a  measurement  process,  we  have  to  decide  whether  the  
former   has   to   be   embodied   by   a   particular   standard   of   physicality   that   is   then  
mathematically   approximated,   or   if   there   is   another   more   extended   narrative   of  
realism   that   can   be   enacted   through   the   deployment   of   alternative   modes   of  
comparisons.  
Even  as  the  philosophy  of  physics  theorizes  realism  through  means  available  
to  quantum  mechanics  in  order  to  explain  the  disconnect  between  the  physical  states  
and  their  observed  behavior,  as  well  as  the  phenomena  they  exude,10  the  materialism  
                                                                                                             
10   For   a  more   detailed   discussion   of   reality   and   realism   from  within   the   lens   of   quantum   physics,   I  
suggest   reading   chapters   four   to   ten   of   Bernard  d’Espagnat’s  On  Physics   and   Philosophy.   Princeton  &  
Oxford:  Princeton  University  Press,  2006.  Most  of  the  discussions  on  reality  and  realism,  that  gesture  to,  
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that  embodies  quantum-­‐‑level   interpretations  requires  distancing  from  the   ‘original’  
atomistic  materialist   tradition   instituted   by   Lucretius   and  Democritus   because   the  
former’s  relationship  to  atomist  materialism  is  shaped  by  different  understanding  of  
physical  phenomena.  Even  so,   the  materialism  is  directly  connected  to  the  physical  
real,  as  well  as  to  what  is  physically  applicable  and  producible.    
The  subject,  a  corporeal  entity  that  is  the  focus  of  the  physical  framework  of  
choice,  is  also  temporal;  however,  the  relationship  of  time  to  the  subject  is  dependent  
on   whether   one   investigates   the   subject   from   a   classically   bound   or   quantum  
physically   defined   framework.   In   the   former   case,   temporality   is   macrosopically  
invariant.   However,   in   quantum   physics,   time   is   mostly   a   metaphysical  
consideration,   despite   renewed   interest   in   understanding   time’s   role   in   quantum  
processes.   Such   an   interest   can   lead   to   renewed   consideration   of   the   relationship  
between  time  and  quantum  objects,  with  applications  to  quantum  informatics.  
2.1.1 Speculative Theory and Mathematical Embodiment 
Beyond   thought   experiments   and   conceptual   developments,   speculative  
theory  is  primarily  configured  mathematically.  Moreover,  the  mathematical  choices  
of  physicists  play  a   large  part   in   their   interpretive  vocabulary.  For  example,  a   field  
                                                                                                             
  
and   acknowledge   the   issues   that  were   raised   in   the  Bell   Theorem,   are   considered   to   be   representing  
problems   of   entanglement,   unequal   distribution,   and   incommensurable   correlations   between  
observation  and  measurement.  
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theorist   may   decide   whether   he/she   wants   to   use   an   algebraic   field   (through  
manipulations  of  complex  variables  and  set  theory)  or  the  Lagrangian11  (an  extension  
of   the   classical   model)   field   theory,   dictated   by   the   level   of   formalism   desired.  
(Mackinnon,  “Generating  Ontology”  45-­‐‑6)    
Nonetheless,  physicists  have  been  oscillating  between  different  mathematical  
approaches   in  working  out   the   foundational   issues   of   quantum  physics,   especially  
when  confronted  with  the  complications  induced  by  infinities  (a  problem  that  arises  
as   we   begin   calculating   the   relativistic   interactions   of   particles   in   quantum  
mechanics).   Renormalization,   as   a   self-­‐‑consistent   algebraic   technique   used   for  
reconciling   long-­‐‑range   with   short-­‐‑range   interactions   and   ‘normalizing   out’   the  
infinities  (divergences)  arising  from  the  equations  of  perturbation  theory  for  waves,  
is   an   important   tool   for   ensuring   that   the   descriptions   of   the   Standard   Model  
interactions   do   not   become   mathematically   unfeasible.12   At   the   same   time,  
renormalization   requires   the   quantization   of   interactions   set   within   the  
                                                                                                             
11   The   Lagrangian   mechanics   was   derived   from   classical   mechanical   application   of   the   variational  
principle   of   action   whereby   the   path   traversed   by   macro   or   micro   objects   in   terms   of   energy   or  
momenta  change,  including  the  conservation  of  these  two  quantities,  are  traced.  Lagrangian  mechanics  
has   since   gone   from   a   Newtonian   classical   framework   to   application   in   quantum   mechanics   and  
quantum  field   theories   for   the  calculation  of  more   than  one  paths   traversed  by  a   single  particle   (or  a  
multiplicity   of   possible   paths   traversed   by   a   multiplicity   of   particles),   so   that   the   amplitude   of  
probability  for  its  final  condition  can  be  calculated.  
12   Perturbative   mathematical   theory   arises   from   the   need   to   ‘simplify’   an   otherwise   impossible-­‐‑to-­‐‑
calculate   mathematical   ‘mess’   that   constitute   the   quantum   system.   However,   there   are   limits   to   the  
former’s  application  as  it  assumes  that  the  particle  i.e.  electron  involved  to  be  free  (not  bounded).  While  
used  in  weak  interactions,  it  cannot  be  used  for  approximating  calculations  in  strong  interactions  such  
as  that  between  the  quarks  and  their  respective  gluons.  
  54  
computational   framework   of   quantum  mechanics.   Gravity’s   inability   to   deal   with  
that   requirement  has   rendered   it   inoperable  within   the   framework  of   the  Standard  
Model.   Even   as   the   Standard   Model   is   already   speculative   in   the   epistemic  
construction   involved   in   the   refinement   of   the   model,   the   paradox   of   gravity  
increases   the   instability  of   the  model.  Nevertheless,   the  resiliency  of   the  model  has  
yet  to  be  challenged  to  the  fullest.    
A   good   example   of   a   type   of   speculative   theory   that   derives   much   of   its  
predictive   and   descriptive   function   from  mathematical   formalism   is   the   theory   of  
supersymmetry,  which  has  strong  theoretical  backing  despite  the  lack  of  conclusive  
experimental  evidence.  However,  we  will  get  into  a  more  thorough  discussion  of  this  
in  chapter  three.13  At  this  point,  I  merely  state  that  supersymmetry  postulates  a  new  
symmetry  in  the  universe  that  is  derived  from  balancing  between  the  fermions  (most  
of   the   particles   in   the   Standard  Model   fall   into   this   category)   and   bosons   (Z,   W,  
Higgs),   with   the   intent   of   alleviating   several   problems,   and   observed   anomalies,  
within  the  Standard  Model.  
                                                                                                             
13   Supersymmetry   here   refers   to   a   partner,   or   shadow,   of   the   existing   symmetry   structure   of   the  
Standard   Model   by   positing   that,   for   every   particle   that   exists   in   the   Standard   model   there   is   a  
‘superpartner’  located  half  a  spin  away  from  the  particle  (hence  every  boson  has  a  fermion  partner  and  
vice-­‐‑versa).  Supersymmetry  particles,  when  finally  experimentally  demonstrated  (experimental  groups  
in  CERN  are  working  hard  on  that  and  are  noting  every  possible  evidence  that  will  help  them  construct  
the  picture   of   the   existence   of   these   superpartners),  will   bring  particle  physics   a   step   closer   to   going  
beyond  the  existing  Standard  Model.  See  Lykken,  Joseph  D.  “Introduction  to  Supersymmetry.”  11  Dec  
1996.   arXiv:hep-­‐‑th/9612114.   One   can   also   look   into   standard   texts   in   particle   physics   for  more   basic  
instruction.    
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Abstract   algebra   undergirds   the   discourse   of   the   Standard   Model   (and  
beyond),   including   the   problems   of   unification   and   symmetry.   Particular  
mathematical   methods   are   chosen   for   their   capability   (and   potential   flexibility)   in  
maneuvering   (and   transforming)   very   complex   computation   required   to   describe  
any  aspect  of  an  embodiment  of  a  microscopic  universe;  however,  the  methods  can  
only  be  the  best  representation  of  the  elementary  entities  (representing  the  different  
fractions  of  an  atom)  making  up  the  Standard  Model.    
Atoms  and   subatomic  particles   are   extrapolated   from  observed  phenomena  
of  nature  that  do  not  appear  to  be  consistently  described  by  the  ‘rules’  and  ‘laws’  of  
the   macroscopic.   The   appearance   of   inconsistency   is   the   outcome   of   a   problem  
whereby   the   ‘symptoms’   of   a   microscopic   state   are   described   in   a   language  
developed  to  deal  specifically  with  the  materiality  of  a  macroscopic  condition.  Even  
the  mathematical   functions   that   are   shorthand   for  producing   thorough  analyses  of  
physical   events   that   cannot   be   verbally   explicated   can   only   demonstrate   what   is  
macrophysically  visualizable  from  the  microphysical;  visual  mathematical  diagrams,  
such  as  the  Feynman  diagram  used  for  demonstrating  the   interactions  between  the  
particles   in  the  Standard  Model,  can  contain  couplings  of  highly  complex  algebraic  
sets   that   have   been   simplified   for   more   efficient   computation   of   subatomic   level  
interactions.    
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It  should  be  mentioned  that  the  details  of  the  physical  states  are  folded  onto  
mathematical   factors   that  have  been  coupled  together,   therefore  hiding  most  of   the  
nuts   and   bolts   when   all   we   see   is   the   final   embodiment   of   a   derived   equation.  
Moreover,   the   interleaving   of   multiple   mathematical   factors   (of   constants   and  
variables),   constitutive  of  equations  used   for  describing   the  physical   states,  are  not  
reversible  to  their  original  selves  if  only  because,  during  reorganization,  the  original  
elements  become  completely  transformed  and  considered  ‘negligible’  under  the  new  
couplings,   with   the   higher   order   terms   in   an   expansion   series   dropped   along   the  
way,  therefore  making  a  reversion  to  the  original  impossible.    
These   eliminations   are   calculated   in   order   to   simplify   an  otherwise   tangled  
mess   of   equations.   The   transformation   requires   an   epistemologically   informed  
decision-­‐‑making  process  with  regard  to  what  can  be  included  and  excluded.  While  
some   of   these   eliminations   are   trivial,   they   can   open   up   questions   pertaining   to  
whether  the  elimination  process  means  a  permanent  exclusion  of  certain  theories  for  
good.  Therefore,   to  understand  what   is   at   stake,   and  what  may  already  have  been  
excluded   in   the   process   of   transformation,   one  must   consider   the   precise   point   of  
that  transformation  in  order  to  estimate,  better,  the  areas  of  interest  in  relation  to  the  
areas   excluded.   This   is   important   for   providing   an   informed,   and   coherent,  
explication  on  why  certain  interactional  processes  behave  in  the  way  they  do.    
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In   addition,   mathematical   formalism   images   theories   of   the   quantum   in  
juxtaposition   to   the   actualities   of   the  world,   and   is   therefore   a   useful  medium   for  
interrogating  established  facts;  for  destabilizing  dominant  epistemic  assumptions  by  
having   us   consider   propositions   that   are   physically   counterintuitive   (yet  
mathematically  logical)  at  a  glance,  but  which  would  make  sense  down  the  road  as  
our  knowledge  of  what  is  out  there  grows.    
However,   we   have   to   remember   that   there   are   as   many   elements   of  
irregularity  in  nature  as  regularity,  with  not-­‐‑so-­‐‑easily  decipherable  logic  other  than  
that   they   all   converge   into   a   pre-­‐‑determined   physical   state.   For   instance,   some  
physical  states   (momentum,  position,  energy)  may  or  may  not  commute   (commute  
here  refers  to  when  the  ordering  of  two  operations,  i.e.  measurements  of  a  particle’s  
properties,   does   not  matter),   depending   on   the   qualities  measured,   or   on  whether  
they  can  be  measured  simultaneously  (without  neglecting  Heisenberg’s  Uncertainty  
Principle).    
While   there   is   a   pattern   of   behavior   and   organization   among   physical  
observables   that   mathematics   tries   to   illustrate   through   the   symmetries   of   the  
Standard   Model,   there   are   also   micro-­‐‑entities   that   are   beyond   the   reach   of  
observation   because   of   the   technological   limitations   of   the  measuring   instruments.  
The   incompatibility   between   the   ontological   and   the   observable   is   the   reason  why  
one  cannot  have  an  absolute  standard  for  deciding,  arbitrarily,  as  to  what  stands  for  
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the  regularities  and  irregularities  in  a  system.  What  the  symmetrical  features  of  the  
Standard  Model  (and  the  breaking  of  the  symmetries)  provide  are  the  mathematical  
and  visual  tools  for  approximating  our  conception  of  nature’s  particles  and  fields.14    
2.1.2 The Activism of Speculative Theory 
Speculative   theory   exists   at   the   highpoint   of   activist   philosophy   whence  
speculative   experiment   can   later   emerge.   Activist   philosophy   is   informed   by   the  
notion  of  radical  empiricism  whereby  all   that   is  experienced  is  real  in  some  way  and  
everything  that  is  real  is  also  experienced  (Massumi  6).  In  the  real  of  the  experience,  
there  is  also  the  problem  of  cost,  and  the  cost  is  not  only  in  the  material  (as  well  as  
financial)   cost,   but   also   the   ontological   and   epistemological   costs   that   are   the  
outcome   of   making   choices   to   activate   specific   nodes:   the   nodes   consisting   of  
theoretically-­‐‑led   experimental   design,   observational   priority   in   the   process   of   data  
collection,   base   level   calibration   of   instruments,   affective   engagement   of   the  
experimenter  with   their   team  of  collaborators  as  well  as  accelerators  and  detectors,  
the   organization   of   authority   and   decision-­‐‑making   concerning   the   release   of   data,  
and  the  naming  process  (including  the  ‘gender  of  the  name’)  of  recently  discovered  
particle/physical  phenomena  or  constructed  instrument.    
                                                                                                             
14   It   is   important   to   consider   these   particles   as   ‘imaginary’   and   an   abstract   conception   of   how   we  
imagine  the  building  blocks  of  the  universe  to  be,  rather  than  to  take  them  as  literal  corpuscular  entities.  
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When   activist   philosophy   provides   the   schematics   for   comprehending  
scientific   knowledge   production   in   terms   of   epistemic   (and   ontological)   costs,   the  
activated   nodes   can   represent   the   intensity   that   stems   from   navigating   dense  
concepts   located   in   the  concrete  and   the  abstract,  as  well  as   the  different  epistemic  
responses   that   might   arise   from   the   different   approaches   for   getting   at   the  
ontological   structure  of  nature.  An  example  of   such  an  activated  node   is   the  point  
where   two   (or  more)   events   representing   two   (or  more)   arrows  of   time   can  merge  
into  one,  as  and  when  it  becomes  convenient  and  possible  to  do  so.    
Another  more  routine  example  can  be  found  in  introductory  particle  physics  
textbooks  on  relativistic  kinematics  discussing  the  center  of  mass  of  the  particles  and  
the   laboratory   framework   of   reference,   where   single   to   multiple   interactions   are  
framed  at  a  specific   instant  or   focal  point.  Such  contextualizations  represent  a  shift  
between   the   perspective/‘viewpoint’   of   the   particle   and   that   of   the   laboratory’s  
human  or  non-­‐‑human  observers.  Agency  is  situated  at  that  intersection  between  the  
two,   the   duration   of   both   inextricably   bounded   by   the   interacting   particles   that  
remain   invariant.   This   agency   is   also   at   the   point   where   “practice   becomes  
perception”   (Massumi   11).   The   relationship   between   the   objects   of   theory   and  
experiment  is  diagrammed  through  the  different  self-­‐‑reflexive  and  agential  practices  
of  theory  and  experiment.    
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Activist   philosophy   brings   speculative   theory   a   step   closer   to   speculative  
experiment   by   accentuating   the   philosophical   phenomenology   of   relationality  
between   humans,   machines,   and  microscopic   entities   at   the   intersection   of   theory  
and  experiment.  More  importantly,  activist  philosophy  foregrounds  the  experiential  
points   that   lay   hidden   in   the  more   formalistic   features   of   speculative   theory.   The  
activism   of   theory   and   experiment   enables   a  more   holistic   presentation   of   realism  
(through  materialist  practices)  to  be  constructed  from  the  differential  approaches  in  
these  two  areas  of  speculative  physics.  
2.2 Speculative Experiment 
Before  proceeding  into  the  discussion  on  speculative  experiment,  I  would  like  
to   point   to   the   differences   in   the   preoccupation   between   a   theorist   and   an  
experimentalist:   how   the   different   interpretive   practices   from   the   two   different  
camps,   even   if   they   converge   at   certain   points,   can   lead   to   different   emphases   on  
theoretical  goals  and  choices  of  frameworks.  For  instance,  quantum  field  theories  are  
unequivocally   important   in   high-­‐‑energy   physics,   both   experimentally   and  
theoretically,   for   formulating  predictive  models   in  particle  physics,  whether  within  
or  beyond  the  parameters  of  the  Standard  Model.    
For  a  theorist,  the  important  question  is  which  of  the  quantum  field  theories  
would  enable  the  greatest  ontological  access  and  success  in  prescribing  microscopic  
phenomena.   An   example   is   the   ongoing   debate   about   which   quantum   field  
  61  
theoretical  approach  is  the  best  for  dealing  with  the  complexities  of  renormalization:  
there   are   those   who   feel   that   an   axiomatic   algebraic   approach   has   a   better   track  
record   than   the   conventional   version,   while   others   consider   both   approaches   as  
merely   rival   theoretical   frameworks   without   either   being   better   than   the   other.15  
Nevertheless,   the   choice,   in   the   end,   is   about   obtaining   the   best   solution   to   a  
problem.  The  decision  over  which  mathematical  approaches  are  the  most  useful  for  
interpretive   purposes   does   not   necessarily   influence   how   experiments   in   high-­‐‑
energy  physics  are  set-­‐‑up  and  performed.  Experimentalists,  while  remaining  aware  
of   the  role  of   theories   in   influencing  the  different  types  of  experimental  design,  are  
more  concerned  with  the  material  applicability  of  the  theory  to  data  analytics  than  in  
sweating  over  which  theory  is  more  mathematically  elegant/comprehensive  (unless  
the  elegance/comprehensiveness  allows  the  experimentalists  more  extensive  material  
reach).    
Hence,   speculative   experiment   can  be   focused  on   experimentally   conceived  
choices   to   search   for   a   still   undetectable   entity   within   the   effective   range   of   its  
existence.  In  a  more  mundane  sense,  speculative  experiment  conforms  to  the  fields  of  
action   in   a   selected   model   (that   can   be   based   on   the   best   likelihoods   established  
                                                                                                             
15  See  the  debate  between  Wallace  and  Fraser  in  History  and  Philosophy  of  Science  Part  
B:   Studies   in   History   and   Philosophy   of   Modern   Physics.   42.2   (2011):   116-­‐‑35   on   the  
axiomatic  versus  conventional  algebraic  method.  
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through   formal   theory   and   statistical   calculations).   Repetitions   may   never   be  
acquired   outside   of   the   habit,   and   there   might   be   no   going   beyond   the   cycle   of  
falsification   and   justification.   However,   I   intend   to   extend   the   notion   of   the  
speculative   experiment   to   embody   the   dialectical   interface   between   micro-­‐‑objects  
and   macro-­‐‑events.   The   millions   of   repetitive   collisions   are   measured   through   the  
scattering   effect;   a   specific   choice   of   data   ‘cut’   can   lead   to   the   unveiling   of  
observables  that  are  hitherto  hidden  by  the  presence  of  other  material  effects  such  as  
dark  matter.    
Firstly,   it   is   important   to   highlight   the   difference   between   speculative  
experiment  and   the  product  of  pure  uncertainty   in  an  experiment.  As   Ian  Hacking  
and  Allan  Franklin  have  both  pointed  out,  experiments  persist  beyond  the  shadow  
of   theory   and   can   exist   independently   as   a   solid   body   of   scientific   research   even  
without   a   priori   predictive   theories   to   initialize   the   experiment.   Moreover,  
experiments   can   form   and   produce   their   own   theorizations   strictly   through   the  
analyses   of   known   cause-­‐‑and-­‐‑effects,   which   would   then   feed-­‐‑back   into   revising,  
altering,  or  modifying  existing  experimental  designs.  The  aspects  of  experimentation  
leading   to   the   formation   of   theories   to   explain   and   describe   the   physical   effects  
observed  had  always  been  part  of  early  modern  and  pre-­‐‑twentieth  century  scientific  
work  in  physics.    
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It  is  under  such  conditions  of  speculation  that  one  observes  the  tension  
between  measuring  and  observing,  modeling  and  measuring,  or  modeling  and  
observing.  The  speculative  method  in  experiments  allows  us  to  think  about  what  it  
means  to  perform  measurements  in  experiments,  the  same  decision-­‐‑making  that  
goes  into  deciding  the  scale  and  range  of  the  measurement,  and  what  observation  
comes  out  of  a  measurement  that  is  conducted  almost  entirely  with  digital  
instruments  today.    
As   the   ontology   of   the   physical   structure   that   the   data   is   supposed   to  
explicate  approximates  ideal  conditions,  Monte  Carlo  simulation,  or  model  building  
with  parameters  under   ‘perfect’  conditions  that  preclude   instrumental  artifacts  and  
other  experimental  errors,  is  produced  as  control  data  for  comparison  with  real  data.  
This   in   itself   is   another   level   of   speculation   as   the   experimentalist  moves   between  
virtual  data  and  actual  data,  while  attempting  to  detect  what  is  contained  in  the  gap  
between  both  types  of  data.    In  speculative  experiment,  there  is  no  determinate  end  
to   an   experiment:   there   might   be   a   physical   end   but   the   theoretical   part   of   the  
experiment  does  not  end  because  the  next  stage  of  becoming  is  already  set  in  motion  
for  the  next  phase  of  experiment  to  occur.  
Also,   speculative   experiment   recognizes   that   measurements   are   bounded  
within  the  confines  of  selected  parameters  and  is  aware  that  experimental  biases  are  
as  much   informed   by   predictive   circumstances   as   by   the  models   (both   theoretical  
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and   computationally   simulated   ones)   they   choose   to   adopt   for   the   design   of   their  
experiments.  However,  the  story  of  its  empirical  discovery  is  another  interesting  tale  
of   speculative   experiment   that   does   not   always   coincide  with   speculative   theory’s  
choices,   if   only   because   experiment   is  more   constrained   by   external   circumstances  
that  frame  the  possibility  of  the  experiment.  
In   particle   physics,   speculative   experiment   diagrams   and   activates   specific  
nodes   of  matter   by   unmasking   an   increasing   array   of   emergent   particles   and   sub-­‐‑
particles,   all  playing   to   the   tune  of  different   fields  of   interactions,   from  Newton   to  
Coulomb   to   Feynman,   their   identities   and   appearances   manifesting,   and  
remanifesting,   through   every   new   theorem   and   quantizable   phenomena.   An  
example   that  best  represents   the  activation  of  nodes   in  speculative  experiment   that  
also   involves   speculative   theory   is   Fermi’s   theory   of   beta-­‐‑decay,   known   as   the  
spectral   emission   of   electrons   from   which   the   original   discoveries   of   neutrinos  
(particles  without  mass  produced  during  the  process  of  decay)  were  made.    
Fermi  had  wanted  to  maintain  an  experimental  analogy  with  electromagnetic  
theory   when   he   found   that   his   theoretical   calculations   agreed   with   experiment.  
Therefore,   he   maintained   only   the   use   of   one   out   of   five   allowable   interactions  
(mathematically   signified   to   represent  directed  and  un-­‐‑directed  actions)   that   could  
take   place,   so   that   the   wavefunctions   of   the   electrons   and   neutrinos   can   be  
considered.   These   are   mathematically   detailed   through   the   use   of   transformation  
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operators   involving   leptons   (electrons   and   neutrinos)   and   hadrons   (protons   and  
neutrons).  In  fact,  what  differed  among  the  five  interactions  would  be  the  particular  
positioning  of  the  transformative  operators   in  relation  to  each  other  and  in  relation  
to   the   dimensional   algebraic   sets   meant   for   denoting   three-­‐‑dimensional   spatial  
elements.  
The   work   on   the   theorization   and   confirmation   of   the   beta   decay,   first   by  
Fermi,  then  by  others  such  as  Konopinski  and  Uhlenbeck,  as  well  as  Beck  and  Sitte,  
was   meant   to   synthesize   the   experimental   data   that   had   been   obtained   from   the  
positron   emitter   and   from  bismuth,   another   form   of   radioactive   element.  Much   of  
the  theoretical  fine-­‐‑tuning  had  to  do  with  organizing  how  one  intends  to  balance  the  
energy  produced  during  the  experiment.  There  was  also  the  work  by  others  such  as  
Gamow   and   Teller,   who   went   back   to   the   fundamental   basis   of   Fermi’s   work   to  
demonstrate   how   Fermi   had   neglected   to   include   certain   effects.   This   means  
revisiting   the  earlier   arrangements  of   the  mathematical  operators   and   then   finding  
another   interaction   that   works.   Knowledge   not   made   manifest   in   the   first   run   of  
theory   became   available   when   considered   from   other   angles,   and   as   further  
experimental  data  were  obtained.  This  led  to  a  better  fit  with  the  model  envisioned  
by  Gamow  and  Teller  than  with  the  original  Fermi  theory.  The  process  would  repeat  
and  new  difficulties  arise  during  the  repetition  of  the  experiment,  so  that  new  curves  
from   newer   data   plots   were   produced   and   the   theory   adjusted.   In   a   sense,   the  
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abovementioned   examples   represent   the   correlation   between   the   real   and   the  
imaginary,  with  neither  quite  exceeding   the  other.  But   it   is  also  representative  of  a  
speculative   theory   that   fueled   the   speculative   experiment,  which   in   turn,   channels  
the  next  round  of  experiments,  and  so  forth.    
Therefore,   speculative   experiment   does   not   fear   the   deconstruction   and   re-­‐‑
construction  of  original  theories  and  experiments  to  produce  increasingly  solid,  yet  
still  speculative,  theories16  that  are  demarcated  by  experimental  choices  built  off  the  
under-­‐‑developed,   inchoate,   empirical   possibilities   of   mathematically-­‐‑driven  
predictions.  This  may  mean  decisions  have  to  be  made  with  regard  to  how  cuts  are  
made  at  points  where  the  entities  are  supposed  to  exist  while  leaving  a  spectrum  of  
possibilities   as   flexible   as  practicable   so   as   to  have  greater   flexibility   for  managing  
expectations  in  potential  outcomes.    
There  are  some  examples  connected  to  speculative  experiment  in  the  year  of  
the  discovery  of  the  Higgs  boson.  One  involves  the  detection  of  a  supposedly  heavy  
subatomic  particle  at  Fermilab  in  Batavia,  Illinois;  the  physicists  had  hoped  that  the  
discovery   of   the   unknown   entity   could   be   the   break   they   need   with   regard   to  
exceeding   the   delimitations   of   the   Standard   Model.   Among   the   conjectures  
connected   to  what   the  unusual   bump  detected   in   the  plot   line  was   that   the   bump  
                                                                                                             
16  See  chapter  one  of  Franklin,  Allan.  Experiment,  Right  or  Wrong.  Cambridge  &  New  York:  Cambridge  
University  Press.  
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could  be  nothing  more  than  an  artifact  produced  by  background  noise  and  a  detector  
that  had  not  been  properly  calibrated.  On  the  other  hand,  it  might  be  an  actual  lead  
into  new  physics.  It  was  soon  found  that  the  perceived  bump  was  an  accident.    
A  similar  situation  happened  in  2011  involving  the  OPERA  detector  in  Italy  
and   the   supposed   detection   of   superluminal   (faster-­‐‑than-­‐‑speed-­‐‑of-­‐‑light)   particles  
that   would   have   falsified   Einstein’s   theory   of   special   relativity,   were   they   proven  
true.    But  as  the  story  went,  there  was  a  mistake  within  the  setup  of  the  experiment.  
In  this  specific  example,  one  crosses  that  grey  line  between  speculation  and  human  
errors.  However,  by  allowing  for  any  such  discoveries  to  be  located  in  the  space  of  
the   speculative,   one   engages   in   every   form   of   the   possible,   in   every   mangle   of  
practice,  and  every  question  that  will  converge  to  the  physical  object  of  interest  with  
newer   insights.   Speculative   experiment   analyzes   the   facts   and   errors   of   material  
entities  immersed  within  its  bounds,  therefore  allowing  each  fact  or  error  to  inform  
the  interpretation  of  the  other.17  
An  experiment,  even  a  non-­‐‑speculative  one,   is  about   finding  a   language  for  
describing   the  observable,   including   the  observation  of  unknown  entities.  Many  of  
                                                                                                             
17  These  are  the  two  most  accessible  articles  that  address  the  problems  denoted  by  the  example  I  have  
mentioned  here.  For  more  on  the  Fermilab  incident,  check  out  Maugh,  Thomas  H.  “Research  Points  to  a  
Fundamental  Change  in  Physics  -­‐‑-­‐‑  or  Else  a  Fluke.”  LA  Times  7  Apr.  2011.  [Accessed  20  August  2013]  <  
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/07/science/la-­‐‑sci-­‐‑anomalous-­‐‑physics-­‐‑results-­‐‑20110407>  and  for  more  
on  the  OPERA  story,  check  out  Strassler,  Matt.  “OPERA:  What  Went  Wrong.”  Of  Particular  Significance:  
Conversations   About   Science   with   Theoretical   Physicist  Matt   Strassler   2  April   2012.   [Accessed   20  August  
2013].   <   http://profmattstrassler.com/articles-­‐‑and-­‐‑posts/particle-­‐‑physics-­‐‑basics/neutrinos/neutrinos-­‐‑
faster-­‐‑than-­‐‑light/opera-­‐‑what-­‐‑went-­‐‑wrong/>.  
  68  
the  works  in  the  history  and  sociology  of  experiments  in  physics  focus  on  the  culture  
of   epistemic   production,   as   well   as   the   various   philosophical   interpretations  
accorded   them,   depending   on   whether   one   takes   on   a   constructivist,   realist,  
positivist/antipositivist,  or  relativist  view  of   the  experiment’s  material  practice.  The  
historiography  of  the  accounts  constitutes  an  examination  of  the  correlation  between  
the   institutional  and  disciplinary  discourses   that  shape  the  choices  made  on  acts  of  
social-­‐‑epistemic   agency   (à   la   Andrew   Pickering)   such   as   deciding   upon   points   of  
measurements;  tracing  the  emergence  of  intentionality  in  the  interaction  between  the  
subject   and   object   in   science;   analyzing   the  material   traces   left   behind   due   to   the  
interactions   between   human   ‘experts,’   instrument/machine,   as   well   as   the   data  
produced;  and  finally,  dividing-­‐‑up  between  the  concepts,  facts,  and  representations  
that  are  discussed  extensively  in  the  social  life  of  the  natural  sciences.18    
Among  the  speculative  aspects  of  experimental  practice  (especially  when  one  
thinks  of  particle  physics)  that  differ  most  significantly  from  speculative  theory  is  the  
                                                                                                             
18  Among   the  works   that   come   to  mind  are   those  by  Peter  Galison,  Andrew  Pickering,  Trevor  Pinch,  
Harry   Collins,   Karin   Knorr-­‐‑Cetina,   Bruno   Latour,   and   Imre   Lakatos,   among   others.   Many   of   these  
works  address   the  contours  of  material  and   relational  agency   (that   could   imply  autonomy,  epistemic  
determination,   intentionality   and   intra-­‐‑reaction),   transmissions   and   dispersions,   the   politics   of  
hierarchy   ranging   from   organizational   layout   to   experimental   choices   (whether   working   towards  
demonstrating  a  specific  theory  or  using  a  particular  instrument),  specific  constraints  and  parameters  of  
an   experimental   research   program   (that   includes   comparing   between   the   results   of   predictions   and  
experiments  while  trying  to  understand  the  deviations  of  the  latter  from  the  former),  collaboration  and  
integration   (or   intercalation,   to   borrow   the   term   from   Galison’s   Image   and   Logic).   There   were   also  
attempts   at   delineating   some   of   the   problematics   relating   to   how   experiments   are   demarcated   and  
situated  within  the  current  experimental  framework  of  practice.    
  69  
design  of  experimental  decision-­‐‑making  for  conducting  speculative  searches:  these  
searches  could  be  theory-­‐‑driven  as  well  as  independently  experimental  in  that  they  
draw  upon  the  analyses  of  data  from  earlier  experiments  to  produce  theories  with  
origins  in  the  experimental.    
In   experimental   particle   physics,   professional   physicists   and   graduate  
students   are  working   on   counting,   scanning,   and   detecting   traces   of   still   invisible  
entities  with  the  hope  of  providing  further  refinement  to  confirmed  theories,  and  to  
‘discover’  evidential  traces  that  may  have  been  lurking  beyond  the  theory.  With  the  
spectrum   of   possibilities   waiting   to   be   uncovered   at   each   energy   band,  
experimentalists  work  in  concert  with  accelerator  physicists  to  define  best  practices  
for  increasing  the  possibility  of  obtaining  ‘quality’  data  within  the  parameters  of  the  
targeted  searches.    
2.3 Speculative Experiment of Fiction: Science Fiction and the 
Politics of Speculation 
Having  discussed  the  role  of  speculative  experiment,  I  argue  that  the  critical  
theories  that  emerge  can  also  be  extended  to  imagining  the  role  of  science  fiction  as  a  
medium   for   prototyping   highly   abstract   and   philosophical   ideas.   The   idea   of   the  
science   fiction   prototype   is   not   new,   for   it   has   been   used   by   futurists,   scientists,  
engineers,  information  technologists,  artists,  and  even  market  forecasters  as  a  way  of  
imagining  a  world  that  could-­‐‑be  as  well  as  could-­‐‑have-­‐‑been.    
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In   his   book,   Science   Fiction   Prototyping:   Designing   the   Future   with   Science  
Fiction,   Brian   Johnson  David  discusses   how   science   fiction,   in   popular   culture   and  
fiction,  has  stirred  the  imagination  of  those  who  then  decided  to  make  it  their  career  
to   be   involved   in   the   creation   of   new   possibilities   for   the   future.   He   provides  
examples  of  technological  forecasts,  such  as  in  robotics,  that  are  constituted  within  a  
chain  of  causal  what-­‐‑ifs  for  extending  the  spectrum  of  possible  occurrences  through  
the   introduction   of   seemingly   innocuous   (or   sometimes   more   radical)   variables.  
Science   fiction,   for   all   its   tension   in  dealing  with   science,   and   thus,   the   facticity   of  
legitimized   knowledge,   is   a   comprehensive   medium   for   social,   political,   and  
technological  challenges.  
In  considering  science  fiction  as  part  of  a  “datum  in  that  act  of  experience,”  I  
am  partial  to  Whitehead’s  critique  of  the  doctrine  of  subjectivist  principle  where  he  
insists   on   the   distinction   between   universals   and   particulars,   and   how   the   act   of  
experience   can   only   be   adequately   parlayed   through   the   universals.   Even   so,   this  
does   not   mean   that   particulars   have   no   place;   I   argue   that   the   particulars   are  
important   for   localizing   and   situating   the   experience  while   the   universals   allow   a  
grander   extrapolation   of   the   experience   to   produce   a   global   fit   that   is   made   of   a  
series   of   particulars   standing   for   series   of   experiences.   In   addition,   Whitehead’s  
discussion  of  the  relationship  between  causal  efficacy  and  presentational  immediacy  
in   relation   to   symbolic   reference   is   important   for   comparison   between  perceptions  
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and   sensations   in   relation   to   representation   –  where   the   comparative   relationships  
are  simultaneously  antipodal  and  inter-­‐‑connected.    Such  relationships  are  part  of  the  
building  blocks  informing  the  universals.  
All  of  the  relationality  discussed  is  part  of  a  phenomenology  that  travels  the  
routes  of  the  past  and  the  present  to  gather  causality  and  immediate  sensations  into  
a   state   of   affectiveness   surpassing   the   parameters   of   linear   logic.   They   are   part   of  
Whitehead’s   attempt   at  developing   a  philosophy  of   organism   that   can   surpass   the  
limits  in  philosophy  of  science.  If  we  think  about  science  fiction  as  the  creation  of  an  
“inorganic   world,”   we   can   then   consider   science   fiction   as   that   world   where  
“causation  never  for  a  moment  seems  to  lose  its  grip.”  Whitehead  argues  that  what  
gets  lost  is  the  “originativeness”  and  evidence  of  “absorption  in  the  present”  which  
leave  no  traces  behind.    
Whitehead’s   injunction   parallels   Lem   Stanislaw’s   gruff   observation.   In   his  
essay  “On  the  Structural  Analysis  of  Science  Fiction,”  Stanislaw  claims  that  science  
fiction  is  a  chance  mistake  that  defamiliarizes  through  the  play  of  inversion.  For  him,  
science  is  a  knowledge  that  can  be  realized  and  set  in  distinction  from  logic,  even  if  
such   a   distinction   may   not   always   be   possible.   Further,   science   fiction   is  
ontologically   different   from   the   rest   of   the   world.   In   the   Dimensions   of   Science,  
Bainbridge  states  that  science  fiction  is  an  imaginative  interpretation  of  science  and  
technology,   communicating   to   a   wide   audience,   ideas   guiding   the   future   of   our  
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civilization   (4).   It   is   my   intention   to   consider   how   science   fiction   can   become   a  
platform   for   thinking   through   the   fundamental   theories   of   physics   as   well   as   for  
working   out   other   scientific   possibilities.   As   literature,   science   fiction   produces   a  
critique  of  politics  as  they  come  into  play  in  science;  the  politics  of  science  colliding  
with   the   social   aspects   of   the   real   world,   and   the   ensuing   results   are   viewed   in  
relation   to   scientific   epistemology.   In   other   words,   science   fiction   is   a   mixture   of  
speculative  physics  and  speculative  politics,  and  there  is  no  better  way  to  introduce  a  
concrete  illustration  of  this  than  by  Alan  Lightman’s  Einstein’s  Dreams.  
Einstein’s   Dreams,   based   entirely   on   thought   experiments   represented   as  
dreams,   is   focused   on   the   inhabitants   of   Berne,   Switzerland.   Lightman’s   novella,  
with  the  exception  of  the  occasional  appearance  of  Einstein  and  his  friend  Besso,   is  
centered  around  the  destinies  of  various,  seemingly  random,  individuals  whose  lives  
were   intricately   connected   to   the   flow   and   movement   of   time;   forward   and   in  
reverse,  as  well  as  across   infinity  or  a   lifetime  truncated  into  a  single  day,  with  the  
looping  of   time  and  different   configurations  between   time  and  aging/rejuvenation.  
The   multiple   plotlines,   connected   through   the   larger   theme   of   space   and   time,  
configure   interactions   of   space-­‐‑time   in   the   parallel   universes   of   our   world   and  
another  world  with   amplified   traits   that   are   not   visible   to   our  world.   Sociological  
and  scientific  practices  become  entangled  and  inseparable,  with  memories  bound  to  
the  actions  that  are  to  come.    
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In  a  dream  sequence  that  continues  daily,  the  lives  of  the  individuals  take  on  
the   shape   of   particles   interacting  with   each   other  within   a   closed   environment,   an  
‘enworlded’  space.19  Hence,  the  mostly  ‘invisible’  observer,  the  active  dreamer  who  is  
Einstein,   becomes   the   experimenter   who   tries   out   different   permutations   of   time  
within   the   framework   of   time-­‐‑dilation,   of   relative   time   between   two   inertial  
frameworks  and  the  curvature  of  space  and  time,  as  well  as  the  problematization  of  
‘lifetime’   from  both  humanistic   and   scientific   contexts.  As  Barad  argues   in  Meeting  
the  Universe  Halfway:  
…It’s  not  that  the  experimenter  changes  a  past  that  had  already  been  present  
or   that   atoms   fall   in   line  with  a  new   future   simply  by  erasing   information.  
The   point   is   that   the   past   was   never   simply   there   to   begin   with   and   the  
future   is   not   simply   what   will   unfold;   the   ‘past’   and   the   ‘future’   are  
iteratively   reworked   and   enfolded   through   the   iterative   practices   of  
spacetime  mattering  –  including  the  which-­‐‑slit  detection  and  the  subsequent  
erasure  of  which-­‐‑slit  information  –  all  are  one  phenomenon.  (315)  
The  novella  begins  by  establishing  the  reader  in  the  primary  space  where  all  
these   ‘wild’   ideas   are   produced:   the   patent   office  where   Einstein  worked.  We   are  
given   a   glimpse   into   his   disheveled   personal   life;   it   appears   that   the   Einstein   of  
Lightman’s   construction  was   a  man   so   completely   obsessed  with   his   dreams   that  
normal   life   became   a   distraction   and   irritation.   The   story   tracks   through   the  
entanglement   of   metaphysical   suppositions   with   physical   realism.   The   narrative  
began  in  April  14  1905  and  ended  on  June  28  1905,  flanked  by  a  prolog  and  epilog.  
                                                                                                             
19  As   is  mentioned  at  various   instances   in  Vivian  Sobchack’s  Carnal  Thoughts:  Embodiment   and  Moving  
Image  Culture  (Los  Angeles:  University  of  California  Press,  2004).  
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Each   day,   except   for   undated   interludes   when   the   reader   is   brought   back   to   the  
reality   of   Einstein’s   physical   presence,   marks   a   succession   of   dreams   where   the  
anonymous   characters   populating   these   dreams   interacted   with   each   other   in   a  
highly  mathematical   fashion,   even   as   the   impact   of   time-­‐‑imposed   (or   time-­‐‑less-­‐‑ly)  
imposed  fates  on  their  lives  remained  significant  to  each  of  these  individual  actants.  
Psychoanalysis   is   put   in   conversation   with   physics   in   the   construction   of   parallel  
worlds,  where   three   different   decisions  were  made   by   a   young  man   to,   or   not   to,  
pursue  a  particular  woman,  and  how  that  pursuit  would  affect  his  life.    
The   novella   also   contains   the   sequence   of   a   man   who   watched   himself  
played-­‐‑out   in   difference   and   repetition,   as   if   the   events   took   place   in   a   house   of  
mirrors,   except   that   he   was   multiplied   across   different   spatial   dimensions   while  
retaining   a   common   ontology   of   time   through   nested   concatenations.   In   the  
repetition  is  the  infinitesimal;  the  man  found  that  the  duration  played  out  in  his  life,  
repeated  by  others,  was  slowly  reduced   to   the  most   important   fundamental  entity,  
which   is   music   in   this   case.   In   the   novella,   Lightman   takes   creative   license   with  
Einstein’s  work  on  electrical-­‐‑technical  time  and  foregrounds  phenomenological  time  
in   the   process   (of   the  Husserlian/Heideggerian   orbit)  while   interrogating   the   very  
notion  of  time  and  its  symbolic  function.  He  illuminates  the  argument  by  narrating  
the  tale  of  two  groups  of  people  living  in  the  same  world;  one  who  is  always  going  
after   time   and   the   other   with   no   clue   about   the   meaning   of   time   in   a   linear,  
  75  
progressive  sense.  While  we  may  think  this  to  be  the  fictionalizing  of  fact  in  order  to  
set   up   a   stochastic   condition,   it   has   strong   relevance   to   how   different   cultures  
themselves   view   time,   and   how   time   therefore   defines   the   way   by   which  
civilizations  rule  over  their  lives.  
Lightman   turns   the   Einsteinian   models   of   special   and   general   relativity,  
theories  that  grew  out  of  scientific  thought  experiments,  on  their  head,  by  laying  out  
the   confluence   of   the   mathematics   with   the   subjective-­‐‑experiential.   The   former’s  
fictionalizing  of  scientific  theories  has  enabled  us  to  venture  into  an  interdisciplinary  
interchange  I  refer  to  as  psychoanalytic  physics.  In  this  simulated  laboratory,  human  
subjects  are   studied  within   the  entanglement  of  physics  and  psychoanalysis  where  
the  maneuvering  of  physical  realities  in  these  different  universes  have  repercussions  
on   the   cognitive   and   psychological   worlds   of   humans   living   through   different  
cosmic  episodes  but  possessing  similar  biology.  Lightman  has  limited  the  setting  of  
the  story  to  Switzerland  so  we  could  not  place  the  story  within  the  larger  context  of  
the  greater  European  continent,  or  some  other  geographical  location.    
A   brief   discussion   of   the   novella   demonstrates,   preliminarily,   the   inter-­‐‑
relationality   between   the   speculative  physics  developed  by  Einstein   and   the   social  
reality   foregrounding   interesting   ideas   not   previously   noticed.   Science   fiction   can  
deploy   the   empirical   data   of   the   micro-­‐‑world   in   conjunction   with   the   analogous  
features   observable   in   the   macro-­‐‑worlds.   It   can   also   become   the   site   where   the  
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discrepant   and   incommensurable   qualities   of   physics   and   literature   can   stand   in  
contestation,  with  the  potential  for  producing  hitherto  unimagined  theories  and  new  
explanations  to  existing  quandaries  or  paradoxes.    
2.4 Theory and Experiment: the Dialectics 
While   one   cannot   posit   a   divorce   between   theory   and   experiment,   it   is  
possible   to   isolate   specific   speculative   practices   that   are   particular   to   experiments.  
Some  of  these  practices  involve  the  material  cuts  enacted  through  the  data  collected,  
which   include   deciding  which   portion   of   the   data   from   the   trackers   and   scanners  
should   be   the   focus,   on   the   design   of   instruments   to   isolate   and   amplify   certain  
unique  characteristics  of   the  object’s  profile   (magnetic   resonance,  direction  of   spin,  
thermodynamic  qualities,  etc.),  and  the  distribution  of  data-­‐‑checks  across  a  network  
of  physicists  among  different  collaborative  groups  who  analyze  the  data  cuts.    
These   data   cuts   include   an   in-­‐‑depth   study   into   the   top   and   beauty   quarks  
(two  of   the  heavier  quarks  of   the  Standard  Model),  as  well  as   interactions  between  
the   gamma   rays,   bosons,   and   supersymmetry   particles   (known   also   as  
superpartners),   all   of  which   could   show  up   the   possibilities   and   limitations   of   the  
Standard  Model.  At  the  pre-­‐‑experimental  level,  one  has  to  deal  with  the  calibration  
of   the   sensitivity   of   the   detectors   against   background   activity,   and   the   specific  
practices   of   engineering   in   connection   with   experimental   physics   that   stem   from  
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working  within  conditions  that  are  neither  as   ideal  nor  as   ‘free’  as  what  theoretical  
physics  can  model.    
At   the   same   time,   one  must   also  be   cognizant  of   the  politics   that   choose   to  
validate   particular   instrumental   techniques   and   analytics   over   that   of   the   others.20  
Such  politics  will  be  more  extensively  discussed  in  the  fifth  chapter,  which  is  where  I  
explicate  on  the  particular  experimental  channels  aimed  at  studying  the  interactions  
of   the  fermions  and  bosons  that  are  coupled  to  the  Higgs  (as  part  of   the  process  of  
revealing  the  properties  of  the  Higgs  empirically),  then  relating  these  searches  to  the  
determination  of  experimental  triggers  and  data  cuts.  
When  drawing  on  the  work  of  the  theorists,  experimentalists  appeal  to  the  
phenomenologists  as  the  mediator.  The  phenomenologist  would  then  take  the  
abstract  theories  that  are  generalizable  from  the  chains  of  connected  but  individual  
events,  and  use  numerical  methods  to  produce  an  algorithm  that  allows  one  to  
rescale  analysis  out  of  the  generated,  but  with  an  eye  cocked  towards  further  data  to-­‐‑
be-­‐‑generated.  Such  speculative  practices  pay  close  attention  to  refining  techniques  
                                                                                                             
20   This   is   a   definite   preoccupation  with   historians   and   sociologists   of   science   such   as  Galison,   Pinch,  
Collins,   and   Knorr-­‐‑Cetina.   Pinch   discusses   this   extensively   in   The   Golem   in   the   explication   of  
experiments  ranging  from  the  chemical  transfer  of  memory  in  the  study  of  earth  worms  to  experiments  
that  ‘prove’  (indirectly  through  observed  phenomena  predicted  of  theory)  the  validity  of  the  theory  of  
relativity  to  the  experimental  narrative  of  the  ‘unobservable’  and  ‘theoretically  constructed’  entity  of  the  
neutrino.  These  examples  represent   that  direct  and   indirect  chain  of  relationality  between  speculative  
theory   and   experiments   (some  of  which   are   considered   speculative   at   the   time  when   they  were   first  
performed)  especially  when  one   takes  a   closer   look  at   the   subjective   relationship  of   the   theorists  and  
experimenters   to   their   objects   of   examinations,   observing   that   point   when   different   elements  
constituting  the  experiments  are  deconstructed  and  put  into  dialog  with  theory.  
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that  will  enable  them  to  detect  predicted  entities,  and  these  entities  are  the  populace  
that  inhabits  the  space  of  the  microphysical.    
Despite   the   existing   dialectics   between   theory   and   experiments,   there   still  
exists   a   gap   between   the   practices   of   experiments   and   theory.   Primarily,   there   are  
differences   in   formalistic  priorities:  most   experiments  are   interested   in   interpreting  
empirical   results   through   the  existing  models   (until   they  encounter  a  phenomenon  
that   could   not   be   reasonably   explicated   within   established   frameworks),   or   to  
simulate   results   using   experimentally   realizable   models   with   hypothetical  
constraints   (that  may   or  may   not   be   realizable  within   current   technology)   enacted  
through   computational   algorithms.   On   the   other   hand,   theories   are   interested   in  
working  out  interpretive  models  with  multiple  epistemic  probabilities,  observables,  
and  symbolically  represented  ontology  that  can  only  be  partially  approximated  and  
might  not  be  experimentally  realized.      
Another  difficulty  is  how  one  prioritizes  the  physical  states  in  the  explication  
of  any  phenomenon.  Connecting  back  to  an  earlier  discussion  on  speculative  theory,  
there   have   been   criticisms   on   how   theory   privileges   the   abstract   illustration   of  
physical   phenomenon   rather   than   consider   a   more   intuitively   ‘physical’   way   for  
producing   interpretations   of   physical   observables   without   overdependence   on  
mathematical   abstraction.   An   illumination   to   this   question   has   been   provided   by  
Helge  Kragh,  by  way  of  an  example  in  the  history  of  quantum  mechanics  where  the  
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utility  of  theory  has  little  to  do  with  comprehension  at  the  theoretical  and  ontological  
level.   According   to   Kragh,   “Max   Born   believed   in   1923   that   ‘the  whole   system   of  
concepts  of  physics  must  be  reconstructed  from  the  ground  up’  (Forman  1968,159).  It  
was  also  Born  who  coined  the  term  ‘quantum  mechanics’  in  a  1924  paper,  whereby  
he   dealt   with   the   problematic   translation   of   classical   formulas   in   their   quantum-­‐‑
theoretic  analogs  by  means  of  the  correspondence  principle”  (159).  The  inadequacy  
of   the   Bohr-­‐‑Sommerfeld   theory   (known   as   the   classical   quantum   theory)   was  
recognized   and   the  name  of   its   successor   –   quantum  mechanics   –  was   coined   at   a  
time   before   anybody   knew   how   to   provide   a   coherent   explanation.   Quantum  
mechanics  might  be  foundational  to  the  formation  of  the  standard  theory  of  particle  
physics  but   the  ontological  crutch  provided  by  classical  quantum  physics   is   still   in  
use   in   the   standard   theory   because   of   the   prescriptive   delimitations   of   quantum  
mechanics.  
2.5 Conclusion 
As   this   chapter   establishes   the   theoretical   motivations   whence   my   work  
departs,   it  grounds   the  multiple   facets  of   theories,  at  a  cultural  and  scientific   level,  
that   will   become   relevant   and   fundamental   to   the   discussions   on  
measurement/interpretation,   observation,   and   modeling   in   the   next   chapters.   In  
these   chapters,   I   hope   to   demonstrate   the   important   connections   between  
experimental   particle   physics   and   its   theories,   foundational   questions   in   quantum  
  80  
theory,   and   science.   Then,   we   will   see   how   the   investigations   into   these   areas  
produce  critical  readings  that  can  be  applied  to  other  relevant  subjects.  
By  the  time  I  get  to  the  concluding  chapter,  I  hope  to  have  demonstrated  how  
speculative  physics  can  be  a  productive  methodology  for  formulating  novel  scientific  
and   philosophical   relationships   and   constructs;   providing   new   insights   into   the  
collaboration  between  physics  and  literature,  by  way  of  science  fiction,  for  inscribing  
a   transdisciplinarily   enriched   and   staunchly   rigorous   theoretical   interface  
constructed  of  physical  and  literary  theories;  producing  a  politically  yet  scientifically  
informed  critical  philosophy  of  the  cybernetics  by  way  of  understanding  its  relation  
to   quantum   states   and   the  Monte  Carlo;   and   finally,   the  potential   for   re-­‐‑reading   a  
different   form   of   media-­‐‑technical   history   through   the   frame   of   a   new   theoretical  
space   through   the   new   theories   that   emerged   out   of   the   Monte-­‐‑Carlo-­‐‑cybernetic  
dyadic   relationship.   I   hope   to   demonstrate   how   understanding   the   historical   and  
philosophical   implication   and   narrative   of   the   Higgs   boson   can   provide   useful  
insight,  albeit  indirectly,  to  the  reading  of  speculative  epistemology  in  science  fiction.  
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…not  many  days   later,   someone   came   to  me   and   expressed   his   bewilderment  with   the   fact  
that  we  make  a  rather  narrow  selection  when  choosing  the  data  on  which  we  test  our  theories.  
“How  do  we  know  that,   if  we  made  a   theory  which   focuses   its   attention  on  phenomena  we  
disregard   and   disregards   some   of   the   phenomena   now   commanding   our   attention,   that  we  
could  not  build  another  theory  which  has   little   in  common  with  the  present  one  but  which,  
nevertheless,  explains  just  as  many  phenomena  as  the  present  theory?”  It  has  to  be  admitted  
that  we  have  no  definite  evidence  that  there  is  no  such  theory.  (Wigner,  The  Unreasonable  
Effectiveness  of  Mathematics  in  the  Natural  Sciences,  1960).  
3. Interpreting and Measuring: the Fiction of the Higgs 
and the Fable of Fundamental Interpretation 
In  his  recent  essay  “The  Garden  of  Live  Flowers,”1  noted  theoretical  physicist  
and   1969   Nobel   Laureate,   Murray   Gell-­‐‑Mann,   reminisced   about   the   important  
formative  influence  he  had  as  a  graduate  student:  
I  suffered,  at  least  as  much  as  other  students,  from  an  infatuation  with  
beautiful   formalism.   Working   with   Viki   Weisskopf   was   a   most  
effective  remedy  against  the  excesses  of  such  an  infatuation.  He  never  
ceased   to  harp  on   the   importance  of   ‘pedestrian’  work   in   theoretical  
physics   and   on   understanding,   by   means   of   simple   arguments,   the  
physical  meaning  of  a  theory  and  its  implications.  He  also  stressed  the  
need   to   learn   about   the   relevant   experimental   evidence   and   to   use  
theory   to   interpret   that   evidence   and   predict   the   results   of   new  
experimental  work  (111).  
Were  we   to   extrapolate   the  meaning   of   ‘experiment’   beyond  Gell-­‐‑Mann’s   original  
intention,  we  can  represent   ‘experiment’  as  a  an  emerging  praxis   that  puts  physics  
                                                                                                             
1  Murray  Gell-­‐‑Mann:  Selected  Papers.  World  Scientific  Series  in  20th  Century  Physics  Vol  40.  Ed.  Harald  
Fritzsch.  Singapore:  World  Scientific  Publishing  Co.  Pte.  Ltd,  2009.  
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theories   into   interactions  with   fictive  models   of   science.   I   aspire   to   complicate   the  
denotation   of   the   “pedestrian”   beyond   a   mere   monolithic   reference   to   routine  
scientific   work   that   would   consider   metaphysical   interventions   into   scientific  
questions  that  complicate  the  current  debates  in  physical  realism  and  materialism.    
Therefore,   through   the  deployment  of   the   critical   framework  of   speculative  
theory   that   I   aspire   to   re-­‐‑read   the   foundations   of   the  Higgs   boson   prediction   and  
discovery   against   the  ongoing   elucidation  and   interpretive   enigma   that   inform   the  
work   within   the   foundations   of   quantum   physics.   As   for   what   the   historical   and  
philosophical  narrative  of  the  Higgs  boson  can  do  to  contribute  to  reconfiguring  the  
epistemic   foundations   of   quantum   physics,   or   to   the   reconstitution   of  
physical/scientific   laws   in   our   approach   to   new   physics,   one   might   consider   the  
significance   of   the   Higgs   boson’s   epistemic   position   in   relation   to   larger  
metaphysical   questions   in   quantum   physics,   the   questions   that   underlie   the  
constitution  and  problematics  of  the  Standard  Model.    
In  a  sense,  the  manifestation  of  the  Higgs  boson  is  a  consequence  of  how  the  
quantum   physical   interactions   have   been   interpreted   and   identified,   therefore  
pushing   forward   the   development   of   one   particular   form   of   analysis   over   that   of  
another.      This   goes   as   far   as   how   the   quantum   measurement   can   then   be  
reconstituted   in   terms   of   how   the   quantum   subsystems   are   perceived   to   behave  
within   spatial   conditions,   especially   in   terms   of   how   they   communicate   among  
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themselves   and  with   the   physically   positioned   observer.   Therefore,   how  we   think  
about  measurement  and  observation  at  the  fundamental  level,  and  what  we  choose  
to  ignore,  is  what  also  gives  shape  to  theoretical  methods  in  the  less  interpretation-­‐‑
directed,  and  more  prediction-­‐‑concerned,  subfields  of  physics.    
In  light  of  that,  I  have  assembled  three  versions  of  the  double-­‐‑slit  experiment  
to  provide  the  most  fundamental  demonstration  of  a  compromise  between  the  rules  
of  classical  physics  with  that  of  quantum  physics  at  varying  degrees,  a  compromise  
that  is  also  symbolized  by  the  Standard  Model.  However,  the  double-­‐‑slit  experiment  
I   am   depicting   in   this   chapter   is   but   a   fictive   simplification   of   the   more   complex  
question  of  entanglement,  and  environment-­‐‑system  communications,  involved  in  the  
discernment   of   local-­‐‑non-­‐‑local   causality.      The   fictive   models   push   the   logical  
boundary   of   metaphysics   and   physics   as   are   embodied   by   the   manifold  
representations  of  the  double-­‐‑slit  experiment  that  also  involves  the  foregrounding  of  
logical  gaps  that  are  the  cause  of  the  physical  paradoxes.    
As  had  been  discussed  through  the  presentation  of  the  double-­‐‑slit  experiment  
in   the   previous   chapter,   speculative   physics,   by   way   of   speculative   theory,  
foregrounds,  and  fictionalizes,   in  the  sense  of  artificially  suppressing  certain  effects  
to  highlight  the  what-­‐‑ifs  of  other  more  subdued  and  less  observable  effects,  in  terms  
of  the  privileging  of  a  particular  interpretation  of  quantum  theory  for  reasons  having  
to  do  with  mathematical  formalisms  that  could  then  produce  the  narrative  structures  
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for   interpretation   to   take   place.   It   is   this   narrative   interpretation   that   sets   up   the  
chain   of   events   involving   the   different   interactions   of   nature   embodied   by   the  
Standard  Model.  The  stage  for  that  interpretation,  with  the  two  main  actors  being  the  
Higgs  boson  and  the  double  slit  experiment,  is  set  when  we  see  what  it  means  to  talk  
about   the   classical   to   quantum   journey   of   the  double   slit   experiment   that   produce  
effects  that  could  later  be  the  Higgs  boson,  with  the  latter  representing  the  next  level  
of  development  in  the  sage  of  particles  versus  fields.  
Therefore,  I  am  proposing  that  the  realization  of  the  Higgs  boson  within  the  
Standard   Model,   and   the   information   produced   from   the   interference   and  
decoherence   of   the   double-­‐‑slit   experiment,   represent   two   spatially   separate  
subsystems   forming   a   composite   system   of   epistemic   micro-­‐‑actions.   The   two  
subsystems   are   connected   through   a   complex   network   of   interactions   involving  
microphysical   entities   that   ‘perform’   to   classically   situated   detectors   and   channels  
transmitting   their   properties   and   structures   to   the   physicist-­‐‑observer.   Moreover,  
ongoing   research   into   these   two   subsystems,   in   high-­‐‑energy   particle   physics   and  
quantum  foundations,  means   the  production  of  experiments   that  could  change  our  
understanding   of   classical-­‐‑quantum   interactions,   and   reconstitute   current  
computational  tools.  
The  seemingly   tenuous  connection  between  the  prediction  and  discovery  of  
the   Higgs   boson,   with   that   of   the   double-­‐‑slit   experiment,   is   merely   deceptive;   in  
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actuality,   both   processes   are   sub-­‐‑parts   of   an   ontological   entailment   of   the   field-­‐‑
particle  model  of   symmetry.  Both  are   components   that  play   important   roles   in   the  
unfolding  drama  of   speculative   theory,  being  as   they  are,  part  of  a  chain  of  events  
that  had  come  a   long  way  from  the  early  years  of  quantum  interpretations  even  as  
their   origins   preceded   the   quantum   revolution.   Further,   the   physics   foundations  
underlying  the  phenomenon  produced  in  the  double-­‐‑slit  experiment  are  of  the  same  
kind  that  underlies  the  Higgs  boson.  In  a  sense,  the  double-­‐‑slit  experiment  interprets  
the   structure,   and   epistemic  path,   surrounding   the  Higgs  prediction,   one  of  which  
involves  the  uncovering  of  certain  properties  of  non-­‐‑relativistic  quantum  mechanics  
that  would  have  implication  on  quantum  field  theories.  The  decades  of  fretting  over  
the  (in)completeness  and  informational   instability  of  quantum  mechanics  has  come  
full  circle  with  the  development  of  quantum  computational  technology  that  can  have  
reflexive   impact   on   how   quantum   measurement   will   be   performed   and  
comprehended  in  classically-­‐‑operated  communications.  This  will  be  discussed  more  
of  in  chapter  seven.  
First  and  foremost,  the  double-­‐‑slit  experiment  can  be  used  to  demonstrate  the  
qualities  of  the  electromagnetic  force  by  illustrating  both  the  field-­‐‑like  and  particle-­‐‑
like  qualities   of   the  photons.  That   the   electrons  behave   in   the   same  manner   as   the  
photons  shows  how  the  quantizability  of  the  most  fundamental  boson  and  fermion  
would   allow   unification   to   take   place   between   the   electromagnetic   and   weak  
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interactions   to   form   the   electroweak   coupling   necessary   as   we   approach   an  
increasing  possibility  of  unification  between  the  different  dimensions  of  interactions.  
Further,   the   double-­‐‑slit   experiment,   by   way   of   the   Feynman   experiment   with   the  
electron  to  be  discussed  later  in  this  chapter  (and  briefly  mentioned  in  Appendix  A),  
is  the  simplest  representation  of  the  properties  of  electrodynamics.    
In   the   second   instance,   the   double-­‐‑slit   experiment   can   also   be   used   to  
demonstrate   quantum   entanglement,   and   the   role   of   the   Bell   theorem,   in  
understanding  the  epistemic  formation  of  the  Higgs  boson  and  the  potential  for  the  
future  simulation  of  the  latter’s  property  through  quantum  computation.  In  fact,  the  
finessing   of   the   Bell   Inequality   theorem   is   necessary   because   of   the   conceptual  
difficulties  of  (in)determinism,  (im)precision,  and  (un)certainty  that  have  demonized  
quantum   causality   in   the   eyes   of   physicists   while   also   finding   greater  
commensurability   between   technological   applicability   and   ontological  
prescriptivism.  
  In   the   third   instance,   the   multiple   variants   of   the   double-­‐‑slit   experiment,  
evolving   since   its   earliest   demonstration   in   the   18th   century,   are   deploying  
increasingly   massive   particles   to   produce   a   more   sophisticated   approach   to  
measurement  needed  for  excavating  an  increasing  amount  of  information  pertaining  
to   the   Higgs.   The   rationale   for   producing   the   three   versions   of   the   double-­‐‑slit  
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experiments,  the  actual  and  fictive  revisions  from  the  real,  will  be  explained  later  in  
the  chapter.    
Nevertheless,   I   would   like   the   reader   to   understand   that   the   connections  
between   quantum   informatics   and   particle   physics   made   in   this   chapter   via   the  
double-­‐‑slit  experiment  and  the  Higgs  boson  is  only  a  basic  demonstration  that  could  
be  developed  in  a  separate  work.  The  purpose  for  presenting  the  connections  as  such  
will   become   clearer   by   the   penultimate   chapter,   as   I   proceed   through   alternate  
readings  of   speculative   theory  and  experiment  as   they  apply   to   the  analysis  of   the  
narrative  of   the  Higgs  boson  and   selected  works  of   science   fiction   centered  on   the  
physics.  Moreover,  in  my  readings  of  the  works  of  fiction  that  have  been  selected  for  
this   dissertation,   one   will   be   able   to   see   the   re-­‐‑enactment   of   the   aesthetics   and  
philosophies  through  the  variants  of  the  double-­‐‑slit  experiments,  not  to  mention  the  
scientific  imaginary  that  can  be  conjured  up  as  a  result  of  the  synthesis  between  the  
conceptual  embodiment  of  the  experiments  and  science  fictional  works.  
This  is  the  first  time,  as  far  as  I  am  aware,  that  a  form  of  critical  longue  durée  
of   the   history   of   the   Higgs   boson   has   been   put   together,   in   this   chapter   and  
Appendix   A,2   with   the   objective   of   making   explicit,   the   inseparability   of   the  
                                                                                                             
2  The  most  recent  attempt  at  a  historical  narrative  of  the  Higgs  boson  was  produced  by  Ellis  et  al.  “A  
Historical  Profile  of  the  Higgs  boson”  (2012),  that  provides  a  good  recent  technical  history  that  explains  
the  current  status  of  the  discovery  of  the  Higgs  boson  in  relation  to  the  incommensurability  during  the  
early  days  of  its  theoretical  formation  and  experimental  interest  (or  lack,  thereof).  However,  the  paper  is  
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fundamentals  of  quantum  theories   from  the  preoccupations  of  high-­‐‑energy  particle  
physics.   In   retrospect,   certain   conceptual   and   ontological   puzzles   in   the   history   of  
quantum  physics  can  either  be  clarified  or  amplified  when  viewed  in  relation  to  the  
historical   development   of   the   Standard   Model   Higgs   boson,   and   beyond   the  
Standard  Model.    
The   discovery   of   the   Higgs   boson   can   be   read   as   a   recovery   of   a   specific  
epistemological   pursuit   of   quantum   theory,   and   therefore,   as   part   of   a   contiguous  
narrative   (though   not   continuous   because   of   a   multiplicity   of   disruptions   in   the  
historiography   of   its   narrative)   marking   the   early   developments   of   modern  
(quantum)  physics  for  configuring  the  different  scales  of  interactions  in  fundamental  
physics.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  also  the  element  of  surprise  in  the  sense  of  the  
unexpectedness  of  discovery  despite  a  setup  premised  on  particular  expectations  of  
discovery;   the   unexpectedness   that   justifies   the   existence   of   the   Higgs   boson   is   a  
consequence   of   the   serendipitous   coming   together   of   the   right   data   in   the   right  
places,  where  the  act  of  discovery  is  not  coincidental.  
With  regard  to  how  we  can  situate   the  acts  of  discovery  and   justification  of  
the  Standard  Model  Higgs  boson  in  relation  to  extant  physical  laws,  I  problematize  
                                                                                                             
  
nowhere  as  extensive  as  what  I  am  doing  here  since  I  am  building  on  more  materials  that  have  emerged  
since  that  time.  
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the   conventional   wisdom   of   the   laws   governing   the   physical   real   that   insist   on  
thorough  independence  from  being  implicated  by  all  of  the  other  life  forms,  without  
considering  that  one  cannot,  with  certainty,  know  the  difference  between  laws  that  
are  anthropically  dependent  and   laws  that  are  not,  given  our  ability   for  measuring  
such   differences   is  weak   and   constituted   by   our   position   as   an   observer.   In   other  
words,   even   if   we   can   imagine   a   distinction   between   the   universals   and   the  
particulars,  we  could  not  do  so  physically  without  being  implicated  in  the  outcome  
of  that  observation,  as  demonstrated  by  the  paradox  of  the  wave-­‐‑particle  duality  and  
Heisenberg’s  Uncertainty  Principle.    
The  problem  of  such  ontological  distinctions  has  also  been  the  Achilles  heels  
of   the   Standard  Model.   However,   as   Norman   Swartz   notes   in   his   essay   “A   Neo-­‐‑
Humean  Perspective:  Laws  as  Regularities,”   in   the  Regularity  Theory,   contingency  
and   the   conditional   are  properties   of   the  physical   laws,   but   both  properties,   in  his  
opinion,   have   strictly   physical   (non-­‐‑organic)   characteristics   (71).   Perhaps,   in   this  
case,  we  need  to  differentiate  between  a  purely  metaphysical  artifact  and  a  scientific  
datum   before   considering   how   that   distinction   can   then   be   applied   to   the  
redefinition  of  the  Standard  Model  Higgs  within  the  framework  of  new  physics.  
Measurement  conceived  at  a  metaphysical  level  acts  as  counterfactual  to  the  
physical   measurement.   However,   a   metaphysical   measurement   lays   no   claim   on  
being  able  to  provide  a  quantifiable  prescription  of  a  phenomenon,  as  the  purpose  is  
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not  the  production  of  a  definite  empirical  value.  Instead,  metaphysical  measurement  
supplements   the   subjective   domain   of   a   physical   measurement   by   becoming   a  
platform   for  modeling   the  what-­‐‑ifs   derived  of   varying  parameters   that   are   neither  
homogenous   nor   linearly   computable.   Those   outputs   are   not   confined   to   arbitrary  
values,  but  rather,  point  to  a  domain  of  potential  possibilities  produced  through  the  
transformation  of  initial  values  to  obtain  a  range  of  non-­‐‑trivial  possibilities.    
Then,   there   is   an   important   linear  differential   equation   function   (where   the  
problems   of   a   geometrical   and   algebraic   nature   converge)   known   as   the   Green’s  
function   that   shapes   the  path   integral  computations   in  quantum  field   theories;   this  
function   is   an   example   of   a   negotiation   between   the   physical   and   metaphysical  
because  of  its  position  as  a  mathematical  operator  that  serves  the  specific  non-­‐‑trivial  
needs   of   second-­‐‑order   differential   equations,   whereby   particular   homogeneous  
boundary   conditions   of   the   inhomogeneous   linear   equations   could   lead,   or   not,   to  
the  construction  of  the  Green’s  function  for  obtaining  unique  solutions.  The  Green’s  
function   also   allows   discontinuities   to   be   calculated.   Therefore,   the   metaphysical  
quality   of   the   Green’s   function   supplements   the   fulfillment   of   a   physical   need   by  
generalizing   from   particular   solutions   to   more   general   principles,   counterfactuals,  
and  physical   laws.  One   can   interpret   the   role  of   the  Green’s   function  as   that  of   an  
‘observer’  that  has  to  deal  with  a  probabilistic  range  of  possible  solutions  in  second-­‐‑
order  equations  when  a  road-­‐‑block  emerges  in  the  form  of  a  discontinuity.  
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As  Norton   asserts   in  A  Primer   on  Determinism,   “observation   combined  with  
inductive   reasoning  may   recommend   one   hypothesis   over   all   others,   but   rarely,   if  
ever,   does   the   combination   yield   a   confidence   that   approaches   the   certainty   with  
which   Laplace’s   demon  went   about   its   prediction   tasks”   (66).   In   other  words,   the  
recommendation  of  a  solution  can  at  best  only  be  probabilistically  determined  by  a  
measurable   datum,   for   as   Whitehead   argues,   “the   data   upon   which   the   subject  
passes   judgment   are   themselves   components   conditioning   the   character   of   the  
judging  subject”  (203).    
Moreover,   the   Laplacian   ideal   of   deterministic   finitude,   where   the  
instantaneously   conceived   physical   magnitudes   and   time   derivatives   of   all  
mathematical   orders   are   contained,   can   only   work   when   the   quantum   system  
utilizes  semi-­‐‑classical  physics  approaches  grounded  on  the  macrostate.  Even  so,  one  
has  to  make  sure  that  there  are  no  contradictions  and  violations  of  any  laws  in  how  
the  evaluative  analytics  are  done  in  moving  back  and  forth  between  the  classical  and  
quantum   worlds.      Nevertheless,   given   the   relativity   of   the   metric   used   for   the  
measurement   of   any   observation,   can   one   decide   as   to   what   constitutes   the   most  
reliable   method   for   dealing   with   truth-­‐‑claims   without   including   the   epistemic  
context?  Could  preparation  at   the  pre-­‐‑measurement  stage  that  sharply  foregrounds  
the   entity   of   observational   interest   only   provide   as   much   information   as   the  
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deployed   epistemic   context   would   allow,   therefore   shaping   the   ethics   of  
metaphysical  interpretation?  
As   John   Bell   suggests,   in   a   different   context,   one’s   ‘moral’   relation   to   a  
physical  representation  is  a  cumulative  effect  of  the  interaction  between  a  quantum  
system   and   its   measuring   instrument,   where   a   normalization   factor   is   needed   to  
ensure   that   the   probability   of   the   outcome   of   a   measurement   made   of   two  
eigenstates  (or  states  of  definite  values),  either  simultaneously  or  one  after  the  other,  
remains   the   same.      This   is  what   Bell   refers   to   as  Wigner’s   “reduction   of   the  wave  
packet,”   which   was,   ironically,   a   method   for   expanding   the   initial   conditions   of  
observable   quantities   by   ‘cutting’   out   the   unobservable   before   renormalizing   the  
remainder.  The  metaphysical  ethics   (morality)   in  quantum  mechanics,  as  proposed  
by  Bell,  advocates  for  a  measurement  system  that  does  the  least  damage,  due  to  the  
production  of  erroneous  readings,  to  the  initial  state  of  the  system  that  is  prepped  for  
measurement,   so   that   the   outcome   is   “consistent   with   the   requirement   that   an  
immediate  repetition  of  the  measurement  gives  the  same  result”  (23).3    
When  Bell  wrote  on  the  aforementioned  question,  he  was  thinking  about  the  
process   of   scattering   and   interaction   between   particles   such   as   the   proton   and  
neutron,  and  his  suggestion  that  one  might  want  to  measure  the  process  rather  than  
                                                                                                             
3  See  “The  Moral  Aspect  of  Quantum  Mechanics”  in  J.S.  Bell’s  Speakable  and  Unspeakable  in  Quantum  
Mechanics.  Second  Ed.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2004.  
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the  initial  and  final  state,  considers  process  as  a  way  of  circumventing  the  physical  
ambiguity  that  arises  from  certain  mathematical  derivations  of  quantum  mechanics,  
even   if   there   are   problems   with   measurement   reproducibility   due   to   the  
unpredictability  of  the  outcome.  Hence,  one  is  faced  with  a  morality  tale  that  defines  
the   analytical   and   interpretive   choices   made   in   the   correlations   between   the  
prediction  of  the  Higgs  boson  and  its  potential  empirical  representation.  Further,  one  
might  have  to  consider  the  ontological  decoupling  of  what  we  understand  about  the  
Higgs  boson  from  the  constraints  of  the  Standard  Model  to  get  to  new  physics.    
The   winding   narrative   of   the   Higgs   boson   provides   rich   material   for  
illustrating  how  speculative  theory  works.  In  the  five  decades  between  its  prediction  
in  1964  and  materialization  as  a  result  of  progress  made  in  the  discoveries  of  other  
elementary   particles,   the  Higgs   boson   holds   the   promise   of   reaffirming   an   almost  
century   old   history   of   particle   physics   while   straddling   the   increase   in   the  
permeability  of  the  theory  into  higher  degrees  of  freedom,  and  therefore,  extending  
the  reach  of  the  Standard  Model  beyond  its  current  realm.  In  other  words,  the  Higgs  
boson   can   be   both   a   counterfactual   to   the   Standard  Model   as   well   as   a   bridge   to  
beyond  the  Standard  Model.  However,   that  will  be  dependent  on  what  the  current  
data   that   has   accumulated   from   experimental   triggers   of   the   Higgs   search   can  
provide;   such   as   what   can   be   extrapolated   for   further   analysis   when   seen   a  
framework   located   beyond   the   Standard   Model,   with   epistemic   meanings  
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foreshadowed   by   seeming   anomalies   that   no   current   theories   could   adequately  
explain  away.  
The   historiography   of   the   Higgs   boson   contains   multiple   points   of  
experimental   and   theoretical   convergences.   The   narrative   of   the  Higgs   boson   also  
highlights,   albeit   indirectly,   the   metaphysical   conceptualization   of   energy   that  
follows  from  developments   in  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  century  history  of  science  
of  microphysical  matter  that  constitutes  physical  quantities  with  both  traceable  and  
less  traceable  causalities.  The  ontology  of  the  bosonic  field  is  mediated  by  different  
energy  states,  with  their  eigenfunctions  encompassing  a  range  of  predictability  that  
could   be   reshaped,   depending   on   how   we   analyze   the   interactions   between   the  
micro-­‐‑entities  constituting  the  energy  and  its  environment.    
Since   we   know   that   the   quantum   field   theories   underlying   the   Standard  
Model  are  constructed  because  of  a  need  to  project  the  quantization  of  energy  onto  
space-­‐‑time,   the   most   basic   description   of   the   QFTs   are   the   oscillating/vibrating  
fundamental  particles  mediating  the  various  interactions  that  can  be  experienced  by  
matter  and  the  interactions  that  perturb  the  bosons  at  their  ground,  and  most  stable,  
state.  The   formalism   that  grounds  quantum   field   theories   is   subject   to  multiple   re-­‐‑
theorizations  by  philosophers  and  physicists,  each  working  towards  the  best  theory  
for  an  experimental  production  across  different  scales  of  quantizations,  such  as  that  
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of   energy.4   Further,   quantum   field   theories   provide   the   platform   for   developing  
metaphysical  conceptualization  of  the  unitarily  symmetrical  arguments  pertaining  to  
the   relationships   between   the   different   elementary   particles   necessary   for  
understanding  their  interactions.    
Philosophically,   I   am   interested   in   expanding   the   discussion   of   ontology,  
particularly  with  regard  to  how  existing  theorems  can  be  reconstituted  for  producing  
more   ontologically   causal   interpretations.   David   Bohm   and   Basil   Hiley’s   The  
Undivided   Universe:   An   Ontological   Interpretation   of   Quantum   Theory   revisits   the  
original   equations   of   quantum   mechanics   to   reconsider   previously   neglected  
parameters   for   producing   solutions   that   can   amplify   outcomes   not   already   made  
clear   in   previous   iterations   of   solutions.   Such   considerations   may   lead   to   the  
convergence  of  more  deterministic  outcomes  by  concentrating  on  what  is  observable  
while   minimizing   the   non-­‐‑observables   (paralleling   Bell’s   own   interpretive  
suggestion).   For   the   most   part,   the   Bohm-­‐‑Hiley   interpretation   is   considered   a  
maverick  and  not  given  sufficient  attention  by  physicists  who  are  not  among  those  
                                                                                                             
4  On  the  theoretical  side  of  things,  there  have  been  no  shortage  of  claims  for  having  successfully  found  
methods   to  achieve   that  quantization  and   that  not  all  means   for  doing  so  are  purely  mathematical   in  
nature.   One   of   the   latest   examples   is   Michael   Epperson   and   Elias   Zafiris’s   Foundations   of   Relational  
Realism:   A   Topological   Approach   to   Quantum   Mechanics   and   the   Philosophy   of   Nature.   Lanham,   MD:  
Lexington  Books,   2013   that  deploys  Whiteheadian   realism  and   topology   towards   that   end.  Epperson  
and  Zaffiris’s  return  to  ordinary  quantum  mechanics  and  propose  sheaf  theory;  a  theory  that  grew  out  
of   the   abstract   algebra   of   topology   and   set   theory;   as   a   solution   to   the   stubborn  paradoxes   found   in  
quantization   attempts.   They   then   read   the   theory’s   interpretive   value   against   Whitehead’s   category  
scheme  found  in  Process  and  Reality.  
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already   interested   in   the   emergent   studies   of   quantum   theory.   Nevertheless,  
physicists  and  philosophers  have  similar  vested  interests  in  ascertaining  how  much  
of   the  classical  approaches   to  quantum  theory  can  be   retained  and  what  had   to  be  
relinquished.  
Hence,   while   measurement   is   the   bread   and   butter   of   the   foundations   of  
quantum   interpretation,   in   the   recent   decade,   attention   has   shifted   to   the  
experimental   implications   of   realizing   the   different   ‘realities’   of   what  would   have  
been   formalistically   derived   through   experiments.   This   is   highlighted   by  
developments   in   the   applications   of   quantum   theory,   where   the   earlier   thought  
experiments  that  Richard  P  Feynman  discusses  in  his  QED:  the  Strange  Theory  of  Light  
and  Matter  are  materialized  by  way  of  the  detectors  and  instruments  built  to  collect  
and  contain  the  data.  In  fact,  members  of  the  quantum  foundations  community  have  
been   discussing   the   experiments   produced   as   variations   of   the   classical-­‐‑quantum  
interactions  of  light  and  matter,  as  represented  by  a  zero-­‐‑mass  boson  (photon)  and  a  
fermion   (electron).   The   division   of   these   ‘particles,’   each   representing   the   most  
fundamental   particle   of   each   category,   instantiates   the   formal   theories   of  
measurement   that   would   describe   the   interactions   of   the   Standard   Model   gauge  
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forces  whence  prediction  for  the  Higgs  boson,  and  its  accompanying  mechanism,  is  
derived.5    
In   their   capacity   for   highlighting   the   ruptures   and   contiguities   in   the  
Standard  Model,  I  posit  photons  and  electrons  as  fundamental  entities  amply  suited  
to   act   as  measurement   controls   in   the   quest   for   getting   as   near   as   possible   to   the  
ontology   of   quantum  physics,  which   are   then  magnified   in  mixed-­‐‑state  multiplets  
(subatomic   groupings   of   particles)   of   the   Standard   Model.   At   the   same   time,   the  
discovery   and   confirmation   of   the   properties   of   these   two   particles   represent   the  
turning   point   whereby   microphysical   entities   can   be   fully   considered   within   a  
quantum  model  without   the   crutch  of   classical   theory.  Each  has   an   important   role  
within   the   hierarchical   network   of   the   Standard  Model.  While   both   exude   similar  
material   phenomenon   in   the   double-­‐‑slit   experiment,   the   fact   that   the   electron  
produces  wave-­‐‑like  interferences  was  not  confirmed  until  fairly  recently.6    
If   the   photon   is   located   at   the   intersection   of   the   space-­‐‑time   symmetries   of  
relativity  with  quantum  energetic  transmission,  it  is  the  electron,  with  its  small  mass  
                                                                                                             
5  There  has  not  been  a  consensus  in  the  physics  community  over  the  naming  of  this  mechanism,  usually  
referred  to  as  the  Higgs  mechanism,  because  of  the  perception  that  the  actual  work  done  on  it  had  been  
due  to  the  creative  contribution  of  multiple  individuals,  some  of  whom  may  not  be  completely  aware  of  
the  game-­‐‑changing  importance  of  their  respective  contribution  at  the  time.      





unit   charge,   and   point-­‐‑like   countenance,   that   is   used   for   demarcating   interactive  
capabilities  of  a  single  and  many-­‐‑body  particle  system  (even  if  most  examples  do  not  
name  the  electron  specifically).  The  energetic  exchange  processes  between  electrons  
(spin   ½)   that   produce   photons   (spin   1)   as   the   energy   absorbed   and   emitted  
represents   the   electromagnetic   force.  Moreover,   the  photons   and   electrons   that   are  
everywhere   indistinguishable   in   their   behavior,   when   considered   individually,  
exhibit  more  distinguishable  markers   in   collective   interactions  with  other   fermions  
and  bosons.    
Therefore,   what   I   would   like   to   do   is   to   show   how   the   concept   of  
measurement   can   unite   the   seemingly   unrelated   foundational   theories   in   non-­‐‑
relativistic   quantum   mechanics   with   the   quantum   field-­‐‑like   developments   of   the  
Standard   Model   Higgs   boson.   Further,   interpretation   has   a   role   to   play   in  
rationalizing   the   observability   of   physical   properties   (both   the   hidden   and   not-­‐‑so-­‐‑
hidden  qualities).  The  virtual  particles,  because  of  the  role  they  play  in  mediating  the  
interactions   of   real   particles   (best   defined   by   the   Feynman   diagram),   perform  
interpretation   through   those   interactions.  Additionally,   interpretation   is   critical   for  
differentiating   between   measurements   in   classical,   semi-­‐‑classical,   and   properly  
quantum  mechanical   systems,  given  how  that  would  modify  our   interpretations  of  
measurement.  
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Energy,   in   its  philosophical  and  material   invocation,   is  also  a  protagonist   in  
the  story  of  the  Standard  Model  Higgs  boson.  One  cannot  properly  explain  why  the  
Higgs  boson   appears   to   be   the  unsurprising  outcome  of   an  ontologically   impotent  
Standard  Model  if  we  do  not  account  for  the  phenomenon  of  energy,  the  same  kind  
of   energy   that   formulated   the   aforementioned   Bose-­‐‑Einstein   and   Fermi-­‐‑Dirac  
statistical   rules.   Without   the   concept   of   energy,   and   a   systematic   way   for  
demarcating   its  existence,  one  might  not  have  witnessed  the  mechanical  revolution  
of  physics,  the  boom  of  big  science,  Einstein’s  theories  of  relativity,  both  physics  and  
science  fiction’s  conception  of  time  travel,  and  the  discovery  of  the  Higgs  boson  that  
earned  the  2013  Nobel  Prize  in  physics.    
There  is  also  a  sense  of  precarity  in  energy  at  multiple  levels:  a  precarity  that  
is  bred  by  the  instability  of  our  epistemic  presentation  of  empirical  evidence  gleaned  
through  a  manipulation  of  physical  techniques  to  access  the  energy.  While  attempts  
are   made   to   render   equivalent   the   different   formal   representations   of   energy   for  
calculational   efficiency;   as   were   developed   in   the   works   of   Lagrange,   Hamilton,  
Bohr,   Einstein,   Heisenberg,   and   Schrödinger,   among   others;   computational  
equivalence  does   not   translate   to   philosophical   equivalence,   if   only   because   of   the  
metaphysical  features  of  the  theories.  
We   might   ask:   how   does   understanding   energy,   in   all   its   abstract   and  
material  manifestations,  help  edge  us  closer   to   the  ontological  question  of   life?  The  
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crossing   between   different   scales   that   energy   performs   with   impunity,   from  
cosmology/astrophysics   to  particle  physics,  and  a  mesoscopic  spectrum  of  physical  
sciences  between  the  aforementioned  two,  are  scaled  up  or  down,  and  are  plugged  
into  different  types  of  models  used  for  interpreting  the  long-­‐‑standing  fictions  of  both  
cosmological  and  subatomic  scales,  such  as  dark  energy  and  the  magnetic  monopole.  
In  the  next  section,  I  consider  why  the  prediction  of  the  Higgs  Boson  is  inevitable  by  
examining  the  confluence  of  events  in  the  development  of  quantum  field  theories.  
3.1 The Higgs boson and its Speculative Denouement for the 
Standard Model 
The   development   of   the   Standard  Model  Higgs   boson   (or   the  Higgs   boson  
that   resides   beyond   the   Standard   Model)   is   a   composite   for   approximating   the  
relational  ontology  between  different  elementary  building  blocks   to   form  a  unified  
ontological   understanding   of   the   universe.   The   bosons   have   a   pivotal   role   in   the  
quantization   of   SU(n)   interactions   such   as   the   electroweak   (W/Z)   and   quantum  
chromodynamics  (the  theory  of  strong  interactions).  However,  there  has  not  been  a  
clear  explanation  of  how  supersymmetry  connects  to  the  prediction  of  the  Higgs  and  
experimental  explication.  The  theoretically  developed  supersymmetry  might  not  be  
a  physical   entity   even   if   it   is   a   legitimate   computational  method   that   supplements  
the  inadequacies  of  the  Standard  Model;  one  might  want  to  consider  it,  instead,  as  a  
mathematical  stopgap  with  a  metaphysical  rationale.  Therefore,  supersymmetry  has  
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a   phenomenological   role   for   bridging   the   goals   of   theory   building   with   that   of  
experiment.  
Fermions,   via   the   Fermi-­‐‑Dirac  weak   interactions,   are   important   as   the   first  
step   towards   achieving   unitarity   and   symmetry.   With   the   unification   of   the  
electromagnetic  and  weak  force,  physicists  began  working  on  experiments  to  search  
for   the   existence   of   very   specific   bosonic   particles   predicted   to   mediate   the  
electroweak   force   (specifically   massive   W   and   Z   bosons).      The   process   of   the  
mediation   of   the   electroweak   force,   and   other   quantizable   forces   of   the   Standard  
Model,   is   supported   by   gauge   theory   as   the   latter   is   important   for   resolving   the  
problem   of   infinities   and   mathematical   divergences   surrounding   self-­‐‑energy  
interactions   that   have   been   epistemically   problematic   since   the   1930s,   coinciding  
with   the   early   development   of   quantum   electrodynamics   bearing   vestiges   of   its  
classical  origins.  At   that   time,  quantum  electrodynamics  had  been  coming  to   terms  
with   the   problem   of   so-­‐‑called   radiative   corrections,   which   are   quantum   effects  
stemming   from   the   differences   between   classical   and   quantum-­‐‑level   results.   Field  
theory  was  supplied  for  the  consideration  of  the  behavior  of  elementary  particles  not  
well  understood  ontologically.7    
                                                                                                             
7Freeman  Dyson  wrote  an  interesting  article  about  the  problems  of  Field  Theory  and  what  it  still  could  
not   do   for   the   1953   issue   of   Scientific   America.   It   can   be   found   as   an   offprint   in   volume   28   of   the  
magazine’s  collected  papers. 
  102  
  In  the  1940s,  the  physics  communities  were  trying  to  find  ways  to  reconcile  
the   field   theoretic   method   of   Schwinger   with   the   particle-­‐‑centric   approach   of  
Feynman   and   the   others.   One   of   the   solutions   was   to   focus   on   a   single   spatial  
component  of  the  particle  and  assume  the  particle  to  be  invariant.  At  the  same  time,  
there   was   also   a   need   to   reconcile   quantized   states   with   relativity;   therefore,   the  
Dirac  equations  came  to  the  rescue  by  enabling  a  compromise  between  gravitational  
and  electromagnetic   fields.  Feynman  had  been  working  on  simplifying  the  method  
for   performing   highly   convoluted   and   error-­‐‑prone   calculations.   He   crafted   a  
theoretical  framework  enabling  an  equivalence  treatment  of  the  relativistic  equations  
of  Dirac   and   the  non-­‐‑relativistic  wave  mechanics   of   Schrödinger   so   as   to  meet   the  
objective   of   creating   a   particle-­‐‑centric   view   of   the   different   interactions   in   nuclear  
physics   as   an   antidote   to   the   highly   complex   field-­‐‑theoretic  methods   proposed   by  
Julian   Schwinger.8   In   fact,   that   was   how   Feynman   developed   his   path   integral  
method.  
What   is   more,   Feynman   was   interested   in   the   renormalization   process   for  
overcoming   the   problem   of   divergences,   this   problem  was   only   partially   resolved  
and  would   not   be   completely   dealt  with   until   the   introduction   of   gauge   fields   by  
Martinus   Veltman   and   Gerard   ’t   Hooft   to   renormalization.   Feynman   had   been  
                                                                                                             
8   See   Adrian   Wüthrich’s   book   The   Genesis   of   Feynman   Diagrams.   Dodrecht:   Spring   Science+Business  
Media  B.V.,  2010,  especially  chapters  one,  four  and  five.    
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working  mostly  with  perturbative  (approximative)  field  theory  even  though  he  was  
interested   in   how   his   path   integrals   could   be   applied   to   the   development   of   non-­‐‑
perturbative  field  calculations.    
Renormalization,   which   works   well   in   quantum   electrodynamics,   would  
prove  to  be  an  integral  part  of  the  Higgs  mechanism  for  providing  the  gauge  bosons  
with  finite  mass.9  At  the  same  time,  one  might  ask  if  renormalization  as  a  process  of  
solving  a  physical  improbability  might  be  limiting  to  the  conceptualization  of  these  
microscopic  entities  and  the  manner  in  which  the  properties  of  mass  and  energy  are  
distributed  among  them,  since  it  would  push  for  a  constrained  conception  of  gauge  
field  theory.  The  issue  of  probabilistic  constraints  was  tackled  when  Freeman  Dyson  
took  the  matrix  formulation  of  the  field  theoretic  approach,  and  correlated  that  with  
Feynman’s   diagrammatic   approach   for   the   purpose   of   simplifying   and   rendering  
more  pragmatic,  a  calculation  process,  thereby  producing  a  consolidated  approach  to  
a  more  rounded  method  for  tackling  highly  complex  scales  of  interactions  in  particle  
physics   and   quantum   theory.   Dyson’s   discussion   of   the   calculations   in   his   paper  
“The  Radiation  Theories  of  Tomonaga,  Feynman,  and  Schwinger,”  drove  the  work  of  
Murray   Gell-­‐‑Mann   as   he   wrestled   with   the   so-­‐‑called   ‘S-­‐‑matrix’   constitution   of  
particles  in  place  of  a  field  theory  unable  to  describe  strong  interactions.    
                                                                                                             
9 See  Sidney  Bludman’s  “The  First  Gauge  Theory  of  the  Weak  Interactions”  in  The  Rise  of  the  Standard  
Model. 
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However,   the   insistence  on  a   flat  hierarchy  of  elementary  particles   in   the  S-­‐‑
Matrix   model,   stemming   from   a   desire   for   a   democratic   ontology,   landed   the  
metaphysical   inspiration   behind   the   model   in   metaphorical   hot   water,   especially  
when   further   experimental   excavations   proved   the   model   untenable.   Would   one  
consider   this   to   be   a   bad   deployment   of   metaphysics   in   action?   Not   necessarily,  
especially   since   the   model   has   been   recuperated   for   considering   the   unstable  
particles   in   quantum  mechanics   in   relation   to   high-­‐‑mass  Higgs   boson.10  While   the  
model   is  useful   for  navigating   the  role  of   the  observed   in  relation   to   the  observing  
system,11  the  micro-­‐‑entities  are  resolved  to  macro-­‐‑measurement  apparatus  because  it  
is  impossible  to  perform  an  objective  measurement  as  an  embedded  observer.12    
Nonetheless,   it   was   Gell-­‐‑Mann’s   work   on   the   strong   interactions   that  
produces   the  partonic  model  of  hadrons.  Much  of   the   early  developments   in  QED  
concentrated  on  free  particles  such  as   the  electrons  and  muons.  The  bound  state  of  
the  nucleus  became   the  new  site   for   consideration,  with   the  development  of  quark  
theory  and  sustenance  of  short-­‐‑range   interactions  of   the  partons.  At   the  time  when  
                                                                                                             
10    Kunszt,  Zoltan.  “Unstable  Particles  in  Quantum  Mechanics,  Analytic  S-­‐‑matrix  Theory  and  Quantum  
Field  Theory.”  Presentation  at  CERN  on  May  14,  2012.  PDF.  
<http://indico.cern.ch/getFile.py/access?contribId=0&sessionId=0&resId=0&materialId=slides&confId=1
74430>.  
11   Stapp,   Henry   P.“S-­‐‑Matrix   Interpretation   of   Quantum   Theory.”   Physical   Review   D.   3.6.March  
(1971):1303-­‐‑20.  
12  Incidentally,  Henry  Stapp  of  the  quantum  theory  and  consciousness  fame  had  also  been  working  on  
the  S-­‐‑matrix  early  in  his  career.  
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the  quark  model  was  proposed,  the  model  was  greeted  with  derision  by  physicists,  
as  was  explained  by  the  1990  Nobel  Laureate   Jerome  I  Friedman  during  his   talk  at  
the   Rutherford   Centennial   Colloquium   at   CERN   in   2011.13   Incidentally,   Friedman  
shared  the  Nobel  Prize  with  Henry  W.  Kendall  and  Richard  E.  Taylor  for  their  work  
on  the  deep  inelastic  experiment  that  finally  validated  the  quark-­‐‑parton  model  that  
helped  to  transition  high-­‐‑energy  particle  physics  into  a  new  era.    
However,  that  experiment  did  not  take  place  until  1968,  four  years  after  the  
initial  prediction.  For  years  after  it  was  first  proposed  in  1964,  the  quark  model  was  
ridiculed  for  daring  to  propose  that  the  atom  is  a  composite  model,  six  decades  after  
the   ‘plum   pudding’   model   of   Thomson   had   been   disproved,   and   at   a   time  when  
much  of  the  particle  physics  experiments  were  targeted  at  the  nuclei  of  the  atoms.  In  
an   article   published   in   the   February   1967   issue   of   the  popular   hard   science   fiction  
magazine,  Analog  Science  Fiction  and  Fact,  Margaret  L  Silbar  satirizes  the  sentiments  
of  the  day  with:    
This   is   a   scientific-­‐‑fact   article   in   that   scientists   seriously   considered   the  
quarks   to   be   fact.   My   personal   opinion   is   that   they   must   be   getting  
desperate!”    
Silbar’s   sarcasm   points   to   how   the   partonic  model,   and   its   accompanying   quarks,  
were  seen  as  metaphysical  constructs  making  extensive  claims  about  changing  how  
                                                                                                             
13See   http://indico.cern.ch/materialDisplay.py?contribId=3&materialId=slides&confId=147420.   Refer   to  
slide  number  12. 
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nature  would  be  understood;  claims  that  require  a  shift  in  experimental  perspectives.  
Nevertheless,  she  was  right  in  predicting,  were  one  to  read  the  rest  of  the  article,  that  
the   discovery   of   quarks   did   not   translate   to   greater   ontological   oversight   on   the  
substance  of  matter.  Instead,  the  discovery  of  quarks  opened  up  even  more  difficult  
questions!14    
The  top  quark,  as  we  will  see  in  chapter  five,  is  experimentally  important  for  
probing  at  the  interaction  vertex  of  the  Higgs  boson,  even  if  not  much  data  could  be  
uncovered  about  the  boson  from  the  beauty  quark  at  the  time  of  writing.    But  the  fact  
that  a  considerable  percentage  of  the  Higgs  bosons  were  discovered  through  decay  
in   the   top   quark   loop   demonstrates   the   compatibility   between   the   conceptual  
structure  of   the  quarks  and   that  of   the  Higgs  boson.  Moreover,   the  prediction  and  
discovery  of  the  pion  in  the  photographic  emulsions  (a  technique  developed  out  of  
studying  the  cosmic  rays)  was  a  precursor  to  the  discovery  of  the  quarks,  as  well  as  
to  symmetry  breaking.  It  was  in  trying  to  work  around  some  of  the  issues  that  arose  
from  the  relationship  between  massive/massless  bosons  and  symmetry  breaking  that  
the  predictive  theory  of  the  scalar  (Higgs)  boson  was  first  derived.    In  addition,  the  
Glashow-­‐‑Weinberg-­‐‑Salam  (GWS)  description  of  the  weak  interaction  is  also  needed  
for  explaining  certain  electromagnetic  features  of  the  quarks.  In  chapter  five,  we  will  
                                                                                                             
14  A  reader  unfamiliar  with  the  history  of  the  quarks  may  do  well  to  check  out  a  brief  summary  of  it  in  
Appendix  A.  
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see   how   the   strong   and   weak   theories   work   together   to   produce   a   solid  
understanding  of  the  Higgs  boson.  
Nevertheless,   there   is   less   symmetrical   stability   in   a   multi-­‐‑dimensional  
geometrical  entity   than  a   two-­‐‑dimensional  surface  because  the  former  faces  greater  
difficulty  in  maintaining  symmetrical  balance  due  to  the  higher  number  of  variables  
involved,  including  indeterminate  variables.  The  same  sort  of  complexity  is  involved  
for   quantum   symmetries   due   to   the   need   in   balancing   the   different   scales   of  
interactions   (not   to  mention  quantum  states)   compared   to   the   classical   symmetries  
operating   within   the   same   macrophysical   continuum.   An   example   of   a   quantum  
symmetry  that  has  much  relevance  for  the  constitution  of  the  Higgs  boson  due  to  the  
act  of  spontaneous  electroweak  symmetry  breaking  is  the  chiral  theory  of  symmetry:  
this   is   where   complex   numbers   enter   the   narrative   for   explicating   the   phase   of   a  
quantum  wavefunction  during  the  rotation  of  handedness  and  helicity  in  the  course  
of   rotation,   important   for  working  out   the  balance  between  matter  and  anti-­‐‑matter  
and  predicting  new  generations  of  particles.    
Prior  to  the  development  of  path  integrals  for  resolving  problems  of  physical  
symmetry,   there  were   also   attempts  made   to   reconcile   the  problem  of   field   theory  
with   the   particle   framework   by   working   out   the   internal   invariance   of   a   system  
under  observation  in  space-­‐‑time.  The  development  of  such  a  system  is  concentrated  
on  a  ‘free’  particle  since  a  particle  that  is  involved  in  interaction  with  another  particle  
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or  its  environment  would  increase  the  number  of  variables  that  have  to  be  accounted  
for.  The  early  interest  in  transformative  invariance  for  maintaining  the  symmetry  of  
a   system   coincided   with   developments   in   Einstein’s   theory   of   relativity,   such   as  
through  the  Lorentzian  transformation.  Of  course,  the  transformation  would  later  be  
expanded   to   include   velocity   and   momentum,   heralding   the   observations   made  
about   the   internal   symmetry   of   a   particle   system   integral   to   describing   the  
conservation   of   energy.   These   symmetrical   structures  would   become   important   in  
dealing  with  the  Higgs  boson’s  seeming  ability  to  ‘give’  mass  to  other  particles.15  
The  prediction  of   the  Higgs  boson  started  with  attempts  at  working  out  the  
problems   surrounding   the   massless   Goldstone   bosons   and   the   requirements   for  
producing  a  massive  scalar  boson.  The  Higgs  mechanism  gives  mass  to  an  otherwise  
massless   scalar   boson   of   zero   spin,   by   producing   field   equations   that   can   interact  
with   other   bosonic   and   fermionic   field   equations   in   the   aftermath   of   spontaneous  
and   explicit   symmetry   breaking.   But   as  we   know,   quantum   symmetry   breaking   is  
not  the  main  claim  of  particle  physics,  for  as  David  Gross  pointed  out  in  199716,  and  a  
physics  professor,  Shivaji  Sondhi17  stressed  in  an  opinion  editorial  in  November  2013,  
                                                                                                             
15   This   blog   post   by   Flip   Tanedo   of   US   LHC   at   a   physics   communication   blog,   Quantum   Diaries  
<http://www.quantumdiaries.org/2011/06/19/helicity-­‐‑chirality-­‐‑mass-­‐‑and-­‐‑the-­‐‑higgs/>.  
16  “Asymptotic  Freedom  and  the  Emergence  of  QCD”  in  The  Rise  of  the  Standard  Model.  Pp  207-­‐‑8 
17 Sondhi,  Shivaji.  “The  Tao  of  Modern  Physics  -­‐‑  Indian  Express  Mobile.”  N.  p.,  n.d.  Web.  18  Nov.  2013.  
<  http://m.indianexpress.com/news/the-­‐‑tao-­‐‑of-­‐‑modern-­‐‑physics/1195124/>. 
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the  study  of  superconductivity  by  Philip  Anderson  had  elucidated  the  principles  of  
broken   supersymmetry   long   before   it   was   understood   by   particle   physicists.   In  
addition,   there   was   in   existence,   then,   the   Yang-­‐‑Mills   theory   that   would   become  
important   for   reconciling   strong   interactions   with   field   theory,   but   was  
unfortunately   not   well   understood   in   the   1950s.   Ironically,   it   was   also   the  
development  in  superconductor  technology  that  enabled  the  design  and  building  of  
the  Large  Hadron  Collider   to  perform  experiments  at  unprecedented  energy   levels  
that  could  then  culminate  into  new  physics  potential.  
Nevertheless,   the   confirmation   of   the   Higgs   boson   brought   together   the  
theoretical   and   experimental   particle   physics   communities   to   consider   theoretical  
candidates  for  extending  the  possibility  of  the  Standard  Model;  the  most  promising  
candidate   in   this   regard   is   the   supersymmetry.   Further,   supersymmetry   has  
provided   the   leading  order  quantum  corrections   for  solving   the  hierarchy  problem  
of  the  Standard  Model,  and  for  reconciling  data  with  theory  by  adding  appropriate  
fermionic   and   bosonic   superpartners   in   order   to   equalize   the   different   interactive  
scales   of   the   Standard   Model.   Physicists   have   been   working   with   the   minimally  
standard   model   supersymmetry   as   a   way   of   attenuating   anomalies   not   properly  
explained  through  the  Standard  Model  symmetrical  features.18      
                                                                                                             
18 See   Christoper   P   Hays’s   “Doubly.Charged   Higgs   Bosons,”   Search   for   the   Higgs   Boson.   Ed.   John  
V.Lee.   New   York:   Nova   Science   Publishers,   Inc,   2006:   7-­‐‑9   and   Gordon   Kanes’s   Supersymmetry:  
Unveiling  the  Ultimate  Laws  of  Nature.  Cambridge,  MA:  Helix  Books,  2000.  Chapter  four. 
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While   the   confirmation   of   the   properties   of   the   super-­‐‑heavy   top   quarks  
appears   to   give   hope   that   one   might   uncover   more   direct   evidence   of  
supersymmetry,   there   has   been   much   back-­‐‑chatter   in   conferences,   meetings,   and  
online  spaces  with  regard   to   letting  nature   takes   its  course;   then  regroup  to  decide  
on  what  to  do  next  should  further  experiments  draw  no  further  material  evidence  of  
the   supersymmetry  model.  Additionally,   there   are   also   the   large   extra   dimensions  
and   the   hidden   valleys,   all   of   which   are   extensions   of   the   exotic   theoretical  
speculation   for   extending   beyond   the   Standard   Model   and   bridging   into   other  
experimentally  uncertain  worlds  such  as  string  theory.    
Even   as   these   supersymmetry   particles   are   more   complex   due   to   their  
relativistic   properties,   they   draw   a   parallel   to   the   ordinary   quantum   mechanical  
debates  of  (non)locality  because  of  derivations  from  similar  quantum  states,  and  the  
fact  that  measurement  enacted  in  both  cases  are  drawn  from  similar  basic  principles  
in  quantum  theoretical  measurements  that  would  be  represented  in  myriad  ways  in  
the   chapters   to   come.   In   addition,   the   aforementioned   example   resembles   the  
parallels   of   symmetry  breaking   in   condensed  matter   and  particle  physics  due   to   a  
shared,   even   if   non-­‐‑visible   ontology.   As   mentioned   in   the   previous   section,   the  
common  ontology  that  each  of  these  physics  share  could  potentially  be  investigated  
as   a   representation   of   mixed-­‐‑state   measurement.   Further   exploration   might  
consolidate,   and   produce   more   persuasive   evidence,   on   the   arguments   regarding  
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how   the   choice   and   method   of   measurement,   whether   as   a   thought   or   an   actual  
experiment,   could   influence   the   epistemic   contexts   of   physical   events   under  
dissection.  
One   might   ask   whether   the   status   of   physical   and   scientific   laws   would  
remain   unperturbed   regardless   of   the   choice   of   theory,   and  whether   experiments’  
attempt  at  coaxing  nature’s  entities   into  manifesting  within  a  physically  observable  
range   (or   the   range   of   instrumental   sensitivity)   could   change   the   state   of   the  
observable  in  relation  to  the  actual  (non-­‐‑interacting)  state.  What  are  the  new  physics  
that  one  can  aspire  to  in  this  century,  and  would  experiments  be  the  ones  to  shape  
new  physics,  given  that  there  are  still  theories  waiting  in  the  background?    If  so,  how  
would   we   like   to   reconstitute   the   logic   that   drives   the   experimental   design,   and  
could   a   metaphysical   intervention   decrease   the   gap   between   epistemology   and  
ontology?      A   summary   of   such   aspirations   are   outlined   in   the   New   Particles  
Working  Group  report  published  in  the  summer  of  2013  that  details  the  not-­‐‑so-­‐‑new  
(in   terms   of   their   theoretical   ‘existence’)   ‘new‘   particles   that   might   be   uncovered  
during   the   second   run   at   the   Large   Hadron   Collider,   to   begin   in   2015   after   the  
upgrades   are   done,   as  well   as   the   next   steps   to   be   taken   should   there   be   no   new  
particles  discovered.19  
                                                                                                             
19   See   Y.   Gershtein   et.al.   “New   Particles  Working   Group   Report   of   the   Snowmass   2013   Community  
Summer  Study.”  <http://arxiv.org/abs/1311.0299>  .  
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Even   before   the   ‘discovery’   of   the   Higgs   boson,   there   have   been   many  
speculations   on   the   next   step   for   elucidating   the  way   forward,   as   physicists   have  
been   frustrated   with   the   epistemological   shortcomings   of   the   Standard   Model   in  
explicating   the   behavior   of   matter   and   prescribing   the   ontology   underlying   the  
Model’s   interactions.   There   are   attempts   to  dig  deeper   into  potentially   suppressed  
physics   stemming   from   the   choice   of   data   cuts   made   that   provide   the   elusive  
solution  to  some  of  the  difficulties  faced  by  the  Standard  Model.  The  discovery  of  the  
Higgs   boson   is   both   a   success   and   a   failure   of   the   standard   quantum   theory:   a  
success  because  it  shows  the  Standard  Model  as  not  being  completely  misguided  and  
a   failure   because   the   discovery   of   the   Higgs   boson   appears   to   have   raised   more  
ontological  questions  than  it  has  solved.  
Perhaps,  what  is  needed  for  this  century  is  the  rethinking  of  the  foundations  
of  quantum  theory   in  relation   to  phenomenologically  engaged  causality;   to   find  an  
access  to  ontology  that  transcends  ‘object-­‐‑gazing’  by  penetrating  those  objects.    One  
will  have  to  re-­‐‑examine  the  apparatus  available  for  more  direct  investigation  into  the  
structure  of  the  universe.    
For   particle   physics,   it   is   an   aspiration   that   the   confirmation   of   the   Higgs  
boson  will  now   take  physicists  away   from   the  comforting   security  of   the  Standard  




Model,   towards   less   standard   measurements.   The   next   section   attempts   to  
demonstrate  how  quantum  theory,  as  we  know  it,   is  shaped  by  certain  interpretive  
practices  and  epistemic  choices.  The  initial  and  final  state  of  a  measurement  process  
contains  as  much  important  information  as  the  interval  between  them.  
3.2 The Foundation of Measurement and (Non)-Standard 
Interpretation 
Now   that  we  have   finally   laid  out   the   (composite)  profile   of   the  Higgs,  we  
can  proceed  with  the  promised  discussion  on  the  double-­‐‑slit  experiment  in  relation  
to   the   former.   As   was   explained   in   the   previous   section,   the   conceptual   rationale  
underlying   the   experiment   that   sits   at   the   intersection   of   realist,   idealist,   and  
relativist  principles  in  the  philosophy  of  science  has  crucial  similarities  to  ontological  
issues   arising   in   quantum   field   theories.   Therefore,   the   bridge   built   of   the   two  
outwardly  dissimilar  physical  events  can  then  be  used  to  account   for  bi-­‐‑directional  
developments   as   their   syntheses   contribute   to   a   comprehensive   characterization  of  
the   properties   underlying   the   ontology   (and   multiple   epistemologies)   of   the  
quantum  micro-­‐‑universe,   since   the   interpretive   method   used   for   making   sense   of  
computationally   processed   data   is   derived   from   choices   made   out   of   expediency,  
pragmatism,  reliability,  and  consistency  across  all  states.  
The  classical  experiment  on  the  wave  interference  of  light  was  performed  at  
the  turn  of  the  nineteenth  century  by  Young  to  explain  the  color  spectrum  that  is  the  
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outcome   of   light   diffraction   by   a   prism   once   observed   by   Newton.20   An   Italian  
mathematician,   Francesco   Maria   Grimaldi,   discovered   that   diffraction   could   take  
place   when   light   passes   through   a   barrier,   either   around   the   edges,   or   through   a  
small   slit,   but   his   findings  were   only   published,   posthumously,   in   1665.   The   non-­‐‑
consensual  views  about  the  characteristics  of  light,  as  constitutive  of  either  particles  
or   waves,   have   been   at   play   since   classical   antiquity.   However,   experiments   with  
optics   in   the   early   modern   period   unleashed   physical   phenomena   that   were  
inexplicable  until  the  late  nineteenth  and  twentieth  century.21    
Having   discussed   the   conventional   setup   of   a   modernized   double-­‐‑slit  
experiment  involving  photons  in  the  previous  chapter,  I  will  proceed  directly  into  an  
explication  of  the  ‘real’  and  fictive  variants  of  the  experiment,  before  explaining  my  
rationale  for  doing  so.  One  can  consider  this  a  form  of  metaphysical  fictionalization  
that  also  anticipates  modifications  in  outcomes  stemming  from  modifications  to  the  
input.  The  modification  in  the  setup  is  a  thought-­‐‑experimental  manipulation  of  John  
Bell’s  concept  of  the  ‘beable’  that  symbolizes  a  theoretical  construct  with  a  materially  
tangible  counterpart  of  more  than  a  single  physical  potential.    
Imagine   having   a   highly   sophisticated   two-­‐‑photon   beam,   double   barreled,  
ray  gun  that  can  control  for  pairs  of  photonic  beams  at  the  point  of  release,  including  
                                                                                                             
20  See  Young.  “The  Bakerian  Lecture:  Experiments  and  Calculations  Relative  to  Physical  Optics.”  1-­‐‑16.  
21  Holton.  Foundations  of  Modern  Physical  Science  543-­‐‑63.  
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the   behavior   of   the   beams.   This   gun   can   also   time   the   release   of   each   pair   of   the  
beams,  so  that  a  photon  from  the  first  beam  entering  one  slit  is  followed  closely  by  a  
photon   from   the   second   beam,   in   accordance   to   a   pre-­‐‑set   timing.   In   this   fictive  
version  of  the  double-­‐‑slit  experiment,  I  imagine  that  one  can  manipulate  the  timing  
and  also  which  slit  the  photons  can  enter  by  (a  fictive  re-­‐‑enactment  of  the  which-­‐‑way  
experiment).  Consider  also,  that  the  ray  gun  has  a  special  function  that  could  be  set  
to  deploy  the  process  of  entanglement  at  will;  in  that  the  gun  could  determine  which  
path   each   photon   emitted   would   take,   with   the   intention   of   increasing   the  
localization  behavior   of   the   input   object.   Therefore,   the  uncertainty   of   the  position  
and  time  are  narrowed,  while  the  probabilistic  range  of  the  momenta  of  photons  is  
increased  to  correspond  to  any  increase  in  energy.    
The  ray  gun  produces  three  different  pairs  of  beams  with  different  phase  and  
interactional   properties.   The   first   type   of   interaction   involves   two  beams   that   pass  
through  the  double-­‐‑slits  as  usual  (in  the  actual  experiment,  it  would  be  one  beam  at  
a  time;  but  in  my  adjusted  version,  it  can  be  one  beam  at  a  time,  two  beams  at  once,  
or  two  beams  almost  simultaneously  although  one  will  not  know  which  beam  goes  
where  until  after  detection  has  taken  place);  the  second  type  of  interaction  consists  of  
two  beams  that  are  intentionally  suppressed  after  they  passed  through  the  slits  (they  
do  as  the  first  type  except  that  the  informational  path  gets  suppressed  immediately  
after   detection   so   that   one   does   not   know   whence   each   beam   originates,   an  
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reenactment  of   the  quantum  eraser);   and   the   third   type   represents   a   state  of   semi-­‐‑
decoherence,   whereby   a   selection   of   photonic   waves   from   the   second   beam   are  
superposed  with  a  selection  of  the  photonic  waves  from  the  first  beam,  leaving  some  
photonic  waves  unsuperposed  (this  means  that  part  of  the  waves  become  quantum  
entanglements   while   the   other   part   still   behave   by   semi-­‐‑classical   rules).   These  
superposed  waves  then  hit  the  screen,  after  going  through  the  slits,  at  the  same  time  
as   the   other   ‘regular’   unsuperposed   photons.   To   throw   another   wrench   into   the  
wheel,  so  to  speak,  the  ray  gun  has  been  set  in  auto  to  emit  the  beams  at  random  so  
that  one  cannot  pre-­‐‑determine  the  type  of  interaction  occurring  at  each  time.  
The  first  example  is  an  enhanced  version  of  the  double-­‐‑slit  experiment  where  
the   infamous   (or   famous)   wave-­‐‑particle   duality   can   be   observed22.   The   second  
example   represents   points   of   decoherence   when   the   interaction   of   the   photons   in  
their   different   states   (differently   localized   states,   or,   if   in   terms   of   a   classical  
                                                                                                             
22.   While   the   classical   version   (Young’s   version)   of   the   double-­‐‑slit   experiment   had   been   in   existence  
before  anyone  has  even  heard  about  quantum  mechanics  or  wave-­‐‑particle  duality,   the  phenomena  of  
the   wave-­‐‑particle   became   more   manifestly   expressed   because   of   the   discovery   of   the   photoelectric  
effect,  which  changed  the  way  physicists  understood  the  properties  of  light.  The  photoelectric  effect  is  
an  observable  phenomena  of  photo  (light)  emission  caused  by  light-­‐‑waves  pushing  through  the  surface  
of  a  solid  to  free  the  electrons  at  the  surface.  This  has  been  observed  since  1887  by  Heinrich  Hertz,  and  
was  further  studied  by  J.J  Thomson.  While   it   is  not  hard  to  explain  why  light  of  particular   frequency  
that  is  shined  onto  the  surface  of  a  solid  with  loosely  bounded  electrons  could  lead  to  the  freeing  of  the  
latter,  what  is  less  easily  explicable  is  the  level  of  threshold  frequencies  required  of  the  light-­‐‑waves  for  
the  electrons  to  be  tipped  over  and  out  of  their  bounded  conditions,  or  how  the  threshold  is  different  for  
different  sets  of  light  waves  even  when  the  energy-­‐‑frequency  for  all  the  light  waves  across  the  spectrum  
remain   the   same.   In  other  words,   in  a   curved  graph,   they  all  have   the   same  slope,   showing  how   the  
energy-­‐‑frequency   relation   is   constant,   and   this   constant   is   called   the   Planck   constant.   One   might  
speculate   that   this   change   of   understanding   transformed   the   manner   in   which   observation   and  
measurement  are  constituted  for  the  physicist.    
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description,  ‘spookily  connected’  states)  are  intentionally  suppressed,  while  the  final  
example   represents   a   state   in   semi-­‐‑collapsed   conditions   where   the   effects  may   be  
observed   to   be   partially   decohering   at   the   classical   level.   However,   in   the   third  
example,  what  one  sees   is   the  ensemble   in  action  of  a  mixed  density  state  with  the  
micro  entities  in  their  initial  and  final  states.  
The   double-­‐‑slit   experiment   on   particle-­‐‑wave   duality   produces   quantum  
interpretations   that  were   applied   to   the  development   of   quantum   electrodynamics  
(as  was   inferred   in   the   beginning   of   this   chapter),   especially   since   the   experiment  
itself  demonstrates   the   limits  of   the  classical  electrodynamics.  Therefore,   the  tale  of  
the   double-­‐‑split   interference   as   a   narrative   of   decoherence   between   classical   and  
quantum  theories  converges   in  an  electromagnetic  radiation  that   is   the  first  stop   in  
symmetrical  relations  that  would  later  be  part  of  the  Standard  Model.  Then,  there  is  
the  Copenhagen  interpretation  of  complementarity  that  posits  how  two  observables  
cannot   be   measured   simultaneously   because   the   classically   located   measuring  
apparatus   and   the   quantum   object   of   measure   each   abides   by   different   rules  
pertaining  to  determinism  and  precision.  23  
                                                                                                             
23   In   more   than   one   instances,   scholars   have   pointed   out   that   the   term   ‘uncertainty’   in   the   famous  
Heisenberg  principle  was  a  result  of  a  disagreement  and  final  compromise  (or  sorts)  between  Bohr  and  
Heisenberg,  stemming  from  the  discussion  about  how  one  can  talk  about  measurement  and  the  finitude  
of  quantum  theory.  Barad  (Meeting  the  Universe  Halfway),  Beller  (The  Genesis  of  Interpretation  of  Quantum  
Physics  1925-­‐‑1927),  and  Jaeger  (Entanglement,  Information,  and  the  Interpretation  of  Quantum  Mechanics)  are  
among  those  who  had  extensive  accounts  of  this  issue,  in  relation  to  indeterminism  and  precision,  and  
they  have  cited  some  of  the  pioneering  quantum  physicists  who  were  also  concerned  about  this  issue  
during  the  difficult  teething  years  of  quantum  theory.    
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However,   what   are   the   qualities   of   measurement   that   change   if   both   the  
measuring   apparatus   and   the   entity   being   measured   obey   only   the   laws   of   the  
quantum?   What   about   the   possibility   of   making   the   interactions   sufficiently  
deterministic   so   that   certain   outcomes   can  be   controlled  without   necessarily   going  
against  the  Heisenberg  Uncertainty  Principle  for  quantum  interactions,  such  as  is  the  
case   with   weak   measurements?24   There   have   been   a   number   of   theoretical  
speculations   raised   on   this   issue   but   we   will   have   to   await   further   progress   in  
quantum  informational  experiment  to  see  how  we  can  change  the  current  epistemic  
language  of  precision,   indeterminism,  and  technological  expediency  when  it  comes  
to   quantum   theoretical   interpretations.   But   for   certain,   a   deeper   exploration   of   the  
double-­‐‑slit  experiment  can  lead  to  development  of  instruments  that  can  change  how  
we  model  the  theories  of  new  physics,  or  even  how  we  simulate  these  theories.  
Moreover,  the  double-­‐‑slit  experiment  tells  us  about  some  of  the  self-­‐‑reflexive  
fundamental  problems  of  measurement,  involving  the  simplest  of  entities,  before  we  
can   attempt   to  measure   even  more   complex   interactions.  When  measurements   are  
performed,   there   is   a   desire   to   regularize   the  measured   entities   to   fit   a   system,   to  
produce  the  best  theory  for  explaining  the  different  locales  of  the  observables.  But  in  
the  process  of  making  that  connection,  entities  with  characteristics  that  appear  to  be  
                                                                                                             
24  Svensson,  Bengt  E.  Y.  "ʺPedagogical  Review  of  Quantum  Measurement  Theory  with  an  Emphasis  on  
Weak  Measurements"ʺ  Quanta  2.1:  18–49.  doi:10.12743/quanta.v2i1.12.  Retrieved  7  April  2014.  
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behaving   differently   could   be   set   aside   for   separate   considerations.   Even   if   the  
intention   is  not   to   ignore   the  signals   these   ‘odd  balls’  bring   to   the   table,  over   time,  
the   system   that   excludes   these   signals,   even   if   only   temporarily,   while   focusing  
attention   on   experimental   searches   that   can   ‘induce’   empirical   evidence   of   other  
more   ‘harmoniously’   coordinated   entities,   could   end   up   never   dealing   with   the  
paradox  until  such  a  time  when  the  occurrence  of  an  unpredicted  event  brings  about  
epistemic   crises.   But   more   importantly   for   the   discussion   here,   the   Copenhagen  
interpretation  of  quantum  mechanics,  and  therefore  the  conceptual  underpinnings  of  
the   quantum   physical   double-­‐‑slit   experiment,   fosters   the   context   enabling   the  
theoretical  development,  and  experimental  searches,   for   the  Standard  Model  Higgs  
boson.  One  might   say   that   the  philosophies  underlying   the  double-­‐‑slit   experiment  
and   the   Standard   Model   Higgs   boson   are   nomologically   constituted   through   a  
nomological  network,  with  the  point  of  origin  being  the  Copenhagen  interpretation.25    
Further,   a   parallel   problem   exists   in   semi-­‐‑classical   physics   with   the  
hypothetical  graviton  because  of   lack  of   fit  with   the   spin-­‐‑environment  models   that  
are  core   to  quantization.   It  does  not  appear   that   the  current  physical   system  of   the  
                                                                                                             
25   See   http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/nomonet.htm.   Even   though   this   concept   was  
originated  for  conducting  psychological  measurements  of  relationships  in  psycho-­‐‑social  settings,  I  find  
it  useful  as  an  analogy  for  depicting  the  not  always  explicit  relationship  between  foundational  physics  
(the   double-­‐‑slit   experiment)   and   particle   physics   (the   Higgs   boson),   as   well   as   in   explaining   that  
speculative  physics,  and  speculative  theory  and  experiment  more  particularly,  shares  a  philosophy  with  
a   nomological   network   because   of   shared   interest   in   the   process   involved   in   theory   to   experiment  
relationship,  including  how  one  can  construct  a  valid  relationality  between  both.  
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Standard   Model   could   deal   with   this   problem   until   we   extend   the   scale   of   its  
dimensional  operations.  There  have  been  multiple  mathematically-­‐‑induced  thought  
experiments   that   ask   one   to   reconsider   the   ontological   correlations   that   might   be  
found  between  gravity  and  the  other   interaction  fields.  At   the  same  time,   there  are  
systemic   attempts   at  working   out   a   semi-­‐‑classical   framework   that   can   supplement  
what  is  lacking  in  quantum  field  theory.26    
Thought   experiments   are   all   very  well   but   effecting   a   practical   application  
requires   the   capacity   to   transform   these   thought   experiments   into   engineering  and  
computational   parallels,   which   would   also   require   the   experimenter   to   engage   in  
other  forms  of  speculative  practices  through  the  construction  of  instruments  and  the  
mechanics  of  data-­‐‑collection  that  include  the  excavation  of  impossible-­‐‑to-­‐‑get-­‐‑at  data  
due   to   technological   limitations.   If   thought   experiment’s   objective   of   effecting  
sufficient   determinacy   succeeds   so   that   more   information   can   be   experimentally  
obtained,   how   would   that   radically   alter   our   perception   of   what   constitutes   as  
measurable   and   scalable   at   the   level   of   apparatus-­‐‑observer   relationship,   therefore  
producing  a  new  perception  of  quantum  field  theory?  
                                                                                                             
26   See   Gorelik,   Gennady.“Matvei   Bronstein   and   quantum   gravity:   70th   anniversary   of   the   unsolved  
problem.”    Physics-­‐‑Uspekhi  2005,  vol  48,  no  10,  pp.  1039-­‐‑1053.    The  paper  addresses  a  rather  interesting  
history  on  the  development  of  quantum  gravity  in  the  1930s  which  connected  with  the  very  early  stage  
of   quantum   field   theory’s   emergence   out   of  work   in   electrodynamics   but   before   the   development   of  
Feynman’s   path   integrals.   The   English   and   Russian   version   of   the   paper   can   be   found  
<http://people.bu.edu/gorelik/cGh_Bronstein_UFN-­‐‑200510_Engl.htm>.   
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I   argue   that   the   performance   of   measurement   on   a   quantum   system  
represents  a  speculative  mode  of  ontological  reading  that  excavates  the  relationship  
between  micro-­‐‑entities  and  their  environment  within  a  bounded  system;  the  sum  of  
the   relationship   can   then   be   extrapolated   for   analyzing   causal   effects   such  
relationships  demonstrate  in  an  overall  state.  It  also  means  reading  beyond  what  can  
be  easily  embodied  mathematically,  to  account  for  greater  subjectivity  and  epistemic  
complexity.   Current   models   of   quantum   theories   contain   mathematical   non-­‐‑
equivalence  between   the  classically  derived  metric  of  gravitation  and   the   theory  of  
quanta.   In  performing  an  ontological  reading,  one  does  not  merely  reconsider  how  
the  physics  of  gravity  can  be  scaled  in  relation  to  other  known  interactions,  but  also  
asks   which   regions   of   the   interactions   would   be   most   affected,   in   the   sense   of  
physical   phenomenology,   when   new   orders   of   quantizations   are   performed;   how  
would   the  outcome,  should   they  come   into  effect,   fit  with   the   logic  embodying  the  
different  interactive  scales?    
Further,  while  it  is  possible  for  ontology  and  epistemology  to  converge  at  the  
initial   and   final   states   of   the   physical   space   one   measures,   it   is   also   possible   for  
epistemology  to  take  its  own  direction  independent  of  what  the  ontology  might  be,  
especially  when  paths  to  ontology  is  largely  underdetermined.  An  example  of  such  
thinking   would   be   if   one   chooses   between   whether   to   recognize   non-­‐‑locality,   a  
condition   conventionally   represented   as   ‘hidden’   variables   due   to   their   non-­‐‑
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observable  states.  Therefore,  we  could  decide  whether  we  would  prefer  a  quantum  
interpretation  that  privileges  greater   levels  of  determinism,  or  not  (to  go  with  Bohr  
or  Bohm?).  At  the  same  time,  one  might  posit  a  one-­‐‑on-­‐‑one  correlation  between  the  
properties   of   quantum   systems   and   their   projectors,   so   that   one   might   ask   if   an  
individualized  and  ‘atomic’  representation  will  bring  about  a  different  outcome  than  
an  approach  that  is  premised  on  statistical  ensemble.    
Nevertheless,  the  need  for  experimental  relevance  requires  one  to  reconsider  
the  mathematical   formalism  embodying   the  particles/mattresses/fields,  and  what   is  
most   suitable   for   the   consideration   of   entities   as   are   represented   by   the  
gravitons/gravitational   fields   and   the   Higgs   bosons/fields.   Physicists   delineate   the  
operative   framework   of   physical   assumptions,   hypotheses,   and   states   while  
inculcating   them   with   a   semblance   of   mathematical   rigor.   If   the   foundational  
question  defining  the  preferred  approach  for  dealing  with  quantum  theory  tends  to  
preoccupy   foundational   theorists,   experimentalists   are  more   interested   in   figuring  
the   best   informal   way   for   modeling   their   experimental   results.   Metaphysics   can  
supplement   phenomenology   in   providing   the   platform   by   which   theorists   and  
experimentalists   locate   conceptual   parallels   and   overlaps,   where   fictional   models  
(and  computational  algorithms)  can  then  be  developed  side-­‐‑by-­‐‑side,  such  as  what  I  
had   attempted   to   do   through   the   fictional   reconstruction   of   the   double-­‐‑slit  
experiments.  
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However,   given   that   experiments   have   only   been   able   to   operate   within  
constrained  degrees  of  freedom  represented  by  the  dimensions  of  space  in  which  the  
detecting  apparatus  is  able  to  reach,  the  question  would  be  what  should  be  done  to  
expand   their   reach   into   dimensions   that   are   counter-­‐‑intuitive   to   our   material  
quotidian.  We  need  to  break  out  of  a  recursive  and  nested  formalistic  approach,  one  
where   the   intervention   to   knotty   problems   involved   patching   up   an   already  
problematic  framework.  The  formalistic  patchwork  approach  has  been  consistently  a  
part   of   the   epistemic   narrative   of   the   Higgs   boson,   an   approach   premised   on   the  
need   to   retain   the   role   of   the   Higgs   boson   for   maintaining   a   symmetrical  
apprehension  of  our  space-­‐‑time.  However,  its  origin  story  was  a  demonstration  of  a  
determination   by   groups   of   physicists   coming   together   to   work   out   what   can   be  
done   with   regard   to   its   masslessness,   and   unseemliness,   by   finding   loopholes  
around   the   problem.   The  Higgs   boson,   because   of   its   position   as   one   of   the   force  
carriers,   is   inevitably   embedded   within   the   ontological   makeup   of   the   Standard  
Model.      
At   the  end  of   the  day,   the  development  of   the  Higgs  boson  has  not  always  
developed  in  congruent  with  that  of   its  experimental  searches.  While  the  discovery  
of   the   Higgs   boson   points   to   seeming   convergence   of   the   theoretical   and   the  
experimental,  in  reality,  that  convergence  is  still  not  a  perfect  fit,  not  until  it  becomes  
possible   to   resolve   the  ontological  crisis  of   the  Standard  Model   in  a  manner  where  
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the   theoretical   and   the   experimental   can   speak.   Maybe   revisiting   the   historical  
evolution  of  quantum  theories  can  help  but  much  work  still  has  to  be  done  to  make  
the   current   elucidation   of   the   theories   of   the   Higgs   boson,   and   its   exotic  
accompaniment,   more   explicitly   concerned   with   what   is   going   on   in   quantum  
foundations,  as  a  step,  even  if  still  inconclusive,  to  getting  to  the  root  of  the  problem.  
3.3 Conclusion 
To   recapitulate,   were   one   to   appropriate   the   language   of   quantum   field  
theories,   it  would  come  as  no  surprise   that   the  various  approaches   involved   in   the  
consideration  of  the  Higgs  boson  revolve  around  acts  of  creations  and  annihilations  
as   represented  by   the  vertices   and   lines  of  particle   interactions,  both   symbolic   and  
actual.  The  narrative  of  the  Higgs  boson  forms,  grows,  and  coalesces  into  materiality  
through  the  explicatory  affordances  of  speculative  theory.    
In  a  sense,  the  Higgs  boson  is  the  interpreting  subject  of  speculative  theory  as  
the   former   could   only   have   descended   from   combinations   of   underdetermination,  
causal   choices,   formal   developments,   and   ontological   anticipations   of   the  possible,  
while   not   quite   a   sum   of   all   these   features.      At   the   same   time,   metaphysical  
approaches   appear   not   to   have   impacted   the   theory-­‐‑to-­‐‑experiment   relations   in   the  
search,  and  the  discovery  of   the  Higgs,  and  this   indicates  how  the  approach   to   the  
Higgs’s   conceptualization   and   eventual   empirical   confirmation   follows   a   very  
particular  epistemic  strategy  that  skirts  more  problematic  ontological  issues,  such  as  
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the  question  of  what  the  Higgs  mechanism  can  do.  Yet,  one  could  surmise  that   the  
problems   of   the  Higgs   boson   are   both   reduced   and   amplified  within   the   classical  
approach   to  matter:   the   quantum   double-­‐‑slit   experiment   amplifies   the   unresolved  
issues   that   dog   quantum   theory   at   the   foundational   level   even   as   the   current  
epistemic   structure   of   the   Standard  Model   is   only   able   to   manifest   a   partial,   and  
greatly   reduced,   representation   of   the   Higgs   boson   that   does   not   present   new  
physics.    
  The   signification   of   the   Higgs   boson   can   be   read   against   the   context   of  
constructivism,   realism,   idealism,   and   instrumentalism.   It   is   a  metaphysical   object  
with  a  physical  counterpart,  of  sorts,  that  seems  to  fit  well  into  the  parameters  of  the  
Standard  Model  while  pointing  to  the  disquieting  precarity  of  the  Model.  But  most  
importantly,   it   reveals  how  we  need   to   rethink  measurement   at   the   intersection  of  
the   known   and   the   unknown,   the   uncertain   and   apparently   determinate.   It   also  
provides   the   subject   orientation   for   discussing   the   fiction   of   indeterminacy   (which  
compels   indeterminism)   and   control   in   a   science   fictional  micro-­‐‑universe,  which   I  
will  begin  to  address  from  the  next  chapter.  
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Indeed,  “touching,”   the   lexicon  of   touch,   strikes  a  grammatical  pose  and  heads  off   on  quite  
diverse  rhetorical  side  paths.  It  carries  a  semantic  tenor  whose  specter  seems  to  obey  a  subtle  
and   ironic   play,   both   discrete   and   virtuoso   (Derrida,   On   Touching   –   Jean-­‐‑Luc   Nancy,  
2005).  
4. Rapprochement of the micro and macro in Egan’s 
Quarantine  
Fans  and  writers  of  hard   science   fiction,   as  well   as   literary   scholars,  do  not  
always   agree   on   the   contents   of   hard   science   fiction,   if   only   because   of   the  
presupposition   that   hard   science   fiction  demands   technical   expertise   and   scientific  
competency   from   its   writers.   The   strict   hardcore   enthusiasts   of   the   genre   can   be  
classified  as  ‘disciplinarians’  who  enforce  a  particular  “field  of  claim,  counter-­‐‑claim,  
and  struggle  with  one  another  rather  than  through  a  relationship  to  a  transcendental  
object  or  investigative  goal  defined  anterior  to  discourse  [the  object  of  science  fiction]  
itself”   (Lenoir   52).   To   appropriate   Lenoir’s   argument   (made   in   relation   to   the  
institutional  practices  of  science)  for  staking  my  argument  about  science  fiction  that  
takes  a  science  studies  approach  in  this  chapter:  the  scientific  ideas  are  experimented  
with   the   aid   of   literary   techniques,   representing   a   particular   “…flavor   of  
contemporary  technoscience,  which  is  simultaneously  political  and  technical”  (52).    
Hence,   the   disciplining   of   the   content   and   rules   of   this   genre   is   used   as   a  
method  for  legitimating  fiction’s  interpretation  of  the  social  in  the  eyes  of  science,  as  
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well  as  in  justifying  the  objective  of  this  genre.    Hard  science  fiction  writers,  for  the  
most  part,  have  a  strong  preference  for  scientific  accuracy  and  would  not  shy  away  
from   indulging   in   highly   technical   discussions   on   the   progress   of   science   in   the  
fiction   they  write,   including   subordinating   the  plot   to   the   science.   In   turning  hard  
science  fiction  as  a  creative  platform  of  elucidation  of  the  techniques  and  sociality  of  
physics,   I   hope   to   take   a   literary   step   in   the   direction   that   has   been   set   by   last  
chapter’s  exposition  on  the  critical-­‐‑historiography  of  the  Higgs  boson  and  fictive  re-­‐‑
narration   of   the   double-­‐‑slit   experiment.   In   the   process,   I   hope   to   illustrate   how  
fiction  holds   the   key   for   a   less   linear  demonstration  of   theoretical   speculation   that  
takes  place  at  the  intersection  of  the  sciences  and  the  humanities.  
That   said,   there   are   a   number   of   supposed  hard   science   fiction   that   do   not  
always  meet  the  criteria  of  scientific  integrity  and  rigor,  as  critics  would  be  quick  to  
point  out.  The  previously  mentioned  Paul  J  Nahin  did  a  critical  survey  of  such  works  
in  the  introductory  chapter  of  Time  Machines:  Time  Travel  in  Physics,  Metaphysics,  and  
Science  Fiction,  whereby  he  pointed  out  the  foibles  and  wrong-­‐‑minded  deployment  of  
attempts   at   time   travel   by   a   rather   substantial   number   of   science   fiction   authors.  
Time   travel   is   not   just   a   fantastical   plot   device   but   with   real   physical   and  
metaphysical   ramifications,   and  has   been   of   interest   to  physicists   dealing  with   the  
idea   of   the   ‘arrow   of   time’   from   different   angles   of   both   fiction   and   natural  
philosophy,  culminating   in   the  special   theory  of  relativity  of  Einstein,   to  be   further  
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discussed   in  chapter  six.     This   topic,   in   itself,   is  worthy  of  greater  exposition  but   is  
not  the  main  point  of  the  dissertation.  
At   the   other   end   of   the   spectrum,   critics  who   prefer   to   read   the   project   of  
science  fiction  through  the  lens  of  literary  criticism,  or  merely  as  an  aesthetic  choice,  
may  find  the  direction  taken  by  hard  science  fiction  to  be  discomfiting.  For  instance,  
Frederic  Jameson  considers  the  ‘paradigmatic’  shift  from  physics  to  the  life  sciences  
to   be   problematic   for   the   conventional   science   fiction   narrative   and   representation  
because   the   increasing   abstractness   of   the   science   makes   the   science   fiction   text  
incomprehensible  to  him  (and  potentially  other  literary-­‐‑minded  readers);  he  argues  
that  “…the  complexities  of  biology  and  the  genetic,   indeed  bio-­‐‑power  itself,  offer  a  
content   and   a   raw   material   far   more   recalcitrant   to   plot   formation   than   even  
Einsteinian  cosmology  and  the  undecideability  of  atomic  sub-­‐‑particles”  (67).  Indeed,  
he   finds   the   latest   hard   science   fiction   based   on   informatics   (or   informational  
science),  such  as  that  by  Greg  Egan,  to  be  inscrutably  unreadable  even  if  the  former  
had  no  issues  with  breaking  down  the  densest  of  critical  theories!    
Following  in  almost  the  same  critical  vein  but  attending  more  to  the  notion  of  
scientific   accuracy   than   its   inscrutability,   is   literary   critic   and   science   fiction  writer  
Adam  Roberts.  He  asks   incredulously,   in  The  History  of  Science  Fiction,  on   the  need  
for   a   demarcation   between   ‘soft’   and   ‘hard’   science   fiction,   before   going   on  
pejoratively  about  what  he  considers  to  be  an  insistence  on  unloading  rigid  scientific  
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orthodoxy   (drawing  on  his   earlier   discussion   of   philosophers   such   as  Karl   Popper  
and  Bertrand  Russell  with  their   ‘rigid’  notion  of  the  scientific  method)  onto  science  
fiction  and  the  inconsistent  deployment  of  the  rules  of  scientific  facticity  by  science  
fiction   critics   and   enthusiasts.   The   latter   half   of   the   critique   unwittingly   reveals  
Adams’s   ignorance   of   the   nuanced   differences   between   axioms,   physical   laws,  
theories,   hypothesis,   and   facts;   and   how   speculation   operates   at   various   levels   of  
acceptability  in  science  based  on  the  aforementioned  categories  and  the  choice  of  an  
interpretive  mode.  
Application   of   conventional   scientific   orthodoxy   as   a   criterion  of   judgment  
for   an   aesthetic   object   is   fundamentally   foolish   even   when   applied   with  
absolute   consistency;   and   when   applied   inconsistently,   as   is   often   is  
(swallowing  the  camel  of  faster-­‐‑than-­‐‑light  travel  but  straining  at  the  gnat  of,  
for   instance,   S-­‐‑shaped  ballistic   trajectories   inside   spinning   environments)   it  
combines   deadness   with   muddle.   Our   choice   between   a   textual   universe  
running  along  the  oppressive  lines  of  Russell’s  scientific  world  government,  
or   a   science   fiction   that   plays   anarchically   with   ‘science’   along   the   lines  
Feyerabend  suggests.  This  seems  to  me  no  choice  at  all.  (16)  
His   prejudice   to   rigid   scientific   accuracy   (or   at   least   a   pretense   to   that  
accuracy)   aside,  he  addresses   a  number  of   important   issues   that   tend   to  get   swept  
aside,   or   are   less   foregrounded,   in   the   more   conventional   discussions   of   science  
fiction,  such  as  the  genre’s  genealogy,  the  parallel  developments  in  history  of  science  
with   science   fiction   (which   demonstrates   succinctly   how   the   ‘science’   is   generated  
within  the  fiction  over  time  in  light  of  new  understanding  and  changes  in  attitudes),  
and  scientific  ethics  in  relation  to  society  (the  latter  third  question  will  come  up  again  
in  chapter  six).   I  am  in  agreement  with  Adams  over  how  science  fiction,  even  hard  
  130  
science  fiction,  should  not  be  so  be  held  so  tightly  to  a  particular  scientific  reading  as  
to  dismiss  unpopular  and  minority  positions,  given  how  some  of  these  positions  are  
read  as    ‘crank’  science  by  scientists  and  some  science  fiction  fans  alike.  
Nevertheless,   there   is   a   critical   reading   of   science   fiction,   including   that   by  
Jameson,  which  privileges  the  scaling  up  of  micro  psychophysical  interactions  (and  
characteristics)  to  fit  the  macro-­‐‑level  sensibilities  of  mundane  politics,  even  if  such  a  
transition   would   mean   leaving   out   the   same   qualities   found   in   the   former  
interactions  that  made  for  such  fascinating  study  in  the  first  place.  Such  critiques  are  
attempts  at  disciplining   the  genre  of   science   fiction   into  a   specific  utilitarian  mold.  
However,   it   is   possible   that   one’s   attitude   to   science   fiction   is   determined   by   the  
choice  of   reading   strategy   (Roberts  2),  one   that   is   “shaped  by  one’s   imagination   to  
synthesize  the  information  given  him,  and  so  his  perception  is  simultaneously  richer  
and  more  private”  (Iser  283).    
The   ‘private   language’   of   literary   criticism  and   the  disciplinary  practices   of  
science,   however   well   understood   they   are   by   others   sharing   the   same   linguistic  
trading   zone,   to   invoke   Galison,   could   still   culminate   into   a   particular   and  
exceptionalist   understanding.  While   the   private   relationship   between   the   text   and  
reader  can   increase   the  richness  of   the   interpretation  by  not  having   to  acquiesce   to  
particular   rules   or   laws   beyond   that   set   by   the   reader,   such   an   experience  would  
never  be  replicable  in  the  same  manner  as  that  of  a  scientific  experiment.  However,  
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even  in  the  case  of  a  scientific  experiment,  there  is  much  more  going  on  than  merely  
the  repetition  of  an  experiment  to  replicate  an  outcome.  Therefore,  the  end  product  
for  both  experiences  is  one  that  is  ideologically  infused  and  theory-­‐‑laden,  rather  than  
universal.  
Most  conventional  approaches  to  practices  in  literary  criticism  do  not  fall  far  
from   the  macro-­‐‑perspectives   of   classical   physics   (including   our   comprehension   of  
the   biological   Lebenswelt),   informed,   as   they   are,   by   Galilean/Newtonian   ‘thought-­‐‑
styles,’  so  much  so  that  even  attempts  at  reading  literature  against  the  non-­‐‑intuitive  
world   of   quantum   operations   would   fall   quite   short.   Therefore,   in   a   number   of  
instances,  we  end  up  with  critical  readings  of  texts  that  did  not  fully  make  use  of  the  
physics  subject  deployed  for  the  performance  of  that  critique,  as  is  the  case  with  the  
various  attempts  at  using  quantum  theory  as  social  theory  in  literary  analysis.1    
However,   the   non-­‐‑intuitive,   but   classical   physics   of   Einsteinian   relativity  
contains  attractive  meta-­‐‑narratives   that   could  spice  up   the  what-­‐‑if   imaginary  of  an  
otherwise   mundane   world   because   the   aesthetics   of   relativity   is   premised   on   a  
familiar  world  (even  if   the  theory  defamiliarizes  how  space  and  time  might  appear  
to  us),  and  can  therefore  provide  a  germane  backdrop  for  sociopolitical  critique.  The  
fascination  that  literary  scholars  have  towards  Einsteinian  relativity  appears  fixed  on  
                                                                                                             
1  See  Samuel  Chase  Coale’s  Quirks  of  the  Quantum:  Postmodernism  and  Contemporary  American  Fiction  for  
such  an  example.  
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the  twilight  and  ‘crises’  laden  years  of  the  1920s,  a  moment  induced  by  the  “so-­‐‑called  
‘failure’   of   mechanics”   (Seth   27-­‐‑29)   due   to   ongoing   ontological   difficulties  
experienced  by  quantum  mechanics,  whose  importance  is  increasingly  validated  but  
whose  hidden  relations  need  to  be  further  finessed.    
Primarily,  this  chapter  is  interested  in  considering  science  fiction  as  a  critical  
historiography   of   techno-­‐‑scientific   interrogations   (critical   in   the   sense   of   being  
sensitive   to   ideological   and  cultural  valuations),  while   also   considering   the  not-­‐‑yet  
practically   viable   interfacing   between   certain   sciences   that   are,   theoretically,   not  
improbable.   Secondarily,   the   chapter   is   interested   in   considering   the   distinction  
between  science  and  technology,  one  that  is  not  always  clearly  demarcated  because  
of  the  conflation  of  techno-­‐‑to-­‐‑science.  Quarantine   is  discussed  as  an  example  of  that  
porous  dichotomy  between  science  and  technology.  It  is  also  the  aim  of  this  chapter  
to   explore   the   fictive   re-­‐‑interpretation   of   the   real-­‐‑time   underdetermined   quantum  
theories  at  its  most  foundationally  enigmatic,  in  a  manner  that  would  best  illustrate  
my  more  theoretical  arguments  in  both  chapters  two  and  three.  
The   techno-­‐‑scientific   interpretations  of  physics   that   is  present   in  Quarantine,  
and   in   the   scientific   issues   raised   throughout   this  dissertation,   can  be   read   against  
Suman   Seth’s   characterization   of   the   development   of   postwar   German   theoretical  
physics:  ‘the  physics  of  principles’  and  the  ‘physics  of  problems.’  
The   physics   of   principles,   which   had   its   most   prominent   proponents  
Poincaré,   Planck,   Einstein   and   Bohr,   can   be   seen   as   the   most   significant  
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continuation  of  and  response  to  fin  de  siècle  debates  about  the  foundations  of  
physics,   offering   in   place   of   any   particular   materialist   ontology   a   physics  
based  on  generalized  principles.   The  physics   of   problems  both  was  newer,  
beginning   esssentially   with   Sommerfeld’s   move   to   Munich   in   1906,   and  
largely  avoided   the  questions  of   foundations.  Sommerfeld  once  quipped   to  
Einstein  that  ’I  can  only  further  the  engineering  of  the  quantum  [die  Technik  
der  Quanten].  You  have  to  make  it  philosophy’.  (41)  
Fiction  like  Quarantine,  their  shortcomings  included,  are  not  evaluated  in  the  context  
of  a  micro-­‐‑politics  produced  of  laws  governing  the  physical  realities  of  the  quantum  
worlds   with   their   own   intense   interactions;   such   interactions   cannot   be   scaled-­‐‑up  
and   measured   against   the   laws   of   the   macro-­‐‑world   without   acknowledging  
problems   of   physical   and   behavioral   incompatibilities   between   micro   and   macro  
entities.  In  other  words,  when  one  conducts  social  experiments  that  involve  ‘crossing  
the  borders’  between  differently   ‘acculturated’  physical   realms,  one  would  need   to  
negotiate   a   space   for   mediating   between   the   realms   to   maintain   the   ontological  
consistency  of  the  physical  laws  regardless  of  the  interpretive  modes  of  choice.  
In  addition,  for  Jameson,  the  ‘hard’  science  is  “…a  miniature  sociology  of  the  
scientists,  a  history  of   their   funding,  and  an  account  of   the  role  of  experimentation  
and  of  scientific  publication  as  well”  (108).  Experiments  become  the  center  whereby  
funding  flows  in  and  scientific  publication  flows  out,  with  clusters  of  scientists  and  
institutional   administrators   adjudicating   the   boundaries   and   parameters   that   will  
determine  how  the  experiments  should  be  performed.  Experimentation  also  enables,  
depending  on  the  apparatus  and  ontological  attitudes  of  the  subject  that  is  the  target  
of   experimentation,   the   re-­‐‑interpretation   of   multitudes   of   theories   that   might  
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converge,   or   not,   into   successful   predictions.   Experiments   can   amplify   uncertainty  
even  as  they  desire  to  achieve  descriptive  clarity.  But  most  importantly,  experiments  
premised  on  creative  science  (which  is  not  the  same  as  imaginary  or  fictive  science)  
take   the   risk   of   transcending   the   law-­‐‑like   restrictions   of   a   scientific   discipline   to  
imagine  an  outcome  involving  the  ‘unrealistic’  mixing  of  temporal  scales  in  order  to  
complicate  the  dichotomy  between  the  historical  and  the  present,  the  macro  and  the  
micro.   In   a   sense,   to   develop   a   philosophy   of   experiment   is   also   to   develop   a  
philosophy   of   an   always-­‐‑transformative   identity   that   finds   commonality   in  
difference.  
The  interpretive  processes  forming  the  core  of  problem  solving  in  evidence-­‐‑
based  science  are  also  rigorously  pursued  in  hard  science  fiction,  except  for  having  
not   to   deal   with   hindrances   that   are   results   of  mathematical   constraints.   Thought  
experiments,   considered   as   theoretical   physics’   closest   fictional   kin   and   analytic  
philosophy’s   favorite  method   for   conceptual   analysis   and   logical   narrations,   could  
only   highlight   an   unknown   entity,   beyond   the   accounted   for   parameters,   through  
the  appearance  of  ruptures  and  breakdowns  during  the  process  of  clarification,  with  
the   emergence   of   new   paradoxes.   This   is   because   most   conventional   thought  
experiments  have  never  been  constructed  to  deal  with   the   logical  capriciousness  of  
knowledge,   derived   from   the   performance   of   speculation,   particularly   when   the  
knowledge  does  not  have  stable  corollaries.    
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Nevertheless,   thought   experiments,   for   all   the   controversies   regarding   its  
usefulness,   and   its   problematic   relationship   to   public   experiments2,   could   be   the  
hypothesis  out  of  which  a  science  fictional  prototype  can  be  built.  At  this  juncture,  I  
will  not  engage  in  a  circular  argument  on  whether  thought  experiments  can  validate  
the  ‘real’  experiments,  given  how  unproductive  such  attempts  are.  Instead,  I  would  
allow  the  rest  of  the  chapter  to  demonstrate  as  a  thought  experiment,  in  and  of  itself,  
on   what   science   fiction   can   do   to   enrich   further,   and   extend   the   interpretive  
possibility,   of   science   as   knowledge   in   circulation   above   and   beyond   its   own  
immediate  milieu.    
Some  hard  science  fiction  authors  believe  in  adhering  as  closely  to  the  logics  
of  established  science  as  possible,  while  keeping  an  eye  out  for  informed  speculation.  
Sometimes,  pondering  over  how  to  reconcile  the  demands  of  fictional  narrative  with  
the  physical  constraints  posed  by  science  could  bring  about  an  unexpected  outcome  
for   the   science.   In   his   essay,   “When   Science   Writes   Fiction,”   Robert   L   Forward  
                                                                                                             
2   In   this   book,  Thought   Experiments,   philosopher   Roy   Sorensen   notes   that   “…Those  who   believe   that  
thought  experiments  justify  and  test  hypotheses  face  a  dilemma  that  we  can  formulate  in  terms  of  their  
connection  with  public  experiments:  
1. If   a   thought   experiment   can   be   checked   through   public   experimentation,   then   not   actually  
checking   leaves   the   results   unverified,   and   an   actual   check   would   render   the   thought  
experiment  redundant  or  misleading.  
2. If  a  thought  experiment  cannot  be  checked  through  public  experimentation,  then  its  results  are  
unverifiable.  
3. Any   experiment   having   results   that   must   be   either   unverified,   redundant,   misleading,   or  
unverifiable  is  without  scientific  value.  
4. No  thought  experiment  has  a  scientific  value.”  (48)  
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provides  an  example  of  how,  while  trying  to  come  to  terms  with  a  knotty  problem  
concerning  where  to  put  a  neutron  star  in  relation  to  a  spaceship  that  had  embarked  
on  a  mission  to  study  the  frontiers  beyond  the  solar  system,  he  came  upon  an  idea  
involving  a  thought  experiment  and  mathematical  calculation  that  would  allow  the  
starship   to   stay   near   to   the   star   without   being   torn   apart   by   the   star’s   massive  
gravity:  this  is  done  by  the  placing  of  six  ultra-­‐‑dense  masses  as  counterforce.    
More   remarkably,   Forward   was   able   to   turn   this   idea   into   a   publishable  
scientific  paper  even  if  his  earlier  intention  had  merely  been  about  writing  a  credible  
science   fiction   story!3      However,   I   am   not   sure   if   I   agree  with   his   contention   that  
science  can  write  the  fiction  if  one  follows  its   lead,  as  this  goes  against  the  point  of  
what   fiction   is  meant   to  do,   as  was  earlier  argued.  But,   should  one  be  able   to   stay  
true  to  the  science  while  allowing  aesthetics  and  social  purpose  to  flourish,  one  could  
demonstrate   more   conclusively   that   the   internal   values   of   science   cannot   be  
dissociated   from   the   social   conditions   enabling   the   former’s   production.   After   all,  
why  should  the  actual  world  be  constricted  by  realist  interpretations  that  are  just  our  
way   of   straining   at   objectivity   in   the   course   of   our   knowledge   production,   itself   a  
questionable  virtue?  As  Whitehead  puts  it  astutely:  
That  actual  world,  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  community  of  entities  which  are  settled,  
actual,   and   already   become,   conditions   and   limits   the   potentiality   for  
                                                                                                             
3   See  Hard   Science   Fiction.Eds.  George   E.   Slusser   and   Eric   S.   Rabkin.   Carbondale  &   Edwardsville,   IL:  
Southern  Illinois  University  Press.5.  
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creativeness   beyond   itself.   The   ‘given’  world   provides   determinate   data   in  
the   form   of   those   objectifications   of   themselves  which   the   characters   of   its  
actual   entities   can   provide.   This   is   a   limitation   laid   upon   the   general  
potentiality  provided  by  eternal  objects,  considered  merely  in  respect  to  the  
generality   of   their   natures.   Thus,   relatively   to   any   actual   entity,   there   is   a  
‘given’  world  of  settled  actual  entities  and  a   ‘real’  potentiality,  which   is   the  
datum   for   creativeness   beyond   that   standpoint.   This   datum,   which   is   the  
primary   phase   in   the   process   constituting   an   actual   entity,   is   nothing   else  
than  the  actual  world  itself  in  its  character  of  a  possibility  for  the  process  of  
being  felt.  This  exemplifies  the  metaphysical  principle  that  every  ‘being’  is  a  
potential  for  a  ‘becoming.’  The  actual  world  is  the  ‘objective  content’  of  each  
new  creation  (65).  
While   many   hard   science   fiction   writers   have   successful   careers   in   the  
sciences   prior   to   writing   fiction;   some   either   become   fulltime   writers   or   continue  
with   their   scientific  practice  while  writing  on   the   side;  an  extensive  background   in  
the  sciences  is  not  prerequisite  to  one’s  ability  to  produce  believable  science  in  fiction  
(though,  in  some  occasions,  one  might  have  to  be  prepared  to  engage  with  scientists,  
who   as   science   fiction   readers,   may   volubly   disagree   with   the   writer’s   fictional  
representation  of  a  science).  Nor  should  one  be  forced  to  conform  rigidly  to  scientific  
facts  in  order  to  produce  good  hard  science  fiction,  as  good  science  does  not  always  
translate  to  readable  fiction  (as  Jameson  duly  notes).    
Science  fiction  is  more  than  a  platform  for  prototyping  scientific  ideas;  within  
the  former  is  the  seed  for  foregrounding  the  form  as  well  as  the  practice  of  science.  
Science  fiction  showcases  a   literary  form  that  combines  scientific  praxis  with  socio-­‐‑
scientific  ideology.  For  instance,  there  are  elements  of  the  fictional  model  at  work  in  
theoretical   physics   because   the   latter   is   about   imagining   a   multitude   of   ways   in  
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which  a  problem  can  be  approached  that  is  dependent  on  experiments  to  materialize  
the   solution.   Until   materialization   can   happen,   the   imagined   narratives   are  
uninstantiated  potentialities.  
Therefore,  the  closest  physics  counterpart  to  the  hard  science  fiction  writer  is  
the   theoretical   physicist,   if   only   because   the   latter   shares   the   same   passion   for  
envisioning   unrealized   potentialities   and   for   pushing   the   boundaries   of   what   is  
possible   while   maintaining   an   allegiance   to   the   laws   of   nature.   When   theoretical  
physicists  decide  on  making  specific  arguments  for  the  physics,  they  emphasize  the  
important  descriptive,  and  explanatory  potential,  of  the  theory;  the  theory  could  be  
deployed  for  producing  tangible  measurements  of  a  phenomenon  whence  practical  
applications   can   be   later   derived.   However,   unlike   the   science   fiction   writer,   the  
bread   and   butter   of   the   theoretical   physicists,   particularly   in   this   day   and   age   of  
funding   constraints,   involves   making   predictions,   and   forecasts,   that   are   not  
technologically  impossible  and  physically  insurmountable.    
Even   if   the   theoretical   physicist   is  willing   to   speculate  within   the   range   of  
available  horizons,  his/her  speculation  is  very  much  delimited  by  the  mathematical  
and  computational   tools  he/she  works  with.  For   the  hard   science   fiction  writer,  on  
the  other  hand,  there  is  less  pressure  to  adhere  to  physical  plausibility  or  to  ground  
the   characters   in   the   fiction  within   our  mundane   everyday.   Instead,   there   is  more  
room   for   a   science   fiction   writer   to   negotiate   conceptual   questions   that   are   more  
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metaphysical   than  physical,  even  while  speculating  on  future  scientific  possibilities  
by  ‘inventing’  a  non-­‐‑  existent  technology  as  a  catalyst  or  mediator  of  that  futurity.  
The   abovementioned   contention   parallels   that   between   philosophers   of  
physics  and  the  physicists   in  general:   the  former  is   interested  in  recuperating  older  
formalism   that   have   fallen   out   of   use  with  most  working   physicists,   in   case   there  
might  be  an  overlooked  potential  while  the  latter  might  not  consider  the  revisiting  of  
older  theories  to  be  productive  (although  some  theoretical  physicists  might  differ  on  
this   point,   especially   those   who   work   on   the   foundations   of   quantum   theory).  
Indeed,  physicists,  by  and  large,  are  more  concerned  with  whether  the  shortcomings  
of   the   theories   advanced   would   impede   the   development   of   a   research   program  
grounded  on  those  theories.    
Nonetheless,  in  the  same  vein  that  a  science  fiction  writer  might  be  interested  
in  furthering  a  choice  in  the  design  of  their  subject-­‐‑narrative,  a  theoretical  physicist  
might   be   rooting   for   a   theory   they   believe   to   be   robust,   with   unrealized  
potentialities,  whatever   the   theory’s   empirical   status.   Further,   the   preference   for   a  
particular  theoretical  method  could  also  be  the  outcome  of  the  philosophical  beliefs  
of  physicists  who  might  perceive  certain  political  imaginaries  as  arising  from  certain  
preferred   theories;   these   theories  not  only   inform  our  views  of  nature  but  also  our  
attitudes   towards   life,   given   the   interest   in   seeking   a   grand   unified   theory   of   the  
universe   since   the   early   twentieth-­‐‑century.   An   example   of   such   philosophical,   or  
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almost  ideological,  convictions  can  be  found  in  Erwin  Schrödinger’s  series  of  lectures  
that  are  compiled  in  What  is  Life  with  Mind  and  Matter  and  Autobiographical  Sketches.    
During  the  lectures,  Schrödinger  plays  the  devil’s  advocate  by  taking  the  role  
of   a   “naïve   physicist”   so   as   to   be   able   to   ask   the   big   question:   how   can   all   of   the  
physics   produced   contribute   towards   enlightening   one   on   the   constitution   of   life?  
This  answer  might  be  delimited  by  laws  of  physics  that  only  knows  how  to  locate  life  
within   spatiotemporal   equilibrium  without   accounting   for   the   immateriality   of   the  
preternatural.   However,   science   fiction   is   able   to   provide   different   degrees   of  
constrained   speculations   about   observed   and   unobserved   phenomena,   with  
outcomes  ranging  from  the  next  logical  step  all  the  way  to  the  unexpected  and  even  
terrifying!    
Such  outcomes  are  not  unimaginable  were  we  to  consider  the  consequence  of  
a  massless  Higgs  on  all  the  known  elementary  particles  of  the  Standard  Model,  and  
how   that   would   change   our   view   of   the   physical   universe   in   relation   to   our  
quotidian  world,  particularly  if  physical  laws  can  be  imagined  to  behave  differently.  
The   effects   of   particular   microphysical   interactions   on   the   socio-­‐‑politics   of   our  
universe,  and  in  both  biological  and  cosmological  space,  are  very  real  in  Quarantine.  
The  novel  bridges  the  internal  epistemic  concerns  located  within  quantum  physical  
interactions  with  socio-­‐‑political  factors  external  to  the  hard  sciences.  
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Darko  Suvin,  in  the  chapter  “SF  and  the  Novum,”  discusses  how  science  is  an  
all   encompassing   “horizon”   of   science   fiction,   though   not   in   the   vulgar   sense   of  
“gadgetry-­‐‑cum-­‐‑utopia/dystopia;”   and   that   a   refusal   to   countenance   the   cause   and  
effect  of  science  in  one’s  fiction  is  to  reject  science  fiction  (67).  But  Suvin  hastens  to  
add   that   the   credibility  of   the   science   fiction   is   independent  of   the   rationale  of   the  
science  (where  the  science  may  or  may  not  be  accurately  depicted).  Rather,  we  have  
to   consider   the  point  of   that   rationale   in   terms  of  what   is  displaced  and  what  gets  
interpreted.   Suvin   expects   the   science   fiction   he   advances   to   be   explicable   by   the  
scientific  method,  however  astonishing   the  phenomena  portrayed,  or  else   it  would  
be  nothing  more  than  a  fabulous  tale.    
However,   this  does  not  mean  that   the  appearance  of  anything  fantastical  or  
‘paranormal’   should   be   immediately   dismissed   from   science   fiction   because   the  
former’s  existence  merely  hints  at  the  limits  of  our  epistemic  situatedness  and  limits  
as  observers.  For  instance,  those,  whose  daily  relation  to  physics  is  informed  by  the  
logics   of   a  Newtonian/Galilean   framework,  might  view   the  popular   theme  of   time  
travel  as  fantastical.  While  real-­‐‑world  physics  is  interested  in  the  potentiality  of  time  
travel,  such  an  interest  also  comes  with  an  understanding  of  the  tremendous  amount  
of  physical   (and  metaphysical)  barriers   that  one  would  have  to  overcome  and  how  
one  conceptualizes  the  spatiality  of  time,  as  had  been  explicated  by  the  principle  of  
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no  discontinuity  in  Einstein’s  field  theoretical  equations  of  gravitation.4    Even  so,  not  
everyone  agrees  on  how  to  portray  the  essence  of  time.5    
The   common   chord   shared   by   science   fiction   and   speculative   theory   is;  
eschew   a   definite   end   in   favor   of   a   stochastic   approach;   the   novum   that   contains  
hidden  variables  could  eventually  be  foregrounded  as  we  dig  deeper  into  the  mesh  
of   interactions   within   scientific   fields   of   interest   to   isolate   the   faint   signals   being  
emanated   to  produce   increasing  evidence,  and  a  composite  profile,  of  a  potentially  
novel  entity  or  organism  that  had  been  far  hidden.  By  integrating  science  fiction  to  
the   hard   sciences,   a   nucleus   of   thought,   fomenting   in   a   critical   methodology,   is  
produced  and  then  used  to  model,  heuristically,  more  interesting,  and  epistemically  
varied,   thought   experiments.   Given   how   measurements   and   interpretations   are  
thought   about   through   the   strict   parameters   of   quantum   and   classical   praxis,   the  
introduction  of  subjectivity  brings  with  it  new  judgments,  so  that  one  may  break  out  
of  what  Whitehead  refers  to  as  the  Cartesian  “substance-­‐‑philosophy.”    
New   anticipations   arise   as   new   environments   come   into   being,   with   the  
possibility   of   a   new   reordering   or   flattening   of   the   currently   dominant   hierarchies  
                                                                                                             
4.   De   Sitter,   Willem.   “On   the   Curvature   of   Space.”   Proceedings   Royal   Academy   Amsterdam/  
Koninklijke  Akademie  van  Wetenschappen  te  Amsterdam  20  (1918):  1309–1312.  Print.  
5   See   Louis   de   Broglie’s   “The   Concepts   of   Contemporary   Physics   and   Bergson’s   Ideas   on   Time   and  
Motion.”   In   Bergson   and   the   Evolution   of   Physics.   Ed.   and   Trans.   P.A.Y.   Gunter,   where   he   discusses  
Bergson’s   resistance   to   considering   time   in   spatial   terms   (the   over-­‐‑geometrization   of   time)   while  
remaining  aware  of  the  delimitations  of  how  time  is  thought  about  in  classical  physics.  
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stemming   from   a   shift   in   original   logic.   Unfortunately,   resistance   to   extra-­‐‑normal  
shifting  of   logic  will  happen  because  of   the  differences   in  agreement  over  how  one  
should   conceptualize   a   scientific   effect   over   a   longer   term,   especially   if   the  
differences  stem  as  much  from  ontological  incommensurability  as  from  the  different  
physical  scales  whence  the  objects  are  interpreted.  Moreover,  we  have  to  heed  how  
the   transposing   across  different   scales   can  produce   an   illusion   that   hides  potential  
paradoxes   and   the   different   manifestations   of   the   same   qualities   because   of   the  
different   epistemic   rules   governing   the   interpretation   of   these   qualities.   They   all  
form  the  driving  goals  of  speculative  theory.    
Greg   Egan,   a   professional   computer   programmer,6   wrote   Quarantine   as   a  
ludic  experimentation  with  scientific  interpretation.  He  models  his  fictional  what-­‐‑ifs  
against   a   futuristic   dystopia   that   has   little   to   do   with   actual   quantum   physics   in  
practice,   but   rather,  what   he   envisions   as   scientific   concepts   containing   promising  
aesthetics   for   fictive   deployment.   In   his   dystopia,   human   characters   have   the  
unprecedented  capability  for  performing  the  quantum  mechanical  act  of  ‘smearing,’  
where   they   primed   themselves   in   readiness   for   potential   entanglements   with   one  
another  and  the  environment  they  are  a  part  of.  
Most   interventions   into   the   narratives   of   quantum   theory   have   been  
formalistic,  if  only  because  the  narratives  are  grounded  on  formalistic  logic  derived  
                                                                                                             
6  See  his  website  http://gregegan.customer.netspace.net.au/.  
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of  mathematical  elements.  However  the  origin  story  of  the  Higgs  boson,  while  itself  
a   narrative   that   began   in   mathematical   formalism,   has   also   become   one   about  
exploiting   epistemic   loopholes   in   order   to   tell   a   more   exciting   story   about   the  
properties  of   the   interactive   forces  of  nature.  Had  groups  of  physicists   shied  away  
from   playing   around   with   mathematical   inelegance   in   the   initial   stage   of   its  
theoretical  development,  the  narrative  of  the  Higgs  boson  might  have  been  different  
from   what   it   is   today.   But   in   terms   of   the   science   fiction   portrayed   here,   I   am  
advancing  a  still  rather  preliminary  view  that  was  articulated  in  chapter  two  about  
speculative   physics,   without   further   argumentation,   on   the   deployment   of   the  
narrative   structures   within   science   fiction   to   explore   the   ontological   shortcomings  
currently   encountered   within   the   philosophical   elucidation   of   the   Higgs   boson.  
However,  that  could  only  be  accomplished  beyond  the  dissertation,  for  this  chapter  
aims  first  at  establishing  a  critical  dissection  of   the  construction  of  such  method  by  
examining   how   a   work   of   hard   science   fiction   can   be   turned   into   work   for  
prototyping   philosophical   ideas   within   physics,   and   vice-­‐‑versa,   beyond   the  
constriction   of   mathematical   formalism,   before   the   latter   is   thrown   into   the   mix  
(which   is   another   trajectory   worthy   of   further   contemplation   beyond   this  
dissertation).  
In  Quarantine,  Egan  does  the  same  thing  with  quantum  mechanics,  exploiting  
its   philosophical   and   conceptual   loopholes   towards   a   creative   end.   While   some  
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might   accuse   him   of   discarding   even   the   most   flexible   parameters   of   higher  
formalisms   in  his  version  of   ‘quantum   interpretation,’   I  would  argue,   instead,   that  
Egan  is   finding  ways  to  navigate  topics  that  have  failed  to  make  headway  through  
scientific   actualization,   by   textually   imagining   the   what-­‐‑ifs   of   a   direct   interface  
between   the   microstates   and   their   environment,   while   ‘compactifying’   the  
interactions  between  events  across  different  scales  to  magnify  their  effect.  One  might  
accuse   Egan   of   focusing   too   much   of   his   narrative   energy   on   the   character   of  
quantum  mechanics   in  relation   to   technologically-­‐‑driven  sociology  to   the  exclusion  
of   subjectivity   in   his   human   characters,   therefore   leading   to   an   appearance   of  
sterility   in   the   characters’   portrayal.   However,   Egan’s   characters   are   like   nesting  
dolls;   in   order   to   penetrate   into   their   core,   one   has   to   break   through   their   layers,  
therefore   delineating   all   that   is   observable   about   their   behavior   through   their  
interactions  with  the  science  that  shape  their  decisions  and  actions.    
4.1 Reading Quarantine as Speculative Theory in the Epochs 
of Capital  
Quarantine   is   set   in   a   future   not   too   distant   from   the   time   of   writing,   but  
which   would   have   felt   rather   distant   when   the   novel   was   published   in   the   final  
decade  of   the   twentieth   century.  Egan  artfully   combines   the  near-­‐‑randomness  of   a  
semi-­‐‑classical   quantum   theory   (semi-­‐‑classical   in   the   sense   that   the   measurement  
quantum   theory   is   still   dependent   upon   classical   physical   structures)   with   the  
mesoscopic  world  of  neural  networks  in  brain  science.      
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I   read  the  novel  as  divided   into   three  epochs  of   individuated  and  collective  
consciousness.  Each  of  the  epochs  can  be  read  as  variations  on  the  original  theme  of  
the   double-­‐‑slit   experiment,   or   what   Karen   Barad   refers   to   as   the   which-­‐‑path  
experiments   that   are   alterable   in   accordance   to   quantum   entanglements   and   the  
quantum  eraser  (where  a  chosen  direction  can  leave  behind  traces  or  have  the  traces  
removed   away   from   the   path   of   detection).   Such   a   reading   parallels   the   creative  
license   that   Lightman   took   with   special   and   general   relativity   theory   in  Einstein’s  
Dreams,   that   is   simultaneously   surrealistic   and   impressionistic,   yet   succeeds   in  
immersing   the   reader   within   the   structural   workings   of   the   physics   theories   that  
inspired  the  narrative.  There  is  little  doubt  that  Egan  is  serious  about  the  science(s)  
he  chose  to  portray.    
The   players   in   the   epochs   are   coupled   in   an   ensemble   to   one   another,   not  
unlike   the   fictional   Ensemble   that   represents   both   an   emergent   view   of   quantum  
states  and  an  assemblage  of  collectivities  (that  are  assemblages  that  will   inform  the  
three  epochs):  Nick  Stavrianos  and  the  corporations  (the  Hilgemann  Institute  and  the  
Ensemble);  Stavrianos  and  the  ‘quantum-­‐‑like’  women,  Po-­‐‑Kwai  and  Laura  Andrews;  
Stavrianos  and  his  dead/virtual  wife  Karen;  Stavrianos  and  the  Bubble.  Temporality  
in   the   form  of  dates  and  numbers  also   take  on   significance  as   they  mark  points  of  
transitions   in   the  novel’s  plot,  even   if   the   transitions  may  not  be  overt,   such  as   the  
background  story  involving  the  terrorist  Children  and  the  effects  of  the  Bubble  that  
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shroud  parts   of   Egan’s   alternate  world   in   “darkness”   by   “shielding”   the   sun   from  
the   other   galaxies.   For   the   Bubble   is   “…an   immaterial   surface   which   behaves,   in  
many   ways,   like   a   concave   version   of   a   black   hole’s   event   horizon.   It   absorbs  
sunlight   perfectly,   and   emits   nothing   but   a   featureless   trickle   of   thermal  
radition…(19).”7  
Stavrianos   is   the   consistent   subject   for   all   of   the   three   epochs,   with   the  
temporality   of   the   epochs   being   at   once   cinematic   yet   marked   by   extra-­‐‑ordinary  
events  that  point  to  ruptures  in  expectations,  and  the  clashing  of  different  ontologies.  
Stavrianos  is  the  center  of  power  in  the  novel.  Just  as  there  are  three  epochs,  there  are  
three   zones   to   power   such   as   are   explicated   by  Deleuze   and  Guattari:   the   zone   of  
power,  zone  of  indiscernibility,  and  zone  of  impotence.  These  zones  are  set  in  terms  
of   flows   and   segments,   of   “financing-­‐‑money,   or   credit   money   [that]   involves   the  
mass   of   economic   transactions”   (A   Thousand   Plateaus   249).   Risks   and   credits   flow  
through  Stavrianos  from  various  behemoths  as  he  switched  between  his  allegiances;  
from  the   flow  came   information   that  are  cycled   through  his  mods,  which  could  be  
turned   into  Capital   (the   capitalization   of   capital   represents   a  desire   for   totality)   so  
that  more   trade   could   take   place.  All   of   these   activities   culminate   into   an   abstract  
machine  that  churns  out  figures  representing  near-­‐‑arbitrary  values.  
                                                                                                             
7   The   description   provided   by   Egan   is   a   fictive   extension   of   Stephen  Hawking’s   own   explication   of  
relativity  and  the  event  Horizon  in  The  Brief  History  of  Time  (1988).  
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At   the   same   time,   we   might   ask   if   it   is   really   possible   to   de-­‐‑
anthropomorphize  human  conceptions,  given  that  the  apparatus  for  performing  the  
measurement,   and   the   body   that   observes   the   measurement,   require   the  
measurement   to   be   reconstituted   into   a   sense-­‐‑making   that   is   always-­‐‑already  
anthropomorphic.  We  get  an  explicit  sense  of  embodied  interpretation  at  work  from  
the   circular   conversations   Stavrianos   had   with   the   other   characters   in   the   book.  
Every  character,  however  minor,  plays  a  part  in  putting  obstacles  (constraints)  in  the  
path  of   the  protagonist  who  had  been  sent   to   recover  a   severely  mentally  disabled  
woman   who   appeared   to   have   escaped   from   a   secured   facility.   Each   of   these  
characters,   even   the  most   improbable   ones   (such   as   the   “aliens”  who   created   The  
Bubble),  are  necessary  as  pawns  (and  needed  for  human  interest)  in  an  environment  
that  offers  an  array  of  physical   states,  where   the   structuring  of   the   chain  of   events  
have  greater  import  than  their  contents.    
On   the   surface,   the   quantum   mechanics   out   of   which   Egan   draws   his  
inspiration   looks   like   the   standard  Copenhagen   interpretation   that   emphasizes   the  
correlations  between  classical  and  quantum  descriptions  of   the  physical  states.  The  
description  of  the  effects  of  physical  interference  and  suppression  of  certain  physical  
behavior,   as   represented   by   the   concept   of   decoherence,   points  more   plausibly   to  
Egan   stringing   together   the   different   readings   of   quantum  mechanics   in   existence;  
from   the   famous   Everett’s   many   worlds   and   the   de   Broglie-­‐‑Bohm   deterministic  
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version,   to   the   lesser   known   objective   collapse   theory,   and   the   Von  
Neumann/Wigner’s  interpretation  that  includes  consciousness  -­‐‑  the  latter  of  interest  
to   physicists   and   philosophers   intrigued   by   how   one   can   get   from   metaphysical  
causation  to  the  production  of  physical  phenomena.    
One  can  accuse  Egan  of  cherry-­‐‑picking  through  the  more   intriguing  aspects  
of   the   interpretations   to   formulate   his   own   interpretation   that   employs   fiction   to  
make  more  literal,  the  speculations  taking  place  in  the  micro-­‐‑narratives  of  quantum  
mechanics,   sometimes   to   a   comic   end,   through   the   psychedelic   invocation   of  
smeared  humans   in  a  smeared  world   in   the   final  pages  of   the  novel.  Even  as  Egan  
admits   to   certain   idealistic,   and   inaccurate,   understanding   of   quantum  mechanics  
that   have   driven   his   ideas8,   the   ‘mistakes’   he   made   are   less   important   than   the  
possibility  he  provides  for  other  ways  of  thinking  about  science  no  less  intellectually  
provocative   and   stimulating.   In   a   sense,   the   idea   of   science,   and   less   its   content,  
shapes  the  narrative.  
The   first   epoch   of   the   novel   constitutes   a   state   of   individuated   being   that  
relates  to  the  force  of  Capital,  yet  is  capable  of  holding  the  latter  at  bay;  the  ground  
of  this  epoch  is  represented  by  strict  binaries,  determinacy,  and  control.  One  catches  
an  antagonistic   tendency,   for  Deleuze  and  Guattari   explain,   “...Politics  operates  by  
macro   decisions   and   binary   choices,   binarized   interests;   but   the   realm   of   the  
                                                                                                             
8  See  Egan’s  post-­‐‑novel  manifesto  at  gregegan.customer.netspace.net.au/QUARANTINE/QM/QM.html  
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decidable   remains   very   slim.   Political   decision-­‐‑making   necessarily   descends   into   a  
world  of  microdeterminations,  attractions,  and  desires,  which   it  must  sound  out  or  
evaluate  in  a  different  fashion”  (244).    
The   first   epoch   begins   when   Stavrianos,   a   former   cop   turned   private  
investigator/consultant/missing-­‐‑persons   retriever,   aligned   himself   with   Capital’s  
interest  in  ‘covering-­‐‑up’  a  potential  liability  in  the  form  of  a  missing  brain-­‐‑damaged  
patient,  Laura  Andrews.  In  the  early  stages  of  the  novel,  Stavarianos  was  in  his  own  
state,   though   a   state   sliced   through   by   a   mod   that   enabled   access   to   a   virtual  
reconstitution  of  his  wife.  In  fact,  the  mod-­‐‑produced  incarnation  of  his  wife  provides  
a   rich   illustration   of   the   delimitations   and   extensivity   of   the   next   generation  
cybernetic   construct   that   may   become   a   possibility   in   the   future,   even   as   one  
ventures   into   the   deconstruction   of   the   gendered   cyborg   embodied   by   the   Nick-­‐‑
Karen  dryad,  but  I  will  not  go  into  that.  
Stavrianos  speculated  on  the  connection  between  Laura’s  disappearance  and  
the   activities  of   an   apocalyptic  group   called   the  Children.   It   is  here   that  Egan   first  
projects   onto   a   collective   that   is   always   in   the   background   but   never   quite   took  
center-­‐‑stage,  yet  is  the  glue  that  link  together  events  that  are  apparently  non-­‐‑causal  
or   non-­‐‑deterministic.   In   addition,   the   tragedy   of   his   past   had   contributed   to  
Stavrianos   leaving   the  employ  of   the  police   force   (thereby  extricating  himself   from  
one  form  of  collective)  and  becoming  a  mercenary  (a  return  to  the  individual).  
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Despite   his   appearance   of   individuation,   Stavrianos   had   spent  much   of   his  
adult  life  looking  for  a  ‘fix’  that  would  allow  him  to  extricate  himself  from  a  chaotic  
(emotionally-­‐‑impacted)  existence  so  as  to  be  able  to  live  in  a  world  where  the  cause  
and  effect  of  actions  are  purely  deductive/inductive,  and  therefore,  more  predictable.  
In   fact,   many   of   the   events   of   the   novel   such   as   the   availability,   for   purchase,   of  
devices   that   could   modify   one’s   biological   programming,   particularly   the   section  
that   controls   for   conscious  behavior   that   include  voluntary  and   involuntary  neural  
functions.  He  has  startling  voluntary  control  over  every  aspect  of  his  physiology  
The  woman  moves  in  front  of  me,  holstering  a  gun.  From  a  pouch  on  her  belt  
beside  the  holster,  she  produces  a  small  hypodermic  capsule.  Stepping  over  
Laura,  she  takes  hold  of  my  jaw  with  one  hand  –  I  lower  my  hear  rate  –  slides  
the  needle  into  a  vein  in  the  side  of  my  neck  –  I  constrict  blood  flow  to  the  area  –  
then  squeezes  the  capsule…Reduced  circulation  will  buy  me  a  few  seconds,  
at  best,  but  that  should  be  long  enough  for  P1  to  make  an  assessment…(75).  
However,  such  over-­‐‑reliance  on  body  and  mind  ‘apps’  can  also  be  read  as  a  
critique   of   societies   enamored   by,   and   addicted   to,   artificial   modifiers   and  
contraptions,   as   means   of   control   and   power.   After   all,   it   is   possible   for   these  
modifiers   to   produce   unintended   effects,   as   is   demonstrated  multiple   times   in   the  
novel  such  as  in  the  not-­‐‑always-­‐‑predictable  behavior  of  the  mod-­‐‑induced  Karen.    
With   this  mods,   Stavrianos   becomes   a   cyborg  with   enhanced  mind   control  
options   for   managing   the   natural   needs   of   his   mind   and   body.   However,   unlike  
Haraway’s  cyborg  that  is  aware  of,  and  struggles  with,  the  ideologies  that  keep  the  
body   shackled,   Stavrianos,   at   least   in  his   initial   state,   embodies   indifference   to   the  
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ideology  of  his  paymaster;  his  risk-­‐‑taking  comes  not  out  of  political  conviction,  but  
rather,  of  an  informational  clout  that  could  be  applied  as  leverage.  Stavrianos  could  
aptly   be   read   as   the   Foucauldian   liberal   biopolitical   subject,   a   subject   that   is  
governed  by  the  multiplicity  of  mods  that  enable  self-­‐‑regulation  while  assuring  some  
level  of   juridical  oversight.  He   is  antithetical   to  conservatives,   such  as  his  own   late  
wife,   who   frowned   on   such   liberal   applications   of   the   invasive   mods,   until  
circumstances  force  compliance:  
Karen   had   no   professional   mods;   doctors,   the   eternal   conservatives,   still  
frowned  upon  technology  –  but  differential  malpractice  insurance  premiums,  
amongst  other  things,  were  gradually  eroding  their  resistance.  (59)  
Yet,  Stavrianos  represents  a  form  of  resistance  at  the  level  of  the  ontological,  
even   if  not  epistemological;  ontological   in   the  sense  of   the  awareness  he  has  of   the  
mod-­‐‑induced   code-­‐‑switching   he   engages   in   that   shapes   the   peculiarities   of   his  
individuality  down   to   the   level   of   the  molecular.  However,   he   is   considered   to   be  
epistemically   invariant   because   he   remained   reliant   on   the   mods   and   the  
programming   of   the   mods   shaped   his   engagement   with   the   world.   Yet,   in   the  
Simondonian  sense,  he  moves  beyond  a  single  individuation  to  begin  incorporating  
these   individuations   into   an   enworlded   system,   to   produce   states   where   the  
individuation  of  a  collective  can  emerge.9    
                                                                                                             
9  See  Gilbert  Simondon’s  The  Position  of  the  Problem  of  Ontogenesis.  Trans.  Gregory  Flanders.  Parrhesia  7  
(2009):  4-­‐‑16.  
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Egan   uses   his   own   knowledge   of   computing   technology   to   draw   parallels  
between   neuro-­‐‑genomic   potential   and   the   neural   networks   performed   by   artificial  
intelligence   (and   other   computational   models),   including   the   nanobots,   as   is  
demonstrated   in   a   scene   where   Stavrianos   obtained   a   nasal   spray   containing   a  
heavily  modified  bacteria  that  can  conduct  “nanomachines”  to  his  brain  and  inhibit  
the  act  of   ‘collapsing’  states.  Ray  Kurzweil  discusses  many  of  the  same  ideas  in  his  
book   The   Singularity   is   Near:   When   Humans   Transcend   Biology,   by   positioning   the  
evolution   of   technology   against   biological   evolution,   inspite   of   their   different  
timescales.    
What   Egan   began   writing   about   in   the   1990s   (although   such   ideas   were  
already   circulating   in   niche   speculative   science   fiction   publications   such   as   the  
Analog),   he   predicted   many   of   the   same   ideas   that   Kurzweil   did,   writing   in   the  
twenty-­‐‑first   century.   The   ‘imagined’  mods   that   allowed   Stavrianos   to  mediate   the  
individual   psychic  with   the   collective   are   not   unlike   the   quantum-­‐‑theoretical   Fock  
space   that   ‘builds’   into   a   single   particle   greater   ‘flexibility’   for   dealing  with   other  
similar   particles.   Therefore,   the   first   epoch   shows   how   that   even   if   Stavrianos  
appears  to  hold  onto  his  agency,  that  agency  is  entangled  with  the  affective  memory  
of  his  late  wife  as  the  voice  of  conscience  that  he  tried  to  quash,  though  not  always  
successfully,  since  her   ‘superposition’  onto  him  can  invoke  unforeseen  somatic  and  
cognitive   interference   that   destabilizes   his   certainty   and   conception   of   the   self.  
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However,   for   the  most  part,  he  was  able   to  maintain  a  certain  control,  up   to  when  
their  increasing  divergence  from  each  other  gave  shape  to  her  increased  autonomy.  
In   the  second  epoch,   suppression   is   intermingled  with   resistance;  desire   for  
knowledge   is   coupled   to   the   deployment   of   the   same   individual   agency   for   strict  
control   in  the  distribution  of  that  knowledge,  and  the  zone  of  power  becomes  both  
centralized  yet  de-­‐‑centered  by  an  internal  rebellion.  The  process  of  ‘smearing’  out  of  
a   single   concentrated   zone   of   power,   often   complicated   by   entanglements   that   are  
not  all  positive  to  those  involved,  takes  center-­‐‑stage  in  this  epoch  even  as  the  ethical  
relationships   between   the   characters,   and   between   the   characters   and   their  
environment,   are   ambiguous.  While   Capital  wants   to   appropriate   the   individual’s  
agency   and   indoctrinate   the   latter   with   its   ideology,   thereby   ensuring   compliance  
from  its  subjects,  subterfuge  could  still   take  place  even  among  Capital’s  most   loyal  
adherents,  if  only  because  they  do  not  trust  the  former’s  implicit  ability  to  maintain  
the   purity   of   the   ideology.   But   what   is   circular   about   the   argument   is   that   the  
insistence  on  the  purity  of  ethics  (or  purpose),   in  a  sense  that  suggests  an  arbitrary  
distinction  between   ideological  purity  and  pretense,  does  not  account   for  how  that  
distinction   can   only   happen   after   a   choice   has   already   been   made   and   the  
implication  of  that  choice  revealed.    
The  circular  argument  of  ideological  purity  is  demonstrated  when  Stavrianos  
goes   from   ‘free’   agent   to   a   supposed   ‘loyal’   employee   of   an   organization   (or   an  
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assemblage  of  organizations)  standing  in  for  the  Ensemble,  where  the  notion  of  free-­‐‑
will,   survival,   and   intrigue   are   not   so   clearly   demarcated.  As  we  have   seen   in   the  
first   epoch,   Stavrianos’s   decision-­‐‑making   process   is   amplified   to   a   state   of  
unwavering  belief   in  the  strict  order  of   logic  due  to  his  mods.  But  his  capture  by  a  
member  organization  of  the  Ensemble  led  to  their  commandeering  of  his  mods,  and  
the   installing   of   a   loyalty   mod.   Over   the   course   of   his   biologically   mediated  
indoctrination,  Stavrianos  was  convinced,  or  was  made  sufficiently  suggestible  to  be  
convinced,   that   his   role   was   to   serve   the   Ensemble;   he   was   to   guard   Po-­‐‑Kwai,   a  
newly  ‘recruited’  college  graduate  who  was  to  become  the  observer-­‐‑participant  in  an  
experiment   involving   quantum   states   that   was   reminiscent   of   the   original   Stern-­‐‑
Gerlach  experiment  on  particle  spin.10  
Nevertheless,   Stavrianos’s   newfound   role  was   quickly   destabilized  when   it  
was  challenged  by  one  of  his  superiors,  Lui,  who  insisted  that  they  had  been  tricked  
into  serving  a  “sham”  Ensemble.  The  former  was  then  introduced  to  the  “Canon,”  a  
secret   society   of   sorts  who   saw   themselves   as   the   upholder   of   the   true   Ensemble,  
                                                                                                             
10  In  this  experiment,  a  beam  of  silver  atoms  is  shot  through  an  inhomogeneous  magnetic  field  and  the  
direction   of   its   deflection   is   noted.   Since   only   neutral   atoms   are   used,   the   deflection   is   completely  
dominated   by   the   spin   effect   of   the   atoms.   The   inhomogeneous   field   is   needed   to   ensure   that   no  
classical  effects  will  cancel  out  the  deflection  of  the  particle.  More  of  the  fascinating  story  of  the  theory  
and   experiment   that   do   not   always   match   up   can   be   found   in   the   December   2003   copy   of   Physics  
Today,  in  the  article  “Stern  and  Gerlach:  How  a  bad  cigar  helped  reorient  atomic  physics”  by  Bretislav  
Friedrich  and  Dudley  Hershbach,  both  scientists.  Karen  Barad  also  discusses  the  quantum  foundations  
of   the   experiment   in   the   chapter   “Entanglements   and   Re(con)figurations”   in   Meeting   the   Universe  
Halfway:  Quantum  Physics  and  the  Entanglement  of  Matter  and  Meaning,  pp  258-­‐‑65.    
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though  their  strict  insistence,  as  Stavrianos  observed,  did  not  provide  greater  clarity  
on  the  meaning  of  that  claim.  However,  relative  to  the  vision,  the  one  goal  shared  by  
the   rebels,   as   represented  by   the   “Canon,”  was   to   retrieve   the   eigenstate  mod   that  
had  been  programmed  from  the  thought  experiments  performed  with  Po-­‐‑kwai.  
In   the   conversations   Stavrianos   had  with   Po-­‐‑kwai   and   Lui,   they   discussed  
how  the  superpositions  of  particular  eigenstates   (which  refer   to  unique  microstates  
whence   a   fixed   value   of   a   physical   property   is   assigned   to   each   individual   state),  
with   an   initial   indeterminate   condition,   could   bring   about   a   determinate   final  
outcome.    At  one  point  in  the  narrative,  Stavrianos  had  a  close  encounter  with  Laura,  
or   one   of   many   versions   of   Laura,   who,   despite   her   mental   incapacity,   had  
successfully  smeared  (or  tunneled)  herself  out  of  physical  barriers,  and  was  able  to  
find   her  way   to   him   in   a  manner   that   both   confused   and   intrigued   him.11   In   their  
conversation,  she  warned  him  that  the  attempt  at  collapsing  an  infinity  of  states  was  
what   brought   about   the   Bubble   in   the   first   place;   the   latter   was   caused   by   an  
                                                                                                             
11   The   creation   of   a   mentally   challenged   character   that   appears   to   have   mastered,   physically,   the  
manipulation   of   quantum  mechanics,   adds   a   notch   to  Egan’s   intentionality,   and   to  what  might   have  
been  his   theories  of   the  mind   in   relation   to   the  neurological   function,  none  of  which  are  given  much  
space   in   the  novel.  However,  his  deployment  of   the  neuronal  modes   as   a  way   for  manipulating  and  
controlling  the  most  subjective  elements  of  the  mind,  such  as  emotion,  appears  to  suggest  that  certain  
behaviors  of  the  mind  are  attached  to  one’s  somatic  condition,  and  can  be  altered  at  will  once  we  have  
access   to   the   right   code   for   doing   so   (a   subtle   allusion   to   Egan’s   background   in   computer   science).  
However,   it   is   clear   that  Stavrianos   is   intrigued  by   this   seeming  capability   that  Laura  possesses  even  
though  he  could  not  explain  how  she  had  done  what  she  did  so  successfully.  He  had  to  choose  between  
accepting,  or  not,  the  rationale  provided  him  concerning  how  Laura  had  been  able  to  smear  her  way  out  
of   the   corporeal   trappings   of   her   disability.   Her   ability   to   smear,   and   therefore   create   instances   of  
herself  in  the  process,  denotes  personal  agency,  even  if  the  outcome  seems  to  be  involuntary.    
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unknown   intelligent   life   that   had   the   sophistication   to   manipulate   the   cause-­‐‑and-­‐‑
effects   of   quantum  mechanics   in   a  way   that   could   affect   the   how   other   intelligent  
lives  would  end  up  perceiving  tangible  outcome  of  that  seeming  entanglement,  and  
collision,  between  events  in  the  microphysical  and  macrophysical  world.    
At  the  same  time,  she  revealed  the  mystery  behind  her  supposed  escape  from  
the  Hilgemann   Institute.   In   the   dialog   between   Stavrianos   and   the   not-­‐‑Laura   (but  
one   of   the   smeared   states   of   Laura),   Egan   attempts   to   demonstrate   the   collapse  
between  perception/consciousness   and  physical   reality,   a  view   that   resonated  with  
some  earlier  views  of  Bohm  and  Eccles.  Here,  we  can  see  a  pseudo  existential  crisis  
of  morality  that  resonates  with  the  point  about  quantum  states  and  morality  by  Bell  
that  I  had  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter.  However,  the  point  of  existence  is  not  in  
dispute;  what  is  in  dispute  is  the  veracity  of  the  claim  to  existence:    
Who  are  you?  Are  you  Laura?  Are  you  real?  
She  laughs.  “No.  But  your  perceptions  of  me  will  be.  I  speak  for  Laura  –  or  
Laura-­‐‑and-­‐‑the-­‐‑smeared-­‐‑Nick-­‐‑and-­‐‑Po-­‐‑kwai,  and  others.  But  mostly  Laura.”  
“I  don’t  understand.  You  ‘speak  for  Laura?’  Are  you  Laura,  or  not?”  
“Laura   is   smeared;   she   can’t   talk   to   you   herself.   She’s   talking   with   the  
smeared-­‐‑Nick-­‐‑and-­‐‑Po-­‐‑kwai,  but  she’s  created  me  to  talk  to  you.”  
“I  -­‐‑“  
“Her   complexity   is   spread   across   eigenstates;   the   two   of   you  would   never  
interact   directly.   But   she’s   concentrated   enough   information   into   a   single-­‐‑
state   mode   to   communicate   the   essentials.   She’s   made   contact   with   the  
smeared-­‐‑Nick-­‐‑and-­‐‑Po-­‐‑kwai  –  but  they’re  childlike,  unreliable.  Which  is  why  
I’m  talking  to  you.”  (230)  
Is   the   process   of   ‘smearing’   in   the   quotation   above   merely   a   neurological  
process   with   physical   consequence,   and   if   so,   how   does   crossing   between   the  
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different   states   take   place?   According   to   Bohm   in   The   Undivided   Universe:   An  
Ontological  Interpretation  of  Quantum  Theory  that  was  published  in  1993  (Egan’s  book  
was  published  in  1992),  neuroscientists  perceive  the  brain  as  derived  from  classical  
concepts   of   physics,   with   humans   perceiving   the   classical   world,   with   all   its  
implications,  happening  simultaneously  in  the  quantum  world.  Bohm  adds:  
However,   some   neuroscientists,   notably   Eccles   [12],   have   suggested   that  
quantum   processes   may   be   important   in   understanding   the   more   subtle  
activities   of   the   brain.   For   example,   as   has   already   been   pointed   out,   we  
know   that   retinal   cells   respond   to   a   few   quanta   at   a   time   and   that   this  
response   leads   to   a   multiplication   of   their   effects   to   a   classical   level   of  
intensity.   But   the   retina   is   just   an   extension   of   the   brain.   There   could  
evidently  be  other  parts  of   the  brain   in  which   such  a   sensitivity  may  exist,  
e.g.  in  certain  kinds  of  synapses.  If  this  were  the  case,  then  the  brain  would  
be   a   system   that   could,   like   a   measuring   apparatus,   manifest   and   reveal  
aspects   of   the   quantum   world   in   the   overall   processes.   Such   quantum  
sensitivity  would  imply  that  in  more  subtle  possibilities  of  the  behaviour  of  
the  brain,  a  classical  analysis  would  break  down…All  this  means  that  as  the  
processes  of  perception  unfolds  into  the  brain,  it  may  as  it  were  connected  to  
the   subtle  quantum  domain  which   latter   [sic]  may   in   turn   reconnect   to   the  
classical  domain,  as  outgoing  action  is  determined  through  amplification  of  
quantum  effects  (179).  
One  could  not  be  accused  of  suspecting  that  such   ideas   in  circulation  at   the  
time  would  have  influenced  Egan’s  own  views  of  how  the  brain  performs  quantum  
collapse,   even   if   he   had   not   read   Bohm.  Nevertheless,   at   the   fictional   level  where  
preferred   realities   are   amplified   while   others   ignored,   Stavrianos   and   his   neural  
mods  embody  these  ideas;  the  confluence  of  the  man  and  his  mods  were  sufficiently  
intense   that   Stavrianos  was   able   to   erupt  out  of   classical  determinism  and   connect  
with  the  quantum  world.    
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Moreover,   there   has   been   a   time,   in   the   1980s   and   1990s,   when   interest   in  
connecting   the  mind  with  quantum  mechanics  became  popular,  particularly  as   the  
shrinking   scale   of   the   electronic   instruments   coincided   with   developments   in  
supercomputing   and   artificial   intelligence   (it   so   happens   that   a   matchbox   size  
supercomputer  also  made  an  appearance  towards  the  latter  third  of  the  novel).  The  
consciousness  and  quantum  theoretical  connections  had  especial  resonance  with  the  
work   of   David   Bohm   and   Henry   Stapp;   both   men   went   back   to   the   most  
fundamental  questions  asked  in  the  early  days  of  quantum  theory  to  steer  quantum  
mechanical  inquiries  into  the  zone  of  ontological  questions,  questions  that  had  been  
set  aside  for  reasons  of  expediency.    
When   the   information   retrieval   processes   of   the   brain   is   exponentially  
increased   as   a   consequence   of   quantum   manipulation,   Egan   predicts   the   perfect  
quantum  supercomputer,   the  kind  that  Kurzweil  also  predicted   in  connection  with  
the   human   intelligence   architecture.   While   Kurzweil   stays   mostly   within   the  
boundaries  of  the  biological,  Egan  is  interested  in  correlating  the  quantum  with  the  
biological  through  his  demarcation  of  the  role  of  observation  in  ‘smeared’  quantum  
mechanical  states  (or  states  that  act  simultaneously  across  different  spatio-­‐‑temporal  
dimensions),  leading  to  the  collapse  of  one  preferred  state  out  of  a  range  of  possible  
states,  where   the   preferred   state   is   not   always   a   process   of   intentional   preference.  
Egan   then   correlates   these   states   with   the   mesoscopically-­‐‑scaled   neural   circuitry.  
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With  Stavrianos,  Egan  is  able  to  demonstrate  how  a  neuronally  connected  quantum  
computer   can   break   through   the   infinity   of   states   to   pick   out   a   slice   for   further  
exploration,  and  immersion.  
Po-­‐‑kwai,  who  played  the  role  of  a  ‘neutral’  observer,  led  a  highly  regimented-­‐‑
lifestyle  to  maintain  her  ‘purity,’  one  that  is  as  much  literal  as  it  is  metaphorical.  She  
is  representative  of  a  ‘pure’  physical  state  prior  to  entanglement,  and  her  subsequent  
entanglements  would  edge  her  towards  a  state  of  such  metaphysical  finesse  that  she  
was  able  to  weave  out  of  her  macro-­‐‑corporeal  being  at  will.  While  in  the  initial  state  
of   physical   ‘purity,’   she   is   as   much   an   observer   as   she   is   part   of   the   measuring  
apparatus,  in  her  ‘smeared’  state  of  ‘unlimited’  potential,  with  almost  no,  or  merely  
negligible,  external   interference  prior   to  her  state  of   ‘collapse.’  As  a  macro-­‐‑classical  
being,  she  was  also  a  detector,  who  in  the  process  of  engaging  with  a  quantum  state,  
became  sufficiently  entangled  so  that  she  was  able  to  influence  the  eigenvalues  of  the  
states,   and   therefore,   reached   a   point  where   she   could  manipulate   her  way   into   a  
‘preferred’  state.    
Soon  enough,  her  entanglement  with  the  quantum  state  made  her  a  part  of  its  
continuous   probabilistic   structure   (known   as   density  matrix),   and   she  was   able   to  
affect   certain   properties   of   a   fundamental   particle   that   ‘tunnels’   through   the  walls  
that  stand  for  energetic  potential  barriers.  A  realist  might  insist  that  Egan’s  portrayal  
of  his  character’s  ability  to  walk  through  solid  walls  and  firmly  shut  doors,  while  in  
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the   state   of   hyper-­‐‑excitation,   as   flights   of   fancy,   a   misapplication   of   quantum  
interpretations,  and  utter  disregard  for  mathematical  and  physical  constraints.    
However,   Egan   is   less   interested   in   performing   just   any   ordinary   thought  
experiment   in   quantum   physics   than   in   breaking   down   the   tendency   towards  
normalization  by  utilizing  the  cognitive  estrangement  science  fiction  affords.  Such  an  
acts   of   estrangement   increase   the   level   of   bizarreness   in   the   already   non-­‐‑intuitive  
interactions   of   a   quantum  world   to   create   an   information   rich   environment,   with  
unlimited   degrees   of   freedom   (or   freedom   as   constrained   by   the   text).   In   other  
words,   quantum   theory,   and   its   epistemic   concerns,   is   supervened   by   a   fictional  
counterpart   for  extending  measurements  of   interpretive  entities   that  are  even  more  
complex  than  the  multi-­‐‑particle  interactions.    
The   connection  Egan  draws  between  neuroscience  and  quantum  mechanics  
may  be   tenuous,  but  not   entirely   imaginary.  Tractions   in  quantum  computing  and  
quantum  artificial   intelligence  have  opened  up  new  vistas   to  decade-­‐‑old  questions  
on   the   connections   between   mind,   matter,   and,   consciousness.   Moreover,   merely  
operating  from  the  confines  delineated  by  the   logic  of  physics  have  not  necessarily  
brought  about  a  breakthrough  for  explaining  the  more  ‘exotic’  speculations  whereas  
the  injection  of  a  ‘fantastical’  imaginative  process  could  push  one  into  defamiliarized  
territory,   and   in   the   process,   enable   new   ‘flavors’   of   thought   experiments   to   burst  
forth.  
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Quantum  mechanics   and   neuroscience   are   subjects   of   sexy   popularizations  
but   remain   shrouded   in  mystification.  No  physicist   can   own   to  understanding   the  
ontology   of   quantum   theories.   As   more   experiments   for   demonstrating   the  
interpretation   of   quantum   theories   are   realized,   a   greater   variety   of   experiments  
become   available   for   the   testing   of   an   array   of   interpretations,   particularly   of  
quantum   information   theories.   The   availability   of   these   experiments   allows   one   to  
probe  the  materiality  of  what  has  been  imagined  by  rendering  more  transparent,  the  
‘blackbox’  of  processes  that  enabled  the  inexplicable  phenomena  in  the  first  place.    
It   is   in   the   third   epoch   that   we   find   a   quantum-­‐‑to-­‐‑mind   interfacing   that  
releases   Stavrianos   from   the   ideological   stranglehold   of   the   corporation’s   loyalty  
mode  and  giving   in   to   the  demands  of   the   ‘Canon.’  He  went  back   to  becoming  an  
individuated   being,   but   with   a   difference:   he   has   now   become   the   master   of  
deception   and   dis/misinformation   as   he   no   longer   served   anyone   but   what   he  
considered  his   principles.  However,   it  was   not   only   Stavrianos  who  was   changed,  
but  also  Po-­‐‑kwai,  as  their  smeared  selves  gained  increasing  strength  so  as  to  become  
independent  of  the  true  Stavrianos  and  true  Po-­‐‑kwai  for  longer  periods  of  time,  until  
the  possibility  of  permanent  smearing  is  achieved.  Nevertheless,  readers  (at  least  the  
author)  are   left  with  unequivocal  certainty   that   it   is   the   ‘true’  Stavrianos  and   ‘true’  
Po-­‐‑kwai  who  are  the  ones  speaking  to  them  because  nowhere  in  the  narrative,  nor  in  
the  actions  following  the  conversations  between  the  characters,   is   there  a  challenge  
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to   that  assumption.  One  can  argue   in   this  case   that  Egan  had  failed   to  marshal   the  
affordances  of  indeterminacy  to  challenge  readerly  comfort  by  being  less  predictable  
in  his  narrative  technique.  
No  longer  bowing  to  capitalist  demands,  and  knowing  that  a  hidden  motive  
existed  whichever  way  he  turned,  he  applied  whatever  assets  he  had  left  to  prevent  
‘reality’   from   being   completely   wrested   from   the   control   of   the   true   selves   by  
attempting  to  prevent  the  entire  world  from  smearing,  which  would  have  happened  
were  Lui  to  let  loose  the  pathogenic  vectors.  Were  universal  smearing  to  take  place,  
the  veil  created  by  the  Bubble  would  be  torn,  and  chaos  could  reign.  
So   I   wait   like   a   human:   sick   with   pointless   unproductive   fears.   Trying   to  
imagine   the   unimaginable.   If   the   whole   planet   smeared,  
permanently…exactly  would  people  experience?  Nothing  –  because  there  is  
no   collapse   to   make   anything   real?   Or   everything   –   because   there   is   no  
collapse  to  make  anything  less  than  real?  Everything,  separately  –  one  isolated  
consciousness  per  eigenstate,  like  the  many-­‐‑worlds  model  brought  to  life?  Or  
everything,  simultaneously  –  a  cacophony  of  superimposed  possibilities?  What  
I’ve  been   through  myself  –  or  at   least   those  memories  which  have   survived   the  
collapse  –  might  bear  no  resemblance  to  the  nature  of  things  when  there’ll  be  
no  collapse  at  any  future  time  (253).  
In   this   epoch,  we   reach  a   state  where   the  properties  hitherto   suppressed   in  
epoch  two,  and  which  were  nascent  in  epoch  one,  rose  above  ground  and  bloomed.  
However,  unlike  the  variations  in  the  Stern-­‐‑Gerlach  experiment  and  the  double-­‐‑slit  
experiments   (and   even   thought   experiments   of   the   Schrödinger   cat),   Egan’s   finale  
does  away  with  all  physical  barriers  by  making  the  dispersion  of   information  load,  
through  the  metaphor  of  public  infection,  the  beginning  of  the  end  of  certainty.  The  
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time  of  the  capitalist,  a  time  considered  as  analytic  by  Antonio  Negri,  is  broken,  and  
a  new  productivity  system  that  is  not  a  mere  reproduction  of  the  original  command  
line  is  now  possible.    
If   the   climax   of   the   novel   signals   the   end   of   bourgeois   science,   it   also  
highlights  a  new  form  of  measurement  and  interpretation,  where  there  is  no  longer  a  
distinction   between   the   quantum   rules   regulating   the   entities   measured,   and   the  
semi-­‐‑classical   to   classical   embodiment   of   the   apparatus   performing   the  
measurement.  Reproduction   is   still   taking  place   in   the   closing  chapter,   as   signified  
by  the  vectorial  multipliers,  but  it  became  less  clear,  ethically,  if  a  new  bio-­‐‑terrorism  
had  just  broken  forth  or  a  new  physical  (and  therefore  mental)  liberty  of  a  new  order  
had  been  achieved.  
The  streets   seethe  with   transformation.  Some  people’s   features  are   shifting,  
flowing  smoothly  or   jumping  between  alternatives;  walking   in  a  daze,   they  
seem   oblivious,   and   I   touch  my   own   face,  wondering   if   the   same   thing   is  
happening   to  me.   Vegetation   is   sprouting   everywhere   –   patches   of  wheat,  
sugarcane,   bamboo;   stretches   of   wild-­‐‑looking   tropical   undergrowth.   Some  
stalls   are   simply   crumbling   into   fine   dust;   others   are  mutating   into   exotic  
architectural   pastische   –   and   the   walls   of   one   have   turned   to   flesh,   blood  
visibly   pulsing   through   veins   as   thick   as   my   arm.   I   stare   up   at   the  
skyscrapers,  most  of  them  surreally  intact  –  but  even  as  I  wonder  at  this,  the  
fractal  cladding  on  one  tower  starts  drifting  down  like  confetti  (273).  
The   view   one   gets   is   almost   cinematic   as   the   reterritorialization   of   the  
metaphysical   and   the   temporal   as   a   new   punctual   system   with   new   creations   is  
elaborated,   and   the   becoming   is  made   into   a   state   of   purity   unconstrained   by   the  
imposition   of   mundane   laws   or   reductive   formalisms.   Were   we   to   view   the   last  
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segment   of   the   novel   from   a   media   archaeological   standpoint,   one   can   treat   the  
events   as   representative   of   rapid   evolution   into   new   technical   bodies   as  
differentiations  converge  into  unifying  processes  parameterized  by  newly  developed  
haecceities.    
The  third  epoch  of  the  novel  feels  uncompleted;  the  veil  has  been  broken  but  
the  reader  is  left  wondering  as  to  what  might  have  been.  We  could  speculate  on  the  
philosophical   conclusions   to   be   drawn   about   measurement   had   the   narrative   not  
ended   just   as   new   predictions   enter.   However,   the   intention   in   the   ending   of   the  
novel  can  be  read  through  the  limits  by  which  one  imagines  a  new  order  that  does  
not  have  a  counterpart  in  actuality,  especially  when  imagining  the  steps  of  problem-­‐‑
solving   involving   fictional   modeling   that   can   later   be   actualized   into   a   physical  
representative   mode.   One   can   imagine   how   the   current   known   methods   of  
measurement,  and  the  ways  for  demarcating  them,  might  change  once  we  enter  into  
new   realities,   new   physics,   and   new   scientific   hybrids.   But   the   fact   that   we   have  
premised   our   understanding   of   the   new   as   counterfactuals   of   the   old   makes   it  
difficult   for   imagining   a   new   that   is   dissociated   from   current   epistemics,   until  
something   that   shatters  our  epistemic  comfort  comes  along,   to  demand  completely  
new  interpretations.  
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4.2 Conclusion  
My   objective   of   reading   Quarantine   as   three   epochs   is   to   demonstrate   its  
physical   (and   metaphysical)   instantiations   that   are   the   products   of   Egan’s   own  
iconoclastic   reading   of   quantum   theory   in   combination   with   developments   in   the  
power   of   computing   and   neuroscience.   But  whatever   the   original   intention   of   the  
author,   the   layers,   segments,   and   meta-­‐‑narratives   contained   in   the   novel   provide  
both  literal  and  less  direct  illustration  of  the  philosophical  difficulties  of  conducting  
measurements   across   different   scales   (and   standards   of   comparisons),   and   what  
could  have  taken  place  should  the  borders  of  delimitations  (and  natural  constraints)  
be  lifted  from  the  interactions  of  entities  that  do  not  usually  cross  paths.    
Each   of   the   epoch   is   replete  with   speculative   extensions   of   a   science  while  
subtly  critiquing  the  institutional  Capital  that  enables  the  production  of  the  science,  
as  well  as  the  emphasis  on  the  dominance  of  a  subfield  of  a  science  over  that  of  the  
other,  or  even  to  privilege  one  form  of   interpretation  over  another.  What   I  had  not  
been   able   to   further   explore,   but  which  Quarantine   provides   an   allegorical   insight  
into  even  if  only  in  a  highly  mediated  sense,  is  the  transmission  and  dissemination  of  
an  interpretive  mode  through  institutionalized  politics  and  epistemic  practices.  Such  
interpretive  modes  are  highlighted  by  the  foundations  underlying  the  creation  of  the  
mods   constituting   the   cyborg   human   race   of   Egan’s   future,   as  well   as   the   ‘secret’  
experiment   conducted   by   the   Ensemble   with   their   strenuous   efforts   at  
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confidentiality.  Further,  Lui’s  almost  fanatical  desire  to  spread,  or  ‘infect,’  the  public  
with   the   organic   vectors   that   ‘carry’   Egan’s   interpretation   of   quantum   mechanics  
represent  the  risks,  utopian  thinking,  and  self-­‐‑interests  of  the  supposedly  politically  
impenetrable  scientific  knowledge.    
Just   as   the   novel   is   a   fictional   reconstitution   of   actual   physics   and  
neuroscience  current  at  the  time  of  their  depictions,  it  also  foregrounds  the  goals  of  
speculative  theory  through  the  former’  demonstration  of  the  fictional  modeling  of  re-­‐‑
interpreted   facts   while   highlighting   the   problem   of   epistemic   choice   and   how   to  
circumvent   a   potential   epistemic   disaster   by   taking   advantage   of   the   loophole  
provided   in  a   theory  or   formalism,  as   is  demonstrated   in   the  case  of   the  history  of  
the  Higgs  boson  in  the  previous  chapter.    
Finally,   to   reiterate   an   earlier   point,   the   three   epochs   of   the   novel   are  
allegorical   to   the   three   variants   of   the   double-­‐‑slit   experiment   discussed   in   the  
previous   chapter   to   show   the  gradation  of   increasing   indeterminism,   even  as   I   am  
not   suggesting   that   the   fictional  modeling   of   the   double-­‐‑slit   experiments   bear   any  
resemblance   to   the   novel.   Rather,   I   am   suggesting   that   they   share   conceptual  
filiations  due  to  their  individual  relationship  to  quantum  mechanics.    In  light  of  that  
affiliation,   the   novel   highlights   how  all   that   underlies   the  determinate   form  of   the  
media   technology  we   consume   in   our  mundane  macro  universe   is   the   outcome  of  
ontologies   stripped   of   their   subjectivities,   and  whose   subjectivities   have   no   direct  
  168  
bearing  on  our  everyday.  However,  in  the  alternate  world  of  Egan  that  conforms  by  
different   scientific   laws,   it   is  no   longer  possible   to   ignore   the  causal  effects  of   such  
subjectivities.  In  chapters  to  come,  one  will  see  a  two-­‐‑prong  realization  of  speculative  
experiment  through  the  experimental  search  for  the  Higgs  boson,  and  the  narratives  
of  two  science  fictional  short  stories  and  a  novella.  
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Scientific,  objective  truth  is  exclusively  a  matter  of  establishing  what  the  world,  the  physical  
as   well   as   the   spiritual   world,   is   in   fact.   But   can   the   world,   and   human   existence   in   it,  
truthfully  have  a  meaning  if  the  sciences  recognize  as  true  only  what  is  objectively  established  
in   this   fashion,   and   if   history   has  nothing  more   to   teach  us   than   that   all   the   shapes   of   the  
spiritual   world,   all   the   conditions   of   life,   ideals,   norms   upon   which   man   relies,   form   and  
dissolve  themselves  like  fleeting  waves,  that  it  always  was  and  ever  will  be  so,  that  again  and  
again  reason  must  turn  into  nonsense,  and  well-­‐‑being  into  misery?   (Edmund  Husserl  in  
The  Crisis  of  European  Sciences)  
5. Observation or What You See is Not What You 
Always Get: the Impossibility of Observing the 
Unknown 
This  chapter  continues  the  conversation  begun  in  chapter  three  that  considers  
the   critical   historiography   of   the   Standard   Model   Higgs   boson   through   the  
perspective   of   speculative   theory.  As   the   story   of   the  Higgs   boson   is   the   center   of  
tension  between  new  physics  and  the  confirmed  Standard  Model,  the  choice  of  going  
either  way  becomes  a  choice  over  how  a  measurement  is  analyzed  and  interpreted;  
speculative   theory   provides   the   theoretical   platform   for   that   contestation   to   take  
place,  as  well  as  anticipation  of  crises  that  would  then  be  experimentally  resolved.  
When  measurement  is  enacted  in  a  physical  world,  there  has  to  be  a  decision  
made   on  what   counts   as   an   observable,   and  whether   it   is   necessary   to   demarcate  
between  an  observable  and  an  unobservable,  or  merely  stick  with  what  the  available  
predictive   models   are   able   to   reveal.   Therefore,   the   degree   of   definability   of   the  
states   being  measured,   or   considered   logically   plausible,   in   a   theory   that   could   be  
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compared   to   other   overlapping   or   adjacent   theories,   is   a   pre-­‐‑requisite   to   whether  
observational   terms   are   considered   as   a   direct   correlation   between   a  mathematical  
proposition  and  physical  phenomena,  or  as  inhabiting  a  separate  world  that  brackets  
out   theoretical   terms   as   distinct   from   an   observation-­‐‑centered   language.   The  
reflexive   connection   between   measurement   and   observation   is   where   we   begin  
considering  the  role  of  speculative  experiment  in  consolidating  or  constructing  new  
theories.     Before   that,   let  us  consider  a   few  quick  examples   that  could  demonstrate  
the  role  of  observation  during  and  after  measurement.  
One   of   the  most   obvious   examples   in   particle   physics   is   the   observational  
term  for  denoting  symmetry  breaking  in  relation  to  the  Higgs  boson,  and  its  points  
of  parallel  and  convergence  with   the   theory  of   the  superconductor.  This   is  because  
particle   physics   and   condensed   matter   share   a   commonality:   the   transmission   of  
energy   between   jostling   (and   oscillating)   pairs   of   electrons   (Cooper   pairs)   and  
phonons  (considered  a  set  of  ‘gapless’  or  dispersing  modes  that  is  a  result  of  short-­‐‑
range   interactions   between   bosons   oscillating   at   a   particular   momentum),   the  
violation   of   electromagnetic   laws   (through   gauge   symmetry   breaking),   and   the  
Meisner   effect   (the   expelling   of   the   external  magnetic   field   of   the   superconductor  
material  once  the  temperature  drops  below  a  fixed  critical  level)  that  is  similar  to  the  
gauge   field   obtaining   a  mass   after   the   symmetry   breaking   of   the   gauge   theory   for  
electromagnetism.   Another   intersecting   point   between   particle   physics   and  
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superconductor   physics   is   the   ‘energy   gap’   model   -­‐‑   the   difference   between   the  
normal   energy   and   superconducting/excited   energy   mode,   which   Whitehead  
quaintly  referred  to  as  quantum  jumps  in  Science  and  the  Modern  World  -­‐‑  for  describing  
energy   at   ground   state   in   relation   to   other   energetic   states   -­‐‑   so   as   to   account   for  
electromagnetic  properties  and  demarcate  the  interactions  of  electrons  and  phonons  
within  the  confines  of  a  system  that  operates  by  the  rules  of  Fermi-­‐‑Dirac  statistics.1  
Superconductor   theory   is   useful   for   demonstrating   quantum   mechanical  
measurements   because   of   the   simplicity   of   its   structure,   and   the   simulation   of  
supposed   ‘massiveness’   of   the   photons   to   reproduce   the   effects   found   in   the  
aftermath  of  the  aforementioned  symmetry  breaking.  The  discovery  of  this  dilemma  
anticipates  a  parallel  problem  in   the  relationship  between  the  Higgs  boson  and  the  
Goldstone   theorem,   as   was   discussed   in   chapter   three.   However,   the   seeming  
paradox   becomes   less   paradoxical   once   we   appreciate   that   there   is   a   hidden  
symmetry   that   provides   a   logical   description   to   such   disjunctive   behaviors   in   the  
particles.2  What   is  observable   in   the  measurement  process   is   initially  dependent  on  
the  configuration  of  physical  parameters,  including  the  latter’s  removal  and  addition  
from  the  boundaries  delineated  by  the  measurement.  
                                                                                                             
1  See  Bardeen,  J.  Cooper,  L.  N.,  and  Schrieffer,  J.  R.  “Microscopic  Theory  of  Superconductivity,”  Physical  
Review  106.162  (1957).  162-­‐‑4.  
2  For  an  accessible  account,  see  chapter  eleven,  “Nobel  Dreams”  in  Sean  M  Caroll’s  Particle  at  the  End  of  
the  Universe.  
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As   the   example   above   demonstrates,   regardless   of   whether   we   relegate  
theoretical  language  to  a  more  materially  concrete  syntax  or  a  transitively  predicated  
observation-­‐‑centered  language  that  maps  experiential  instances  to  physical  behavior  
(the  example  above  represents  both   instances),   experimental  epistemology   is  about  
making  empirical  associations  regardless  of   the  theoretical  density  of   the   language.  
Therefore,  an  observation  language  should  include  a  capacity  for  computation  while  
ensuring  consistency  in  the  language’s  descriptive  capacity.      
Therefore,   I   share  with  Mary  Hesse   the   idea,   as   articulated   in  her   essay  “Is  
There  an  Independent  Observation  Language,”   that  an  observation   language   is  not  
immutable   regardless   of   the  physical   laws,   and   that   a   classification   system   is   only  
useful   if   it   can   be   modified   to   provide   functionally   useful   descriptions   of  
objects/subjects  as  new  discoveries  are  made,  with  emerging  knowledge  of  hitherto  
unknown  properties  causing  one  to  question  what  should  change  and  what  could  be  
retained.   Hesse   also   brings   up   the   problem   of   an   inter-­‐‑subjective   language   of  
observation,   and   whether   such   an   observation   language   can   be   properly  
independent   of   theory-­‐‑ladenness,   an   approach   Einstein   had   apparently   tried   to  
move   out   of   through   an   ‘operational’   approach   not   biased   by   “theoretical  
implications.”3  However,   to   suggest   that   one   can   retreat   to   an  operationalist  mode  
                                                                                                             
3   See   Hesse,   Mary.   “Is   there   an   Independent   Observation   Language”   in   The   Nature   and   Function   of  
Scientific  Theories.  Pittsburgh,  PA:  University  of  Pittsburgh  Press,  1970.    
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that  is  devoid  of  theory-­‐‑ladenness,  by  excluding  all  references  to  any  paradigms  that  
might   suggest   the   presence   of   a   theory,   is   a   naïve   anti-­‐‑realist   position   because   it  
assumes   lack   of   presuppositions   governing   the   articulation   of   any   scientific  
argument  through  a  purely  objective  and  ‘blank  slate’  approach.  Such  an  argument  
is   unconvincing   and   improbable   given   that   one   could   not   design   an   experiment  
without  assuming  parameters  that  have  built-­‐‑in  theories.  
Even   as   the   potential   predicted   by   theory  would   drive   early   proposals   for  
experiments   to   test   the   theory,   experiments   also   construct   their   own   theories,  
theories   that   were   the   aftermath   of   quantifiable   measurements   and   observations  
direct   or   indirect.   One   might   argue   that   there   is   an   observation   language  
independent   of   an   all-­‐‑encompassing   Theory,   but   it   is   misleading   to   think   that   its  
own   meta-­‐‑narratives   would   have   no   theoretical   consequences   on   the   act   of  
observation.   In   fact,   the   theoretical   consequences   of   the   meta-­‐‑narratives   of   the  
theories   could   be   analyzed   through   the   historical   genealogy   of   the   formative  
influences,   and   considerations,   behind   the   theory.   Therefore,   the   elucidation   of  
theory   is   full   of   contradictions   and   subjectivities   at   the   level   of   formation   when  
viewed  only   from  a  physical  direction  due   to   logical   ruptures  marked  by   the  non-­‐‑
observability  of  certain  processes  that  require  a  more  metaphysical  approach  by  way  
of  further  explanation  of  the  seeming  illogic.  Also,  the  illogic  is  also  the  result  of  an  
emphasis  on  a  particular  mode  of  thinking  over  that  of  others,  and  it  is  that  thinking  
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that  drives  how  certain   theories  are  articulated,  and  how   the  experiments  are   then  
designed  in  relation  to,  and  also  in  contradistinction,  to  the  predictive  theories.    
According  to  Willard  Van  Orman  Quine,  attributing  probabilistic  certainty  to  
events   is   an   act   of   speculation   anchored   not   on   what   is   known   but   on   what   is  
believed.  There  might  be   an   appearance  of   surface-­‐‑level   contradictions   that   can  be  
finessed   once   the   underlying   ontology   of   the   contradictions   are   uncovered,   and  
therefore,  resolved.  But  as  Quine’s  web  of  belief  does  not  allow  for  a  consideration  of  
contradictions,  it  is  therefore  insufficiently  capable  of  dealing  with  a  complex  web  of  
paradoxes   within   the   Standard   Model   that   are   the   outcome   of   our   incomplete  
comprehension   of   the  Model’s   ontology   and   lack   of   prescriptive   capability.  While  
Quine   is   right   in   expressing  his   concerns  with   the  measurement  of   subjectivity,  he  
does  not  leave  any  room  for  the  possibility  of  adductive  thinking  that  transcends  the  
usual  deductive  and  inductive  modes  of  thought.    
As   he   puts   it,   the   observation   language   (and   sentences)   of   science,   as  
conditioned  by  strict  evidential  and  positivistic  correlation,  could  only  point  to  what  
is   externally   obvious   and   verifiable   by   another   witness   but   leaves   no   room   for  
internalities.  But  what  he  is  right  about   is   that  the  element  that  makes  science  both  
hard   yet   possible   is   “…because   it  must   build   a   coherent   system   from   the   diverse  
evidence   gleaned   and   reported   by   people   of   different   times,   places,   cultures,   and  
interests…”(Ullian  &  Quine  29).  
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In   the   next   section,   I   will   discuss   the   searches   that   led   to   the   final   about  
confirmation   of   the   Higgs   boson   by   discussing   the   construct   of   the   detectors  
involved,  the  design  and  triggers  of  the  experiment,  and  the  outcome  of  the  searches  
that   provide   a   composite   profile   of   the   Higgs   boson.   In   the   process,   I   intend   to  
demonstrate   how   the   discovery   of   the   Higgs   boson   is   an   act   of   speculative  
experiment  because  of  what   it   can   and   cannot   tell   us   about  new  physics,   and  also  
because   the   analytic   framework   of   its   discovery   is   based   on   the   current   best  
understanding   of   quantum   field   theories   that   could   still   be   further   revised   even   if  
they  continue   to  be  able   to  make  Standard  Model  predictions.   I  will   then  end  by  a  
brief   foray   into  what   this  means   for   candidate   theories,   and   their  potential  proofs,  
beyond  the  Standard  Model.  
5.1 The Fiction of the Higgs boson: Dimensions of 
Observability 
The  Large  Hadron  Collider   (LHC)  consists  of  an  agglomeration  of  different  
experiments  occupying  the  different  sectors  of  its  mammoth  complex.  The  four  main  
experiments   are   ATLAS   (A   Toroidal   LHC   Apparatus),   CMS   (Compact   Muon  
Solenoid),   ALICE   (A   Large   Ion   Collider   Experiment),   and   LHCb   (Large   Hadron  
Collider  –  beauty/bottom).  Each  of   these  experiments  were   constructed  with  goals,  
constraints,  and  methods  of  measurement  of  particle  properties  that  will  manifest  a  
sort  of  physical  materiality  that  contribute  to  the  construction  of  the  Standard  Model,  
and  possibly  beyond.   In   this   chapter,   I  will   be   focusing   specifically  on   the  ATLAS  
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and   CMS   high-­‐‑energy   experiments   because   of   how   both   experiments   converge   in  
their   examination   of   different   entities   produced   from   the   same   high-­‐‑energy   LHC  
collisions.  The  experiments   involve  searching  for   the  Higgs  boson,  whose  mass   the  
Standard  Model  does  not  directly  predict.  Indirect  estimations  are  however  obtained  
through   the   measurements   of   other   particles,   most   notably   the   masses   of   the   top  
quark  and  W  boson  with  contributions  from  the  Higgs  boson.    
Each   experiment   provides   a   multi-­‐‑faceted   approach   to   solving   theoretical  
puzzles   such   as   parity   violation   (an   inversion   process   that   violates   the   spatial  
reflection   symmetry   in   weak   interaction,   a   phenomenon   not   observed   in  
electromagnetic   and   strong   interactions),   spontaneous   symmetry   breaking   that   is  
necessary   for   the   Higgs   mechanism,   and   a   variety   of   foundational   questions   in  
relativistic   quantum   field   theories.   After   all,   one   of   the   major   goals   of   the   LHC  
experiments   is   to   explore  vector  boson   interactions  while   figuring  out   the  place  of  
the  scalar  Higgs  boson  in  the  process  of  trying  to  achieve  unification  among  all  the  
available   forces,   finessing   the   relationship   between   matter   and   anti-­‐‑matter,   and  
understanding   how   different   kinds   of   measurements   can   be   enacted   at   the  
intersection   of   quantum   interpretation   and   the   actual   experiments.   As   a   general-­‐‑
purpose  detector,  the  LHC  tries  to  measure  all  of  the  particles  of  the  Standard  Model  
as   best   as   it   can.  Whatever   form   the   physics   beyond   the   Standard  Model   takes,   it  
would   ultimately   leave   signatures   from   its   decay   corresponding   to   the   known  
  177  
properties   of   the   bosons,   quarks,   gluons,   charged   leptons,   and   neutrinos   of   the  
Standard  Model.  
The   signals,   signs,   and   codes   are   the   fragments   of   clues   that   contribute   to  
constructing   a   picture   of   the   universe’s   ontology.   The   LHC,   by   way   of   colliding  
beams  of  protons,  provides  the  starting  point  for  enabling  the  different  experiments  
located  at  varying  points  around   the  LHC  ring   to   record  all   the  possible  outcomes  
from  the  energy  produced  during  each  collision.  The   inscriptive  process   ‘re-­‐‑writes’  
the  theories  so  that  they  might,  in  the  end,  converge  or  diverge  from  predictions.  For  
a   more   thorough   understanding   of   the   role   of   instruments   in   performing  
measurements  and  observations,  one  must  be  cognizant  of  the  kind  of  technologies  
built  into  each  segment  of  the  experimental  apparatus  to  ensure  accurate  calibration  
and  fine-­‐‑tuning  of  the  apparatus  prior  to  the  launching  of  the  experiment.  
For   the   purpose   of   this   chapter,   I   will   be   discussing   the   detectors   from   a  
general  perspective  rather  than  speak  to  specific  differences  between  the  ATLAS  and  
CMS  detectors  except  where  necessary,  given  that  much  of  what  they  do  is  similar.  
At  the  same  time,  the  description  of  the  morphology  of  the  detectors  is  also  critical  to  
considering  how  the  different  specialized  sub-­‐‑sections  are  important  to  the  different  
speculative  choices  of  theory  that  will  then  transfer  into  the  experiments,  as  well  as  
experiment’s   own   limited   attempts   at   working   through   the   different   what-­‐‑ifs   of  
available  data  for  analyzing  traces  of  the  Higgs  boson’s  presence.    
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The   CMS   and   ATLAS   experiments   have   similar   yet   different   tracking  
systems:  CMS  uses  a  pixelated  strip  detector  made  of  silicon  whereas  ATLAS  uses  a  
hybrid   tracking   system   that   consists   of   the   pixelated   silicon   strip   detector   and   a  
transition  radiation  tracker.  Their  respective  assembly  follows  a  strict  linear  order  of  
customized   instruments   for   performing   specific   functions   given   that   a   chain   of  
evidence  must  be  maintained  for  ensuring  the  credibility  of  the  obtained  data.  Each  
of   these   specialty   instruments   will   target   specific   properties   located   within   the  
physics  events  passing  through.      
While   the   subsections  of   the  detector   served  very   specific  purposes   and  do  
not  deviate  from  doing  what  they  have  been  programmed  to  do,  what  is  interesting  
would  be   the   choice  of  design   and  materials   (also  determined  by   the  best   that   are  
available),  which  enable  these  preprogrammed  actions  to  occur;  actions  that  are  the  
outcome   of   a   history   of   theoretical   and   experimental   choices,   and   the   theory-­‐‑
ladenness   of   the   hypothesis   that   inform   the   experiments,   therefore   producing,   the  
transfer  of  speculative  inquiry  from  theory  to  experiment.    In  other  words,  the  sub-­‐‑
detectors   are   the   sites   that   re-­‐‑enact   the   physics   choices   that   interweave   calculated  
acts  of   speculation  with   increasingly   confirmed   (or  disconfirmed)   selections.  All  of  




Figure  1:  A  computer-­‐‑generated  image  representing  a  cross-­‐‑sectional  slice  
of  the  ATLAS  detector  and  how  some  of  the  typical  particles  measured  interact  
with  the  various  detector  components.  The  colliding  proton  beams  travel  
perpendicular  to  this  view  in  the  beam  pipe  as  shown  at  the  bottom  of  the  image.  
The  detector  regions  are  cylindrically  symmetric  about  the  beam  pipe.  ATLAS  
Experiment  ©  2014  CERN  
  
For  as  the  figure  above  illustrates,  at  the  sub-­‐‑detector  levels,  we  have  the:  
1) momentum   measurement   of   charged   particles   from   reconstruction   of   the  
particle  tracks  through  the  inner  tracker  of  the  detector;  
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2) measurement  of  the  angle  of  the  particle  produced  at  the  point  of  collision  in  
relation   to   the   accelerating   beam,   also   from   the   track   reconstructed   in   the  
inner  tracker;  
3) electromagnetic   calorimeter   for   electron   and   photon   identification,   and  
hadronic   calorimeter   for   jets   (experimental   signatures   of   the   quarks)   and  
energy  measurement;  
4) muon   identification   through   measurement   of   muon   tracks   in   specialized  
detectors    placed  outside  the  calorimeter;  
5) sufficient  background  noise  rejection  to  provide  a  highly  efficient  trigger  for  
high  transverse-­‐‑momentum  objects.  
The  experimenters  have  also  to  bear  in  mind  the  tolerance  level  for  radiation  damage  
in   the   detectors.   With   the   LHC   experiments   requiring   fast,   radiation-­‐‑hard,   and  
finely-­‐‑segmented  detectors,   the  readout  speed  of  the  detectors  have  to  be  such  that  
they  can   resolve   the   time  between   two  successive   radio   frequency   (RF)  bunches  of  
colliding  protons.    
Additionally,   one   has   to   account   for   energy   that   might   be   ‘missing’   from  
observation,   and   this   is   where   one   has   to   be   attentive   to   the   kind   of   material  
structure  of  the  detectors  and  compute  the  limit  of  their  capacity  for  containing  and  
transmitting   the   information   on   all   the   energy   produced   in   the   course   of   the  
interactions.  Some  particles,  such  as  the  ‘neutral’  neutrinos,  do  not  interact  with  any  
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detector  components  so  as  to  leave  the  detector  unobserved  and  to  the  ‘dissipation’  
of   energy   that   leads   to   the   ‘missing   energy.’   It   is   the   calculations   of   the   missing  
energy  that  provides  the  indirect  detection  of  such  neutrinos.  
The   calorimeter   area   of   the   detector   is   central   for  measuring   the   energy   of  
electrons,  photons,  and  hadrons  encountered  that  was  produced  from  proton-­‐‑proton  
collisions.   Photons   and   electrons   are   primarily   detected   in   the   electromagnetic  
calorimeter.  A  muon  spectrometer   surrounding   the   calorimeter   consists  of   toroidal  
magnets   needed   for   providing   a   large   magnetic   field,   and   precision   tracking  
chambers.   Moreover,   the   inner   tracker   is   located   closest   to   the   photon   beamline,  
consisting  mostly   of   silicon  pixel   and   strip  detectors   for  high  precision   tracking  of  
particles.  The  silicon  detector  subsystem  also  measures  the  secondary  decay  vertices  
of   the   heavy   quarks   (such   as   the   beauty/bottom   and   charm   quarks).   This   is  
particularly  important  for  increased  sensitivity  to  the  Higgs  boson  given  that  one  of  
the  main  states  of  its  decay  would  be  the  beauty/bottom  quark.    
The  scale  of  the  transverse  momentum  (momentum-­‐‑component  in  the  plane  
perpendicular  to  the  beam  direction)  of  the  particles  resulting  from  the  collisions  that  
could  be  captured  by  the  detectors  is  important  for  determining  the  accuracy  of  the  
measurement   and   the   type   of   observational   interpretation   that   could   emerge.   The  
accumulated  raw  data  then  goes  through  a  process  of  reconstruction  after  the  events  
are  selected,  to  filter  out  what  the  physicists  consider  as  uninteresting  (though  this  is  
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another   point   of   subjective   evaluation   that   is   dependent   on  what   the   target   focus  
happens  to  be  at  the  moment)  by  tracking  particular  signatures  of  interest.    
What  goes  on  in  the  process  of  filtering  and  selection  when  it  is  done  in  the  
absence   of   a   theory   that   can   prescribe  why   one  would   select   particular   events   for  
analyses   over   others;   what   criteria   goes   behind   the   decision   on   deciding   which  
events  will   be   able   to   contribute   to   greater   knowledge   of   the  Higgs   boson?  While  
certain   historic   high-­‐‑energy   physics   experiments   have   to   contend  with   discordant  
results,   the   search   for   new   physics   have   so   far   been   contending   with   marked  
absences;  absences  made  all   the  more  pronounced  by  the   lack  of   further  revelation  
from  the  already  trillions  data  bytes  that  had  been  collected  during  the  harvesting  of  
informational   signals   at   the   cross-­‐‑sections   of   particle   interactions   at   the   detector.  
Real-­‐‑world   data   is   complicated   by   the   need   for   piecing   together   information  
garnered  from  millions  of  signals  over  multiple  detectors  even  within  the  span  of  a  
single   experimental   run.   Hence,   the   challenge   created   is   unprecedented   in   big  
science   and   is   the   reason   why   statistical   simulations   and   measurements   of  
distribution  are  so  important.  
The  design  for  the  trigger  and  data  acquisition  from  LHC  experiments  comes  
out   of   the  manner   in   which   selection   is   made   so   that   rare   physics   signals   can   be  
extracted  from  overwhelming  background  processes  such  as  is  the  common  case  for  
high-­‐‑energy   hadron   interactions.      For   instance,   there   is   ten   orders   of   magnitude  
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difference   between   the   number   of   proton-­‐‑proton   collisions   and   number   of   Higgs  
boson  produced.  Hence,  increasing  the  sensitivity  of  selectivity  involves  the  addition  
of   rejection  power   for   ‘irrelevant’  material.  However,   the   requirement   for   rejection  
power  depends  on  which  channel  the  selection  is  likely  to  take  place,  even  if  what  is  
required   of   a   hadronic   interaction   may   not   be   necessary   to   other   interaction  
channels.  Therefore,   the   interaction  rate   that   is  being   tracked  has   to  commensurate  
with  the  ability  of  the  technology  to  acquire  and  store  the  data  being  produced.      
The  process  of  data  acquisition   that   features   the   configuration,   control,   and  
monitoring  of  data-­‐‑taking  operations  require  the  sort  of  systemic  coherence  for  high-­‐‑
level  computational  processing  and  switched  networks,  especially  necessary  for  the  
global   grid   collaborations   that   are   the  nodes   of   labor  processing   through   the  data.  
Then,  there  is  the  problem  of  scalability  in  terms  of  the  necessary  computing  power  
needed  for  dealing  with  high-­‐‑level  triggers.  Once  the  data  is  accumulated,  they  have  
to  be  moved  into  more  permanent  storage  before  they  are  backed  up.  
The  triggers  are  important  to  speculative  experiment  because  of  the  former’s  
responsibility   in   acquiring   ‘good’   physics   events   for   analysis,   and   the   need   for   a  
minimization  of  dead  time  (latency  in  data  recording)  and  accumulation  of  artifacts.  
A  complex  algorithm  is  included  in  the  decision  process  and  is,  in  itself,  part  of  the  
determining   factor   for   characterizing   the  best   statistical  method   to  be  used  on  any  
sets   of   data.   To   illustrate   the   complex  process   of   data   acquisition   informed  by   the  
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triggering  process,  I  lay  out  the  stages  involved  in  ATLAS  data  acquisition  design,  as  
described  by  L.  Mapelli  and  G.  Mornacchi  in  “The  Why  and  How  of  the  ATLAS  Data  
Acquisition  System”  (398-­‐‑99)  in  At  the  Leading  Edge:  the  ATLAS  and  CMS  Experiments,  
together  with  my  own  analysis  of  each  stage  of  the  design:  
1) Factorization   into   main   functions   and   partitioning   of   one   system   into  
multiple  systems  to  ensure  limited  functionality  and  optimal  operability.    The  
latter   is   particularly   important   in   the   event-­‐‑building   stage   for  which   batch  
physics  could  then  be  produced  for  analysis.  Partitioning  allows  a  detector  to  
multitask  so  that  a  readout  of  the  triggers  could  be  performed  simultaneously  
with  data-­‐‑taking,  sort  of  like  having  a  partitioned  hard-­‐‑drive  where  you  can  
maintain  multiple  operating  systems  or  operationally-­‐‑directed  processing  in  
the  background,  then  select  the  one  you  need  to  foreground  when  desired.  
2) The  minimization  of  the  data  movement  to  reduce  the  complexity  and  cost  of  
the  system.  This  means  a  sequential  processing  of  events  accepted  at  the  first  
level  and  then  the  selection  of  readout  based  on  the  second  level  filtering  of  
the  events.  Now  this  second  part  is  important,  since  teams  of  individuals  are  
involved   in   making   that   decision   based   on   a   compromise   of   what   should  
then  be  kept.  This  means  that  the  best  argument  for  the  case  wins  even  if  the  
weaker  case  might  actually  be  the  one  that  contains  the  hidden  potential  for  
unexpected  discovery.    
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3) A  uniform   approach   to   data   readout   as   a  way   of  minimizing   transfer   loss.  
The   uniformity   is   helped   by   the   maximum   adoption   of   hardware   and  
software   that   maximally   exploits   advances   in   communication   buses   and  
links,   networking   and   processing   units,   operating   systems,   programming  
languages,  databases,  and  inter-­‐‑processing  communication  packages.  
4) During  the  staging  period  of  the  experiments  (which  is  the  pre-­‐‑experimental  
stage),  not  only  the  physics  but  also  the  politics  of  funding  and  safety  checks  
are  involved  in  determining  what  would  be  the  acceptable  direction  for  data-­‐‑
collection,  as  well  as  the  parameters  to  be  set,  such  as  the  type  of  luminosities  
emitted   (quantities   measuring   the   ability   of   an   accelerator   to   produce   the  
required   amount   of   interactions),   and   the   final   outcome   of   what   could   be  
detected  through  the  data  collected.  
To  make  the  data  taking  more  efficient,  tagging  is  used  as  a  method  of  information  
classification  so  that  event  selection  can  become  more  efficient  once  one  knows  what  
to  look  for.  This  is  after  the  data  reconstruction  and  the  analysis  of  the  information  
have  already  taken  place.  
As   Allan   Franklin   argues   in   Experiment,   Right   or   Wrong,   one   of   the   most  
important   parts   of   experiment   has   to   do   with   data   selectivity,   and   nobody   who  
works  with  big  data   science  would  dispute   that.  While  he  uses   the  example  of   the  
analysis   of   the   K   meson   (a   particle   composed   of   two   quarks)   experiment   as   an  
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example  of  such  selectivity,  this  parallels  the  process  that  goes  on  in  selecting  events  
that   held   the  most   potential   for   the   discovery   for   the  Higgs.  Moreover,   the   choice  
that   emphasizes   the   observation   of   one   phenomenon   can   mask   effects   that   could  
point  to  a  phenomena  operating  at  a  scale  that  has  been  masked.  Further,  the  story  of  
the  search  for  the  Higgs  did  not  begin  at  the  LHC,  but  had  been  ongoing  long  before  
the  LHC  began  data  collection,   so   the  decision   for  proceeding  at   the  LHC  rides  on  
the  earlier  decisions  made  at  the  other  accelerators  and  detectors,  such  as  at  LEP  (a  
predecessor   of   the   LHC)   and   the   Tevatron   (at   Fermilab   even   if   its   high   energy  
searches   have   since   been   discontinued).  Without   going   into   numerical   details,   the  
previous  searches  were  later  combined  with  the  new  searches  at  the  LHC  involving  
Higgs   decay   channels   to   vector   bosons,   diphotons,   tau   leptons,   and   hadronic   jets  
(such  as  from  beauty/bottom  quarks).    
A  crucial  feature  of  speculative  practice  in  experiment,  even  if  one  might  not  
consider  it  as  that,  is  the  incorporation  of  blind  analyses  into  the  kinematic  region  of  
the  Standard  Model  Higgs  boson   to  minimize   the  bias   that  may  come  about  when  
correlating  prediction  to  observation.  While  blind  analysis  is  never  entirely  blind  or  
objective  given   the  aforementioned  problem  of   theory-­‐‑ladenness,   it   still  points   to  a  
deliberate  decision  for  imposing  a  particular  conception  of  measurement  in  relation  
to   the  observables,  and   therefore,  an  epistemic  choice   for  approaching  ontology.  A  
guideline   for   such   an   analysis   was   published   in   2000   for   the   BABAR   experiment  
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(that   is  of  no   relation   to   the  Higgs  experiments).  To   cite   the  guidelines   (by  way  of  
Franklin):  
…There  are  a  number  of  ways  in  which  the  Experimenter’s  Bias  can  infect  a  
measurement  which  can  be  eliminated  with  blind  analysis.  First,  the  point  at  
which  the  decision  is  made  to  stop  working  and  present  one’s  result  can  be  
influenced   by   the   value   of   the   result   itself,   and   how   it   compares   to   prior  
results  or  predictions.  In  a  blind  analysis  the  decision  to  stop  and  publish  is  
made  based  on  external  checks,  and  not  on  the  numerical  value  of  the  result.  
After  all   there   is  no   information  about   the  correctness  of  a  measurement   in  
the   numerical   value   obtained;   a   blind   analysis   enforces   this   separation.  
Second,   choices  about   the  data   to   include,  or   the   cuts   to  use,   can  be   subtly  
biased,   if   the  effect   these  choices  have  on   the  result   is  known.   [As  we  have  
seen,   the   bias   is   not   always   subtle.]   Often   changes   in   an   analysis,   which  
change   the   data   set,   can   affect   the   value   of   a   result   on   a   statistically  
reasonable  way.  A  blind  analysis  ensures  that  such  choices  affecting  the  data  
sample  do  not  bias  the  result.  Third,  the  values  and  types  of  cuts  to  use  can  
be  biased  by  knowledge  of  the  effect  of  these  cuts  on  particular  events  in  the  
data.  In  particular,  for  rare  decay  searches  or  measurements  involving  small  
samples   a   blind   analysis   removes   the   possibility   that   cuts   are   chosen   to  
include  or  exclude  particular  events  in  the  data.  In  this  case  a  blind  analysis  
ensures  a  statistically  meaningful  result.  (Selectivity  and  Discord  134)  
However  well   intentioned  the  blind  analysis  method  is  for  minimizing  bias,  
the   fact   that   the   experiments   are   designed   to   produce   a   range   of   expected   effects  
based  on  prior  assumptions  already   ‘biases’  expectations   to  particular  assumptions  
of  ontological  structures.  In  the  final  section,  I  will  discuss  the  case  of  the  supposed  
non-­‐‑empirical   materiality   of   the   predicted   supersymmetry   and   how   its   existence  
hinges   upon   a   particular   analytic   approach   to   the   Standard   Model   that   is  
underdetermined.  But  before  that,  I  would  like  to  discuss  briefly,  the  two  important  
papers  published  by  ATLAS  and  CMS  in  the  aftermath  of  the  announcement  of  the  
Higgs   boson   discovery   on   July   2012.   These   papers   reveal   the   difficulties   and  
  188  
uncertainties   in   putting   together   a   deterministic   picture   of   the   Higgs   boson   in  
relation  to  all  the  other  known  elementary  particles.  
In   the   August   2012   article   by   the   ATLAS   collaboration   containing   an  
extended  analysis  of  a  post-­‐‑discovery  announcement,  the  four-­‐‑lepton  decay  channel  
involving  a  Higgs  boson  decaying  to  two  Z  bosons  seems  the  most  promising  due  to  
good  sensitivity  over  a  wide  mass  range  and  the  excellent  momentum  resolution  of  
the   final   state  particles   (electron   and  muons   from   the   subsequent  Z  boson  decays)  
within   the  ATLAS  detector   (the  CMS   group   also   agrees   on   this   point).   The   article  
indicates   that   a   less   direct   decay   to   leptons,   by  way   of   bottom   and   charm  quarks,  
electrons  from  photons  conversion,  and  hadronic  jets  misidentified  as  electrons,  are  
important  backgrounds   to   the  Higgs  boson  signal.  Although  only   tiny  excesses  are  
noticeable,   the   Higgs   boson   to   ZZ   channel   is   relatively   clean   compared   to   its  
background  processes  and  conforms  to  the  Standard  Model  theoretical  prediction  for  
the  Higgs  boson  within  current  experimental  uncertainties.  On   the  other  hand,   the  
Higgs  boson  to  diphoton  channel  is  problematic  because  of  the  greater  background  
compared   to   the  Higgs   signal.   In   addition,   there   is   also   incomplete   knowledge   of  
some  of  the  materials  that  were  being  measured  by  the  calorimeter  (6-­‐‑7).  Even  so,  the  
Higgs  mass  in  this  channel  can  be  very  well  reconstructed  and  it  has  a  good  fit  to  the  
prediction  of  the  Standard  Model.  
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  In  the  Higgs  to  WW  channel,  candidates  for  this  channel’s  searches  are  pre-­‐‑
selected   by   requiring   two   opposite-­‐‑charge   leptons   of   different   flavors,   with   the  
events  classified  into  two  exclusive  leptonic  channels  depending  on  the  flavor  of  the  
leading  lepton.  Electronic  candidates  are  selected  through  a  combination  of  tracking  
and  calorimetric  information,  their  criteria  optimized  for  background  noise  rejection.  
Acceptable  muonic   candidates   have   to  match   the   tracks   at   the  muon   spectrometer  
and   inner   detector.   Sensitivity   to   the   Standard   Model   Higgs   boson   is   produced  
through  the  application  of  further  selection  criteria  depending  on  the  jet  multiplicity,  
with   the   data   divided   into   three   different   categories   of   jet   search   channels   in  
accordance   to   the   number   of   jets   in   the   final   state.   The   number   of   jets   is   vital   for  
increasing  sensitivity  so  as  to  be  able  to  recognize  the  Higgs  boson  that  is  sometimes  
submerged  in  the  background.  I  could  go  on  with  more  examples  of  search  channels,  
but  the  few  primary  examples  I  have  highlighted,  coupled  with  the  more  general  but  
relevant  critical  descriptions  I  have  provided  above,  serve  well  to  foreground  almost  
conclusively,   that   material   evidences   converge   to   produce   a   composite   statistical  
profile   compiled   from   different   channels   so   as   to   be   able   to   get   at   a   statistically  
rigorous  confirmation  that  an  entity  resembling  the  Higgs  boson  exists  in  nature.  
There   are   a   variety   of   systematic   uncertainties   in   all   analysis   of   the   data  
because  of  the  various  (in)efficiencies,  detector  responses,  luminosities,  background  
sources,  as  well  as  data  transfer  factors  from  the  Monte  Carlo,  for  extrapolation  into  
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the   signal   region   (more   of   the   last   point   will   be   discussed   in   chapter   seven).  
Statistical   methods   are   used   to   interpret   the   significance   for   the   Standard   Model  
Higgs  boson  signal  in  the  data.  A  likelihood  test  is  done  between  the  hypothesized  
values  for  the  Higgs  boson  and  a  statistical  profile  that  has  been  compiled  based  on  
likelihood  ratios.  In  fact,  as  of  today,  ongoing  analyses  are  working  through  some  of  
the  systematic  uncertainties  that  abound  in  order  to  be  able  to  consider  details  that  
might   have   been   missed   in   the   early   stages   of   analyses   while   also   incorporating  
latterly  derived  knowledge.    
A  comparable  paper  on  the  topic  was  published  by  CMS  on  August  2012  (in  
the   same   journal,   Physics   Letters   B),   although   the   paper   spends  more   time   on   the  
history  and  future  expectations  of  new  physics  than  the  more  business-­‐‑like  approach  
of  the  ATLAS  paper.  However,  the  CMS  paper  provides  a  good  point  of  comparison,  
given  how  one  is  dealing  with  the  discovery  from  the  vantage  point  of  probabilities  
and  uncertainties,  even  as  the  paper  excludes  what  ATLAS  includes  in  terms  of  the  
search  within  an  estimated  mass  range,  and  vice  versa.  What  the  paper  highlights  is  
that  the  analyses  published  were  re-­‐‑optimized  based  on  an  afterthought,  caused  by  
new  raw  data  reconstructions  and  savvier  event  selections.4    
                                                                                                             
4   The   decision   involved   in   when   to   publish,   especially   the   strategy   for   representing   results   in   an  
intensely   high-­‐‑pressure  world   of   big   science  when   the   results   are   announced,   is   another   fascinating  
subject   for  more   in-­‐‑depth   study,   and   not  merely   because   of   the   purported   tendency   of   dressing   up  
results  or  changing  interpretation  to  suit  epistemic,  social,  or  economic  expectations.  
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The   analysis   produced   by   CMS,   using   the   blind   analysis   method   for  
confirmation   of   experiment   to   theory,   demonstrates   how   the   data   collected   is  
correlated   more   closely   to   prediction   than   statistically   expected   because   of   an  
original  experimental  hypothesis  that  happens  to  be  a  statistical  construct.  The  CMS  
collaboration  was  able   to  differentiate   the   spin  of   the  Higgs   from   that  of   the  other  
available  particles,  which  was  further  finessed  in  the  analyses  they  performed  on  the  
data   in   2013.  However,   I  will   not   be   elaborating   on   the   newer   analyses   since   that  
would  not  add  more  to  the  arguments  I  am  already  making.  
I  need  to  re-­‐‑emphasize  that   the  non-­‐‑prediction  of   the  Higgs  mass  by  theory  
has   to  do  with  how  the   theory  of   the  Higgs  mechanism  has  been  derived  and  also  
that  experiments  are  only  able  to  access  a  mere  fraction  of  all  that  is  out  there,  with  
the   potential   of   current   interpretation   being  wrong   even   if   one   does   not   deny   the  
existence  of   a  material   entity   resembling   the  Higgs.  As   the   case  of   supersymmetry  
reveals,   its   strong   candidacy   as   the   theory   that   is   needed   to   extend   the   Standard  
Model,  when   coupled   to   the   still   not   yet  worked  out   reason  of   the  how  and  why,  
merely   illustrates   the  unresolved  ontological   problem  of   the   Standard  Model.  Will  
the  Standard  Model  become  the  be-­‐‑all  of  our  universe’s  narrative,  or  have  our  biases  
and  localization  within  the  site  of  observability  barred  us  from  ever  having  access  to  
the  ontology  underlying  the  Model?  
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5.2 The Missing Supersymmetry (SUSY) and Going Beyond 
the Standard Model (BSM) 
In   a   2011   (revised   from   a   2010   talk)   unpublished   paper,   J.D.   Lykken   from  
Fermilab   considers   the   imprecise   use   of   the   phrase   ‘beyond   the   Standard  Model’  
(BSM)   by   physicists.   The   phrase   can   be   used   to   refer   to   experimentally   verified  
physical  phenomena  that  have  not  yet  been  accommodated  by  the  Standard  Model  
(such   as   Dark   Matter,   gravity,   and   neutrino   oscillations)   all   the   way   to   a   deeper  
phenomenon   that   is   accommodated   by   the   Standard   Model,   but   only   under  
especially  framed  circumstances,   including  any  relevant  extensions  to  the  Standard  
Model  (1).  It  also  appears  that  much  of  the  theorizations  are  stubbornly  embedded  in  
our   dimension   of   space-­‐‑time   and   mathematically   sensible   degrees   of   freedom  
governed  by  the  epistemic  logic  of  relativistic  quantum  mechanics.    
However,   it   is   important   to  establish,   foremost,   that  supersymmetry  (SUSY)  
is  not  a  BSM  model,  but  rather  a  BSM  framework  that  holds  a  multitude  of  models  
together.  SUSY  has  been  the  favored  theory  among  the  other  more  exotic  candidates5  
because  of   its  simple  premise:  a  single  additional  and  seemingly  natural  symmetry  
and   the   range   of   problems   it   solves.  However,   until  we   can  understand  better   the  
role  SUSY  plays  in  relation  to  the  Standard  Model  beyond  the  computational  finesse  
                                                                                                             
5  Technicolor  variants,   theories  predicting  axions,   large  extra  dimensions,  hidden  valleys,   little  Higgs  
theories,   and  others,  none  of  which   I  will   explicate  upon  here  beyond  stating   that   they   form  various  
model-­‐‑hypotheses   for   getting   at   the   problem   of   unification,   scales,   and   higher-­‐‑order/multiplicity   of  
dimensions  not  yet  addressed.  
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the   former  provides,   it   remains  uncertain  as   to  whether  SUSY  can  provide  a  better  
ontological  approach  to  understanding  the  mechanism  of  the  Higgs  boson.    
Further,   SUSY  appears   to  have  greater  prescriptive  power   compared   to   the  
Standard  Model,   though   the   former   still   fails   to   solve   the   ontological   conundrum  
surrounding  the  physicality  of  the  Standard  Model  beyond  providing  more  beautiful  
and   elegant   computational   finesse.   This   is   because   SUSY   and   the   Standard  Model  
share   the   same   quantum   field   theoretical   delimitations,   and   therefore,   their  
predictive  capabilities  are  similarly  constrained.  
While   there   have   been   a   number   of   literatures   on  what   SUSY   can   achieve  
when  searches  are  made  for  predicting  a  wide  range  of  SUSY  regimes,  none  of  them  
address  the  heuristics  of  SUSY  in  any  way  that  is  external  to  the  regime  of  discovery.  
The  gauge  theories  that  provide  mathematical  support  to  symmetry  relations  within  
electrodynamical,   weak,   and   strong   interactions,   have   not   been   physically  
explicated,   yet   the   former   theories   provide   the   structural   basis   for   framing   the  
theories   of   supersymmetry.   In   addition,   the   transformation   between   the  
mathematical   phases   (such   as   from   non-­‐‑relativistic   to   relativistic   mode)   does   not  
bring  about  any  significant  physical  change,  since  it  mostly  revolves  around  the  re-­‐‑
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organization  of  positions  without  changing  the  frame  of  reference,  and  therefore,  the  
theory-­‐‑laden  assumptions  embedded  in  the  frame.6    
The   non-­‐‑existence   of   SUSY,   however,   does   point   to   some   gritty   issues,  
particularly   issues   of   verisimilitude.  On   the  one  hand,   it   points   to   SUSY  as   a  non-­‐‑
counterfactual   of   the   Standard   Model   since   there   is   no   other   indication   that   the  
Standard  Model  is  not  right.  At  the  same  time,  the  existence  of  the  Standard  Model  
necessitates  the  existence  of  SUSY,  or  something  comparable,  since  the  deficit  within  
the  former  requires  an  object  that  can  at   least  fulfill   the  function  that  SUSY  does  in  
order   for   the   Standard   Model   to   exist.   But   to   take   a   logico-­‐‑phenomenological  
perspective,  the  problems  of  the  Standard  Model  are  not  sufficient  pre-­‐‑conditions  for  
confirming  SUSY  despite   their   sharing  a   similar  mathematical  ontology,  and  could  
therefore   form   a   more   complete   theory   together.   Despite   the   many   perceived  
justifications  for  at  least  a  minimal  supersymmetric  extension  to  the  Standard  Model  
(MSSM),   the   lack   of   a   strong   experimental   confirmation   beyond   the   formalistic  
rationale   of   this   theory  points   to   the   inherent  difficulties   of   attaining   a   ‘perfect   fit’  
between  the  possibility  of  theory  with  the  expectations  of  experimental   justification  
                                                                                                             
6   See   for   example   Lyre,   Holger.   “Does   the   Higgs   Mechanism   Exist?”   International   Studies   in   the  
Philosophy  of  Science  22.2  (2008):  119–133.  
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and   verification   so   as   to   be   able   to   approximate   the   ontological   foundation   of   the  
Standard  Model  more  definitely.      
At   the   experimental   level,   the   most   straightforward   incarnation   of   SUSY  
requires   supersymmetric   particles   to   exist   at   around   the   1   TeV   mass   range;   any  
higher   and   the   theory   starts   to   run   aground,   particularly   in   the   fine-­‐‑tuning   of   the  
Higgs   mass.   In   addition,   the   current   lack   of   evidence   of   any   supersymmetric  
particles  at   the  LHC  means  placing   limits  on   the   former’s  mass  when  approaching  
the   problematic   level   of   1   TeV.   It   is   possible   to   consider   SUSY   as   mainly   a  
phenomenological   tool,   or   what   Dudley   Shapere   refers   to   as   unobservable  
background  information.  The  issue  of  whether  SUSY  can  be  observed  brings  to  bear  
the  question  of  whether  its  actual  discovery  has  a  role  in  the  Higgs’s  measurement.  
Shapere   also   argues   that   the   idea   of   what   is   unobservable   (or   an   idea   without  
observable   consequences)   can   become   accepted   if   it   is  mathematically   or   logically  
implied   by   another   observable   subject,   and   needed   for   maintaining   consistency  
regardless  of  whether  the  unobservable  is  implied  by  the  observable  portions  of  the  
theory  (Shapere  159).  
While   the   LHC   upgrades   are   now   getting   ready   (the   LHC   will   re-­‐‑start  
operations   in   April   2015)   to   run   at   higher   collision   energy   and   luminosity,   thus  
increasing  the  sensitivity  to  the  existence  of  supersymmetric  particles,  the  next  stage  
would  involve  consideration  of  where  data  cuts  can  be  made  in  order  to  single  out  
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any   particular   physics   events   that   might   increase   sensitivity   towards   the  
manifestation  of  as  yet  unidentified  particles  that  could  be  the  best   lead  to   locating  
SUSY.  However,  we  also  have  to  grapple  with  what  it  means  to  be  making  the  right  
data   cut   in  hope  of   landing  on   the   right   cluster,  pending  an   empirical   evidence  of  
SUSY.  Hence,  what  we  end  up  with  is  a  chicken  and  egg  problem.  
We   know   that   there   will   always   be   problems   with   experiments   because  
instrumental  technology  could  not  always  catch  up  with  theory  for  various  physical  
reasons,  and  experiments  are  also  dependent  on  the  developments  of  other  areas  of  
applied   material   sciences.   With   the   margins   of   uncertainty   being   wider   than   the  
preferred  effects,  attempts  at  excavating  the  physical  footprints  of  SUSY  within  that  
range  of  uncertainty  can  be  both  informative  and  problematic.  However,  one  would  
still  have  to  search  for  these  predicted  elements  in  the  region  of  ‘uncertainty’  that  are  
parameterized   by   selection   criteria   determined   by   predictions   and   experimental  
triggers,   which   includes   digging   deeper   into   particles   that   are   still   not   quite   well  
understood   by   merely   adjusting   from   existing   methods.   The   questions   that   one  
should   continue   to   ask   are:   how  much   of   the   uncertainty   is   due   to   measurement  
limitations   and   how   much   is   constituted   by   an   inability   to   deal   with   discordant  
results,  issues  of  non-­‐‑local  observations,  or  speculative  turns  necessary  for  mediating  
between   empirical   evidence   and   theory?   Speculating   on   possibilities   that   are  
ambiguous   despite   their   basis   on   facts   pushes   us   into   considering   the  meaning   of  
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uncertainty,   the   duck   and   rabbit   thinking   that   goes   into   the   decision-­‐‑making  
processes,  and  the  discordant  truth-­‐‑claims  that  can  bias  the  measurements.    
This   means   a   reconsideration   of   the   cognitive   process   underlying   the  
construction  of  models,   proofs,   and   formalism   such   as   that  detailed   in   a   thorough  
paper  by  Arianna  Borelli   “The  Case  of  Composite  Higgs:  The  Model  as  a   ‘Rosetta’  
Stone   in  Contemporary  High-­‐‑energy  physics”  when   she   discusses   the   problematic  
epistemologies   underlying  model   formation   such   as   is   the   practice   in   high-­‐‑energy  
physics   leading   to   the   production   of   ad-­‐‑hoc   and   expendable   models   that   do   not  
consider  how  these  models  can  expand  into  more  developed  and  rigorous  theories.  
She  also  discusses  the  use  of  a  hybrid  mix  of  rigorous  formalism  and  non-­‐‑formalistic  
approaches  utilized  for  the  formulation  of  predictive  models  that  could  lead  to  either  
spectacular  or  disastrous  results.    
But   more   interestingly,   she   explores   how   physicists   use   models   as   an  
apparatus   for   constructing   a   fiction   or   toy  model   for   heuristical   explorations.   She  
contrasts   the  non-­‐‑rigorous  model-­‐‑building  enterprise  of  particle  physicists  with  the  
more  deliberate  act  of  theory-­‐‑building  that  takes  place  through  a  rigorous  invocation  
of  mathematics   that  string-­‐‑theorists  engage   in   to  get   to  a   final   theory,  even   if   there  
are  no  available  experiments  for  bringing  those  theories  to  life.  She  rightly  points  to  
particle  physicists  being  more  interested  in  the  physical  validity  of  the  mathematics  
used   for   producing   practically   useful   models.   Moreover,   she   foregrounds   the  
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importance  of  combining  a  strong  theoretical  core  with  desired  empirical  features  as  
a  way  of  repositioning  the  role  of  the  observational   language  within  theory,  theory  
that  is  constituted  of  a  hybrid  of  narrative  and  empirical  reference  (or  justification).  
As   the   fictional   and   actual   experiments   discussed   above   have   served   to  
demonstrate,   speculative   experiment   involves   taking   together   all   the   supposed  
points   of   indeterminism   and   current   theories   that   are   ontologically   problematic   to  
reflect  on  the  subjectivity  of  the  experimental  approaches  while  similarly  considering  
emergent   practices   that   could   break   the   mold   of   continuity   and   contiguity   for  
attaining  new  physics.  One  could  also  take  the  speculative  practices  in  experiment  as  
material   for   modeling   more   concrete   approaches   that   foreground   the   ambivalent  
relationship  between  epistemology  and  ontology.    
SUSY  is  the  model  of  thought  experiment  and  the  unobservable  that  is  ideal  
for   demonstrating   how   theoretical   speculation   could   broaden   the   concept   of  
speculation   for   the   exploration  of   the  non-­‐‑observable   in   relation   to   the  observable.  
To   re-­‐‑iterate   Friedrich   Schelling   loosely,   an   experiment   is   a   self-­‐‑construction   of  
phenomena  that  can  never  transcend  the  forces  of  nature,  so  we  can  be  assured  that  
once  we  are  on  the  right  track,  however  uncertain  our  knowledge,  the  product  will  
manifest  itself,  just  perhaps  in  a  way  different  than  expected.  
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5.3 Conclusion 
Does  speculative  experiment,  in  conjunction  with  BSM,  represent  a  new  crisis  
in   the   science  of  particle  physics?  After  all,  previous  crises  have   led   to  unexpected  
discoveries  that  revolutionized  particle  physics  in  the  1970s,  and  more  recently,  the  
discovery  of  the  Higgs  boson  that  had  once  been  on  the  receiving  end  of  criticism  in  
the  same  manner  that  SUSY  now  faces.  Hence,   it  appears   that   the  possible  crisis,   if  
reconstituted   within   the   paradigm   of   potential   revolution,   is   what   is   needed   to  
encourage  the  reconsideration  of  the  available  and  whatever  else  there  is  to  be  done  
still.   One   might   even   argue   that   experimental   crises   are   crucial   to   speculative  
experiments  because  the  crises  expose  the  problem  that  can  arise  when  the  theories  
driving   the   experiments   do   not   bring   about   a   predicted   result,   or   worse,   lead   to  
experimental  ‘crashes.’    
In  chapter  seven,  we  will  be  revisiting  some  of  the  same  issues  that  have  been  
raised  in  this  chapter  with  regard  to  how  analysis  is  performed  of  the  Higgs  search  
data  through  Monte  Carlo  simulation  used  to  produce  test  models  for  determining  a  
distribution   of   probabilistic   outcomes   of   unknown   entities   based   on   variable  
parameters.  Taking  a  leaf  out  of  the  theoretical  and  historical  issues  raised  by  Borelli  
on   attitudes   to   theory   and   model   in   high-­‐‑energy   physics,   chapter   seven   will   dig  
deeper   into   what   is   epistemically   contingent   and   necessary   about   the  
simulation/statistical   model   and   its   implications   for   both   speculative   theory   and  
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experiment,   as  was   discussed   thus   far.   But   before   that,   in   the   following   chapter,   I  
will   venture   into   a   discussion   of   how   science   fiction   performs   a   speculative-­‐‑
experimental   turn   to   demonstrate   the   other   components   of   experimental   practices  
that  will  complement  the  issues  raised  in  this  chapter.  
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Yet,  "ʺthe  only  reality  capable"ʺ  reflects  an  ambition  to  provide  atoms  with  a  mode  of  existence  
that,   following  Bruno  Latour,   I  have   associated  with  "ʺexperimental   factishes"ʺ—beings   that  
we  are  compelled  to  describe  as  having  been  constructed  by  us  and  simultaneously  endowed  
with   an   autonomous   existence…In   other  words,   the   "ʺexperimental   factish"ʺ   constructed   by  
detection  answers   the  questions  addressed   to   it,   but   its   responses,   although  veridical   in   the  
sense  that  they  resist  the  accusation  of  being  mere  artifacts,  are  still  not  "ʺtruthful"ʺ  if  by  this  
we   mean   the   avowal   a   being   can   be   led   to   make   concerning   its   own   truth.   (Isabelle  
Stengers  in  Cosmopolitics,  Volume  II).  
6. Fact from Fiction: the Impossible Affair of 
Observing the New through an Unknown 
One  of  the  more  unique  features,  or  considerations,  of  science  fiction,  beyond  
its  ideological  embodiment  as  scientific  cognition  of  a  secular  age,  is  its  expression  of  
ontological   curiosity   in   perforating   the   boundaries   of   the   present   and   known   to  
reach  into  the  future  and  the  unknown.  Sometimes,  the  genre  also  extends  into  a  past  
that  has  never  been,  or  a  past  with  a  twist  to  its  timeline.  Science  fiction  is  more  than  
a  creative  mode  for  theorizing  utopia  and  dystopia  through  the  framework,  or  lens,  
of  techno-­‐‑gadgetry,  socio-­‐‑technological  forecasting,  and  socio-­‐‑political  interfaces  that  
could   either   be   a   part   of   a   futuristic   extension,   another   dimension   of   time,   or   an  
‘alien’   culture   (in   a   pulp   fictional   and   metonymic   sense).   But,   given   that   science  
fiction  has   its  earliest   incarnations   in   fictions,  preceding   the  Enlightenment  project,  
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such   as   Johannes   Kepler’s   Sommium   Sive   Astronomia   Lunaris   and   Margaret  
Cavendish’s  The  Blazing  World,  before  being  succeeded  by  post-­‐‑Enlightenment  (and  
therefore,  a  Romantic)  critique  of  the  hubris  that  came  out  of  over-­‐‑reliance  on  science  
and  reason  as  demonstrated  through  Mary  Shelly’s  Frankenstein,  the  genre  is  shaped  
by  a  categorical  approach  to  epistemology  that  is  Eurocentric  in  its  teleology.    
This  is  not  to  say  that  there  are  no  earlier  works  that  can  be  considered  under  
this   category,   or   that  works   from  non-­‐‑European   cultures  might  not   be   considered,  
but   rather   that   the   development   of   certain   ‘canons’   of   the   genre   informed   by  
particular  epistemic  sensibilities  are  what  shaped  our  cognate  of  science  fiction.1  But  
most   importantly,   the   genealogy   of   these   works   provides   one   of   the   earliest  
indications  of  fiction  as  philosophical  and  cultural  inquiries  into  science  by  way  of  a  
systematic   probing   of   a   post-­‐‑Copernican   scientific   culture.   Observations   and   the  
interpretive   acts   following   the   observations   were   then   catalogued   and   described,  
with  fiction  opening  up  imaginaries  into  the  not  yet  observable  for  speculation.  
According  to  Eric  S.  Rabkin  in  the  May  2004  issue  of  the  PMLA,  the  cultural  
system   of   science   fiction   “coordinates   politics,   technology,   and   more   enduring  
symbolic   concerns   about   gender   (ants   are   female,   nests   are   evil,   but   men   have  
flamethrowers)  and  poetic  space  (aboveground  is  good;  belowground  is  bad)”  (463).  
                                                                                                             
1  Darko  Suvim  and  Adams  Robert  have  much   to   say  about   the  genealogies  of   science   fiction   in   their  
aforementioned  respective  books  discussed  in  chapter  four.  
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However,  I  am  interested  in  thinking  about  science  fiction  beyond  the  usual  critique  
of   cultural   valuations,   aesthetics,   and  moral   truth   claims,  while   not   neglecting   the  
latter   categories.   I   am   also   invested   in   thinking   about   science   fiction   as   science  
studies   (and   social   studies   of   science),   such   as   is   demonstrated   in   Sheryl   Vint’s  
“Archaeologies   of   the   ‘Amodern’:   Science   and   Society   in   Galileo’s   Dream”   in   the  
Winter-­‐‑Spring  2012  volume  of  Configurations.  However,  we  differ   in  our  theoretical  
(and  philosophical)  approaches  as  informed  by  the  subject  of  our  study.  Moreover,  I  
concentrate  specifically  on  hard  science  fiction  that  are  focused  on  modern  physics:  
science   fiction   is   a   platform   for   navigating   some   of   the   more   subjective   and  
speculative   aspects   of   scientific   epistemology,   especially   elements   of   theoretical  
sciences   that   are   mostly   speculative   yet   ground-­‐‑breaking   if   experimentally  
confirmed.  
Hence,   I  attempt  to  examine  hard  science  fiction  as  a  speculative  account   in  
science   studies   that  problematizes  non-­‐‑quantifiable  and  ethically  ambiguous   ideals  
in   the  constellation  of  scientific  knowledge.   I  argue  that  science  fiction   is  a  suitable  
platform   for   dealing   with   morality/ethical   questions   that   span   the   internal   and  
external   values   of   science   because   of   the   genre’s   ability   to   model   friction   and  
problematic  encounters  between  science  and  society,  and  even  between  the  sciences.  
In  addition,  science  fiction  is  useful  for  the  production  of  thought  experiments  that  
amplify   and   defamiliarize   ideologically   and   socio-­‐‑politically   invasive   issues   while  
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crossing   into   the   territory   of   ‘extra-­‐‑normal’   science;   the   latter   of   which   is  
hyperspeculative   because   of   lack   of   direct   connection   to   any   established   scientific  
theories.   Extra-­‐‑normal   science   can   be   deployed   for   asking   hard   philosophical  
questions  about  the  metaphysics  of  reality  as  well  as  for  complicating  the  usual  run  
of   physical   uncertainties   by   compounding   the   perplexing   problems   involved   in  
distinguishing   the   pseudo   from   the   real.   In   this   manner,   science   fiction   is   the  
platform  for  expanding  metaphysical  inquiries  that  critically  assess  institutional  and  
epistemological   demarcations   of   pseudoscience   by   employing   the   Schelling-­‐‑ian  
argument  of  the  ideal  being  explained  through  the  real.  
For   Jameson,   scientific   and   philosophical   speculations   are   “ideological  
constructs   designed   to   ground   a   particular   political   system   in   biological   nature”  
(168).   This   connection   from   the   ideological   (quantum   measurements)   to   the  
biological  is  illustrated  in  the  dystopian  subjectivity  of  Egan’s  Quarantine,  and  would  
become   equally   problematic   in   the   works   of   fiction   to   be   examined   here.   But   the  
dystopia  is  also  a  utopia  that,  as  Jameson  argues  
…brings   us   to   what   is   perhaps   the   fundamental   Utopian   dispute   about  
subjectivity,   namely   whether   the   Utopia   in   question   proposes   the   kind   of  
radical   transformation   of   subjectivity   presupposed   by   most   revolution,   a  
mutation   in   human   nature   and   the   emergence   of   whole   new   beings;   or  
whether  the  impulse  to  Utopia  is  not  already  grounded  in  human  nature;  its  
persistence  readily  explained  by  deeper  needs  and  desires  which  the  present  
has   merely   repressed   and   distorted…If   absolute   difference   is   achieved,   in  
other  words,  we  find  ourselves  in  a  science-­‐‑fictional  world…in  which  human  
beings   can   scarcely   even   recognize   themselves   any   longer.   On   the   other  
hand,   if   Utopia   is   drawn   too   close   to   current   everyday   realities,   and   its  
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subject  begins   too  closely   to  approximate  our  neighbors  and  our  politically  
misguided  fellow  citizens…(168)  
That   struggle   between   differentiation   and   mimesis   in   the   mundane   permeates  
Benford’s  Gregory  Benford’s  Matter’s  End  and  Mozart  on  Morphine  at  a  much  lower  
register   than   in   the   husband-­‐‑and-­‐‑wife   (Richard   and  Nancy   Carrigan)   co-­‐‑authored  
Minotaur   in   a   Mushroom  Maze   (to   be   known   as  MMM),   mainly   because   Benford’s  
flight   into   the   fantastical   is   carefully   engineered   to   produce   an   imagined   outcome  
unconstrained  by  physical  realities  (although  not  necessarily  physical  laws  since  the  
laws  will  exist  regardless  of  our  perception  of  them).    
In  the  three  fictional  works  to  be  discussed,  I  hope  to  make  evident  that  the  
nomological  fable  penetrating  the  perforated  lines  of  science  fiction  and  ideological  
utopian  fantasies  are  as  much  colored  by  Western  centrism  in  relation  to  the  ‘other,’  
as   they  are  by  a  desire  for  material  agency.  Even  if  one  finds  parallels  between  the  
physics  that  are  the  focus  of  the  stories  and  the  more  concrete  socio-­‐‑political  actions  
of  the  human  characters,  one  would  not  be  able  supervene,  or  superimpose,  one  over  
the  other,  because,  to  put  it  in  Nancy  Cartwright’s  words,    
First,   a   concept   that   is   abstract   relative   to   another   more   concrete   set   of  
descriptions  never  applies  unless  one  of  the  more  concrete  descriptions  also  
applies…Second,   satisfying   the   associated   concrete   description   that   applies  
on  a  particular  occasion  is  what  satisfying  the  abstract  description  consists  in  
on  that  occasion  (39).    
While   the   abstract   categories   are   pervasive   and   culminate   into   finales   without  
arriving   at   an   ultimate   resolution   as   the   concrete   dissolves   into   the   abstract,   the  
  206  
incompleteness  of  what  is  observable  and  the  difficulty  in  attributing  direct  cause-­‐‑to-­‐‑
effect  are  reminders  of  all   that   is  beyond  plain  sight:   the  missing  petrons  in  MMM,  
the  unattainability  of  higher  dimensions  of  knowledge  in  Mozart  on  Morphine  beyond  
the   imagination,  and  an  apocalyptic   explosiveness   in  Matter’s  End   that   exhibits   the  
impossibility   of   disentangling   the   epistemological   from   the   ontological   after   the  
elusive  temporal  instability  of  the  proton  is  pinned  down  (even  if  only  fictionally).  
Given   that   the   entanglement   of   the   epistemological   with   the   ontological   is  
also  an  entanglement  between  the  physical  and  metaphysical,  my  support  of  Darko  
Suvin’s   argument   concerning   how   the   character   of   fiction   in   science   fiction   is   an  
embodiment  of  estrangement  does  not  extend  to  his  attribution  of  non-­‐‑relationality  
between   science   fiction   and   metaphysics.   In   the   sense   I   am   applying   here,  
metaphysics   is   seen   as   an   entailment,   or   counterfactual,   of   the   physical   (despite  
metaphysics’s   rather  contentious  history  within  particular  strands  of  philosophy  of  
science),  while  for  Suvin,  metaphysics  is  akin  to  myths,  folklore,  and  the  paranormal.      
Moreover,   science   fictional   works   that   take   on   the   theme   of   the   physical  
sciences  intersect  constantly  with  metaphysics:  metaphysics  often  articulate  theories  
of   causation,  or  problems  with   causation;  physical  objects   are  utilized  as   examples  
while   physics   applies   metaphysical   conceptualization   to   articulate   the   ontological  
problems  found  in  its  interactions.  Further,  the  model-­‐‑theory  relationship  today  has  
evolved   tremendously   because   of   the   increasing   sophistication   in   computational  
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techniques  compared  to  what  was  available   for  early   twentieth-­‐‑century  predictions  
in  quantum   theory  and  cosmology.  Available   computational   techniques   enable   the  
modeling  of  both  discrete  and  continuous  elements  simultaneously,  and  are  thereby  
able   to   foreground   areas   altogether   deterministic   and   stochastic   for   big-­‐‑picture  
analysis.  This  specifically  means  that  there  are  increasing  opportunities  for  creating  
computational  thought  experiments  of  metaphysically  directed  questions  on  physics.  
Contra  Suvin’s  argument  that,  “…To  expect  from  SF  more  than  a  stimulus  for  
independent   thinking,   more   than   a   system   of   stylized   narrative   devices  
understandable  only  in  their  mutual  relationships  within  a  fictional  whole  and  not  as  
isolated   realities,   leads   insensibly   to   the   demand   for   scientific   accuracy   in   the  
extrapolated  realia”   (28),  chapter   four  wants   to  demonstrate   that  science   fiction  can  
be  more  than  a  stimulus  for  independent  thinking  or  stylized  narrative  device,  and  
the  demand  for  scientific  accuracy   is  both  necessary  and  not   insensible,  but  should  
be   conceived   as   much   more   than   what   is   defined   by   an   empirical,   and   material  
evidence-­‐‑based,   mode   of   production.   Science   fiction,   especially   of   the   hard   or  
mundane  variety,  has  the  potential  for  being  a  generative  platform  that  encourages  
the   exploratory   potential   of   the   novum   for   experimenting   with   the   what-­‐‑ifs   of  
scientific   speculation   within,   or   beyond,   the   constraints   of   known   physical   and  
natural  laws.  Hence,  to  expect  more  from  science  fiction  is  not  just  to  expect  scientific  
accuracy,   but   also   to   expect   a   commitment   in   dealing   critically   with   science  
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performing   ideology   (or   vice   versa)   and   science’s   relation   to   difficult   ethical  
questions.  Science  fiction  simultaneously  idealizes  and  reveals  the  power  structures  
of  science.    
The  works  of   fiction  considered  here  contain   literal  and  less  obvious  acts  of  
scientific  observations;  some  of  these  acts  are  transitively  enacted  with  a  theoretical  
goal  in  mind  while  others  are  involuntarily  performed  because  of  the  manifestation  
of   certain   physical   phenomenon.   Nevertheless,   observations   are   the   outcome   of  
measurements;  if  the  act  of  measurement  is  more  amplified  in  Quarantine,  the  after-­‐‑
effects   of   the  performance  of  measurement,   also   indirectly   alluded   to  here,  will   be  
further  magnified  by  the  relationships  between  the  characters.  
Whatever   the  outcome,   it   is  obvious   that  measurement  and  observation  are  
inextricably  entangled.  I  begin  by  considering  and  re-­‐‑theorizing  the  conceptual   loci  
of   hard   science   fiction   in   relation   to   the   selected   works   before   considering   how  
science   fiction   can   be   a   productive   site   for   envisioning   the   scientific   method   and  
futures  of  science,  especially  physics.  At  the  same  time,  I  will  be  examining  how  the  
authors  use  scientific  observation  in  their  imagining  of  fictive  discoveries  in  terms  of  
the  latter’s  implications  on  fictive  universes  paralleling  ours.  
6.1 Hard Science Fiction: the Ethics of the Speculative 
When  the  potential  for  an  unexpected  discovery  detonates  a  series  of  events  
that   could   change   the   course   of   our   relationship   to   the  world  we   inhabit   (and  not  
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necessarily  in  a  way  that  is  comfortable  or  humanly  safe),  the  ethics  of  dealing  with  
that  discovery   is  complicated  by  the  differences  between  an  abstract  absolute   truth  
and  expedient  truth:  the  former  truth  is  governed  by  the  desire  of  ontological  access  
to   the   foundations   of   nature   while   the   latter   requires   one   to   consider   the  
consequences  of,  and  primary  motive  for,  unleashing  that  knowledge  into  the  world.  
The  scientist  has  to  decide  on  whether  the  act  of  enacting  an  observation  may  require  
the   amplification   of   particular   physical   properties   of   the   entities   that   do  not   occur  
naturally   in  a   form  suitable   for  examination  (especially   in   the  sense  of  being  easily  
observable),  thereby  bringing  about  catastrophic  side-­‐‑effects  in  the  same  manner  that  
a  mirror  version  of  a  drug  chemical  could  produce  a  fatal  outcome  when  ingested.  
MMM,  published  in  three  installments  over  the  summer  of  1976  (May,  June,  
and  July)  by  hard  science  serial  Analog  Science  Fiction  and  Fact,2  brackets  the  discourse  
of  the  observable  versus  the  non-­‐‑observable  as  part  of  its  plot  device  even  if  the  act  
of  observation  is  not  always  about  advancing  the  cause  of   the  physics.  The  novella  
parallels  Benford’s  Matter’s  End   in   its  deployment  of   the   exotic   features  of  particle  
physics.    In  the  case  of  MMM,  the  search  and  discovery  was  for  the  petrons,  which,  
                                                                                                             
2  Richard  Carrigan,  one  of  the  co-­‐‑authors  of  the  short  story,  had  authored  an  article  in  the  Feb  1976  of  
Analog  about  the  discovery  of   the  meson  through  the  Standard  Positron-­‐‑Electron  Asymmetric  Ring  at  
SLAC.  
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according   to   the   Carrigans3   in   their   note   preceding   the   story,  were  molded   in   the  
image   of   the   magnetic   monopole   (a   hypothesis   that   rode   high   on   the   waves   of  
speculation   at   the   time   the   novella   was   written)4   and   a   very   particular   kind   of  
elementary  interaction  known  as  muon  catalysis.5    
On  the  other  hand,  Matter’s  End  is  centered  on  the  discovery  of  the  decay  rate  
of  a  proton,  a  highly   stable  particle  whose  ability   to  decay   into  a  neutral  pion  and  
positron   is   as   hypothetical   as   the   existence   of   a   magnetic   monopole.   A   real-­‐‑life  
reconstitution   of   the   fictional   petrons   and   the   actual   discovery   of   a   proton   rate   of  
decay   will   certainly   break   new   ground   for   the   Standard   Model   in   a   way   the  
discovery   of   the   Higgs   boson   has   not,   given   the   former   discovery’s   potential   for  
changing  our  understanding  of  matter  completely.  
Therefore,   the   unimagined   effects   of   such   discoveries   that   imply   the  
instability  of  matter  constituting  our  physical  being  is  the  reason  behind  the  similar  
psychedelic   (or   nightmarish,   some   would   say)   finale   of   Quarantine   (since  
                                                                                                             
3  While   Richard   Carrigan   used   to   be   a   physicist   at   Fermilab,   his   collaborator   and  wife,   Nancy   Jean  
Carrigan,  is  an  artist  and  poet  who  had  found  much  inspiration  from  her  indirect  association  with  the  
scientific  world.  See  http://home.fnal.gov/~carrigan/Nancy_carrigan_cosmology.htm.  
4  There  was  an  article  about  the  magnetic  monopole  by  Margaret  Silbar  in  the  November  1976  issue  of  
Analog.  
5   Incidentally,  Richard  Carrigan  had  also  written  an  article   (“The  Discovery  of   the  Gypsy”,  February  
1976,   Analog)   on   the   discovery   of   the   J/psi   elementary   particle   that   heralded   the   November   1974  
revolution  birthing   ‘new  physics.’  As  one  would   see   in  Appendix  A,   the  muon  catalytic  process  was  
part  of  the  chain  of  events  that  led  to  the  eventual  discovery  of  the  J/psi.  
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unconstrained   ‘smearing’   also   denotes   matter   instability)   and  Matter’s   End   as   the  
authors  tried  to  imagine  an  end  of  world  sequence.  The  difficulties  of  imagining  the  
not-­‐‑yet-­‐‑actualized   is   an   important   problem   in   speculative   experiment,   and   this  
problem   serves   to   explain   why   many   of   the   predictions   of   the   unknown   are  
anchored  on  the  known  and  how  the  dependence  on  epistemology  derived  from  the  
observable  delimits  the  range  of  experimental  expectations.    
However,   one   might   wonder   if   the   almost   similar   endings   of   the   two-­‐‑
abovementioned  works  are  merely  a  confirmation  of  a  niche  practice  in  the  genre  as  
stated  by  David  Brin  in  “Running  out  of  Speculative  Niches”  
It  is  betraying  no  fraternity  secret  to  say  that  to  some  degree  hard  SF  writers  
write  for  each  other.  That   is,   in  addition  to  wanting  their  works  to  be  good  
stories  for  the  sake  of  the  broad  audience  (and  even  critics),  these  writers  also  
tend  to  be  aware  of  the  other  hard  SF  authors  as  they  work  out  the  details  of  
their  plots  and  universes  (9).  
In  the  same  anthology  where  Brin’s  essay  appears,  Gregory  Benford,   in  “Is  There  a  
Technological   Fix   for   the   Human   Condition,”   states   that   fidelity   to   the   physical  
universe   is   demanded   of   hard   science   fiction   because   of   its   capacity   for   detailed  
prediction  as  well  as  falsification  by  experiment,  and  is  thus  a  more  reliable  indicator  
of  future  possibilities.    
According  to  Benford,  even  fantastical  tales  that  fall  under  the  rubric  of  hard  
science  fiction  abide  by  the  logic  of  scientific  verisimilitude  in  the  same  vein  that  the  
future   technologies   envisioned   would   appear   ‘magical’   to   the   world   prior   to  
actualization.   However,   he   argues   for   a   science   that   is   deeper   than   humanity’s  
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concerns,   “…remorselessly  deterministic,  uncaring  of  our  personal  preoccupations,  
and  yet   capable   of   revealing  wondrous  perspectives.   It   can   either   encase  us   in   the  
indifference  of  the  universe,  or  liberate  us”  (85),  Benford  uses  as  an  example  of  such  
a   case,   the   story   “The   Cold   Equation”   by   Tom   Godwin,   the   one   that   John  
Huntington,  in  ”Hard  Core  Science  Fiction”  that  also  appears  in  the  same  anthology,  
insists  as  hovering  between  “two  incongruent  ideas  of  SF:  one  promises  liberation  by  
means   of   an   ingenious   solution   to  what   seems   an   irresolvable   problem.   The   other  
promises  a  rigorous  holding  to  the  rules  of  plausibility  (51).”  Huntington  goes  on  to  
suggest  that  the  linear  narration  of  the  story  that  leads  to  an  inevitable  end  riffs  more  
with  the  perception  of  what  the  hard  sciences  do  than  what  they  are  about,  given  the  
limitations  of  our  ontological  access  to  the  science  and  the  insistence  on  the  idea  of  
‘scientific  rationality’  in  tales  of  hard  science  fiction.    
The   arguments  Benford   and  Huntington  have   advanced  with   regard   to   the  
present   science  as  being  unhuman  and  unconnected   to   ethical   complications  differ  
from   the   narratives   of   the   three   works   explored   here,   even   when   the   characters  
voiced   their   trust   in   the  science   to   the  exclusion  of  other  social  considerations.  The  
reasons  are   two-­‐‑fold:  1)  barring  natural  catastrophes  unrelated  to  human  activities,  
certain   artificial   conditions   have   to   be   created   for   the   manifestation   of   a   physical  
phenomenon  in  a  manner   that   is  observable  and  analyzable  by   the  scientists  2)   the  
scientists,  as  are  other  humans,  are  embedded  within  the  consequences  unleashed  by  
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any   physical   phenomena   that   have   directly   impacted   their   world,   regardless   of  
whether   the   phenomena   are   induced   or   natural.   Even   if   the   scientists  who   set   the  
course   for   a   catastrophic   outcome   might   not   be   directly   impacted   by   the  
consequences,  such  as  Benford’s  evocation  of  India’s  biotechnological  environmental  
disaster   in  Matter’s   End  purportedly   caused   by   first  world   scientists,   the   scientists  
still  face  the  consequences  through  other  means,  such  as  the  wrath  of  the  public  and  
the   lost   of   general   good  will   and   trust.   Despite   setting   such   an   event   in   a   distant  
land,   the  urgency  of  Benford’s  not-­‐‑so-­‐‑subtle  political  commentary  is  not   lost  on  his  
American  readers.    
Philosophers  and  sociologists  such  as  Allan  Franklin  (who  is  also  a  physicist),  
Ian   Hacking,   Andrew   Pickering,   and   Harry   Collins,   of   course,   have   discussed  
external  but  directly  impacting  issues  in  relation  to  how  one  constructs  the  material  
position   of   experiments   and   the   outcomes   projected   (including   the   lack   of  
resolution),  even  if  they  do  not  always  agree  on  how  best  to  define  the  truth-­‐‑claims  
of  experiments   in  relation  to  the  realities  produced.6  However,  as  Knorr-­‐‑Cetina  has  
noted,   and   whose   argument   I   am   extending,   epistemology   constructed   from  
experiment  is  marked  by  the  level  of  access  that  one  has,  and  the  access  is  not  purely  
                                                                                                             
6   See   Selectivity   and  Discord   by  Allan   Franklin,  The  Mangle   of   Practice   by  Andrew   Pickering,   and  The  
Golem:  What  Everyone  Should  Know  about  Science  by  Harry  Collins  and  Trevor  Pinch.  One  can  also  see  
Franklin’s  summary  and  response  to  the  arguments  advanced  in  the  introduction  of  his  aforementioned  
title.  
  214  
from   the   relationship   between   the   physicist   and   the   instrument,   but   also   the  
privilege  that  allows  more  access  to  certain  groups  of  physicists  than  of  others,  such  
as  those  from  particular  research  institutes  or  universities.  In  fact,  the  setting  of  the  
discovery  of  the  proton  decay  in  India,  with  its  ‘primitive’  technology  and  apparent  
distant   location   from   the   main   artery   of   ‘cutting-­‐‑edge’   research   in   the   US,  
foregrounds,   rather   sharply,   the   privilege   of   access   within   the   communities   of  
physics.  Benford’s  Indian  scientists  are  at  pains  to  gain  recognition  from  the  ‘control-­‐‑
center’   of   science,   as   when   US   protagonist,   Robert   Clay   (the   centrality   of   his  
character  is  made  manifest  by  the  fact  that  his  inner  life  is  the  only  one  the  reader  has  
any   insight   into,  while   his   Indian   colleagues   remain   caricature-­‐‑like),  was   flown   in  
and  brought  over  to  their  humble  facility  to  validate  their  findings.  At  the  same  time,  
one   gets   a   sense   of   resistance   in   conforming   to   the   epistemic   expectations   of   their  
western  colleagues.  Prestige  and  recognition  that  comes  from  changing  the  course  in  
the  world   of   science  were  never   far   from   the  minds   of   all   the  physicists   involved,  
whatever   their   nationality,   as   were   also   rivalry   and   communitarianism   (both   of  
which  were  noted  by  Traweek  and  Knor-­‐‑Cetina)7.  
                                                                                                             
7  More   historical   studies   about   doing   science,   and   national   to   international   collaborations   in   particle  
physics,   can  be   found   in  Fermilab:  Physics,   the  Frontier,   and  Megascience  by  Hoddeson  et  al.   and   the  3-­‐‑
volume  History   of   CERN   by   Hermann   et   al.   Also   the   first   five   chapters   in   Galison   and   Hevly’s   Big  
Science  documents  the  history  of  particle  physics  collaborations  of  mostly  US  big  national  laboratories,  
with  the  exception  of  CERN,  from  the  1920s  to  the  1970s.    
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Speculating   about   the   potential   for   grand   discovery   means   that   we   must  
reconsider   our   relationship   to   the   ontological   foundation   grounding   the   laws   of  
physics   governing   our  mundane  world;   speculating   through   thought-­‐‑experiments-­‐‑
made-­‐‑real-­‐‑by-­‐‑way-­‐‑of-­‐‑a-­‐‑fictional-­‐‑universe   is   the   leitmotif   of   all   the  works   of   fiction  
discussed   here,   selected   especially   for   demonstrating   the   balance   between   factual  
science  and  the  imagined  extensions  of  scientific  possibilities  through  fiction,  even  if  
not  all  the  works  take  equal  advantage  of  the  affordances  of  science  fiction  to  push  
harder   at   the   epistemic   boundaries   of   the   science   even   if   the   science   is   a   primary  
object   of   interest   to   the   plot.   Further,   the   representations   of   scientific   productions  
(including   observations)   that   one   finds   narrated   in   the   stories,   follow   from   a   tacit  
assumption  of  scientific  expertise  that  the  reader  is  expected  to  accept  almost  at  face  
value.  However,  authors  and  readers  meet  in  the  difficulties  they  face  in  imagining  
the  unknown,   therefore  providing   this   chapter  with  an  ontological   cliffhanger   that  
segues   well   into   the   penultimate   chapter’s   consideration   of   the   important   role   of  
generative  simulations  for  piecing  together  ‘big’  data,  of  many  orders  of  magnitude,  
to  work  out  the  what-­‐‑could-­‐‑be  instead  of  merely  the  what-­‐‑ifs,  of  the  unknown.    
6.2 Configuring Scientific Observation in Hard Science Fiction 
MMM   is   set   in   the   aftermath   of   the   ‘November   revolution’   of   1974,   a  
revolution   touted   by   physicists   as   changing   the   face   of   particle   physics   through  
unexpected   discoveries.   Richard   Carrigan   uses   his   own   experience   in   the   field   to  
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conjure  a  quite  realistic  plot  of  the  scientific  industry:  from  the  job  market  right  to  the  
actual   experimental   processes   while   not   hesitating   from   injecting   bits   of   the  
fantastical.  Compared  to  the  more  surrealistic  tone  in  Benford’s  short  stories,  MMM  
is   decidedly   an   Indiana   Jones-­‐‑like   adventure   tale.  While   lacking   the   same   level   of  
literary   finesse   and   philosophical   reflections   found   in   the   other   two   short   stories,  
MMM  can  be  read  as  an  embodiment  of  a  pragmatic  (male)  experimentalist’s  gaze  of  
the  world  he  inhabits.  That  said,  all  of  the  chief  protagonists  of  the  stories  discussed  
here   are   male,   with   the   co-­‐‑starring   female   characters   holding   mainly   peripheral  
roles,  with   substantial   amount  of   character  development   for   the   latter   taking  place  
outside   the   immediate   purview  of   the   reader.   The   smartest  woman   in   the   story   is  
portrayed  as  a  villain,  even  if  a  complex  and  unreadable  one,  who  upheld  dangerous  
beliefs  incomprehensible  to  white  bread  Americans.  
The  discovery  of  the  ‘petron’  particle  is  read  analogously  to  the  then  feverish  
excitement  in  the  world  of  high  energy  particle  physics  of  the  1970s:  the  confirmation  
of  the  existence  of  quarks  and  the  discovery  of  stable  exotic  particles  able  to  produce  
enormous   amounts   of   energy   through   fusion-­‐‑like   recombination   of   specific  
properties   that   govern   matter   and   anti-­‐‑matter.   There   was   no   reference   to   any  
particles   of   Higgs-­‐‑like   quality   although   the   existence   of   the   boson   had   been  
predicted  more   than   a  decade   earlier  when   the   story  was  published.  But   then,   the  
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importance   of   the   Higgs   boson,   beyond   that   of   the   theoretical   spectrum,   was   not  
quite  realized.8  
At  an  age  when  big  science  was,  and  still  is,  integral  to  physics  experiments,  
there  were  echoes  of  resistance  and  conspiracy  through  the  art  of  espionage,  and  a  
call   to  return  to  an  earlier  pre-­‐‑big  science  era   that   is  not  necessarily  a  return   to   the  
pre-­‐‑technological.   Big   science   also   represents   the   coming   together   of   technological  
triumphalism  with  the  ontological  status  of  scientific  realism;  the  former  cannot  lead  
to   a   resolution   of   the   latter.   This   is   particularly   the   case   since   observation   is  
instrumentally   mediated,   and   therefore,   the   noetic   referent   (intellectually   abstract  
signifier)   of   what   is   observed   depends   on   the   conceptual   judgment   that   is  
performed.  But   then,  what   is   experimentally   achieved   could  not,  usually,   correlate  
with  theoretical  predictions  directly,  if  because,  as  philosopher  Evandro  Agazzi  puts  
it,  the    
physical  reality  we  propose  are  not  visual   (or   the   like),  but  conceptual,  and  
here  the  autonomy  of  the  noetic  world  may  pose  problems.  Even  with  visual  
representations  –  we  have  seen  –  we  are  free  of  combining  them  in  a  fictional  
picture   that   represents   only   a   possible  world   of   referents  with   no   concrete  
counterpart.  With   the   conceptual   representations  we   have   an   even   greater  
possibility  of  constructing  ‘theoretical  models’  whose  degree  of  abstractness  
has   only   certain   weak   limitations   of   mathematical   and   logical   character.  
(“Observability  and  Referentiality”  56)9  
  
                                                                                                             
8  See  Ellis  et.  al,  “A  Historical  Profile  of  the  Higgs  Boson.”  
9  An  essay  in  The  Reality  of  the  Unobservable.  
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Therefore,   what   this   chapter   intends   to   demonstrate,   through   the   cognitive  
apparatus  provided  by  science  fiction,   is  that  the  conceptual  need  not  be  limited  to  
the  mathematical.  One  might  want  to  consider  what  other  areas  of  epistemology  that  
cannot  be  mathematically  reducible  to  unequivocal  formal  logic,  and  which  might  be  
better   demonstrated   through   subjective,   yet   politically   loaded,   interactions.   This   is  
particularly  true  in  dealing  with  how  one  tackles  the  consequence  of  making  a  choice  
when  operating  through  the  scientific  method.  
Further,  the  Carrigans  juxtapose  the  tale  of  the  Cretan  Minotaur  (the  figure  of  
the  mythical  bull  takes  on  multiple  figurations  here),   the  labyrinth  (that  points  to  a  
physical  underground  structure  and  convoluted  experimental  paths   that   led   to   the  
petrons),  industrial  intrigue  (financial  gain  to  be  had  from  control  over  cutting-­‐‑edge  
renewable  energy  resource),  and  the  more  ancient   (or   timeless)   form  of  deism.  The  
story  begins  at  a  bar  by  a  wharf  not  far  from  the  real-­‐‑life  Brookhaven  Laboratory  is  
located;   the  wharf   and   the   bar   are  where   the   reader   is   introduced   to   some   of   the  
characters   who   catalyze   the   events   of   the   novella:   Bull   Tauroman,   a   man   of  
supposedly   inscrutable   pedigree   but   of   an   ambiguous   background,   is   the   central  
antagonistic  force;  the  physicists  Mario  Petronelli,  who  claimed  to  have  predicted  the  
discovery  of  the  petrons,  and  D.A.  Silverman,  who  was  instrumental  in  bringing  the  
main  protagonist,  John  Leigh,  into  the  story.  
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The  real  action  began  when  some  petrons  were  found  stolen  from  Petronelli’s  
laboratory.   Leigh  was   requested   to   leave   his   ‘cushy’   job   at   a   laboratory   in   Illinois  
(and   comfortable  non-­‐‑relationship  with   a   flight   attendant  who  happened   to   be  his  
neighbor)  to  re-­‐‑enter  the  ‘job  market’  at  the  American  Physical  Society  so  as  to  track  
down  who  might  be  holding  on  to  the  stolen  petrons  and  would  therefore  be  in  need  
of  an  accelerator  physicist  to  build  the  necessary  generator  for  producing  more  of  the  
said   particles.   It   appears,   in   the   novella,   that   Leigh   holds   a   double   professional  
identity  as  a  physicist  and  a   ‘secret  agent’  of   sorts.   In   the  process,  he  met  Daydala  
Pandarou,  an  alluring  yet  mysterious  physicist  with  hidden  ambitions  claiming  to  be  
of  Cretan  descent  but  whose  clan  had  been  residing  in  Morocco  for  generations.  She  
had  hired  Leigh,  on  behalf  of  Tauroman,  under  the  pretext  of  building  a  coil  needed  
for  sterilizing  compost  used  in  underground  mushroom  growing.  She  was  a  brilliant  
theoretician   and  phenomenologist   (due   to  her   ability   in   straddling   the  practices   of  
experiment   as   acutely   as   theory)   who   claimed   priority   in   the   prediction   of   the  
petrons   (that   she   referred   to   as   the   dayons),   and   also   a   worshipper   of   the   Earth  
Goddess,   together   with   her   band   of   male   Moroccan   downlinks.   Further   in   the  
novella,   it   would   soon   become   evident   that   the   dayons/petrons   served   a   larger  
purpose  for  her  than  just  science.    
Leigh  was   initially   enamored   of   her,   as   was   evident   in   their   near-­‐‑intimate  
night  of  dinner  and  clubbing  at  a  nightspot,  but  their  relationship  cooled  immensely  
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after  he  moved  into  the  mansion,  the  Hall,  housing  Tauroman  and  his  factotums  that  
also   included   Daydala’s   cousin,   Alexi   Pandarou,   another   enigmatic   figure   and  
Tauroman’s  secret  paramour.  Leigh  became  increasingly  suspicious  of  Daydala  and  
her   intentions   independent   of   whatever   Tauroman   was   planning.   Further,   it   was  
during  his  stay  at  the  Hall  that  he  met  and  formed  an  alliance  with  the  stepdaughter  
of  Tauroman,  a   skilled   sculptor  alternately   referred   to  as  Ariadne  and  Abbie,  with  
whom  Leigh  shared  more  cultural  resonances.    
At  the  same  time,  the  novella  contains  a  subplot  involving  a  securities  agent  
Nathan  Hunter   (the   only  minority   character  who   is   not   ‘othered’),   who   had   been  
tasked  with   investigating  a  possible  money   laundering  activity   involving   terrorists  
even  as  he  was  personally  bent  on  investigating  a  potential  financial  scam  going  on  
in  his  old  hometown  of  West  Virginia.  The  reader  would  soon  find  that  the  separate  
subplot   is   connected   to   the  mushroom  growing   and   stolen  petrons,  with   the  main  
link  being  Daydala  herself,  especially  after  Hunter  was  unceremoniously  murdered  
by   Tauroman’s   kennel  man,  Hole.   Thereafter,  much   of   the   novella   is   preoccupied  
with   Leigh   trying   to   recover   the   stolen   petrons   from  Daydala   and   her  men  while  
outwitting  Tauroman.  Even  as  he  was  doing  so,  he  tried  to  ‘protect’  Ariadne  (despite  
her  being  a  very  capable  and  strong-­‐‑willed  woman)  while  figuring  out  the  ultimate  
plan  that  Daydala  had  for  both  the  petrons  and  Tauroman’s  downfall.  
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The   authors   represent   the   fantastical   features   in   the   novella   as   constituting  
indeterminate  features  of  the  world  that  juxtaposes  the  ‘exotic’  qualities  of  quantum  
theory  against  the  greater  determinism  of  classical  physics.  Although  the  science  that  
forms   the   core   of   the   adventure   is   rigorous,   the   authors   did   not   seem   to   do  more  
than  rehash  the  dominant  narratives  about  discovery  and  experiment  in  physics.  At  
the   same   time,   there   were   also   some   issues   with   gendered   stereotyping   and  
Hollywood-­‐‑derived   masochism.   The   possibility   of   modeling   the   outcome   of   the  
discovery  of  the  petrons  through  a  macro-­‐‑micro  interaction  within  a  macro-­‐‑universe  
has  not  been  taken  advantage  of.  
Nevertheless,   there   are   fascinating   references   to   the   analog   and   digital  
technologies  that  were  available  at  the  time,  such  as  a  tape  recorder  that  can  encrypt  
messages,  and  an  early  version  of  a  search  engine  with  analog  features  reminiscent  
of  ARPANET.  Since  the  story  was  written  prior  to  revolution  in  personal  computing  
and  desktop   supercomputers,   the   reader   is   offered   a   glimpse   into   the  writing   and  
debugging   of   codes   that   required   hand-­‐‑coding   onto   punched   cards   before   being  
processed  through  the  computer;  computer  time  was  costly  since  it  had  to  be  shared  
among   multiple   users,   one   user   at   a   time.   But   as   the   next   chapter   would  
demonstrate,   the   employment   of   computational   simulation   to   aid   in   experimental  
heuristics  had  grown  in  parallel  with  the  development  of  big  science.    
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Within   this   story,   which   one   will   also   witness   in   Matter’s   End,   is   an  
underlying  gesture  to  phenomenology  (in  the  form  of  the  experiential  and  the  ontic),  
where   the  experimental  and   the   theoretical   come   together   to  produce  an  explosive  
outcome  through  the  deployment  of  the  rationally  inexplicable  (though  it  could  be  a  
mere   illusion  hiding   the   science   behind),   such   as   how  Daydala   and  her  men  were  
able  to  vanish  quickly  without  a  trace  despite  being  holed  up  in  a  cavernous  mine.  
As  we  will   see   later,  both  stories  can  be  read  as  parables  of  ontological  pursuits  of  
dimensions   not   unequivocally   constrained   by   direct   physics-­‐‑to-­‐‑mathematics  
correlations,   and   therefore,   need   only   adhere   to   the   constraints   imposed   by   the  
aesthetical  needs  of  the  narrative.    
At  the  same  time,  both  stories  draw  on  narratives  of  big  laboratory  sciences  
that   two  of   the   three  writers  were  acquainted  with   in   their  capacities  as  physicists.  
When  MMM  was  written,   the   social   studies   of   laboratory   sciences  were   only   just  
beginning,  and  most  discussions  of  the  latest  sciences  in  this  region  are  more  likely  
to  appear  in  hard  science  fiction  magazines  such  as  Analog.  Though  only  gestured  to  
in   the   stories   discussed   here   and   not   directly   explored   in   the   chapter,   the  
organization  of  big  science  had  implications  on  the  decisions  and  choices  pertaining  
to   experimental  directions   and  design.  Nevertheless,   it   is   not   only   the  politics   that  
fund   and   grow   the   science   that   are   at   play,   but   also   market   forces,   as   the  
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technologies   produced   are   seen   to   provide   potential   profitable   avenues,   as   was  
highlighted  in  MMM.  
Matter’s   End   is   the   more   straightforward   of   the   two   Benford   short   stories  
discussed   here   but   the   thinking   behind   the   sociology   of   physics,   and   of   scientific  
knowledge,   is   much   more   sophisticated   than   that   found   in   MMM,   possibly   the  
desired   effect   of   learning   from   science   fiction   history,   given   that   this   story   was  
written  almost   twenty-­‐‑years   later.  Benford   is   interested   in  providing   the  necessary  
scientific   edification   to   his   readers   so   that   they   could   appreciate   the   intellectual  
flavor   of   the   story:   the   implausibility   of   the   decay   of   a   proton   due   to   its   inherent  
stability  and  because  it  is  the  lightest  and  most  fundamental  of  the  baryonic  (three-­‐‑
quark)  particles.    
Moreover,  the  decay  of  the  proton  would  change  how  the  universe  is  viewed  
while  also  enabling  a  major  stride  in  envisioning  a  symmetrical  feature  beyond  the  
current   Standard  Model,   and   therefore,   a   new  model   that   is   either   derived   out   of  
Grand  Unified  Theories  or  something  completely  unprecedented.  There  are  intricate  
maneuverings  involving  chirality  (such  as  whether  the  field  occupied  by  the  particle  
has   left   or   right-­‐‑handed   spatial   directionality),   and   also   the   imbalance   between  
matter   and   anti-­‐‑matter   caused   by   the   explicit   breaking   of   the   baryonic   number  
symmetry,   therefore   ending   in   a   non-­‐‑zero   sum   total.   The   story   challenges   the  
assumption  of  logical  materiality  with  regard  to  the  unexpected  and  speculative  in  a  
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high-­‐‑energy  experiment,  as  was  presaged  by  his  mystical-­‐‑minded  Indian  physicists  
with  their  rudimentary  instruments  but  unbending  will.  
Probably,   as   a   way   of   upping   the   notch   on   political   intensity   that   could  
culminate   in   the   fulmination   against   scientists   in   the   finale,   Benford   includes   a  
background   of   third-­‐‑world   disenchantment,   and   hostility,   towards   first   world  
science,  that  is  equivalent  to  the  ecological  narrative  of  the  dumping  of  products  of  
questionable   provenance   onto   impoverished   and   less   stringently   regulated   low-­‐‑
income  countries.  Interestingly,  Benford  also  illustrates  how  interpretations  derived  
from   semi-­‐‑mystical   philosophies   can   have   actual   physical   ramifications,   a   ploy  
possibly   used   to   illustrate   an   aesthetical   counterpoint   to   a   materialistic   form   of  
scientism.  
Here,   the   laws   of   nature   became   the   point   of   contestation  when  what  was  
impossible   becomes   actualized.   Whatever   the   physical   constraints,   creative  
interpretations   would   be   able   to   extend   beyond   the   physically   observable   in   the  
same   manner   that   quantum   theoretical   interpretations   could   work   around   the  
emergent  qualities  of  matter  that  appeared  paradoxical.  There  was  even  a  reference  
to  the  “implicate  order”  first  advanced  by  Bohm  to  reference  the  deep-­‐‑seatedness  of  
the  unknowable.    
Benford’s  decision  to  set  the  fiction  of  the  discovery  of  the  proton’s  lifetime  in  
India,  a  country  with  a  complex  history  in  physical  and  mathematical  sciences  that  
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preceded  modern  science,  allowed  him  to  engage  in  some  metaphysical  speculation  
in   relation   to   the   physical.  Metaphysical   speculation   does   not   entail   changing   the  
ontology   of   physics,   but   rather,   changing   the   perception   of   its   laws,   particularly  
when  an  unexpected  discovery   is  made  regardless  of   the  degree  of  expectation.  As  
one  of  the  Indian  physicists  tried  to  point  out  to  Clay,  nature  responds  in  accordance  
to  our  choice  of  theoretical  and  experimental  approach.  However,  nature’s  response  
is   as   limited   as   the   approaches   used,   therefore   representing   science’s   imperfect  
access  to  the  ontological,  for  we  have  no  omniscient  relationship  to  the  deep-­‐‑time  of  
history.  
“You   are   an   experimentalist,   Dr.   Clay,   and   thus   –   if   you   will   forgive   my  
putting   it   so  –  addicted   to  cutting   the  salamander.”  Patil  made  a  steeple  of  
his  fingers,  sending  spindly  shadows  rippling  across  his  face.  “The  world  we  
study   is   conditioned  by  our  perception  of   it.   The   implied  order   if   partially  
from  our  own  design.”  
“Sure,  quantum  measurement,  uncertainty  principle,  all   that,”  Clay  had  sat  
through   all   the   usual   lectures   about   this   stuff   but   didn’t   feel   like   doing   so  
again.   Not   in   a   dusty   shed   with   his   stomach   growling   from   hunger.   He  
sipped  at  his  cup  of  weak  Darjeeling  and  yawned.  
“Difficulties  of  measurement  reflect  underlying  problems,”  Patil  said.  “Even  
the  Westerner  Plato  saw  that  we  perceive  only  imperfect  modes  of  the  true,  
deeper  world.”  
“What  deeper  world?”  Clay  sighed  despite  himself.  
“We  do  not  know.  We  cannot  know  (271).”  
What   is   not   revealed,   at   any   point   in   the   story,   was   how   speculation   is  
deployed   experimentally,  whether   by   the   following   of   a   hunch   or   hypothesis   that  
constituted  the  fictional  discovery  of  proton  decay.  Benford  did  not  bother  to  go  into  
the   details   of   what   steps   the   Indian   physicists   took   to   have   envisioned   the  
breakthrough,   because   the   very   fictionality   of   the   event   made   the   steps   opaque  
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guesswork  to  him;  even  if  he  were  able  to  imagine  them,  not  all  of  his  readers  would  
care   enough   to   know.   Nevertheless,   if   Benford   had   wanted,   it   would   have   been  
possible   for   him   to   draw   on   the   store   of   countless   other   experiments   of   a   similar  
nature  that  had  been  performed,  by  working  backwards  from  the  point  of  discovery.  
However,  it  would  be  hard  to  justify  the  literary  value  of  such  extended  descriptions  
of  the  experimental  method  unless  the  narrative  can  be  sublimated.  All  that  we  have,  
in  the  story’s  finale,  is  the  perceived  effects  of  the  breakthrough  by  reconfiguring  his  
characters   into   a   fugue-­‐‑like   state.      This   is   understandable,   for   it   is   difficult   for   a  
scientist   to   go   back   to   his/her   science   and   imagine   something   that   has   not   yet  
happened   in   actuality   because   that   act   of   imagining  would   reveal   a   bias   that   is   a  
result  of  his/her  web  of  belief,  such  as  I  have  discussed  in  chapter  five.      
If   a   collaboration,   and   tension,   between   theorists   and   experimentalists,   as  
well   as   their   divergent   attitudes,   were   demonstrated   in   Matter’s   End,   Mozart   on  
Morphine  is  a  semi-­‐‑autobiographical  but  fictional  account  of  a  mathematical  physicist  
that   alternates   between   works   of   intellectual   creation   and   the   ‘annoyances’   and  
obligations  brought  about  by  the  quotidian,  including  life-­‐‑altering  real-­‐‑world  events  
such  as  an  illness,  that  no  amount  of  rigorous  probing  at  ontology  could  change.  But  
the   story’s   core   thesis   is   that,   however   much   major   life   events   might   shift   the  
narrator’s  attitudes  and  priorities  work-­‐‑wise,  the  objective  realities  of  the  physics  are  
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immanent  and  will  continue  to  be  regardless  of  how  he  perceived  or  interpreted  the  
scientific  episteme.  
In  Wholeness   and   the   Implicate  Order,  written   in   the   1970s,  Bohm  argues   that  
the   prevailing   trend   of   modern   physics   is   against   thinking   in   terms   of   a   divided  
wholeness,   where   any   aspects   of   relativity   and   quantum   theory   that   suggest  
otherwise   are   de-­‐‑emphasized   and   shoved   into   the   dense   lines   of   mathematical  
calculus.  He   suggests   that   the   trend   is   towards  a   “traditional   atomistic  notion   that  
the  universe  is  constituted  of  elementary  particles  which  are  ‘basic  building  blocks’  
out  of  which  everything  else  is  made”  (14-­‐‑5).  This  is  not  an  inaccurate  account  of  the  
tension  between  a  particle  and  field-­‐‑centric  discourses  of  microphysical  events,  as  I  
have   pointed   out   in   chapters   two   and   three,   as   well   as   Appendix   A.   The   1970s  
constitute  the  height  of  particle-­‐‑centrism  because  of  the  kind  of  discoveries  emerging  
from  particle  physics,  many  of  which  were  highly  unexpected  and  have  changed  our  
fundamental   relationship   to  our  physical  universe.  Even   the   construction  of  Higgs  
profile  mediates  between  field-­‐‑like  and  particle-­‐‑like  dispositions.  
India,   epitomized   by   the   depiction   of   spiritual   scientists   and   smoldering  
representations  of  the  exotic  unknowability  of  pungent  smells,  organized  chaos,  and  
intoxicating   rhythms,   is  put   into   contestation  with   the   clean  and  definable   logic  of  
the   Western   physicists;   India   is   supposed   to   sit   at   the   binary   opposite   of   logical  
positivism  and  exaggerated  demonstration  of   theoretical  underdetermination.  With  
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that  in  mind,  Whitehead’s  concept  of  process  as  a  way  of  synthesizing  the  not  always  
harmonious   narratives   of   matter   across   the   supposedly   unconnected   physical  
properties  can  be  repatriated  for  understanding  how  process  operates  in  speculative  
experiment.   Moreover,   his   philosophy   of   organism   presents   the   organism   as   a  
community  of  “actual  things”  inseparable  from  process  that  is  repeated  from  phase  
to  phase  but  accumulates   information  with  each  new  phase  so   that  a   semblance  of  
epistemological   completeness,   and   therefore   ontological   attainment,   becomes  
apprehensible.   Probably,   fiction   as   process   philosophy   can   be   the   bridge   to   the  
seemingly   irreducibility   of   epistemological   dualism   that   attempts   to   reconcile   the  
theoretical  unknown  with  an  actual  world.  
In   addition,   Benford’s   representation   of   the   Indian   physicists’   view   of   the  
universe   in  Matter’s   End   bears   a   resemblance   to   Bohm’s   discussion   in   the   latter’s  
aforementioned   book.   Bohm   argues   that   in   the   East,   such   as   that   represented   in  
Benford’s  rendition  of  India,  exists  a  view  that  perceives  nature  as  representative  of  
wholeness   and   denies   fragmentation   and   division.   Bohm   further   adds   that   the  
measurable   is   less   fundamentally   important   than   the   immeasurable,   the   latter   of  
which   cannot   be   named   or   understood   through   conventional   reality.  What   that   is  
measurable   is   false   and   deceitful,   and   Benford   evokes   this   very   end   in   the   story  
when   he   conjures   a   semi-­‐‑apocalyptic   outcome   of   the   acts   of   measurement,   for   as  
Bohm  states  “the  entire  structure  and  order  of   forms,  proportions,  and   ‘ratios’   that  
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present  themselves  to  ordinary  perception  and  reason  are  regarded  as  a  sort  of  veil,  
covering   the   true   reality,   which   cannot   be   perceived   by   the   senses   and   of   which  
nothing  can  be  said  or  thought”  (23).  In  other  words,  one  can  observe  more  directly  
the   effects  of   a  physical   action  but  not   so  much   the   causality  of   that   action,  which  
would   also   allow   one   to   capture   the   ontological   quality   of   a   physical   event;  what  
could   be   measured   is   the   effect   of   the   cause.   Therefore,   one   is   dependent   on   an  
interpretive  theory  as  a  surrogate  to  observation  of  the  cause.  
The   fictive   what-­‐‑if   representation   of   the   proton   decay   in   Matter’s   End  
parallels  the  historical  narrative  in  the  scientific  tale  of  the  muon  and  beta  decay  in  
the  weak  interaction  of  the  Standard  Model,  even  if  the  reader  is  not  told  the  details  
and  has  to  take  the  author’s  word  that  a  discovery  has  definitely  been  made.  While  
the  experiments  are  solid  and   the  data   indisputable,   the  calibrations  and  selections  
that   led   to   the   collection   of   raw  data,   the   reconstruction   of   the   data,   the   statistical  
analysis,  and  the  final  interpretation,  all  operate  through  approximations  that  allow  
a  measure  of  constrained  speculation  to  seep  in.  However,  as  speculation  is  wedded  
into   decision-­‐‑making   paths,   they   are   not   consciously   viewed   as   separate   from   the  
acts   of   hypothesis-­‐‑forming   or   theory   construction.  Yet,   it   is   clear   that  many   of   the  
metaphysical  postulations  that  Benford  engages  in  over  the  course  of  the  story  are  a  
result  of  his  indirect  deployment  of  speculation  to  discuss  hidden  causalities.    
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The   question   of   whether   there   is   uniqueness   to   the   scientific   method   in  
relation   to   scientific  observation   comes  up   in  Mozart   on  Morphine,   a  meta-­‐‑narrative  
that  deconstructs   the   cognitive  processes  of   a   single  physicist   even  as  Matter’s  End  
puts  an  individual  physicist  in  relation  to  other  physicists  of  very  different  cultural  
backgrounds   despite   their   sharing   of   an   unassailable   faith   in   the   common  
vocabulary  of   the   scientific  method:  measurement,   observation,   and   interpretation.  
But   in   both   stories,   Benford   is   bent   on   showing,   with   as  much   authenticity   as   he  
could  muster,  how  the  scientists  (who  are  the  physicists  in  this  case),  would  behave  
when  left  to  deal  with  the  professional  world  they  inhabit,  something  which  Benford  
claims   that   certain   science   fiction   novels   featuring   scientists   as   protagonists   fail   to  
do,  such  as  Le  Guin’s  The  Dispossessed  (Is  there  a  Technological  Fix  89).  But  there  is  no  
fixed   natural   law   governing   how   scientists   behave   other   than   by   force   of   habit,  
epistemic   socialization,  and   their   relationship   to   the  environment   they  navigate,   as  
my  second  chapter  has  indicated.    
Mozart   on   Morphine   highlights   a   multi-­‐‑layered   act   of   measurement:   the  
measured  dosage  of  morphine  delivered  to  the  narrator  in  his  sick  bed,  the  measured  
rhythms   of   the   classical   symphonies   he   listened   to,   and   the   precise   rendering   of  
mathematics  for  explicating  the  problem  of  quantum  theories  extending  beyond  the  
micro  world  to  one  that  transcends  the  unrelenting  routine  of  our  macro-­‐‑worlds.  For  
the  narrator,   there   are  depths  of   chaos   and   irreducibility   in   that  grey  area,  not  yet  
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totally   embraced   by   either   classical   or   quantum   physics,   so   that   the   point   of  
irreducibility   can  mean   a   difference   between   corporeal   life   and   death.   That   point  
could  be  none  other  than  an  act  of  everyday  violence  that  is  nevertheless  too  difficult  
to  be  mathematized  
I   saw  the   teenagers  scattering  and   the  scrawny  man   in  his   twenties  poking  
the  small  silvery  gun  at  them,  yelling  something  I  couldn’t  quite  make  out.  I  
assumed   as   an   automatic   axiom   that   the   gun   was   loaded   with   blanks;  
certainly   it  wasn’t   very   loud...The  man   started   swearing   at   a   kid   near  me,  
who   was   moving   to   my   right.   I   was   still   doggedly   running   so   when   the  
second  shot  came  I  was  just  behind  the  kid  and  the  found  went  tssiiip!  by  my  
head.  (10)  
The  narrator  was  not  shot  but  the  rush  from  the  event  activated  his  neuronal  
circuits  and  unblocked  the  pathway  to  inspiration  for  untangling  the  tangled  
equations  he  had  been  working  through,  for  as  he  continued  
I  had  been  pursuing  a  model  for  the  universe  which  did  not  begin  with  any  
assumption  about   its  dimensionality.  We  are  used   to  our  cozy   three  spatial  
directions  plus  ever-­‐‑flowing  time  –  four  dimensions  in  all.  When  God  made  
everything,  was   this   choice   forced?  Could   the  deep   laws   governing  matter  
work  well  in,  say,  six  dimensions?  Twenty-­‐‑six?  (11)  
The  sense  conveyed   is   that   the  depths  of  our  unknowability   is  so  great   that  
other   forms  of   ignorance   that  are  merely  expedient   for  maintaining  social   relations  
are  too  petty  in  the  grander  scheme  of  things,  yet  so  absolutely  necessary  for  social  
cohesion.   At   the   same   time,   what  Whitehead   argues   as   elements   that   can   extend  
beyond   the   body,   in   this   case   the   body   of   the   narrator,   are   the   straight   lines   and  
planes,   which,   when   read   metaphorically,   represent   the   physical   scientist’s  
conditioned   response   to   the  world.  According   to  Whitehead,   there   is   a  problem   in  
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identifying  the  distinction  between  a  ‘presented  locus’  that  is  a  geometrical  relation  
of   the   body   that   reacts   to   certain   presentational   immediacy   relating   to   antecedent  
occurrences  external  to  the  body  that  are  then  interpreted  for  relevance  to  the  main  
body;   and   the   ‘union   of   becoming’   that   is   dependent   on   actual   entities   and   their  
qualities,   locus,  and  duration   in  relation  to  each  other.  These  are  what   the  narrator  
strained  against  in  his  projection  of  the  implicit  order  between  the  events  of  his  trip  
to   Alabama   to   visit   his   folks,   the   car   accident,   his   hospitalization   because   of   an  
appendicitis,  and  his  calculations  that  hinted  on  a  theoretical  merging  between  the  as  
yet  disjunctive  world  of  gravity  and  the  other  forces  of  nature,  in  preparation  for  the  
emergence  of  quantum  gravity.  
Benford’s   deliberate   use   of   stream   of   consciousness,   which   grips   at   each  
temporal   frame   as   they   pass   without   imposing   a   rigid   categorization   of   each  
moment,   showcases   the   tension  between   the   striving   for  an  elegant  prescription  of  
the   physical   world   and   the   inevitable   chaos   that   reigns   in   the   everyday   of   a  
physicist’s  life.  Then,  there  are  the  direct  or  indirect  consequences  on  the  narrator’s  
attitude   and   sense-­‐‑perception   regarding   the   events   of   his   life   in   relation   to   the  
calculations  he  was  trying  to  solve,  and  how  those  events  had,  or  not,  shaped  how  he  
thought   about   his   science.   The   reader   is   only   belatedly   informed   that   the   story  
he/she   is   reading   is   a   speech   at   a   Nobel   Prize   award   ceremony.   The   underlying  
significance  of  the  narrator’s  explication  is  revealed  in  the  finale,  as  he  speculates  on  
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the  connection  between  mind  and  matter,  as  well  as  that  of  quantum  choices,  none  of  
which   are   connections   that   can   be   broached  with   certainty.      But   the   source   of   his  
obsession   that   is  also  a   topic   receiving  a   revival  of   interest  among  metaphysicians,  
philosophers  of  physics,  and  theoretical  physicists  currently,   is  temporality  and  the  
structures   of   time,   for   this   is   where   philosophical   and   theoretical   physical  
speculations   could   range  most   freely  beyond   the   limits   of   experimentally   imposed  
constraints  
One  of   the  deeper   implications   is   that   there   is  another  kind  of   time.   In   that  
system,   our   truncated   space-­‐‑time   forms   a   surface   in   the   more   general,  
superstring  space-­‐‑time.  To   that  world,  everything  we  perceive  would  seem  
like  the  surface  of  a  soap  bubble,  wobbling  in  air.  The  bubble  has  no  edge,  no  
boundary  –  and  so  we  will  never,   in   that  higher  coordinate  system,  plunge  
through   an   abrupt   juncture.   This   implies   that   time,   in   the   larger   sense,   is  
never-­‐‑ending.  Of  course  it  is  not  our  time,  but  rather,  the  duration  defined  in  
higher   spaces.   The   existence   of   this   generalized   time   is   perhaps   the   most  
startling  deduction  of  mathematics.  But  what  does  this  mean?  We  search  for  
a   completely   unified   theory,   curling   the   fragmented   forces   of   our   hobbled  
universe  into  the  Ur-­‐‑Force.  Still,  even  that  is  just  a  set  of  rules  and  equations.  
(19)  
The   quotation   above   relates   to   a   long-­‐‑standing   interest   in   the   connection   between  
string   theory   and   particle   physics,   with   gravity   and   the   dimensions   of   time   as  
mediators.   With   the   confirmation   of   the   Higgs   boson,   interest   in   revisiting   the  
potential   of   string   theory   as   a   logical   connection   to   supersymmetry,   which   is  
considered  as  the  most  promising  among  the  exotic  candidates  for  extending  beyond  
the   Standard  Model,   has   been   renewed   as   described   in   the   penultimate   section   of  
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chapter  5  (in  5.2).  Despite  its  fictional  quality,  one  could  read  this  story  as  scientific  
auto-­‐‑ethnography.  
Nevertheless,  as  the  narrator  (and  Benford)  both  admit,  the  story  does  not  fall  
into   the   usual   category   of   an   oral   history   produced   by   a   scientist   in   response   to  
questions   about   his/her   scientific   achievements   and   serendipitous   acts   that  
culminated   in   the  breakthrough   in  his/her  work.  However,   the   story  demonstrates  
how  remarkably  difficult   it   is   to  define  matter  as   it  performs   in  accordance   to,  and  
beyond,   the  multitudes   of  physical   laws   that   are  meant   to   constrain   the   actions   of  
matter,  but  which,  in  actuality,  fail  to  control  for  non-­‐‑causal  metaphysical  events.  
Further,   the   mind-­‐‑matter   interaction   in   the   quantum   space   demarcated   by  
Quarantine   that   relates   molecular   neuroscience   with   acts   of   collapsing   quantum  
states   is   also   taken   up   by   Mozart   on   Morphine   when   the   latter   addresses   the  
connection   of   fundamental   essences   to   humanity,   not   unlike   Lightman’s  Einstein’s  
Dreams  discussed   in   the  second  chapter.  That  essence  cannot  be   readily  explicated;  
all   attempts   at   describing   the   essences   tend   to   be   impoverished   and   require  
substitutions   by   other   substantial   signifiers.   The   aforementioned  problem  parallels  
the   difficulties   of   envisioning   new   physics  materially  when   one   is   uncertain   as   to  
whether   the   current   analyses   are  unequivocally   correct,   or   if   a  major   revision   of   a  
paradigm  that  reconsiders  cases  of  discoveries  going  back  more  than  five  decades  is  
required  in  order  for  a  new,  yet  unforeseen,  model,  to  be  reconstructed.  
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6.3 The Morality of the Scientific Method: Fictive Realities 
There  are  three  common  scientific  features,  or  values,  embodied  in  the  three  
stories.   The   first   has   to   do   with  metaphysical   morality,   or   the   abstract   conditions  
where  ethical  questions  arise:  do  we  try  to  save  the  world,  as  we  know  it,  or  allow  a  
domino   chain   of   events   that   can   lead   to   an   unpredictable   outcome   just   for   the  
purpose  of  advancing  science.  In  MMM,  Leigh  had  to  choose  between  making  sure  
that   the   mine   where   the   scientific   operations   and   mushroom   farming   took   place  
would  not  explode  and  kill  everyone  in  it;  or  recovering  all  of  the  petrons,  including  
the  ones  that  Daydala  had  filched  from  the  leaking  vat,  because  of  the  potential  for  
greater   catastrophe   should   the   petrons   be   inappropriately   let   loose.   This   was   the  
same  ethical  question  that  confronted  the  narrator  in  Mozart  on  Morphine,  though  at  a  
more   conceptual   than   corporeal   level   (despite   his   having   been   very   ill),   on   the  
question  of  human  experience  in  relation  to  the  science  and  the  effects  of  amplifying  
certain  physical  choices  or  experiences.    
In  Matter’s  End,   one   is  given  a   stark  and   literal   representation  of  quantum  
observation  that  riffs  off  the  Schrödinger  cat  and  wave-­‐‑particle  duality  paradox10  of  
                                                                                                             
10  For  the  uninitiated,   the  Schrödinger  cat  story  was  used  as  an  example  by  Schrödinger   in  one  of  his  
papers,   Die   gegenwärtige   Situation   in   der   Quantenmechanik   (The   Present   Situation   of   Quantum  
Mechanics),   where   he   fretted   over   the   ontological   incompleteness   of   the   quantum   mechanics   in   its  
ability   to   describe   but   not   to   predict.   In   this   original   thought   experiment,   which   is   about   the  
superposition  of  states  (the  state  of  the  cat  being  alive  or  the  cat  being  dead),  a  cat  is  secured  in  a  sealed  
steel   chamber   (supposedly  with  a  device   that  would  still  bring  air   to   the  cat),   together  with  a  Geiger  
counter  that  contains  bits  of  radioactive  substance.  Should  the  atom  decay,  the  cat  would  then  be  dead  
after  about  an  hour.  However,  there  is  no  way  in  which  the  observer  would  know  unless  he/she  is  able  
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probabilities  and  knowability.  By  announcing  the  confirmation  of  the  rate  of  proton  
decay,  Clay  and  the  team  in  Bombay  made  the  entire  world  complicit   in  their  own  
unraveling,  now  that  the  latter  were  made  conscious  of  the  instability  of  matter.  
Mrs  Buli  stretched  lazily,  as  though  relaxing  into  the  clasp  of  the  moist  night.  
“So  we  have  proven  the  passing  nature  of  matter.  What  fresh  forces  does  that  
bring  into  play?”  
“Huh!”  Clay  spat  back  angrily,  “Look  here,  we  just  sent  word  out,  reported  
the  result.  How  –“  
“So   that   by   now   millions,   perhaps   billions   of   people   know   that   the   very  
stones  that  support  them  must  pass.”  
“So  what?   Just  some  theoretical  point  about  subnuclear  physics,  how’s   that  
going  to  –  “  
Who   is   to   say?  What   avatar?   The   point   is   that   we   were   believed.   Certain  
knowledge,  universally  correlated,  surely  has  some  impact  –“    (Matter’s  End  
286)  
The   concern   for   the   safety   of   the   world   and   the   danger   that   scientific  
experimentations   could   unleash   had   been   part   of   the   public   rhetoric   in   the   days  
leading  right  to  the  re-­‐‑starting-­‐‑up  of  the  Large  Hadron  Collider  (LHC)  in  2010  after  
                                                                                                             
  
to  unseal   the  chamber  and   look   inside.  Until   then,   the  smeared  condition  of   the  cat   is   that   it   is  either  
dead  or  alive   (though  not  both),   ‘smeared’  out   in  equal  possibility.  The  smeared,  as   translated   in   the  
paper,  is  “…part  of  the  inner  law  of  the  concept  that  it  should  change  in  a  given  manner,  that  is,  if  left  to  
itself  in  a  given  initial  state,  that  it  should  continuously  run  through  a  given  sequence  of  states,  each  one  
of  which  it  reaches  at  a  fully  determined  time.  That  is  its  nature,  that  is  the  hypothesis,  which,  as  I  said  
above,  one  builds  on  a  foundation  of  intuitive  imagination  (152).”  One  can  find  the  translation  of  this  
paper  in  part  1.11  of  Quantum  Theory  and  Measurement  edited  by  John  Archibald  Wheeler  and  Wojciech  
Hubert  Zurek.  Princeton,  NJ:  Princeton  University  Press,  1983.    The  wave-­‐‑particle  duality  concept  also  
draws  on  the  same  concept  as  that  found  in  the  Schrödinger  cat  paradox,  except  that  the  indeterminism  
concerns  how  the  performance  of  observation  at  a  quantum  or  classical  level  could  lead  one  to  observe  
matter  as  behaving  as  particles  or  waves.  There  are  both  dominant  and  alternative  quantum  theoretical  
interpretations  of  this  problem  that  I  will  not  get  into  here.  
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its  unceremonious   shutting  down   in  2008  due   to   a  problem  with   some  of   its  giant  
magnets.  Prominent  biochemist  Otto  Rössler   continues   to   insist  on   the  danger   that  
the  LHC  experiment  poses  to  the  rest  of  the  world.11    
Then,  there  is  the  second  feature  connected  to  the  first,  in  that  the  scientific  
observations   through   the   performance   of   experimentation   and   calculations   could  
lead   to   the   gradual   revealing,   in   tandem  with   the   unraveling,   of   the   properties   of  
entities   being   analyzed.   In   MMM,   scientific   rivalry   reveals   the   problems   of  
precedence   and   ownership,   and   the   different   point   of   views   and   knowledge   that  
rival  groups  can  have  of  the  same  entity,  as  laid  out  here  with  pun  intended.  
“Petrons!”   she   exclaimed.   “I   presume   you   mean   the   charge.   If   they   must  
have   a   nickname,   I   prefer   to   use   dayons.   I   predicted   them   years   ago.  
Petronelli  only  found  them.”  
Leigh   almost   felt   like   laughing.   Even   at   this   charged   moment   the   injured  
vanity  of  a  scientist  was  fighting  for  recognition.  
“I  really  don’t  care  what  you  call  them  –  dayons,  petrons,  they  are  still  stolen  
property.   I’m   afraid   you   have   no   right   to   them.”   Still   holding   the   gun   on  
Daydala,  he  moved  to  the  petron  vat  and  with  one  hand  began  to  uncouple  it  
from  the  machine.  
…  
“Nonsense,  Daydala.  I  know  you  can’t  blow  the  mine  up.  Petronelli  says  that  
the   boiler   might   make   a   minor   explosion   but   it   would   take   a   while   to  
develop.”  
Daydala   laughed   scornfully   “Petronelli   has   not   the   knowledge   I   have.   He  
doesn’t   know   the   parameters.   Put   your   gun   down   or   I   shall   throw   the  
switch.”  (Minotaur  in  a  Mushroom  Maze:  Conclusion  91-­‐‑92)  
                                                                                                             
11   See   an   example   of   one   of   Rössler’s   statements   on   the   danger   posed   by   the   LHC   at   the   Lifeboat  
Foundation  website,  https://lifeboat.com/blog/2012/03/cern-­‐‑cannot-­‐‑continue-­‐‑the-­‐‑lhc-­‐‑experiment.  
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In  Matter’s  End,  the  usual  work  of  turning  scientific  observation  into  a  
reportable  event  with  solid  consistency  and  logic  
Consideration  of  each  candidate  event,  his  checks  and  counterchecks,  vertex  
corrections,  digital   array   flaws,  mean   free  paths,   ionization   rates,   the  artful  
programming  that  deflected  the  myriad  possible  sources  of  error.  He  could  
feel   tension   rising   in   the   room,  as  he   cast   the  events  on   the   inch-­‐‑thick  wall  
screen,  calling  them  forth  from  the  files  in  his  cubes.  Some  he  threw  into  3-­‐‑D,  
to   show  the   full  path   through   the  cage  of   iron   that  had  captured   the  death  
rattle  of   infinity…And  at   the  end,  all   cases   reviewed,  he  said  quietly,  “You  
have  found  it.  The  proton  lifetime  is  very  nearly  1034  years.”  (274)  
does  not  necessarily  work  with  the  geometrical  properties  we  are  used  to  working,  
though  it  could  lead  us  to  question  our  ‘normal’  perception  of  geometry  as  solid  and  
non-­‐‑transient.  
Smooth   glistening   forms   began   to   emerge   from   the   rough,   coarse   earth.  
Above  the  riotous,  heaving  land  the  moon  was  now  a  brassy  cube.  Across  its  
face   played   enormous   black   cracks   like   mad   lightning…Quietly   the   land  
began   to   rain   upward.   Globs   dripped   toward   the   pewter,   filmy   continent  
swarming   freshly   above.   Eons   measured   out   the   evaporation   of   ancient  
sluggish  seas.  (288)  
The   description   above   is   reminiscent   of   the   amalgamation   between  
consciousness,   the  mind,   and  quantum  physics   that  we  have  witnessed   in   chapter  
three  in  Egan’s  Quarantine.  While  Mozart  on  Morphine  takes  a  more  sober  approach,  
the  description  by  the  narrator  of  his  relationship  to  the  world  that  is  shaped  by  his  
dependence  on  what  the  mathematical  equations  tell  him  merely  made  him  acutely  
aware  of  the  depth  of  his  ignorance  
Still,  there  emerges  now  evidence  of  mental  processes  at  work  on  many  level  
of  physical  reality.  We  may  be  part  of  some  larger  act.  For  example,  perhaps  
we  contribute  remotely  to  the  universe’s  thinking  about  itself…  We  probably  
cannot  know  this  with  anything  approaching  scientific  certainty  –  ever.  The  
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recent  work  of  myself  and  others  suggests,  though,  that  higher  entities  affect  
our   times   in   distant   but   profound   fashion…The   equations   can   only   hint,  
imply,  describe.  They  cannot  tell  us  why.  (22)  
This   brings   us   to   the   third   scientific   feature,  which   is   the   oriental  Other   as  
antipodal   to  western   scientism   in   its   emphasis   on  material   rationality.   In  MMM,   a  
conspiracy  subplot  involving  a  pantheist/deistic  religion  and  goddess  worship  of  the  
oriental   other   is   constructed   to   heighten   the   tension   of   the   unknowable,   but  
Benford’s   fiction   discussed   here   also   deploys   the   trope   of   the   exotic   oriental   to  
amplify   the   scientific   speculation   into   exotic   forms   of   matter   that   is   core   to   the  
narratives   while   engaging   with   the   politics   of   scientific   knowledge   production  
within   the   context   of   the   Third   World.   The   binary   representation   of   scientific  
knowledge  in  Western  and  Eastern  mode  of  thought  within  these  stories  are  marked  
by  an  American  exceptionalism  of  the  1970s  and  mid-­‐‑1990s  that  turned  the  promise  
of   international   scientific   collaboration   into   an   international   race   for   scientific  
ascendancy  due  to  the  Cold  War,  and  the  unending  rhetoric  concerning  the  threat  of  
the  non-­‐‑allied  Other.    
At   the   same   time,   there   was   a   technological   optimism,   in   the   sense   of   the  
enormous   scientific   complexes   from   space   to   nuclear   programs,   lasting   until   the  
early   1990s   that  marked   the   official   end  of   the  Cold  War   (though   Jameson,  whose  
remarks   I   am   appropriating   here,   has   a   different   take   on   technological   optimism  
from  myself.  He  considers  technological  development  primarily  from  the  context  of  
industrialism)  that  was  “brutally  effaced  by  the  neo-­‐‑conservatism  revolution  and  its  
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accompanying  effects  –  the  debt,  population  explosion,  the  failure  of  modernization  
–  in  the  Third  and  later  in  the  Second  Worlds”  (Jameson  153).  The  rise  of  reactionary  
neo-­‐‑conservatism   that   has   been   displaced   from   the   US   onto   the   foreign   Other   is  
explicitly   detailed   in  Matter’s   End.   In  Matter’s   End,   the   Indians  wreaked   havoc   by  
breaching   an   (un)secured   scientific   facility   (that   was   hosting   a   US   citizen)   and  
planned   an   insurrection   against   what   they   perceived   as   a   desecration   of   sacred  
beliefs.  
This  is  where  Whiteheadian  process  philosophy  becomes  useful  in  helping  us  
understand  the  modes  of  scientific  thoughts  underlying  the  narrative  process,  even  if  
I  am  modifying  his  original  reading  slightly  to  suit  the  current  object  of  examination.  
According   to   Whitehead,   there   are   two   kinds   of   processes:   macroscopic   and  
microscopic.  The  macrosopic  process  represents  a  transition  from  actualization  to  the  
process   of   actualizing   (“actuality   in   attainment”)   while   the   microscopic   process  
involves   the   conversion   of   conditions  postulated   as   real   into  determinate   actuality  
(214).   In   the   two  sentences,  Whitehead   reconstitutes   the  meaning  of   the   real   in   the  
same   way   that   the   real   of   the   universe   is   transformed   (though   not   definitely  
actualized);   the   theoretical   methodology   resonates   with   the   sequences   of   events  
culminating  into  acts  of  discovery  and  validation  in  Mozart  on  Morphine  and  Matter’s  
End.   In   the   former   short   story,   the   formal   actualization   is   kept   subdued  while   the  
narrator   gives   free   reign   to   speculating   about   the   ‘other’   hidden   potential   that   his  
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theory  might   not   have   predicted   because   his   theoretical  model   could   only   extend  
from  the  observable,  even  as  he  realized  that  most  of  the  processes  of  nature  are  non-­‐‑
local  to  our  dimension,  and  therefore,  hidden.    
The   three   stories   converge   onto   a   theme   of   discovery   and   a   feeling   for  
discovery,  where  the  subject-­‐‑superject12  underpins  the  foundation  of  a  responsibility  
that   one   feels   in   one’s   relationship   to   knowledge,   and   the   knowledge   process  
originates  a  set  of  feelings  that  strives  for  the  ultimate  act  of  creation  that  is  always  
negotiating   between   the   actual   and   the   ideal.   With   the   discords   involved   in   the  
narrative  of  discovery  in  particle  physics,  epistemic  unity  is  broken  once  a  seemingly  
marginal  problem,  or  a  ‘hidden  variable’,  comes  out  of  the  woodwork  and  messes  up  
an  otherwise  ‘neat’  interpretation  of  an  observation.    
The   concrescence,   which   is   the   process   of   prehension   for   achieving  
ontological   cohesion,   attempts   at   integrating   between   multitudinous   entities   that  
might   have   values   in   conflict   with   one   another   in   order   to   achieve   momentary  
ontological  unity.  Concrescence  governs  the  final  pronouncement  of  a  discovery  that  
contests   a   linear   methodological   approach:   one   that   excludes   the   potential   for  
speculation.   In   this   case,   knowledge   could   serve   a   definite   goal   of   resolving  
particular   issues,   however   indisputable   and   continuous   the   chain   of   custody   of  
                                                                                                             
12  A  superject  represents  Whitehead’s  attempt  at  countering  the  limitations  of  a  subject  that  stops  short  
of  the  creative.  
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scientific  evidence,  if  only  because  disruptions  that  do  not  have  to  answer  for  macro-­‐‑
state  consequences  can  be  remaindered  out.    
In  the  case  of  Mozart  on  Morphine,  Benford  tries  to  show  that  there  is  a  macro-­‐‑
level  consequence  if  a  particular  theory  has  been  proven  true,  and  that  consequence  
stems   from   the   change   in  one’s  primary   feeling,   or  physical   feeling,   after   realizing  
that  the  familiar  universe  one  occupies  is  about  to  change.  As  Whitehead  puts  it,    
A  simple  physical   feeling   is  an  act  of   causation.  The  actual  entity,  which   is  
the   initial   datum   is   the   ‘cause,’   the   simple   feeling   is   the   ‘effect,’   and   the  
subject   entertaining   the   simple   physical   feeling   is   the   actual   entity  
‘conditioned’  by  the  effect.  This  ‘conditioned’  actual  entity  will  also  be  called  
the   ‘effect.’  All   complex  causal  action  can  be   reduced   to  a   complex  of   such  
primary   components.  Therefore   simple  physical   feelings  will   also  be   called  
‘causal’  feelings.  (326)  
Even   if   the   physicality   of   that   feeling   is   exaggerated   in   the   story,   it   enables   the  
presentation  of  an  important  point  made  in  Process  and  Reality,  which  is  his  attempt  
at   foregrounding   the   conceptual   development   of   the   superject   and   concrescence,  
whereby  the  presence  of  an  entity,  or  the  employment  of  a  particular  action  or  sets  of  
feelings,  can  stimulate  the  generation  of  more  entities  (that  could  be  either  actualized  
or  merely  idealized).    
The  extension,  or  projection,  into  another  feeling  or  set  of  interactions  is  what  
experimentation   entails.   In   other   words,   the   interpretation   of   the   observables   (or  
absences/non-­‐‑observables)   in   the   experiment   constitutes   following   a   direction  
because   a   specific   interpretation   of   a   high-­‐‑energy   event   focuses   the  
observer/experimenter’s   attention   inward   on   a   theory   with   sufficient   point   of  
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preoccupation   to   the   exclusion   of   other   consideration.   But,   should   such   acts   of  
concrescence  become  discrete  and  almost-­‐‑independent  propositions  by  disinterested  
parties  involved  in  the  act  of  crosschecking,  with  each  party  independently  forming  
their   own   hypotheses   of   the   said   proposition.   The   nexus   of   these   acts   would   be  
cumulative  for  each  individual  concrescence  to  converge  into  a  point  of  heightened  
predictive  capability.  
In  all  the  three  stories,  acts  of  observation  and  interpretation  of  the  measured  
effects  raise  abstract  but  ethical  questions  that  are  implicitly  connected  to  our  macro-­‐‑
world   but   are   still   speculative,   with   too   many   moving-­‐‑parts   in   the   potential  
resolution   for   an   ultimate   conclusion.   Moreover,   the   very   abstract   quality   of   the  
ethical  questions  lead  to  responses  that  are  insufficiently  explicit  for  producing  any  
definite   resolution   as   that  would   require   one   to   have  more   access   to   the   ontology  
that   sets   off   the   questions   than   one   already   has.   At   the   same   time,   through   the  
marshalling   of   the   fictional   form,   the   authors   are   able   to  write   a   poetic   history   of  
science  that  allegorizes  the  problem  of  enacting  intellectual  histories  when  much  of  
what   is   understood   are   extrapolated   from   facts   constituted   of   the   best   logical  
options.  In  other  words,  one  does  not  always  know  which  layer  of  the  multifaceted  




The  physics  portrayed   in   each  of   the   story   is   a  demonstration  of   a   crisis   in  
particle  physics   that  had  been  ongoing  even   to   this  day,  with  no   final  word   in   the  
horizon.   Hard   science   fiction   is   suited   for   such   explorations   of   crises   and   for  
throwing   together   all   the   vexing   paradoxes   to   see   whether   one   might   create   the  
ultimate   ‘grand’   paradox   that   unveils   the   rupture   in   that   fabric   of   cosmological  
ontology,  or  if  the  paradoxes  will  smooth  out  the  way  wrinkles  on  fabric  do.    
At  the  end  of  the  day,  science  fiction  is  located  within  a  ‘classical’  dimension  
of  actions,  replete  with  its  own  language  codes,  but  well  poised  for  elucidating  types  
of   knowledge   located   in  dimensions   alternate   to   our   physical   ontology.   Therefore,  
knowledge   aimed   at   exploring   a   dimension   beyond   the   scope   of   our   linguistic  
capability  would  require  the  localization  of  that  knowledge  within  a  comprehensible  
rubric.  In  the  process,  areas  of  knowledge  that  cannot  be  as  easily  localized  takes  on  
a  speculative  flavor.  
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Information  Science  must  refer  to  the  actual  domain  of  code,  even  if  the  theory  could  generate  
completely  different  models  (and  should).  And  despite  the  will  and  belief  of  the  code’s  
developers,  decodings  are  just  as  possible  as  they  are  rare.  (Friedrich  A.  Kittler  in  
Protected  Mode)  
7. Simulating Nature: Monte Carlo as Speculative 
Methodology of Approximating the Ontology of 
Particle Physics 
Had  you  been  a   fan  of   the  CSI   franchise,  or  watched  a  number  of   episodes  
from  this,  or  similar  crime-­‐‑busting  TV  shows,  you  soon  find  that  in  many  cases,  we  
start  with  an  unknown  subject  (the  unsub)  who  had  perpetrated  the  crime.  In  some  
cases,  the  identity  of  the  victim  might  not  even  be  known.  You  will  then  have  teams  
of   forensic   specialists,   from   crime-­‐‑scene   investigators   to   a   forensic   pathologist,  
combing   through   physical   evidence   and   the   body,   to   piece   together   the   cause   of  
death,   to   locate   the   primary   crime   scene,   and   uncover   the  motive   for   the  murder  
(often,  the  lack  of  a  motive  can  just  be  as  informative).    Without  any  proper  lead,  or  
idea  if  the  evidence  is  intact,  what  one  gets  are  almost  random  pieces  of  a  puzzle  that  
are  part  of  a  crime  or  crime  scene.  
The  detectives,  at  their  end,  would  be  trying  to  obtain  as  much  paper  trail  as  
possible,  on  both  the  victim  and  unsub.  In  some  of  the  more  exciting  episodes,  one  
could  have   so   little   evidence   to  piece   together,   including   the   occasional   lack   of   an  
actual   body   (even   if   the   identity   of   a   possible   victim,   and   perpetrator,   might   be  
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known),   or   the   body   was   so   badly   decomposed,   that   the   forensics   team   and  
detective(s)   had   to   rely   on   computer   simulation   to   piece   together   the   last   few  
moments,   as   well   as   identity,   of   the   victim.   The   acts   of   evidence   gathering,  
simulation   (whether   through   manual   crime   scene   reconstructions   or   computer  
generation),   and   organization   of   collected   evidence   to   create   a   composite   profile,  
converge  into  a  heuristic  method  of  testing,  analysis,  and  interpretation.    
The   scenario   depicted   above   that   is   most   analogous   to   the   Monte   Carlo  
simulation   in   high-­‐‑energy   physics   are   the   acts   of   simulation,   specifically,   the  
simulations   that   involved   the   crunching   or   processing   of   data   to   predict   the  
likelihood  of  the  how  and  why  of  an  event  occurring  (which  would  be  the  crimes  in  
the  aforementioned  scenario).  Likewise,  in  high-­‐‑energy  particle  physics,  important  to  
any  analysis  of  data  is  an  understanding  of  the  different  physics  processes  in  relation  
to   their   detectors,   such   as   at   the   Large  Hadron  Collider   (LHC),  which   could   only  
provide  partial   information.  This   is  where   the  Monte  Carlo  simulations  come   in   to  
help  fill  in  the  blanks.    However,  the  Monte  Carlo  as  depicted  in  high-­‐‑energy  physics  
is  a  strange  beast,  for  in  that  field,  the  implementation  of  the  Monte  Carlo  is  more  an  
accident   of   history   than   an   intentional   progression.   It   is   also   what   makes   its  
operation   a   little  different   from  what  might   have  been  understood   in   terms  of   the  
Monte  Carlo’s  development  within  war  operations  research  and  nuclear  physics.  
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In   this   chapter,   I   will   discuss   how   the   Monte   Carlo   acts   as   a  
phenomenological   bridge   in   the  divide   between   theory   and   experiment   in   particle  
physics,  as   illustrated  by  macro  level  measurements  of  entities  that  go  by  quantum  
rules.  Monte  Carlo  mediates  the  more  speculative  aspects  of  the  new  propositions  in  
theory  with  the  ultimate  act  of  confirmation  through  experiments  that  had  also  been  
originally   speculative.   The   development   of   the   philosophy   of   Monte   Carlo  
computation  has   as  much   clarifying   effect   on   the   scientific  method  of   the  physical  
sciences   as   it   would   have,   surprisingly,   in   other   theoretical   developments   in  
humanistic  studies,  such  as  in  media  theory,  critical  code  theory,  and  the  technology  
of  film.  Further,  I  will  demonstrate  Monte  Carlo’s  synthetic  position  within  physics  
and  computing  by  locating  it  within  cybernetic  theory;  it  so  happens  that  one  of  the  
pioneers   of   the   Monte   Carlo   method,   John   von   Neumann,   was   also   a   pioneer   of  
cybernetics.   That   said,   I   attempt   to   go   beyond  Galison’s   positioning   of   the  Monte  
Carlo  method  as  a  philosophy  of  pseudo-­‐‑random  generation,  which   though  an  apt  
description  of  the  method,  is  a  too  limited  reading  as  it  does  not  sufficiently  account  
for   information   creation,   recirculation,   and   epistemic   discords   that   can   arise  when  
speculating  from  the  what-­‐‑might-­‐‑be  within  statistical  data  analyses.1  
The  Monte  Carlo  method   evaluates  what  would   have   been   rather   complex  
multiple   integration   practices   in   calculus   by   reducing   (or   ‘normalizing’)   the  
                                                                                                             
1  See  Peter  Galison’s  “Random  Philosophy”  in  The  Reality  of  the  Unobservable.  
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computation   to   probability   density   distributions.   In   other  words,   the  Monte  Carlo  
method   “provides   a   method   of   simulating   experiments   and   creating   models   of  
experimental   data.   With   a   Monte   Carlo   calculation,   we   can   test   the   statistical  
significance  of  data  with  relatively  simple  calculations,  which  require  neither  a  deep  
theoretical   understanding   of   statistical   analysis   nor   sophisticated   programming  
techniques”  (Bevington  and  Robinson  76).      
There   is  a   finiteness  of   range  whence   the  random  samples  are  selected,  and  
each  calculation  starts   from  the  simplest  expansion  series  of  a  distribution  function  
that  are  rendered  only  as  complex  as  the  computation  process  needed  to  obtain  the  
required   level  of   resolution  and  detail.  Then,   in   the  process  of   ‘random’  selections,  
parameters  are  set  and  values  that  fall  outside  the  boundaries  of  the  parameters  are  
rejected.  However,  as  will  be  explained  later,  having  pre-­‐‑determined  parameters  for  
initiating  cuts  on  data  of  presupposed  interest  is  problematic.  For  as  Bevington  and  
Robinson   note,   rejected   events   “do   not   improve   the   statistical   accuracy   and   every  
effort  should  be  made  to  reduce  the  time  spent  on  calculations  that  lead  to  ‘misses’  
rather  than  ‘hits’”  (92).  
However,   unlike   the   forensic   scientists   who   get   a   semblance   of   corporeal  
access   at   the   end   of   the   day,   the   particle   physicists   would   never   achieve   direct  
contact  with  the  particles  they  study.  In  high-­‐‑energy  particle  physics,  the  most  direct  
contact   the  physicists   could  ever  have  with   their  object  of   study   is   statistically  and  
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digitally  mediated,   through  the  deployment  of  simplifications  and  approximations.  
Imagine   trying   to   discover   one’s   family   history   and   only   being   able   to   do   so  
‘virtually,’   where   even   contact   with   living   family   members   must   be   mediated.  
Further,   the   digital   affordances   that   the   Monte   Carlo   simulations   deploy   further  
augment   the  problem  of  undecideability  because  every   legible   fact  and  established  
theories  are  inbuilt  with  varying  degrees  of  indeterminism.  
When   Karin   Knorr-­‐‑Cetina   wrote   Epistemic   Cultures:   How   the   Sciences   Make  
Knowledge,  the  sensitivity  of  the  detectors  was  not  what  they  are  today;  the  detectors’  
abilities   to   scan   background   events   for   locating   faint   signals   of   unknown  particles  
were  limited.  Hence,  the  reference  that  Knorr-­‐‑Cetina  makes  to  the  term  ‘smearing’  is  
in   relation   to   the   distortion   of   physical   distributions   because   of   the   detector’s  
inability  to  resolve,  or  give  distinguishable  responses,  to  pairs  of  particles  interacting  
too   closely   together.   This   kind   of   smearing   is   also   a   form   of   data   ‘smearing’  
(rendered   imprecise)   that   comes   from   the   addition   of   random   variables   to   sets   of  
computations   to   simulate   what   comes   out   of   a   finite   measurement   of   errors  
(Bevington  and  Robinson  93).  Smearing  works  at  a  much  higher  macro  level  than  the  
micro-­‐‑level  smearing  depicted  in  quantum  level  operations  as  represented  by  mixed  
quantum-­‐‑classical   states   and   the   Heisenberg   Uncertainty   Principle’s   depiction   of  
kinematical  events  at  a  relativistic  energy  level.  
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Further,   there   is   another   type   of   distortion,   such   as   in   the   case   of  
misidentifying  one   category  of  particles   for   that   of   another,  which  would   result   in  
more  misinterpretations  down  the  line,  even  when  these  misidentified  particles  are  
interacting   with   other   properly   identified   particles.   Such   potential   for  
misrepresentations   stemming   from   misidentifications   are   also   referred   to   as   ‘fake  
events’   that   are   usually   background   to   the   signal   events   of   interest.  However,   the  
still   fresh-­‐‑in-­‐‑the-­‐‑memory   disaster,   between   September   2011   and   March   2012,  
involving   the   OPERA   detector   in   France   that   boasted   of   having   detected   a  
superluminal  neutrino  only  to  find  that  the  supposed  discovery  was  caused  by  flaws  
with   the   experimental   equipment,   kept   the   physics   communities   cautious   about  
making   stringent   checks   on   every   result   before   they   are   willing   to   concede   that  
something  new  has  actually  been  discovered.  Even  the  detection  of  the  Higgs  boson  
was   couched   in   the   careful   language   of   statistical   probability,   so   that   every   other  
explanation  unrelated  to  the  discovery  can  be  considered.  
Nevertheless,   one  might  want   to   consider   the   possibility   that   the   so-­‐‑called  
‘fake   events’   might   indicate   the   limits   of   certainties   in   our   searches,   therefore  
highlighting   the   need   to   re-­‐‑strategize   how   analyses   and   interpretations   are  
performed;   in   other   words,   what   techniques   of   instrumental,   or   even   analytical,  
calibrations   of   experimental   instruments   must   be   mustered   to   anticipate   the  
unknown  within  the  finitude  of  the  statistically  known?  While  the  Higgs  boson  was  
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an  expected  discovery  (in  the  sense  that  its  discovery  has  been  statistically  calculated  
within   viable   standard   deviations   above   the  material   background   of   other   known  
elementary  particles),  a  number  of  the  discoveries  that  had  preceded  the  discovery  of  
the  Higgs  boson  had  been  unexpected,  and  the  physicists  had,  at  one  time  or  another,  
thought  that  the  discoveries  were  artifacts  of  experiments  that  merely  needed  to  be  
finessed,  such  as  was   the  case  with   the  discovery  of   the   J/psi  and  charmed  mesons  
(that  are  made  up  of  two  quarks).2    
Even  if  the  arguments  proposed  by  Knorr-­‐‑Cetina  on  the  epistemic  cultures  of  
the   high-­‐‑energy   physics   still   hold   true,   particularly   the   technical-­‐‑epistemic   core  
informing   the   narrative   of   discovery,   analysis,   and   interpretation   in   standard  
quantum   physics,   we   have   to   be   mindful   that   certain   assumptions,   based   on   the  
limits  of  current  knowledge,  would  have  to  be  revised  as  new  facts  emerge,  with  the  
possibility  of  a  scientific  revolution  à  la  Kuhn  as  and  when  more  revelations  flood  in.  
Further,   instead   of   arguing   that   a  measurement   is   ‘meaningless,’   in   the   tongue-­‐‑in-­‐‑
cheek  manner   of   Knorr-­‐‑Cetina;   because   of   lack   of   direct   correlations   between   the  
object  being  examined,  how  the  measurement  is  performed,  and  the  location  of  the  
measuring   apparatus;   one   might   want   to   consider   measurement   as   not   about  
approximating  precision,  or  the  most  accurate  depiction,  of  a  material  phenomenon.    
                                                                                                             
2  See  Goldhaber,  Gerson  “From  the  Psi  to  Charmed  Mesons:  Three  Years  with  the  SLAC-­‐‑LBL  Detector  
at  SPEAR”  in  The  Rise  of  the  Standard  Model.  
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Instead,  one  might  want  to  consider  measurement  as  constituting  the  reality  
where   certain   theoretical   interpretations   can  work   in   relation   to   that  phenomenon,  
and   then   be   prepared   to   capture   the   outcome   of   the   interactions   between   the  
phenomenon  and  the  theories  involved.  Such  a  process  of  measurement  has  already  
been  at  work  in  the  description  of  quantum-­‐‑like  features,  but  requires  a  shift  of  the  
macro-­‐‑observer’s  perception,  and  attitude,  of  its  relationship  to  its  physical  world.  
In   fact,   the   development   of   simulation   generators,3   and   the   Monte   Carlo  
method  for  testing  pseudo-­‐‑data  generated  from  reconstructed  experimental  data,   is  
what  we  refer  to  as  modeling-­‐‑as-­‐‑measurement,  whereby  the  data  is  used  to  build  a  
composite   representation   of   an   entity,   of   groups   of   entities,   without   insisting   that  
everything   must   converge   into   a   sharp   profile   to   produce   representations   of   an  
unknown  entity.  At  the  same  time,  data  that  are  considered  ill-­‐‑fitted  are  rejected  as  
long   as   the   recurrences   of   rejection   do   not   become   too   frequent,   to   the   point   of  
having   to   reconsider   one’s   entire   epistemic   framework.   It   is   through   the   act   of  
constructing   models   that   the   points   of   speculation   within   theory   and   experiment  
come  together  to  demonstrate  the  problem  of  quantifying  uncertainties.    
There  are   two  parts   to   the  Monte  Carlo   simulation  of  which  we  have   to  be  
aware.  First,   there   is   the  Monte  Carlo  dataset  obtained   through  an  event  generator  
                                                                                                             
3  I  will  sometimes  refer  to  simulators  as  generators  and  vice-­‐‑versa  as  they  are  the  same  thing.  But  for  the  
most  part,  I  will  use  ‘generator’  as  a  more  specific  referent  and  ‘simulator’  to  denote  a  more  general  one.  
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that   provides   the   parameters   for   the   momentum   and   trajectory   of   millions   of  
individual   particles,   created   from   high-­‐‑energy   collisions   that   produce   a   specific  
process   of   interest   such   as   the   proton-­‐‑proton,   or   the   top-­‐‑top   (quark)   events.   The  
Monte  Carlo  dataset   is  used  to  determine  what   the  process  being  generated  would  
look  like  in  the  detector  so  that  the  physicist  knows  how  to  measure,  or  search  for,  
event  choices  of  interest.  The  simulation  includes  the  modeling  of  the  process  itself,  
and   how   the   particles   from   the   simulated   process   subsequently   interact   with   the  
detector.   The   raw  data   is   then   reconstructed   and   re-­‐‑inserted   into   the  Monte  Carlo  
process   for   a   second   round   of   analysis   and   generation   to   produce   another   set   of  
Monte  Carlo  data  for  comparison  to  experiment  as  part  of  the  global-­‐‑fitting  process.  
An   important   aspect   of   the   process   elucidated   here   is   how   one   might   enact   the  
process  of  data  cuts  out  of   the  millions  of  events  available,  and   to  use   the  selected  
events  to  construct  a  physical  (or  microphysical)  picture  that  has  not  been  predicted  
prior  to  the  process  of  construction.    
Knorr-­‐‑Cetina  highlights  an  important  role  that  the  Monte  Carlo  performs  for  
excavating  signals  with  similar  signatures  from  background  noise.  However,  she  did  
not  adequately  address  the  assumption  of  errors,  specifically  errors  that  either  came  
of  accidental  inclusion  of  artifacts,  the  background  interference  of  faint  signals,  or  the  
misidentification   of   certain   unknown   particles   because   of   ignorance   of   a   potential  
interaction.   Further,   the   consistent   appearance   of   errors   may   point   to   the  
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incompleteness   of   a   theory   or   model   at   hand,   and   potential   misunderstanding   of  
what  a  phenomenon  entails.  
Monte-­‐‑Carlo  as  a  scientific  tool  blurs  the  distinction  between  experiment  and  
theory.   As   Peter   Galison   notes,   “…the   Monte   Carlo   appeared   experimental;   by  
eschewing  the  bench,   it  appeared  theoretical.  The  categories   themselves  had  begun  
to   slip,   in  what  must   have   appeared   provocatively   oxymoronic”   (Image   and  Object  
701).   Galison   and   Knorr-­‐‑Cetina   agree   to   Monte   Carlo’s   capability   for   expanding  
beyond   the   reach   of   the   analytic   numerical  method,   but   that   capability   hinges   on  
computing  power   rather   than  manual  prowess.   In   recounting   the  history  of  Monte  
Carlo’s  development   for  detecting  muons   (from  neutrinos)   and  neutron   scattering,  
as  well   as   in   the   calculations   that   led   to   the   development   of   the  A-­‐‑bomb,  Galison  
recounts   the   historical   twists   and   turns   that   come   from   attempting   to   reconcile  
experiment   to   theory,   especially   when   the   theory   does   not   provide   sufficient  
descriptive  guidance  that  could  indicate  conclusiveness.    
One   example   was   the   neutral-­‐‑current   experiment;   neutral-­‐‑current   is   an  
oxymoronic   term  because   it   implies   a   current   that   is   neutral   (rather   than   charged,  
which  is  usually  the  case),  and  the  very  characteristic  of  its  neutralness  complicates  
the  detection  process.  The  neutral  current  is  produced  through  the  weak  interactions  
mediated  by  neutral  Z  bosons;  the  search  for  the  neutral  current  parallels  that  of  the  
Higgs  boson  except  that  neutrons  and  neutrinos  were  involved  and  the  experiment  
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was  conducted  at  a  much  smaller  scale.4  The  phenomenological  characteristic  of  the  
Monte  Carlo  is  affirmed  by  its  position  at  the  intersection  of  theory  and  experiment.  
As  Galison   asks,   “How   should  we   class   the   type   of   data-­‐‑to-­‐‑model   (inversion)?  As  
experimental   theory?   Theoretical   experiment?   Is   it   a   case   of   induction   from   data?  
Deduction  from  theory?”  (747).    
For   the  mathematicians,   the  Monte  Carlo   can   be   a  measure   of   the   changes  
within  the  state  space  and  stochastic  processes  that  are  due  to  temporal  variations  as  
well  as  probabilistic  representations.  For   the  statistician,   (s)he  obtains   the  sampling  
methods   that   correlate   to   physical   processes.   For   the   particle   physicist   seeking   to  
provide   controlled   reconstruction   of   a   certain   phenomena,   both   these   different  
features   converging   at   the   Monte   Carlo   are   important.   As   we   will   see   in   greater  
detail   in   the   following   section,   Monte   Carlo   provides   the   background   calculation  
that   can  be   calibrated   for  greater   sensitivity   to  new  physics,   thereby  providing   the  
model   by   which   any   background   excesses   can   be   calculated   for   new   physics  
detection.  Hence,  Monte  Carlo  mediates  between  old  and  new  physics  by  setting  the  
condition  for  the  latter  to  emerge,  potentially,  from  the  former.  
                                                                                                             
4     See  How  Experiments  End  chapter  four.  The  earliest  discussion  of  the  neutral-­‐‑current  experiment  can  
be   found   in   Reviews   of   Modern   Physics.   55.2   (April   1983):   477-­‐‑511   as   “How   the   first   neutral-­‐‑current  
experiments  end.”  In  The  Disunity  of  Science,  Galison  discusses  the  historical  role  of  Monte  Carlo  in  early  
developments   of   nuclear   thermodynamics   and   particle   physics   in   “Computer   Simulations   and   the  
Trading  Zone,”  which  I  will  not  get  into  here.  Suffice  to  say  that  the  development  of  the  Monte  Carlo  
technique   coincides   with   the   growth   of   big   science,   where   the   combination   and   transmutation   of  
multiple,  and  simultaneous,  causal  events  produce  details  beyond  one’s  expectation.  
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However,  Galison  brings  up  an  important  point  regarding  how  Monte  Carlo  
changes   the   way   physicists   deal   with   theoretical   uncertainty   and   predictive  
precision.   There   are   definite   aspirations   towards   tracking   errors   to   attain   ‘correct’  
expectation  values  and  to  decrease  the  inexactitude  of  measurement  during  searches.  
Furthermore,  statistical  investigations  of  the  empirical  data  require  the  development  
of   computationally   efficient   algorithms   to   generate   pseudo-­‐‑random  numbers   to   fit  
the  distribution  of  the  generated  data  with  the  experimentally  produced  data.  Monte  
Carlo   constitutes   an   alternate   reality,   what   Galison   refers   to   as   the   tertium   quid  
intersecting  theory  to  experiment,  that  I  ascribe  to  a  phenomenological  constitution  
of   the   epistemology   of   particle   physics.   The   Feynman   diagram   provides   the  
blueprint   whence   specific   algorithms   are   developed   for   processing   selected  
interactions,  especially  in  calculating  crucial  corrections  to  the  quantum  field  theory  
of  the  hybrid  electroweak  force.  
Even   if   the  Monte  Carlo   simulation   process   is   embraced   as   unequivocal   to  
refining  experimental  calibrations,  the  uncertainty  embedded  within  its  predictions,  
through  the  generation  of  pseudo-­‐‑random  numbers,  had  created  uneasiness  among  
physicists   used   to   an   analytic   approach   with   well-­‐‑defined   resolutions.   For   the  
physicists,  it  means  ceding  the  tight  reign  of  control  they  have  over  the  experiment  
and   having   to   contend  with   not   knowing  where   and  when   an   uncertain   quantity  
might   appear   in   their   data   dump.   Dealing  with   heuristically-­‐‑obtained   uncertainty  
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also   requires   a   cognitive   shift   in   how  one  understands   the   acquisition   of   scientific  
facts,   the   construction   of   algorithmic   and   experimental   modularity,   and   the  
epistemic  identity  within  the  nebulous  intersection  of  experiment  and  theory.  
Additionally,  the  data  generated  through  the  Monte  Carlo  is  also  vulnerable  
to  what  Knorr-­‐‑Cetina  refers  to  as  “negative  knowledge,”  knowledge  at  the  limits  of  
knowing,  of  the  mistakes  made  in  the  process  of  knowing,  and  also  the  existence  of  a  
barrier   (expected   or   unexpected)   that   interferes   with   our   process   of   knowing.   As  
methods  are  developed  to  decrease,  and  suppress,  errors  caused  by  random  number  
generation,  Monte  Carlo  shows  up  the  delimitations  one  encounters  when  trying  to  
develop  algorithms  out  of  theory  whose  ontological  robustness  is  questionable,  such  
as  quantum  chromodynamics  (QCD),  which  is  a  short-­‐‑range  strong  interaction  that  
is   intense   yet   highly   unstable   above   a   certain   threshold   and   therefore   very  
complicated  to  simulate.  But  it  allows  physicists  to  skirt  the  irresolvable  questions  of  
the  theoretical  simulation  of  a   jet,  an  experimental  signature  of  a  quark  in  the  LHC  
detector  production  that  is  important  for  simulating  the  energy  range  that  the  Higgs  
boson  is  expected  to  appear  in.  
In  the  following  section,  I  discuss  how  the  stochastic  and  probabilistic  quality  
of  the  Monte  Carlo  techniques  can  be  read  in  conjunction  with  cybernetics,  and  what  
this  would  mean  in  terms  of  code,  algorithm,  and  digital  epistemology.  However,  I  
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will  not  be  entering   into  the  specific   formalisms  that  shape  the  development  of   the  
Monte  Carlo,  as  they  do  not  contribute  to  the  core  arguments  of  this  chapter.  
7.1 The Cybernetic World of the Monte Carlo in High Stakes 
Physics 
The   stochastic   process   that   dominates   the   Monte   Carlo   routines   might  
eschew   temporal   histories   epitomized   by   the   Markov   chain   (a   stochastic  
computational  method)  but  the  Monte  Carlo  has  a  Husserlian  eidetic  quality  because  
its  mathematical  narratives  and  statistical  excesses  enable  one  to  approximate  ontic  
unity,   the  very  embodiment  of   ‘quantum  memory,’  which  has  a  ring  of  conceptual  
incredulousness   given   that   the   quantum   states,   in   their   pure   conditions,   do   not  
maintain   information   of   past   events   after   the   events   had   taken   place.   The   idea   of  
quantum  memory,  as  was  proposed  by  cybernetics  pioneer  Heinz  von  Foerster  at  the  
Sixth   Conference   of   Cybernetics   in   1949,   simulates   both   the   transference   of  
remembrance  from  one  ‘cell’   to  another,  through  the  process  of   ‘impregnation,’  but  
does  not  destroy  the   information  stored  in  the  original  cell.  The  quantum  state-­‐‑like  
explication  of  neural  networks   is   reminiscent  of   the   concepts  Egan  had   invoked   in  
Quarantine  with  regard  to  the  energetic  quality  of  information  transmission.    
In   fact,   von   Foerster   was   trying   to   draw   parallels   between   what   was  
understood  about   the  behavior  of   the   energy   (and  particles)   at   the  micro-­‐‑quantum  
universe  with  what  was  known  about  neurons  and  molecules   in  biochemistry  and  
neuroscience   at   that   time,   to   produce   his   idea   of   a   “biophysical   backbone”   that  
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draws  heavily  on  the  philosophical  version  of  phenomenology  and  early  simulation  
processes   afforded   by   developments   in   nuclear   science.5   The   samplings   and   data  
counts   conducted   through   the   Monte   Carlo   converge   into   unity;   unity   has   to   be  
determined   purely   through   the   essences   (that   are   both   the   data   and   effects  
extrapolated   from  the  data)  provided  by   the  experiences.  All   the  actions  embodied  
within  the  Monte  Carlo  contribute  to  a  physical  knowledge  that  will  then  feed  back  
into  the  redefining  of  the  experiential  known  as  particle  physics  phenomenology.  
However,   this   means   that   Monte   Carlo   becomes   unitarily   irreducible,  
phenomenologically   in   the   philosophical   sense,   because   of   a   need   to   consider  
secondary   and   tertiary   interactions   that   might   not   be   reducible.   In   other   words,  
particles  are  not  only  produced   through  the   interactions  of  a  single  particle  pair  of  
partons   (that   are   ‘point-­‐‑like’),   but   also   through   additional   partonic   (hard)  
interactions  and  softer  interactions  from  beam  remnants,  all  important  for  fitting  the  
experiment  with  the  Monte  Carlo  generated  statistical  models.  Therefore,  the  models  
are  representative  of  the  
…empirical   consciousness   of   a   self-­‐‑same   thing   that   looks   ‘all   around’   its  
objects,   and   in   doing   so,   continually   confirms   the   unity   of   its   own   nature,  
and  the  essence  and  necessarily  possessing  a  manifold  system  of  continuous  
patterns  of  appearances  and  perspective  variations,  in  and  through  which  all  
                                                                                                             
5  See  Foerster,  Heinz  von.  “Quantum  Mechanical  Theory  of  Memory.”  Cybernetics:  Circular  Causal,  and  
Feedback  Mechanisms  in  Biological  and  Social  Systems.  Transactions  of  the  Sixth  Conference  March  24-­‐‑25,  1949,  
New  York,  N.Y.  Ed.  Heinz  von  Foerster.  New  York:  Josiah  Macy  Jr,  Foundation,  1950.  112-­‐‑145.  Print.  
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objective  phases  of  the  bodily  self-­‐‑given  which  appear  in  perception  manifest  
themselves  perspectively  in  definite  continua.  (Husserl  131)    
Husserl   appears   to   have   anticipated   the   same   reasoning   that   enters   into   the  
formulation  of  Monte  Carlo  algorithms,  with  its  own  fundamental  perspective  based  
on   the   bounds   of   its   sampling   quality   and   measure   (including   the   margins)   of  
statistical   error.   The   Monte   Carlo   generative   practices   of   simulation   and  
reconstruction   represent   that   manifold   system   of   “continuous   patterns   of  
appearances  and  perspective  variations”  (131).  
Even  as  the  Monte  Carlo  generates  events  that  focus  on  slices  of  the  moment,  
without   the  baggage  of  past   recollections,   the   fine-­‐‑tuning  of   the  algorithm  is  based  
on  systemic  eidos,  and  therefore,  of  a  recollection  that  has  already  been  synthesized  
(and  processed)  rather  than  merely  accumulated.  The  datum  of  Monte-­‐‑Carlo  reality,  
where   the   reality   is   a  more   sublime   reconstitution  of   a  physical   feeling   for  nature,  
can   actualize   metaphysical   subjectivity   while   still   attending   to   the   demands   of  
physical   reality.   Hence,   the   eidos   of   the   physical   is   re-­‐‑articulated   by   Whitehead  
when  he  states  that  “simple  physical  feelings  embody  the  reproductive  character  of  
nature,  and  also  the  objective  immortality  of  the  past.  In  virtue  of  these  feelings  time  
is   the   conformation  of   the   immediate  present   to   the  past”   (Process   and  Reality   238).  
Even   if   not   intentional,   the   preceding   quotation   can   be   read   against   the   affective  
measure  within  quantum  mechanics  where  time  does  not  play  a  central  role  even  in  
time-­‐‑dependent   equations,   and   which   has   a   tendency   to   metamorphosize   into   a  
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spatial   quality   due   to   the   geometrical   equivalence   factor.   Therefore,   quantum  
mechanics  can  only  predict  the  moment  when  the  calculation  is  performed,  with  no  
innate  sense  of  historicity  or  futurity.    
However,  the  quantum  mechanical  memory  of  Foerster  works  on  preserving  
memory   against   the   coefficient   of   forgetting   by  utilizing   the   classical   properties   of  
the  physical  world,  with   the  Monte  Carlo  presenting  a   form  of   eidos   (the  memory  
system)  that  compiles  and  profiles  the  quantum  physical  reality  of  particle-­‐‑events  by  
conserving  the  memory  of  what  it  was  to  prepare  for  the  prediction  of  what-­‐‑might-­‐‑
be.   Galison   has   referred   to   Monte   Carlo   as   an   inquiry   into   natural   philosophy  
because  of  the  latter’s  ability  to  offer  insight  into  a  reality  previously  missing  from  a  
constricted  view  afforded  by  analyticity.  In  other  words,  the  structure  of  the  Monte  
Carlo   is   able   to  break  away   from  a  default   assumption  of  null  hypothesis   to  build  
relationships  between  seemingly  unconnected  and  differentially  manifested  physical  
phenomena,   through  extrapolations  between  comparative  datasets.  Thereafter,  new  
analyticity  can  emerge  from  the  consolidation  of  these  new  connections.    
As   previously   argued,   Monte   Carlo   can   be   considered   as   a   cybernetic  
construction  of  computational  media  (of  the  Whiteheadian  concrescence)  whence  the  
flows  of  discreteness/digitality  and  continuity/analog  become  the  discursive  measure  
of   the   content   within   the   bounds   of   the   simulation   and   generation   practices.   The  
flows  are   sensitive   to  potential  mis-­‐‑measurement,   and   to   the  encoding  of  potential  
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biases   onto   the   observation   process   because   of   the   observer’s   ‘special’   relation   to  
empirical  and  theoretical  expectations.  A  Monte  Carlo  model  is  largely  probabilistic  
and   stochastic,   and   derived   of   theoretical   models   that   are   mostly   indeterminate,  
mainly  descriptive,  and  insufficiently  prescriptive.  Whitehead’s  genus  of  conditions  
for   novel   consequences   of   an   enduring/eternal   object   are   aimed   at   ensuring   the  
preservation  of  the  original  identity  of  a  physical  subject,  while  providing  sufficient  
contrast  between  the  subject  at   the  “ground”  and  a  stochastically  conceived  model.  
Moreover,  Whitehead’s  theory  of  extension,  where  he  posits  that    
…decided  conditions  are  never  such  as  to  banish  freedom.  They  only  qualify  
it.   There   is   always   a   contingency   left   open   for   immediate   decision.   This  
consideration   is   exemplified   by   an   indetermination   respecting   ‘the   actual  
world’   which   is   to   decide   the   conditions   for   an   immediately   novel  
concrescence…some  actual  entities  may  be  either  in  the  settled  past,  or  in  the  
contemporary   nexus,   or   even   left   to   the   undecided   future,   according   to  
immediate  decision.  (285)  
The  quotation  above  anticipates  the  same  epistemic  attitude  as  the  extension  theories  
of  Standard  Model,  where  even  the  physical  revelation  of  the  Higgs  does  not  denote  
any   epistemic   certainty  with   regard   to   experimental   choices.  After   all,   the   creative  
emergence  that  the  Monte  Carlo  method  supports  can  be  imported  into  the  “physical  
feelings”  of  actual  “pseudo-­‐‑determinants”  that  transmute  into  a  singular  nexus  from  
an  array  of  intensities,  valuations,  and  eliminations;  the  physical  feelings  arise  from  
mediated  rather   than  directly  physical  connections   to   the  various  strains  of  nature.  
Monte  Carlo  actualizes  physical  representation  to  be  as  congruent  as  possible  to  the  
microphysical   computational  processes  being  modeled,  a  process  Whitehead   refers  
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to   as   the   conversion   of   conditions   from   the   merely   real   (which   represents   the  
potential   for   physical   realization)   into   determinate   actuality   (even   if   the  
microphysical  events  can  only  produce  an  approximate  outcome).    
As   someone   who   has   pioneered   foundational   mathematical   thinking   and  
cybernetics,   John  Von  Neumann,   through  his  The  Computer   and   the  Brain,   provides  
insight   into   the   human-­‐‑computer   interface   that   shapes   the   development   of   the  
Monte  Carlo  by  considering  the  process  of  memory  (the  Husserlian  eidos)  as  digital  
and  stochastic.  According  to  Von  Neumann,  access  to  memory  is  dependent  on  the  
general   state   of   the   machine   at   the   point   of   access,   and   not   all   points   can   be  
accessible   at   the   same   time,   as   provisions   are   needed   for   prioritizing   when   each  
access  is  allowed.  He  also  warns  of  how  errors  may  get  into  the  system  through  the  
process   of   computational   iterations   that   lead   to   divergences   brought   on   by   the  
amplification  of  errors.  
By   demonstrating   the   structural   parallels   between   mathematics,  
computation,   and  what  was  understood  of   the  neuronal   sciences   in   the  1950s,  von  
Neumann  provides  a  purview  into  a  total  expression  of  problems  and  intentionality  
within  each  sequence  of  the  control  points  in  relation  to  their  connections  to  several  
organs  (organs  of  the  body,  or,  in  the  case  of  the  LHC,  the  various  sub-­‐‑detectors)  for  
the   simulation   of  more   than   one   operation.   The  Monte   Carlo   simulators   available  
today  can  be  read  analogously  to  the  historic  differential  analyzers  and  integrators  of  
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mid-­‐‑twentieth   century   physical   computers   considered   as   more   economical   and  
efficient  than  a  purely  arithmetic  processer;  the  latter  requires  non-­‐‑trivial  but  rather  
arduous   steps   when   attempted   electromechanically   until   the   same   steps   could   be  
sublimated   in   digital-­‐‑electronic   circuitry.   That   is   why   there   are   multiple   modular  
codes  available  for  breaking  down  event  processing,  whereby  the  codes  ride  on  the  
idea  that  specialization  will  improve  and  increase  the  rate  of  output.  
Moreover,   as   the   previous   chapter   indicated,   the   search   for   a   singular  
manifestation  involves  the  differentiation  of  leptonic  from  hadronic  decays,  and  the  
constitution   of   these   interactions   within   electroweak   and   strong   fields.   Then,   we  
have   to   attend   to   the   transformation   between   the   initial,   intermediate,   and   final  
states   of   the   particle   processes.   Given   that   the   interactions   simulated   represent  
strong  interaction  particles  as  point-­‐‑like,  there  have  to  be  considerations  of  how  the  
final  statistical  reconstruction  can  be  interpreted  in  relation  to  the  search,  such  as  the  
Higgs  boson  in  this  case.    
While   early   variations   of   the   Monte   Carlo   methodology   are   much   more  
physical   due   to   the   use   of   analog   computing,   their   gradual   transformation   to   the  
purely  virtual  can  be  read  against  Whitehead’s  theory  of  feelings,  such  as  the  process  
of   transmutation   that   attempts   to   find   unity   in   the   disparate   actualities   of   feeling  
(from   the   primitive   physical   to   the   noematic)   and   the   oscillating  movements   that  
transmit  between  different  categories  of  feelings  (physical  and  conceptual,  objective  
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and  subjective).  The  Monte  Carlo  process,  despite   its   location  within   the  virtual,   is  
primarily  a  physical  causality   that  has  undergone   transmutation  at  multiple  points  
for   the  production  of  mathematical  approximations   that  von  Neumann  refers   to  as  
vehicles  in  the  transmission  of  information.  Moreover,    
…a  system  of  logical  instructions  that  an  automaton  can  carry  out  and  which  
causes   the  automaton  to  perform  some  organized  task   is  called  code…If   the  
machine   is   to   solve   a   specific   problem   by   calculation,   it   will   have   to   be  
controlled   by   a   complete   code…Such   systems   of   instructions   which   make  
one  machine   imitate   the   behavior   of   another   are   known   as   short   codes.   (The  
Computer  and  the  Brain  70-­‐‑1)  
The  algorithm  controlling   the  Monte  Carlo   forces   the  computer   to  simulate,  
as  authentically  as  possible,   the  process  of  data  production  at   the  detectors,  before  
the  data  (with  point-­‐‑like  and  field-­‐‑like  interactive  representations)  are  reconstructed  
and   analyzed,   to   facilitate   the   process   of   passing   judgment   and   locating   of  
congruence   between   experiment   and   theory.   This   is   to   construct   a   procedural  
approach  used  for  dealing  with  problems  relating  to  independent  trials  and  types  of  
replications   that   could   be   either   positive,   negative,   or   producing   of   neither   truth-­‐‑
claims   nor   final   verifications.   Since   the   Feynman   diagram   structures   perturbative  
(approximative  computational  modeling)  of  quantum  field  theories  and  contains  the  
rules  of  operation  for  describing  the  branching  acts  of  fermionic  and  bosonic  decay,  
the  former  becomes  the  ontology  for  the  algorithm  that  underlies  the  short  code  for  
the  computer   to   imitate   the  real-­‐‑time  behavior  of   the  microphysical  components  of  
nature.    
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When   thinking   about   the   role   of   code   in   prediction,   determination,   and  
stochastic   processing,   let   us   reconsider   the   cross-­‐‑sectional   interactions   that   are   the  
focus   of   the   acts   of   simulation,   and   the   Standard   Model   particulars   that   are   of  
interest  within   the   simulations,   now   that  we   have   arrived   at   the   cross-­‐‑road   in   the  
aftermath  of  the  unveiling  of  the  Higgs  boson,  with  the  upgrade  plans  of  the  LHC  to  
higher   energy   levels   underway   before   the   second   phase   of   experiments   begins.  
Additionally,   the   stochastic   process   of   the   Monte   Carlo   is   able   to   trace   and  
reconstruct   the   moment-­‐‑by-­‐‑moment   effects   of   the   decay   represented   within   the  
different   scales   of   the   Standard   Model   gauge   (force)   interactions,   with   the   weak  
interaction   particularly   important   for   describing   the   aforementioned   Higgs  
mechanism’s   role   in   mediating   the   Higgs   boson   in   relation   to   the   other   known  
elementary  particles.  
Furthermore,   when   particle   collisions   take   place,   they   produce   angular  
rotational  momenta   needed   to   calculate   the   handedness   of   the   coupling   processes  
effecting  sensitivized  polarizations  that  can  then  be  computed.  During  the  process  of  
computation,   loop   corrections   (the   aforementioned   quantum   field   corrections)   are  
included  because  of  their  numerical  relevance  to  Monte  Carlo’s  statistical  processing.  
Primary-­‐‑stage  corrections  at  the  vertex  (the  primary  site  where  particle   interactions  
at   the   initial   point   of   collisions   are   calculated)   contain   couplings   that   are   flavor  
dependent   (the   quantum   number   properties   of   isospin   and   strangeness)   for   the  
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bottom/beauty  quark  mass  but  with  corrections  added  from  the  top  quark  channel.  
The   corrections   expand   the   top   quark   sector,   thereby   increasing   the   probability   of  
obtaining  information  about  the  Higgs  boson  from  background  signals.  
  An  important  aspect  of  the  aforementioned  particle  physics  search  involves  
the   detection   of   very   faint   effects   of   new   physics   in   the   background   of   all   new  
physics   searches   that   make   the   calculation   of   the   Standard   Model   contribution  
challenging.  In  the  search  for  new  physics,  Monte  Carlo  provides  directionality  and  
legitimization  to  the  process  through  its  ability  to  engage  in  precision  measurements  
required  for  constructing   the  parameters  of   the  Standard  Model:   the  pre-­‐‑computed  
electromagnetic   fine   structure   constant   (characterizing   the   strength   of   the  
electromagnetic   interaction)   at   zero   momentum   transfer,   a   Fermi   constant   that   is  
extracted   from   muon   lifetime   decay,   and   the   mass   of   the   Z   boson.   All   of   these  
features   are   important   for   the   evaluation   of   the   different   aspects   of   the   Standard  
Model  weak  interaction  needed  in  the  decipherment  of  the  Higgs  boson.  The  effects  
are  measured  from  the  low  and  high  end  of  the  energy,  whereby  exotic  new  physics  
with  slightly  different  structures  can  produce  particles  with  lower  energies  than  that  
born  out  of  typical  processes.  
Therefore,   a   check   for   global   consistencies   of   data   obtained   of   relevant  
particles   requires   a   fit   from  data   to  model   by   accounting   for   all   correlations  while  
leaving  an  unknown  parameter  ‘free’  to  float  about  the  fit;  this  parameter  represents  
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that  degree  of  uncertainty  in  data  to  model  fit.  To  give  due  diligence  to  experimental  
uncertainties,  measurements  of  basic  characteristics  of  the  particles,  such  as  the  mass  
of   the  Z  boson   and   top  quark,   are   simultaneously   included   in   the  dataset   and   left  
unbound  in  the  simulated  fit-­‐‑to-­‐‑data.  The  precision  data  modifies  the  data  either  at  
the   level   of   Born   approximation,   a   mathematical   physics   method   used   for  
perturbative   calculation   in  weak   scattering,   or   loop   corrections   in   electroweak  and  
strong  interactions.  Moreover,  a   targeted  interference  with  the  Standard  Model  can  
increase   sensitivity  while   deviation   from   the   asymmetry  measure   of   the   Standard  
Model  could  signify  non-­‐‑Standard  Model  new  physics.  
As  previously  mentioned,  the  hadronic  partons  behaving  as  point-­‐‑like  objects  
in   the   Standard   Model,   can   be   addressed   by   scaling,   a   process   that   ensures   the  
scattering   cross-­‐‑section   does   not   depend   on   kinematic   or   trajectory   values.   This   is  
particularly  useful  for  describing  the  hard  scattering  process  (that  happens  for  strong  
particle  interactions);  in  fact,  the  gluon  was  discovered  through  the  measurement  of  
the  jet  rates  (produced  through  the  fragmentation  of  quarks  and  gluons  via  collisions  
at   a   point   of   convergence   of   that   interaction,   also   known   as   vertex)   during   the  
interaction.  However,   the   perturbative   theory   does   not  work   for   obtaining   precise  
calculations   in   all   hard-­‐‑scattering   cases.   Instead,   a  partonic  distribution   function   is  
employed   to   compute   fractions   of   energy   (of   the   strong   interaction   quarks   and  
gluons)   too   complex   for   perturbative   calculations,   with   the   algorithmic   aid   of  
  269  
leading   orders   (and   higher)   variable   calculus.   Of   course,   asymptotic   freedom   is  
given,  and  always  assumed,  for  any  strong  interactions.6    
The  parton  energy  distribution  in  the  hadrons  is  distinguishable  by  the  flavor  
of   the   quantum   numbers.   The   parameterization   of   the   parton   distribution   from  
global   fit   (the   general   big-­‐‑picture   fit)   accounts   for   the   effects   of   experimental  
measurement   limitations,   including   uncertainties   within   the   parameters   of   the   fit.  
Moreover,  the  large-­‐‑distance  effects  of  the  strong  interactions  are  decoupled  from  the  
original  hard  reactions  and  do  not  distort  the  measurable  picture  too  much,  therefore  
predicting   the   presence   of   initial   partons   as   collimated   streams   of   hadrons.   Early  
measurement  of  the  event  shapes  allows  the  differences  in  the  modeling  of  multijet  
production   to   be   studied,   which   provide   valuable   input   to   the   Monte   Carlo  
generator  tuning.7  
The   next   section   will   engage   in   a   close   reading   of   the   Monte   Carlo  
contribution  to  the  search  for  the  Higgs  boson,  including  an  analytical  consideration  
                                                                                                             
6  In  the  case  of  asymptotic  freedom,  it  helps  us  understand  how  energy  suppression  happens  for  quarks  
in  terms  of  the  quark  and  gluon  coupling  strength  that  can  be  calculated.  The  next  to  leading  order,  and  
beyond,  help   fine-­‐‑tunes   the   calculation   for   collinear  and   low-­‐‑energy   (infrared-­‐‑safe)   event   shapes   that  
are   the   result   of   electron   and   positron   collisions;   all   of   which   are   then   combined   with   other   hard  
scattering  calculations  to  improve  the  sensitivity  of  the  latter.  These  are  processes  that  are  built  into  the  
Monte  Carlo  algorithms  for  dealing  with  the  hard  scattering  processes  involving  strong  interactions.  
7  On  this  site  is  a  gif  file  of  a  graph  illustrating  the  datasets  for  signals  and  background  in  the  Z  bosons  
decay  channel  for  the  Higgs.  The  datasets  are  data  obtained  through  the  two-­‐‑fold  process  in  experiment  
and   the   Monte   Carlo   https://twiki.cern.ch/twiki/pub/AtlasPublic/HiggsPublicResults/4l-­‐‑FixedScale-­‐‑
NoMuProf2.gif  
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of   the   generators   important   to   simulating   the   required   events   for   Higgs   boson  
analyses.  We  will  also  consider  how  the  quantum  computer,  in  its  ability  to  simulate  
and  predict  datasets   that  are  significantly  more  complex  and  multivariable   in   their  
dimensionality,   can   impact   the   future   capability   of   the   present-­‐‑time   Monte   Carlo  
method.  The  quantum  computer,  and  the  promise  of  new  knowledge  it  embodies  as  
an   outcome   of   simulation   practices,   is   a   superjective   (more   than   a   pure   subject  
because   of   its   latent   promise   of   unimagined   possibilities)   potential   occupying  
simultaneously,  physical/material  and  conceptual/intellectual   states  of  becoming  so  
as  to  produce  novelty  and  new  scientific  idealisms.  
It   is   also   crucial   to   bear   in   mind   the   role   of   prediction   within   the  
phenomenological   and   experiential   that   enables   the   point   of   convergence   between  
theory   and   experiment.  We   can   begin   to   understand   the   role   of  Monte  Carlo   as   a  
speculative  superject  because  the  latter  can  extend  beyond  the  observed  subject  and  
add  a  creative  dimension  to  data’s  emergence   in  and  out  of  a  virtually  constructed  
world.  In  understanding  Monte  Carlo  as  a  speculative  superject,  we  are  more  able  to  
comprehend   its   order   within   the   epoch   of   speculative   spatio-­‐‑temporality.   This   is  
important   if  we  consider  all   the   independent  and  dependent  objects   located  within  
the   global   fit   of   the   data   generated.   The   mechanism   of   feedback   and   circulation  
between  determinate  and  indeterminate  points  in  the  stochastic  processes,  derived  of  
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transmission  as  distributed  and  circulatory,  with  points  of  recollection  and  feedback  
as  found  in  cybernetics.    
7.2 Monte Carlo as Speculative Heuristics of the Higgs Boson 
I   want   to   state   explicitly,   that   the  Monte   Carlo   simulation   of   experimental  
data   is   separate   from   the   algorithms   (and   software)   used   for   event   reconstruction  
(and   particle   identification)   of   experimental   raw   data   even   if   there   are   points   of  
intersections;  without   the  event  reconstructions,   the  Monte  Carlo  simulators  would  
not  be  able  to  access  a  coherent  and  analyzable  version  of  the  datasets.    Regardless  of  
which  sub-­‐‑process  a  particular  Monte  Carlo  generator  focuses  on,   the  subprocesses  
are  about  simulating  the  final  states  of  a  high-­‐‑energy  (or  low-­‐‑energy)  collision,  right  
down   to   the   properties   of   individual   stable   particles   and   their   individual  
momentum.    
However,   what   is   interesting   about   the   simulations   is   the   basis   of   their  
statistical  analytics:  reconstructed  data.  In  the  process  of  reconstruction,  the  collected  
raw  data  are  digitally  sifted  and  selected  so  that  our  most  immediate  connection  to  
the  data  is  always  mediated.  The  actual  materials  for  reconstruction  are  from  the  raw  
data   that   have   been   especially   triggered   to   produce   events   of   particular   interest.  
Then,  reconstruction  is  done  with  the  aid  of  algorithms  that  provide  probabilities  for  
the  detection  of  the  particles  produced  during  collision,  and  after  decay.  At  the  end  
of  the  process,  the  generators  will  then  evaluate  as  to  whether  the  reconstructed  data  
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can   produce   sufficient   information   for   commensuration   with   initial   theoretical  
predictions.  
There   are  multitudes   of   generators,   which   are   basically   code  modules   that  
produce  new  transformations  with  the  intention  of  attaining  novel  techniques  for  the  
analyses   of   the  Higgs  boson   to   improve  prediction   capacity.  The  generators   of   the  
Monte   Carlo   are   not   similar   to   the   generators   of   the   microphysical   features   one  
might  find  in  quantum  field  theories,  but  can  still  extend  the  capabilities  of  the  latter  
by  providing  new  factorizations  and  normalizations  for  easier  calculations  within  a  
statistical   framework.  The  relationship  between   the  different  generators   lead   to   the  
coding   of   the   algorithms   used   to   further   substantiate   or   disprove   theoretical  
conjectures.  
There  are  a  number  of   similarities   in   the  Monte  Carlo  generators  employed  
by   both   the   ATLAS   and   CMS   collaborations   in   discerning   the   probability   for  
observing   the  Higgs   boson.   In   fact,   the   statistical   methodology   for   processing   the  
data   leading   to   the   prediction   of   the   Higgs   boson   was   developed   by   both  
collaborations   through   the   collaborations’   involvement   with   the   LHC   Higgs  
Combination  Group   as   part   of   the   requirement   for   simultaneous   analysis   of   data,  
from   separate   search   channels,   to   control   against   all   statistical   and   systemic  
uncertainties.  The  methodology  has  been  developed  as  a   result  of  40  sub-­‐‑channels,  
each   of  which   could,   in   combination,   contain   a   total   number   of   distributed   events  
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that  converge  onto  a  mass  for  the  Higgs  boson  within  the  range  of  110  to  600  GeV,  
quite  close  to  its  latest  energy-­‐‑mass  of  126  GeV.  
Most  of  the  uncertainties  come  from  our  knowledge  of  how  detectors  react  to  
particles   that   transverse   the   former:   jet   energy,   for   instance,   contains   the   largest  
uncertainty.     Among   the  uncertainties   that  arise,   confirming  my  earlier  arguments,  
are   “theoretical   uncertainties   on   the   expected   cross   sections   and   acceptances   for  
signal   and   background   processes,   experimental   uncertainties   arising   from   the  
modeling   of   the   detector   response   (event   reconstruction   and   selection   efficiencies;  
energy   scale   and   resolution),   and   statistical   uncertainties   associated   with   either  
ancillary  measurements   of   backgrounds   in   control   regions   or   selection   efficiencies  
obtained   using   simulated   events”   (Chatrchyan   et   al   28).   The   combination  
methodology  involves  the  introduction  of  a  signal  modifier  for  increasing  the  signal  
strength  of  the  expected  Standard  Model  Higgs  boson,  a  method  for  evaluating  the  
Higgs   boson’s   background   yields,   and   a   likelihood   estimation   for   evaluating   the  
probabilities   of   selected   events   through   the   statistical   frequentist   method   of  
counting.    
For   testing   the   hypothesis   on   the   production   of   the   Higgs   boson,   a   test  
statistic   (such   as   the   chi   square)   is   constructed   out   of   information   encompassing  
observed   data,   expected   signal,   expected   background,   and   all   uncertainties  
associated  with   these   expectations.   Therefore,   one   is   able   to   rank   all   experimental  
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observations  based  on  whether   they  are  more  consistent  with  background  only,  or  
background   +   signal,   hypotheses.   Finally,   to   infer   the   non-­‐‑presence,   or   seeming  
absence,  of  the  Higgs  boson  signal  in  the  data,  the  observed  value  of  the  test  statistic  
is  compared  to  the  distribution  values  in  background  only,  or  background  +  signal,  
hypotheses.    
The  pseudo-­‐‑datasets  generated  by   the  Monte  Carlo  are   taken   from   the  vast  
library   event   samples   already   available   for   evaluating   the   likelihood   of   the  
background  only  or  background  +  signal  hypotheses   (29).  The  methodology  comes  
with  techniques  for  quantifying  absences  and  excesses  in  the  signals  obtained  but  I  
will   not   enter   into   the   technicality   here;   suffice   to   state   for   now   that   they  will   be  
important  in  the  generation  of  pseudo-­‐‑datasets  and  for  dealing  with  the  expectations  
of  observation  when  the  time  comes  for  reconstructing  evidence  for  the  Higgs  boson.  
What  the  above  explanation  illustrates  is  the  importance  of  signal  data  as  part  
of  the  search  data,  which  is  then  compared  to  the  simulated  events  sharing  common  
parameters   for   producing   enriched   individual   background   contributions,   so   as   to  
develop  techniques  for  excavating  the  signal  created  from  background  processes  that  
share   a   similar   signature  with   the   detector.   As  was   discussed   in   chapter   five,   the  
search  for  the  Higgs  boson  signal  means  performing  a  maximum  likelihood  fit  to  one  
selected   final   state   of   Higgs   mass   across   different   channels   with   multiple   events  
constitutive  of  the  state.  To  do  so,  one  enlists  the  computational  capability  of  Monte  
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Carlo  generators  with  multipurpose  and  specialized  functions.  
PYTHIA  is  one  of  the  major  general-­‐‑purpose  event  generators  used  by  both  
ATLAS  and  the  CMS.  The  generator  contains  the  Lund  string  fragmentation  model  
(a  model  that  propagates  individual  quarks  produced  from  the  collision  that  leads  to  
the   formation   of   the   aforementioned   ‘jets’)   used   by   other   programs   that   link   to  
PYTHIA  for  the  hadronization  phase  of  the  simulation.  The  ‘string-­‐‑like’  effect  at  the  
hadron  is  basically  caused  by  the  long-­‐‑distance  self-­‐‑interactions  of  gluons  (‘glue-­‐‑like’  
particles)   that  make   field   lines   attractive   to   each   other,  with   the   strong   interaction  
field   lines   compressed   into   string-­‐‑like   tubes.   PYTHIA,   which   is   linked   to   other  
sublevel  generators,  is  important  to  the  modeling  of  final  states  at  hadron  colliders,  
such   as   the   parton   shower   emissions   and   jets   produced   out   of   multiple   partonic  
interactions.  Originally  programmed   in  Fortran,  PYTHIA’s   later  versions  had  been  
ported   over   into   C++   to   take   advantage   of   the   object-­‐‑oriented   modularity,  
particularly   for   the   convenience   of   being   able   to   call   subfunction   libraries   internal  
and  external  to  the  code.    
However,  the  problem  with  PYTHIA  engaging  with  too  many  sub-­‐‑processes  
is  the  lack  of  concentrated  resources  for  dealing  with  problems  found  in  higher  order  
precision.   Moreover,   because   of   other   complicated   dynamics   involved   with   color  
correlations   (a   case   particular   to   strong   interactions   because   of   the   ‘flavors’   of   the  
gluons),   the   implementation   of   PYTHIA   is  more   complicated   and   lugubrious   than  
  276  
that   of   the  HERWIG   generator,   another   popular   general-­‐‑purpose   event   generator,  
because   the   latter   does   not   have   to   deal   with   complicated   and   non-­‐‑trivial   color  
correlations.   Nevertheless,   both   require   other   more   specialist   generators,   such   as  
TAUOLO  and  PHOTOS,   for  describing   tau   lepton  decays   and  photon  propagators  
respectively,  as  well  as  other  specialist  generators   that   focus  on  parton  distribution  
function  calculations.8  
To  demonstrate  how  the  different  specialized  generators  fit  with  the  general-­‐‑
purpose   generators   in  deploying  different   precision  measurement  methods   for   the  
simultaneous   analyses   of   signals   and   backgrounds   across   different   channels,   I  
consider  examples  of  sample  events  and  simulators  used  in  the  CMS  and  ATLAS’s  
searches   for   the   Higgs   boson.   For   both   the   collaborations,   once   events   have   been  
generated   with   either   PYTHIA   or   HERWIG,   the   particles   produced   are   then  
propagated   through   a   detector   simulator   based   on   the   Monte   Carlo   program  
GEANT4   that   is   used   by   all   the   detectors   at   the   LHC.   The   simulation   includes   a  
realistic  modeling   of   the   (beam)   pile-­‐‑up   condition   observable   from   collected   data.  
Corrections  obtained  from  measurements  in  data  are  applied  to  account  for  the  small  
differences  between  actual  data  and  simulated  ones.  For  example,   large  samples  of  
W,   Z,   and   J/Ψ   (J-­‐‑Psi)   particle   decays   are   used   for   deriving   factors   for   lepton  
                                                                                                             
8   For   examples   of   the   sets   used   for   the   parton   distribution   functions,   see   page   2   of   the   ATLAS  
Collaboration  article  “Observation  of  a  new  particle  in  the  search  for  the  Standard  Model  Higgs  boson  
with  ATLAS  detector  at  the  LHC.”  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.physletb.2012.08.020.  
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reconstruction   probabilities   and   enabling   greater   efficiencies   in   particle  
identification.  The  description  of  the  Higgs  boson  signal  is  obtained  through  Monte  
Carlo   simulation   such   as   special   matrix   element   generator   like   POWHEG   (taking  
advantage  of  the  method  involving  the  leading  orders)  that  is  interfaced  to  PYTHIA.  
One  of   the  more   important  work  of  code  that   is  built   into  the  generators  and  data-­‐‑
fitting   processes   is   the   capacity   for   making   material   cuts   that   would   have  
implications  on  what  data  get  processed  through  the  call  functions  of  the  generator,  
thereby  allowing  certain  conditionals  to  be  fulfilled  and  measurements  to  be  made  to  
meet   the   expectations   of   the   experiment.   I   take   as   an   example   given   in   figure   1  
below,   a   snippet   of   code  written   in   C++   that   is   focused   on   a   particular   final   state  
containing   two   leptons   (dileptons).   While   a   large   segment   of   the   ‘introductory’  
section  of   code   involves   functional,   variable,   and   library  declarations   coming   from  
non-­‐‑publicly   accessible   databases   and   other   sub-­‐‑processing   modules   of   the   code,  
there   are   also   modules   within   the   code   that   specialize   in   making   ‘cuts’   and  
producing  selections  from  the  datasets  of  the  samplings.    
The   cuts   are   made   for   excavating   the   background   and   signal   rejections,  
determining  mass  delimitations  of  the  selected  particles,  producing  a  match  between  
the   target   particles,   adjustments   and   allocations   (through   weighting)   of   data  
samples,   obtaining   of   acceptance   levels   for   particular   events,   tagging   of   jet   events  




Figure  2:  A  snippet  of  a  specialized  code  for  analysis  of  Monte  Carlo  events  
in  the  dilepton  final  state  by  recently  graduated  Duke  PhD  in  particle  physics  
(2013),  Kevin  Finelli.  
Furthermore,   there   are   multiple   sub-­‐‑functions   involved   with   how   the   cuts  
should   be   projected;   each   represents   a   problem   of   decision-­‐‑making   in   that   choice  
between  flexible  exploration  and  probabilistically  saturated  selection.  They  could  be  
constituted   as   Whitehead’s   “Category   of   Objective   Diversity”   that   asserts   the  
essential  self-­‐‑identity  of  an  individuated  entity  (225).  In  this  case,  the  entities  are  the  
multiplicity  of  cuts  denominating  the  concrescence  of  each  consequence  that  comes  
of  making  choices,   and   the   superject  of  a   satisfactory  outcome   is  obtained   through  
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the   inversion   of   that   identity.  When   the   entities   that   were   theoretically   conceived  
become  actualized,  one  has   to  be  wary  of  potential  duplications   in  order   to  ensure  
that   no   double   counts   are   made   of   the   background   material   and   foregrounded  
signals.  
The   data   cuts,   as   enacted   by   the   algorithmic   parameters   of   the  
aforementioned  code,  is  definitive  yet  speculative;  definitive  in  the  arbitrariness  that  
is   involved   when   Monte   Carlo   analysis   suggests   a   ‘cut’   on   the   experimentally  
obtained  data  for  further  processing.  At  the  same  time,  the  experimental  triggers  are  
themselves   another   set   of   ‘cuts’   enacted   when   they   are   made   with   the   aim   of  
producing   specific   sets   of   interactions.   The   speculative,   on   the   other   hand,   is   the  
indeterminateness  of  what  gets  included,  excluded,  and  occluded  during  the  process  
of  exchange  and  realization  of  any  sets  of  knowledge  (scientific  in  this  case).  While  it  
is  highly  possible  that  the  realization  could  merely  reinforce  the  theory  that  shapes  
the   stochastic   process   without   rupturing   the   theory’s   sense   of   security,   it   is   still  
possible   for   ambiguity   to   seep   in   as   the   cuts   are   made   out   of   best   available  
knowledge.   Therefore,   further   testing   and   replication   of   the   events   can   reveal   a  
potential  weak  link.    
At   the   end   of   the   day,  what   is   actualized   becomes   public,   and   the   private  
language  of  the  code  known  to  the  technically  initiated  can  produce  interpretations  
that   express   the   experiential   core   of   nature,   even   if   that   experience   operates   from  
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different  levels  of  existential  onticity.  The  discursive  conjugation  between  code  and  
the  popular  image  of  the  double-­‐‑slit  experiment  (that  has  been  discussed  in  the  past  
few   chapters)   gives   rise   to   a   new   form   of   computing   that   is   the   technological  
equivalence   of   quantum   entanglement.   In   other   words,   the   quantum   idea   of   the  
double-­‐‑slit   experiment,   by  way   of   the   Aspect   experiment9,   becomes,   at   this   point,  
embodied   in   the   form   of   a   technologically   sophisticated   quantum   computer,   or  
quantum  supercomputer,  that  draws  on  the  theories  of  quantum  entanglement  as  its  
operational  directive.    
As  we  sieve  through  an  exponential  amount  of  data  (a  huge  amount  of  data  
accumulated   never   got   addressed   due   to   labor   shortage   and   limits   in   computing  
resources)  and  become  intensely  aware  of  making  cuts  that  could  preclude  one  from  
making  a  discovery  of  a  lifetime,  the  affordances  of  a  quantum  supercomputer,  once  
sufficiently   developed,   could   change   how   physicists   make   decisions   about  
experimental   triggers   (experiments   that   are   conducted   due   to   an   earlier   decision  
made)   from   currently   narrow   parameters.   However,   to   optimize   a   quantum  
computer   for   future  particle   searches   requires   knowledge  over  how   to  manipulate  
                                                                                                             
9  This  is  the  experiment  that  tries  to  prove  Bell’s  Inequality  Theorem  and  quantum  entanglement.    The  
experiment  was  conducted  to  resolve  the  conundrum  the  came  out  of  the  Einstein-­‐‑Bohr  debate,  and  the  
EPR  paper  of   the  1930s.  The  experiment  was   conducted  using   two  channel  polarizers,  with   spinning  
photons   or   protons.   For  more   details,   see  Aspect,  Alain   et   al.   “Experimental   Realization   of   Einstein-­‐‑
Podolsky-­‐‑Rosen-­‐‑Bohm  Gedankexperiment:  a  New  Violation  of  Bell’s   Iequalities.“  Physical  Review  Letters  
49.2.  12  July  1982:  91-­‐‑95.    
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the  computer’s  built-­‐‑in  strengths  and  weaknesses.  
In  Quantum  Computer  Science:  An  Introduction,  N.  David  Mermin  states  that  a  
quantum  computer  is  one  “whose  operation  exploits  very  special  transformations  of  
its   internal   state…The   laws   of   quantum   mechanics   allow   these   peculiar  
transformations   to   take   place   under   carefully   controlled   conditions”   (1).   He   also  
emphasizes  the  greater  sensitivity  to  potential  disruption  in  operations  of  a  quantum  
computer  should  there  be  any  unexpected  physical  interaction  that  has  not  been  pre-­‐‑
programmed   into   the   system,   resulting   in   a   decoherence   that   fatally   disrupts   the  
transmission  of   informational  bits.   In  quantum  computing,   the  macrophysical  scale  
becomes  less  relevant  and  a  microphysical  atomic  scale  system  is  decoupled  from  a  
macrophysical  environment.  
Just  like  the  famous  story  of  the  Schrödinger  cat  involving  the  determination  
of  quantum  states,   the  Alice  and  Bob  sender-­‐‑and-­‐‑receiver  narrative  about  quantum  
entanglement   and   cryptography   is   a   staple   in   the   history   surrounding   the  
development  of  quantum  computing.10  However,  I  will  not  enter  into  a  discussion  of  
                                                                                                             
10  The  Alice  and  Bob  story  involves  the  sending  of  information  encoded  in  qbits  or  quantum  bits.  Alice  
will  randomly  encode  her  message  in  a  specific  photon  into  either  one  of  the  polarized  states  available  
to  her  then  transmit  the  string  of  qbit  encoded  messages  to  Bob.  Bob  will  then  decide  whether  he  wants  
to,   first,   transform   the  message  with   the   help   of   a   special   operator   or   just   pass   it   directly   through   a  
measurement  gate.  Alice  tells  Bob  over  an  unsecured  channel  the  type  of  the  qbits  sent  but  not  the  state  
in   which   it   is   located   while   Bob   tells   her   which   of   his   measurements   agree   with   Alice’s   choice   of  
information  type  that  she  has  sent  over.  The  reason  for  this  is  to  avoid  interception  by  an  eavesdropper,  
whereby  the  actions  of  the  eavesdropper  would  then  be  detectable  by  Alice  and  Bob  by  the  alterations  
made   to   the   system.   However,   this   is   only   possible   because   of   the   no-­‐‑cloning   theorem   of   quantum  
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the   role  of   cryptography,  but  would   instead,   concentrate  on  an  aspect  of  quantum  
computing   with   greater   relevance   to   the   discussion   of   Monte   Carlo:   the  
measurement  gates,  which   is   a  hardware   representation  of   the  Born   rule   (a   law   in  
quantum  mechanics  that  links  the  squared  magnitudes  of  amplitudes  to  hard  values  
that  one   can   read  off  during   the  process  of  measurement);  quantum  searches   (also  
known   as   the   Grover   iteration   method)   that   uses   the   principle   of   (unitary)   state  
transformations   at   the   quantum   level   to   obtain   an   almost   definite   recovery   of   a  
targeted  value;  and  quantum  error  corrections  that  can  be  done  without  knowing  the  
cause   of   the   corruption.   Imagine   being   able   to   conduct  multiple   levels   of   searches  
without  worrying  about  a  buffer  overload  or  storage  capacity  issues.  
Quantum   computers   have   to   deal   with   a   measurement   problematic   that  
alters  the  state  being  measured  due  to  unpredictable  disruptions  stemming  from  the  
process  of  interaction  and  entangling  between  states,  as  well  as  the  non-­‐‑discreteness  
of  an  error  that  can  increase  exponentially  over  time!  Due  to  the  stochastic  quality  of  
quantum   computers,   it   shares   parallel   proneness   to   error   as   that   of   Monte   Carlo  
data-­‐‑fitting,  given  that  much  of  the  microphysical  features  of  the  events  Monte  Carlo  
work  with  are  largely  of  a  non-­‐‑macrophysical,  and  therefore  non-­‐‑classical,  nature.    
                                                                                                             
  
computing  that  renders  it  different  from  classical  computing,  in  that  there  is  no  memory  retained  of  the  
selections  or  changes  that  have  been  made.    See  Mermin  for  more  technical  details.  
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Hence,   what   we   learn   from   dealing   with   the   state   of   coherence   and  
decoherence  in  quantum  computing  can  be  applied  to  dealing  with  error  corrections  
in   the  Monte  Carlo.  Another   aspect   to   consider   is   the   amount   of   data   that   can   be  
simulated  because  of  how  quantum  memories  work  (the  no-­‐‑cloning  theorem  where  
no   memories   are   retained   of   the   selections   that   have   been   made)   and   the  
transmission   of   information   that   does   not   require   a   classically   induced  
communication   channel   that   has   to   deal   with   the   issue   of   pile-­‐‑ups   and   energy  
inefficiencies.    
The   still   unfinished   narrative   of   what   quantum   computing   can   do   to  
contribute  to  the  simulation  of  multipath  events  is  of  interest  here,  as  it  speaks  to  the  
same  problems  faced  by  physicists  who  have  to  deal  with  way  too  much  data  so  that  
too  many  cuts  have  to  be  made,  sometimes  to  the  detriment  of  getting  sufficient  data  
to  produce  truly  global  representations  of  nature.  How  would  the  developments  of  
quantum   computing   be   productive   to   changing   the   current   practices   in   statistical  
modeling   would   also   come   from   changes   in   how   one   develops   the   modeling  
techniques,   as  well   as   a   reconceptualization  of  data,  within  more  dynamic   spatial-­‐‑
temporality  in  relation  to  existing  categories.  
7.3 Conclusion 
Finally,   the   constitution   of   the   Monte   Carlo   generators   and   simulation  
practices   within   the   backdrop   of   media   technicity   requires   a   more   thorough  
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development   of   machinic   phenomenology,   one   mediated   and   buffered   by   the  
detectors   of   the   LHC   that   bear   witness   to   microphysical   events   by   tracking   the  
signals  during  quantum  level  interactions  with  macro-­‐‑detectors  operating  under  the  
rule  of  classical  physics.  The  presencing  of  media,  as  epitomized  by  the  relationality  
between   the   detectors,   data,   and   Monte   Carlo   simulators/generators,   is   one   of  
absence  and  presence,  of  immediacy  and  delayed  manifestations.  
The  LHC  requires  extra-­‐‑sensory  extension,  but  it  is  not  quite  certain  that  the  
Monte   Carlo   simulators   could   provide   that   extension   unless   the   former   can   be  
reconstituted  as  a  speculative  machine  that  finds  wriggle  room  beyond  the  formality  
of   its   responsibility   to   the   Standard   Model   experiments.   Therefore,   the   media  
question  here  is  the  question  of  the  cybernetic,  a  molar  organization  whence  we  can  
locate  the  “power  center”  that  Deleuze  and  Guattari  refers  to  as  “defined  not  by  an  
absolute   exercise   of   powers  within   its   domain   but   by   the   relative   adaptations   and  
conversions   it   effects   between   the   line   and   the   flow.”   In   fact,   their   respective  
concepts  of  the  molar  and  the  molecular  most  aptly  define  the  relationship  between  
the  detector  events  and  Monte  Carlo  events  because  it   is   the  system  of  reference  to  
the   events   that   are   important   rather   than   size,   scale   and   dimension   (239).      The  
molecular  in  this  case  is  one  that  is  expansive  and  flowing,  not  demarcated  by  rigid  
segmentations   and   lines   (hence   the   Monte   Carlo   events)   while   the   molar   (the  
detector)  is  organized  to  resonate  within  the  delimitations  of  a  nature  it  can  access.  
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This  brings  me  back  to  the  speculative  writing  performed  through  the  Monte  
Carlo,  and  the  modes  for  reading  the  events  in  terms  of  the  analytic  output  and  more  
expansive   interpretations   performed.   Should   we   be   successful   in   producing   a  
speculative  media   space  not  only   for   constituting   the   epistemic  bodies  of   scientific  
objects,  but  also   for  consideration  of   the  visuals,   sounds,  and   the   tactile,  what  new  
aesthetical   analytics   can   be   invoked   in   this   bridge   between   the   media   arts   and  
sciences?      
For  as  Joanna  Drucker  argues  with  regard  to  speculative  computing  from  the  
intellectual   tensions  of  digital   humanities,  where   speculative   computing   is  defined  
as   pushing,   ”subjective   and   probabilistic   concepts   of   knowledge   as   experience  
(partial,   situated,   and   subjective)   against   objective   and   mechanistic   claims   for  
knowledge   as   information   (total,   managed,   and   externalized)”(5),   the   speculative  
computing   that   grows   out   of   a   Monte-­‐‑Carlo   and   LHC   detector   hybrid   creates   a  
connection  from  the  mundane  delimitations  represented  by  the  interaction  between  
the  detectors  and  nature,  into  a  virtual  world  that  is  artificially  induced  and  contains  
a  propensity  for  cinematic  display.  In  addition,  through  speculative  computing,  the  
ontological   can  be  better   approached  when  one   shapes   a  methodology   around   the  
unexpected  instead  of  merely  the  fulfillment  of  existing  criteria.  
The   connection   between   high-­‐‑energy   particle   physics   (including   quantum  
theory)   to   the   cinematic  happens  at  multiple   levels  but   I  will   only  discuss   the   two  
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most  relevant  to  the  chapter.  At  the  first  level  is  the  rhetoric  of  reading  the  science  of  
the   genome   (in   terms   of   the   cross-­‐‑fertilization   and   hybridization   of   genes)   against  
quantum   entanglement   (that   is   a   part   of   development   in   quantum   informatics),  
which   are   then   used   to   produce   a   biophysical   thinking   about   information  
transmission   and   embodiment,   such   as   what   the   aforementioned   essay   by   von  
Foerster   attempts   to   do.      Even   if   physicists   are   using   physics   theories   to   study  
biological  subjects,  such  as  in  a  recently  published  paper  on  the  migration  studies  of  
population  that  applies  the  stochastic  method  of  equilibrium  to  model  the  study  in  
ways   similar   to   the   Monte   Carlo   statistical   analyses11,   the   actual   merging   of   the  
quantum  with   the   biological   has   not   gone   beyond   the   level   of   the   fictive   and   the  
speculative.   It   is   in   imagining   the   infinite   ways   by   which   we   can   represent   the  
techniques  of  biophysical  hybridization,  departing  from  the  limits  of  science,  that  the  
combined   techniques   of   the   science   fictional   and   cinematic   storytelling   become  
increasingly  cogent.  The  end  product  could  bring  about  the  explicit  actualization  of  
the  virtual-­‐‑real  relation  even  as  critique  is  simultaneously  performed.    But  the  audio-­‐‑
visual-­‐‑tactile  representation  of  the  end  product  remains  to  be  seen.  
At  another  level,  there  is  also  the  actual  filmic  realization  of  the  significance  
of   the   LHC,   the   activities   at   CERN,   and   their   relationship   to   society   and   science.  
While   there  have  been  multitudes   of   animated  documentaries  produced  by  CERN  
                                                                                                             
11  See  Lombardo,  Pierangelo  et  al.  
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(and   related   national   laboratories)   about   their   experimental   set-­‐‑ups   and   actual  
experimental  processes  as  part  of  public  outreach,   the  year  2014  sees   the   launch  of  
LHC  inspired-­‐‑documentaries  addressing  larger  issues  of  science  and  society  that  are  
not   specifically   science   communication   infomercials;   more   significantly,   the   two  
documentaries  are   released  more   than  a  year  after   the  announcement  of   the  Higgs  
boson   even   if   the   production   of   the   documentaries   coincided  with   the   summer   of  
2012,  which  was  when  the  announcement  was  made.      
Particle   Fever   is   specifically   about   the   science   of   the   particle   physics  
experiments   and   the   people   involved   in   it.   The   exhilaration   and   euphoria   of   the  
scientific  production  (and  the  imagination  that  derives  from  speculating  at  the  edge  
of   the   unknown)   is   foregrounded   while   the   actual   scientific   grind   is   mostly  
submerged.  The  same  goes  for  another  documentary,  The  Circle,  which  is  less  about  
the  science  that  comes  out  of  the  Large  Hadron  Collider,  but  about  the  reaction  (and  
speculation)  of  the  surrounding  community  in  the  south  of  France  to  what  is  going  
on  at  CERN,  as  well  as  how  an  artist  appears  to  be  trying  to  interpret  what  goes  on  
there.  However,  both  documentaries  emphasize  the  different  acts  of  speculation  that  
are   involved,   using   filmic   techniques      (and   animation)   to   demonstrate   the   multi-­‐‑
layers  of  speculation  at  an  epistemological  and  even  ontologically  existential  level.  
How   do   the   affordances   of   digital   media   bring   us   a   step   closer   to   the  
ontological,   to   that  point  of  ontic  genesis,  and  towards   the  attainment  of  unitarity?  
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The   idea   of   the   simulacra,   such   as   that   embodied   by   the   experimental   work   and  
simulation   surrounding   the   search   for   the  Higgs  boson,   appropriates  Baudrillard’s  
hyper-­‐‑reality   to   probe   at   the   presentation   of   ontology   during   the   process   of  
simulation;   what   paradigm   of   the   observable   is   deployed   in   the   epistemics   of  
simulation  practices  that  also  informs  the  epistemic  consumption  (and  thus  reading)  
of  the  output  of  the  practices?  If  there  is  one  Baudrillardian  claim  of  the  simulacrum  
that   epitomizes   the   spirit   of   this   chapter,   it   is   that   closing   of   the   gap   between   the  
imaginary  and  the  real  through  the  absorption  of  their  distance  between  each  other,  
so  that  there  is  room  for  a  critical  projection  of  the  reconstitution  of  meaning  behind  
an  experiment,  the  experiential,  and  the  virtually-­‐‑real.  
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8. Epilog: Evaluating Speculative Physics 
I  started  out  by  appropriating  speculative  physics  as  enunciated  by  Schelling,  
but  through  reading  him  not  as  being  antithetical  to  empiricism  in  his  metaphysics;  
rather,  I  read  him  as  encouraging  reflection  into  how  one  deals  with  the  relationality  
between  product  and  productivity,  and  the  prehension  (and  extension)  of  nature,  a  
philosophical  belief  also  shared  by  Whitehead.  What  I  had  done  in  this  dissertation  
is   less   about   attempting   to   force   Schelling’s   idealist   philosophy   onto   any   scientific  
philosophy,  but  to  update  the  his  philosophy  for  developing  a  more  encompassing  
theoretical   methodology   for   reading   modern   physics,   and   its   philosophical  
conceptualization.    
However,  it  is  by  taking  Schelling’s  original  conceptualization  of  speculative  
physics,  and  then  rewriting  it  against  new  identities  conceived  about  nature  that  one  
comes   by   the   revelation   of   quantum   laws,   of   the   speculative   philosophy   of  
Whitehead   that   was   born   when   the   new   fields   of   physics   was   coalescing,   and   as  
algebraic  geometry  underwent  a  transformation  from  the  time  of  its  inception  in  the  
eighteenth   century.   There   is   an   idealist   spirit   shared   by   both   Schelling   and  
Whitehead  with  regard  to  nature  and  the  mind  in  the  seeking  of  the  proto-­‐‑causes  of  
nature   that   had   been  much   neglected   in   philosophies   overly  wedded   to   empirical  
concerns  and  logical  truism.  If  there  is  a  take  home  lesson  from  speculative  physics  
and  process   philosophy,   it   is   not   to   assume   that   one   can   neatly   carve   out   a   ‘bare’  
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physical   organism   (‘bare’   in   the   sense   of   the   ontic)   into   purely   quantifiable   or  
discretely   measurable   packages.   As   the   previous   chapters   had   indicated,   the  
quantifiable   are   to   be   managed   next   to   the   unquantifiable,   to   potentially   positive  
outcome,  and   that   the  process  points   to  behavior  of  physical   elements   that  are  not  
evident  at  the  initial  and  endpoint  of  a  physical  process.  
Therefore,   we   cannot   assume   that   a   seemingly   precise   scientific   argument  
within   a   linearly   logico-­‐‑empirico   format  will   progress   onto   an   intuitive   or   certain  
end.   Foremost,   we   cannot   claim   certainty   over   the   epistemological   framework  
through  which   logic  operates  and  must  be   ready   to  accept   that   the  calibration  and  
adjustment   done   by   the   rules   of   that   epistemology   are   always   flawed.  Moreover,  
given  our  problematic  access  to  ontology,  the  supposed  physical  laws  governing  the  
structure  and  purpose  could  be  the  cause  for  destabilization  when  a  paradox  erupts.    
As  Ackermann  states  in  Data,  Instruments,  and  Theory,  “…Logic  cannot  coerce  
directionality  in  which  projection  from  a  basis  to  anticipated  future  data  should  take  
place”   (5).   As   he   rightly   argues,   the   underdetermined   undecideability   and  
constraints   of   logic   mean   that   the   empirical   uncertainty   in   data   may   never   be  
adequately   resolved.   Further,   despite   wariness   in   ascribing   scientific   practice   as  
speculative,   there   is   plenty   of   evidence   to   prove   that   acts   of   speculation   exist   at  
different  points  of  the  decision-­‐‑making  processes  in  science,  as  the  chapters  and  also  
Appendix   A   have   sought   to   demonstrate.   Even   with   the   most   precise   of  
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measurement,   the  measurement  can  only  be  as  accurate  as   the  descriptive   limits  of  
its   epistemic   effectiveness,   or   the   type   of   instrument   deployed,   as   the   relationship  
between   the   knower   and   knowledge   is   dependent   on   the   apparatus   used   for  
delineating   the   properties   of   that   relationship.   The   oft-­‐‑cited   example   is   the  
Schrödinger   cat,   whereby   one   assumes   that   the   state   of   the   measured   is   changed  
after   interaction  with   the   observer   if   only   because   it   is   difficult   to   disentangle   the  
state   of   the   observer   from   that   of   the   observed   due   to   their   simultaneously,   and  
commonly,   ‘smeared’   conditions.      But   as  Ackerman  notes,   and  which   I   agree,   it   is  
possible   that   the   object   studied   is   unaffected   by   the   observer/knower;   the  
observer/knower   could   be   the   one   to   have   changed   because   of   exposure   to  
transformative  (game-­‐‑changing)  events  that  alters  his/her/its  perception,  such  as  was  
illustrated  in  Matter’s  End.  
Hence,  to  counter  that  lack  of  autonomy,  which  speculative  physics  gestures  
towards,  one  should  view  scientific  praxis  as  a  methodological  emergence   that  can  
only   be   consolidated   over   time   as   data   accumulates   and   as   our   understanding   of  
what  to  do  with  the  data  improves.  However,  we  must  still  be  cognizant  that  it  takes  
a  long  time  to  get  sufficient  data  to  demonstrate  ceteris  paribus  truths.  Even  so,  that  is  
a   hard   accomplishment   because   of   the   multiple   levels   of   considerations   involved  
during  decision-­‐‑making   in  order   to  know  which  model   to   invest   in   (in   the   form  of  
one’s  labor  and  funding)  and  the  realization  that  any  exclusion  of  data  could  result  
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in   the   preclusion   of   a   potential   discovery.   If   the   narrative   of   the   Standard  Model,  
especially   the   Higgs   boson,   is   any   indication,   it   is   obvious   that   the   theory   of  
justification  and  discovery  are  speculative,  even  if  differently  so.  In  the  former  case,  
one   has   to   obtain   empirical   justification   on   why   a   particular   model   is   the   best  
ontological   explanation   there   is,  with   explanations  defined  as   syntactical   or   logical  
relationships   to   putative   theories   (in   Ackermann’s   words)   of   the   observable  
behaviors,   and  properties  of   local   symmetries   that  undercut   the   interactions  of   the  
Standard   Model.   For   instance,   the   supersymmetry,   or   a   version   of   it,   has   to   be  
sufficiently   justified   so   that   there   is   an   unequivocal   determination   of   its   role   in  
balancing  between  the  theoretical  prediction  and  experimental  manifestation  of   the  
Standard  Model  Higgs  boson.  
Nevertheless,   as   was   stated,   it   is   possible   for   justification   to   break   down  
when   it   turns   out   that  what   is   expected   becomes   unexpected,   and   something   else  
that   has   no   known   version   in   a  model   is   discovered   in   its   stead.   In   other  words,  
poles   of   singularities   and   ruptures   can   prevent   one   from   following   through   with  
even   the  most  elegant  mathematical   logic.  This   is  where  one  gets   into   the  mode  of  
discovery,   a  mode   even  more   speculative   than   the   justification   of   theory,   because  
there   is  no  formula  for  determining  how  discoveries  are  made,  and  the  parameters  
for  that  determination  can  be  as  broad  or  as  narrow  as  the  steps  required  to  manifest  
the   object   of   discovery.   But   it   is   in   this   potentiality   of   discovery   that   speculative  
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physics  is  most  interested  in  working  out,  because  this  is  where  new  knowledge  can  
happen.  
The  consideration  of  the  scientific  model  as  a  fable  or  fiction  is  not  novel,  as  
other   philosophers   of   science,   such   as  Nancy  Cartwright,   Joseph   Rouse,   and   even  
Hans  Vaihinger  (his  notion  of  fictive  judgments),  had  considered  how  fiction  can  be  
used   for   understanding   epistemological   and   ontological   accounts   of   physical  
theories,   such   as   the   relationship  between   abstract   to   concrete   sets   of  descriptions,  
and  for  satisfying  a  concrete  description  by  way  of  satisfying  an  abstract  description  
(Cartwright  39).  We  consider  first  the  differentiation  of  fictional  construct  at  the  level  
of   a   hypothesis   and   theory,   before  moving   on   to   consider   fiction   and   semi-­‐‑fiction.  
Fiction,  in  the  sense  meant  here,  is  the  use  of  narrative  to  model  particular  groupings  
or  clusters  of  ideas  that  could  be  scientific,  or  not,  while  semi-­‐‑fiction  is  a  model  that  
enables   expediency   during   inference   making.   For   Vaihinger,   there   is   an   added  
valence  of  difference  between  semi-­‐‑fiction  and  hypothesis,  with  the  former  limited  to  
the  realm  of  the  metaphysical  and  the  latter  having  a  semblance  of  scientific  value.  A  
good   example   of   a   semi-­‐‑fiction   would   be   the   gedankenexperiment   used   to   provide  
interpretive   heuristics   to   aspects   of  modern   physics   that   could   not   be   empirically  
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demonstrated  while  a  hypothesis  would  be  an  initial  idea  experimentally  set  up  for  
testing  and  repetition,  at  multiple  levels.1  
From  chapters  two  to  seven,  I  have  been  building  an  ontology  of  fictions  that  
unshackle  the  restrictions  of  all  kinds  of  praxis-­‐‑coupled  fictions;  fictions  such  as  the  
laboratory  fictions  that  fall  within  the  rubric  of  how  one  can  characterize  particular  
distinctions  of  an  object  that  falls  within  the  embrace  of  a  scientific  domain,  thought-­‐‑
experiments  that  serve  to  illuminate  physical  phenomena  within  familiar  constraints  
while  gesturing  to  the  need  for  resolving  paradoxes,  and  experimental  systems  that  
are   conceptual   arguments   of   pre-­‐‑determinate   judgments.   Instead   of   following   the  
common   Hempelian   model   of   articulating   deductive   inferences   that   draws   on  
theor(ies)  and  the  praxis  of  known  facts,  or  even  inductive  logic,  I  have  tried  to  show  
how  all  features  of  the  theoretical,  experimental,  and  fictive  can  be  coherent  yet  not  
necessarily  similarly  interpretable,  or  even  be  mutually  consistent  at  all  times.  In  the  
sense  that  contradictions  can  happen  in  a  system,  the  same  contradictions  are  merely  
representations  of   observables   interspersed,   and   intercalated,   among  hidden   logics  
of  the  unobservable  variables  of  the  system.  The  appearance  of  illogic  is  because  the  
observer  only  has  a  partial  view  of  the  ontology.    
                                                                                                             
1  Interested  readers  can  check  out  Hans  Vaihinger’s  The  Philosophy  of  'ʹAs  If'ʹ:  A  System  of  the  Theoretical,  
Practical   and   Religious   Fictions   of  Mankind,   Trans.   by  C.  K.  Ogden.   The   first   edition  was   published   in  
England  by  Routledge   and  Kegan  Paul,   Ltd.   in   1924   but   there   have   been  multiple   editions  made   by  
other  publishers  since,  the  latest  being  in  2008.  
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The   above   connects   to   the   seeming   illogicality   of   juxtaposing   precision  
measurement   and   determination  with   that   of   the   speculative.  As   the  Monte  Carlo  
critical  narrative  informs  us,  tight  control  over  inputs  and  the  global  scale  of  the  data  
can  be  summarized  into  more  precise  outcomes.  But  this  is  riding  on  the  assumption  
that   the   parameters   are   unproblematic;   in   reality,   we   are   uncertain   as   to   whether  
predictions  always  end  in  fulfillment.  But,  there  is  also  another  logic  represented  by  
the   null   hypothesis   that   argues   for   a   non-­‐‑correlation   between   the   tight   controls   of  
input   with   the   precision   of   output   in   the   sense   that   one   cannot   control   for  
determinate  outcome  from  the  point  of  input.  A  good  example  of  such  a  case  is  the  
oft-­‐‑discussed   double-­‐‑slit   experiment   and   its   variants.      Nevertheless,   this   does   not  
mean   that   precision   could   never   be   obtained;   it   just   means   that   some   adjustment  
would  have  to  be  done  in  order  to  get  at  the  desired  measurable.  To  use  the  double-­‐‑
slit  experiment  example  again,  this  means  adjusting  the  setting  of  the  experiment  so  
that  we  might  be  able  to  determine  which  slit   the  beam  of  particle  will  be  entering  
into  at  a  specific  slice  of  time,  or  whether  the  information  obtained  from  the  which-­‐‑
path  experiment   can  be  erased  after   the  measurement  has  been  performed,   so   that  
initially  ‘suppressed’  interference  pattern  can  return  (Barad  311-­‐‑12).  
The  null  hypothesis  could  also  arise  from  the  underdetermination  between  a  
measured   effect   and   interpreted   causality.   In   other   words,   in   the   case   of   causal  
effects   involving   experimental   data,   one   cannot   be   unequivocally   certain   of   direct  
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cause-­‐‑and-­‐‑effect   correlations   between   a   particular   set   of   data   and   a   physical  
phenomenon,   and   therefore,   the   cause   of   that   phenomenon.   For   instance,   the  
inclusion  of  hitherto  new  parameters  unrelated   to   the  original  data  could  make  no  
difference   to   what   is   already   observed;   or,   the   new   parameters   could   sufficiently  
complicate  the  original  observation  so  that  one  can  no  longer  differentiate  the  cause  
from   the   effect,   or   even   determine   the   relation   between   cause   and   effect.  One   can  
approximate  the  truth  but  not  draw  direct  conclusions  from  the  former.  
All   the   acts   of   theorization,   experimentation,   and   analysis   have   to   do  with  
acts  of  reading,  writing,  and  interpretation  that  parallel,  but  do  not  directly  correlate  
to,  measurement,  observation,  and  modeling.  In  thinking  about  how  readers  interact  
with   a  variety  of  media,  whether  physicists   reading  of   the  values  provided  by   the  
console  screens  connected  to  the  detectors,  reports,  preprints,  and  published  results;  
or   a   literary   scholar   reading   through   the   core   of   poetic   corpora,   the   process   of  
reading  (a  cognitive  inscription)  can  be  constituted  as  surface  level  (epistemological)  
reading   in   relation   to   a  deep-­‐‑level   reading   that   tries   to  get   right   to   the  ontological  
layer.2    
Epistemological   reading   can   then   be   constituted   as   a   form   of   comparative  
reading,  where  one  compares  between  the  multitudes  of  epistemic  content  derived  
                                                                                                             
2  I  have  a  deeper  discussion  of  this  in  a  conference  paper  published  in  a  Proceeding.  See  Lee,  Clarissa  Ai  
Ling  Lee  “Speculative  Reading,  Speculative  Physics:  the  Ontology  of  the  Large  Hadron  Collider”  in  EPJ  
Web  of  Conference,  vol  28.  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/epjconf/20122812033>  
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from  a  range  of  subfields  of  knowledge.  Epistemological  reading  can  also  be  used  to  
compare   between   variable   readings   of   a   physically   similar   phenomenon.   I   have  
brought  up  such  an  instance  in  chapter  three  when  I  discussed  the  parallels  between  
the   superconductor   and   gauge   field   theoretical   developments.  Another   example   is  
the   relationship   between   neural   networks   and   quantum   states   demonstrated  
multiple   in   the  chapters,  beginning  with  Egan’s  Quarantine.  Were  we   to   read   these  
knowledge   fields   as   ‘texts,’   we   can   then   apply  Wolfgang   Iser’s   phenomenological  
account   of   reading,      “…one   text   is   potentially   capable   of   several   realizations…no  
reading  can  ever  exhaust  the  full  potential…the  text  refers  back  directly  to  our  own  
preconceptions…the   potential   text   is   infinitely   richer   than   any   of   its   individual  
realizations”  (280).    While  there  is  a  whole  load  of  difference  between  a  ‘literary’  text  
and  raw  data  mined  and  processed  through  an  array  of  scientific  instruments,  both  
are   similar   in   that   the   degree   of   their   potency,   and   potential,   are   the   result   of   the  
mode  and  choice  of  interpretations  performed  in  the  readings  of  these  disciplinarily  
inflected  ‘texts.’  To  sum  it  up,  the  connections  formed  between  the  subfields  require  
a  particular   imaginative  synthesis   that  converges  metaphysical   realization  with   the  
physically  observable.  
Ontological   reading,   on   the   other   hand,   reads   into   the   lines   of   tacit  
knowledge  to  confront  the  subsumed  ideologies  embedded  in  the  ‘cell  structure,’  the  
code,   of   the   foundational   structure   of   knowledge.   While   epistemological   reading  
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means  working  with  hyper-­‐‑mediated  or  distantiated  datum  that  screens  us  from  the  
‘raw-­‐‑ness’   of   an   event,   ontological   reading   requires   dealing   with   unmediated  
affectivity   and   the   subject   as   it   comes   into   being.  Not  much  of  what   goes   on  with  
regard  to  the  events  of  the  Standard  Model  has  involved  ontological  reading  because  
of  the  ‘distance’  between  the  scientists  and  the  triggers.    
However,  the  Monte  Carlo  code  can  narrow  the  gap  between  the  ontology  of  
the   scientific   object   at   hand   and   the   physicists’   epistemic   relation   to   the   object.  
Beyond   quantum   theory,   epistemological   and   ontological   readings   could   also   be  
applied   to   the   critical   readings   of   other   scientific,   humanistic,   and   artistic   subjects.  
Moreover,   I   have   been   suggesting,   in   all   my   chapters,   that   the   performance   of  
speculative   physics   has   the   purpose   of   bringing   epistemically   disparate   subject-­‐‑
matter   together   for   creating   new   and  hybridized  perspectives.   Speculative   physics  
enables   intervention   into   supposedly   epistemically   inscrutable   and   politically  
unreachable  subject  matter.    
In  a  sense,  speculative  physics  updates  the  extensive  reading  on  process,  the  
abstract  method,   and   concrescence  promulgated  by  Whitehead   in   light   of   the  new  
ontological   problematics   raised   in   quantum   field   theories   and   even   potential   new  
physics   that   could   extend,   and   further   reveal,   the   holes   and   self-­‐‑contradictions   in  
current   theoretical-­‐‑physical   interpretations.   Nevertheless,   a   more   extensive  
development  of   this   critical   study,  of  which   this  dissertation   is  only  a   start,  would  
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have   to   come   later.   At   the   end   of   the   day,   it   is   my   aspiration   to   attempt   the  
development  of  a  methodology  that  could  be  applied  for  working  with  linguistically  
and  epistemically   incommensurable  disciplinary  fields  by  drawing  foremost  on  the  
highest   order   of   their   conceptual   abstractions,   which   is   the   ‘summit’   that   these  
disparate   disciplines   are   most   likely   to   meet.   However,   this   ‘summit’   is   largely  
unattainable   by   most   interdisciplinary   scholars   who   might   only   have   a   tenuous  
grasp   of   the   disciplines   external   to   their   home   disciplines.   In   light   of   that,   greater  
collaborative   conversations   are   in   order   for   improving   the   development   of  
interdisciplinary  discourse  that  goes  beyond  gesturing  from  the  sidelines.  
8.1 Extending Speculative Physics Beyond Physics and 
Science Fiction 
As  the  concluding  section  of  chapter  four  suggests,  speculative  physics  could  
be   an   emergent   approach   for   reconstituting   the   essentials   and   substances   of  
speculativeness,  of  a  concrescence  where  the  relationship  between  the  environment  
of  the  media  and  the  content  projected  is  more  deeply  embedded  within  the  affective  
nexus  of  the  organism,  such  as  is  the  case  with  Nick  Stavrianos  in  Quarantine,  where  
all   forms   of   sensory   consumption   is   configured   and   determined   by   increasingly  
well-­‐‑calibrated,  and  precise  mods  that  are  of  the  nth  orders  of  cybernetic  biological-­‐‑
to-­‐‑digital-­‐‑and-­‐‑back   controls.   But   is   it   merely   a   façade   of   control,   or   is   there   an  
emergent   form   of   life   that   takes   control   of   the   mind’s   relationship   to   the   world?  
Whose  eidos  is  being  constituted:  the  mods  or  the  organic  brain?  But  then  again,  one  
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can   also   argue   that   the  distinction   between   the   intellectual   and   sensual   is   blurred,  
when  the  strategy  for  feeling  appears  to  be  regulated  by  the  mind.  
D.N.  Rodowick,  in  the  Virtual  Life  of  the  Film,  has  re-­‐‑imagined  the  medium  of  
new   media   technologies   in   juxtaposition   to   the   old   celluloid   of   the   cinema   to  
reconfigure  the  medium  of  film,  by  way  of  a  contestation  between  the  analogous  and  
the  digital  medium.  The  Monte  Carlo  machinery  has  also,   at  one  point,  developed  
from  an  analog  computer  for  simulating  data  collected  for  war  strategies.  The  same  
statistical  methods   are   then   deployed,   in   the   aftermath   of  World  War   Two,   to   the  
study  of  the  big  science  of  space  and  nuclear  physics,  but  with  much  mediation  and  
modification  to  suit  the  contingent  requirements  of  the  object  of  study.  The  problem  
with   the   analog   computer   is   that   its   operative   mode   is   only   at   the   level   of   the  
macrophysical,  something  which  Von  Neumann  also  alludes  to,  less  directly,  in  The  
Brain   and   the   Computer.   Therefore,   many   of   the   discrete   and   macroscopically  
paradoxical  processes  at  the  quantum  level  become  too  complicated  to  be  computed  
onto   a  macrophysically   oriented   computer.  However,   this   does   not  mean   that   the  
analog  computer  cannot  be  programmed  to  crunch  data  from  quantum  interactions,  
such  as  is  illustrated  in  The  Minotaur  in  the  Mushroom  Maze  novella  in  chapter  six.  It  is  
just   that   the   outcomes   are   semi-­‐‑classical   approximations   constrained   by   the  
mechanical  limitations  of  the  computer  that  means  the  exclusion  of  higher  orders  of  
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complex   calculations,   and   therefore,   of   more   complex   representations   and  
inscriptions.  
But  how  can  one  begin   to   read   epistemic   and   cultural   objects   speculatively  
and   politically;   to   understand   that   there   can   be   abstract   and   concrete,   as   well   as  
absolute   and   relativistic,   entanglements   that   take   place   within   the   architecture   of  
information   mingled   with   the   ideological,   the   factish,   and   the   unanalyzable?   The  
unanalyzable  represents  knowledge  that  could  not  fit  any  analytic  logic,  or  contains  
too  many  higher  order  terms  that  require  greater  sensitivity  of  instrument  (combined  
with   the   right   algorithm)   before   access   becomes   feasible.   The   unanalyzable,   as  
Babette  E.  Babich  explains,  is  couched  in  the  expectancy  of  clarity  that  is  attained  by  
definition   or   a   fiat,   aiming   to   dissolve   the   state   of   perplexity,   but   that   could   also  
reduce   a   problem   not   readily   reducible   without   causing   repercussions;   such  
repercussions  can  include  changing  what  might  have  been  (33).   In   light  of   that,  we  
might  also  consider  the  theory-­‐‑ladenness  of  the  gaze  upon  the  object  of  analysis  that  
is   dependent   upon   the   situatedness   of   the   subject;   the   subject   acculturates   the  
interpretive  process  emerging  from  the  gaze.  With  that,  let  us  consider  what  is  that  
extra  which  speculative  physics  brings  to  critical  science  studies.  
8.2 Critical Science Studies and Speculative Physics 
Critical   science   studies   have   existed   as   multiple   variants,   especially   in   the  
form  of   the   social   and   cultural   studies  of   science.  All  of   them  are   interested   in   the  
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operation   of   politics   in   knowledge,   including   the   politics   that   circumscribe   the  
various   stakeholders   of   knowledge.   In   Science   Studies:   An   Advanced   Introduction:  
David  Hess  explains  that  the  term  “critical”  is  as  ambiguous  as  it  is  complex  in  the  
context  of  contemporary  science  and  technology  studies  (STS).  
In   the   humanities   the   term   ‘critical   theory’   usually   refers   to   a   theory   of  
literary   or   cultural   criticism,   in   other  words,   a   theory   that   helps   guide   the  
interpretation  of  texts.  In  the  social  sciences  the  same  term  often  refers  to  the  
Western   Marxist   tradition   associated   with   the   Frankfurt   school   and   post-­‐‑
Marxist  researchers   influenced  by  the  school,  such  as  Jürgen  Habermas…In  
STS   the   term   is   sometimes   used   to   describe   the   confluence   of   research  
traditions  that  includes  feminist/antiracist  studies,  critics  of  the  technological  
society,   radical   science   researchers,   and   various   other   scholars   who   are  
concerned   with   issues   of   social   justice   and   democracy.   The   category   of  
critical   STS   therefore   overlaps   with   but   is   not   continuous   with   cultural  
studies  of  science  and  technology.  (113)  
However,   what   is   of   concern   here   is   what   critical   science   studies   could   do,   in   a  
radical   sense,   in   dealing   with   the   uncertainties   and   destabilized   knowledge  
categories,  including  one’s  knowledge  of  the  self  and  others,  to  produce  an  approach  
to   knowledge   that   is   empowering   even   to   the   minority   stakeholders   of   the  
knowledge  structure,  albeit  those  who  came  late  into  the  game.      
Moreover,   given   speculative   physics’   interest   in   how   one   can   fit   the  
unobserved   in   relation   to   the   observed,   the   former   is   interested   in   comparing  
between   the   different   interpretations   and   propositions   for   synchronizing   the  
determinate  with  the  indeterminate.  At  the  same  time,  speculative  physics  is  aware  
of   the   complication   involved   in   separating  dominant   from  subordinated  categories  
of   knowledge,   as  well   as   in   contending  with   the   difficulties   of   self-­‐‑reflexivity   and  
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epistemic  doubt.  Such  is  the  case  when  the  qualities  of  some  micro-­‐‑entities  are  not  as  
well   delineated,  with   uncertainty   over   how   one  might   speak   of   the   politics   of   the  
invisible.  To  give  a  better  demonstration  of  my  argument,  I  will  draw  on  a  favorite  
example   of   philosophers,   taken   from   Nelson   Goodman’s   concept   of   projectable  
predicates.    
Imagine  an  object  A  that  contains  a  property  allowing  it  to  emanate  the  color  
blue  at   time   t1.  But,  with  additional  data  and   interactions  over   time,  or  maybe,   the  
unleashing   of   an   unpredicted   event,   the   object   A   now   seems   to   exude   a   different  
hue,   perhaps   green,   at   t2.   The   blue-­‐‑green,   or   grue,   of   object   A   has   not   actually  
changed   the   characteristics   of   the   object;   on   the   surface,   the   characteristics  merely  
look  different  to  an  external  observer  (remember  the  double-­‐‑slit  experiment).  This  is  
actually  Goodman’s   deployment   of   lawlike   versus   non-­‐‑lawlike   generalizations   (no  
underlying  characteristics  of  object  A  has  changed  in  going  from  blue  to  grue)  that  
enable  (or  not)  the  making  of  forecasts  and  predictions,  assuming  that  there  is  direct  
continuity  from  the  past  to  the  present,  and  into  the  future,  and  that  we  do  not  need  
different  calibrations,  methods,  or  instruments  to  trace  that  timeline  of  continuity.  
Perhaps  one  does  not  assume  that  intellectual  continuity  is  necessary  to  insert  
oneself  convincingly  as  a  subject   that  matters   in  making   interventions   to  otherwise  
inscrutable   topics;   or   the   marginality   of   the   observer   position   itself   can   be   an  
advantage   in   injecting  non-­‐‑dominant  epistemic  contributions   that  could  potentially  
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break  the  cul-­‐‑de-­‐‑sac  in  current  scientific  ventures  so  that  such  contributions  become  
invaluable.    
I  am  reminded  of  Traweek’s  example  of  an  international  postdoctoral  fellow  
who  came  from  a   less  developed  country  and  had  to  contend  with   the  classist  and  
social   biases   of   his   colleagues   while   working   hard   to   prove   his   competence   in   a  
world  that  privileges  the  mastery  of  technological  gadgetry.  Couple  that  scenario  to  
Galison’s  historical  review,  in  Image  and  Logic,  of  the  contribution  of  the  lesser  known  
Marietta  Blau  whose  ‘primitive’  gadgetry  had  brought  tremendous  contributions  to  
the  developments  of  nuclear  science  (and  is  one  of  the  earliest  work  on  nuclear  level  
interactions),   one   seriously   ponders   the   role   of   a   knowledge   producer   and   actor  
located   at   the   margins,   or   who   were   made   invisible.   What   form   of   epistemic  
subversions  could  they  potentially  perform  from  the  so-­‐‑called  periphery,  to  be  able  
to   impose,   more   solidly,   their   epistemic   matter   onto   an   intellectual   tradition   that  
wants  them  forgotten?    
Nevertheless,   an   epistemic   memory   of   an   ontological   potential   is   not  
predicated  on  the  certainty  of  what  went  before.  Rather,  it  is  built  of  historical  traces  
that  continue  to  be  carried  by  objects  progressing  through  time.  That  is  the  essence  of  
speculative  physics.    
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Appendix A: The Standard Model of Particle Physics: 
From Prehistory to History 
Knowledge  starts  out  as  bare   life  with  radical  potentialities.  As   layers  upon  
layers  of   the  potentialities  and   information  build  up  and  gather,  we  break   through  
the   walls   of   established   facts   (or   the   factish,   where   agency   and   dependence   on  
interpretations   occur   simultaneously)   to   obtain   fresh   insights.   At   the   same   time,  
there   is   also   a   perspective   that   one   has   to   deal   with,   such   as   the   possibility   of   a  
‘specious   present’   that   Isabelle   Stengers   refers   to   in   Thinking   with   Whitehead.   She  
argues   about   “how   much   the   notion   of   appearance   is   a   powerful   attractor”   for  
inducing   confrontation   between   two   stereotypical   categories   that   can   lead   to   the  
choice  of  one  possibility  over  that  of  another  (60).    
However,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  an  autonomous  objective  fact  in  scientific  
knowledge  since  objectivity   is  based  on   the  premise   that   the  self  of   the  knowledge  
producer   can   be   effaced   during   the   narrative   of   knowledge   construction,   and   that  
knowledge   can   attain   absolute   non-­‐‑subjectivity   by   mechanical,   or   instrumental,  
means1.   Since  knowledge   formation   takes  place   at   the   intersection  of   subject-­‐‑object  
relation,  and  is  defined  by  its  relationship  to  theoretical  paradigms  selected  precisely  
for   being   able   to   produce   the   most   convincing   explanation/description   (an   act   of  
                                                                                                             
1   See   Daston   and   Galison’s   Objectivity,   particularly   its   chapter   one   that   introduces   the   history   of  
mechanical   objectivity   in   knowledge   production   through   instrumentation   and   other   mediating  
apparatuses  to  provide  the  beginnings  to  the  aspirations  of  objectivity  in  science.  
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subjective   agency),   factual   objectivity   can   never   be   determinate.   Moreover,   pure  
objectivity  does  not  account  for  the  more  speculative  elements  that  are  included  into  
the  building  blocks  of  facts.  
The  mechanistic   paradigm   influencing   the   developments   of   theoretical   and  
experimental   physics   in   the   areas   of   thermodynamics,   optics,   and   electricity,  
between   the   18th   and   19th   century,   converge   in   classical   electrodynamics.   Classical  
electrodynamics   is   the   study   of   electromagnetic   field   through   ontologically  
determinate  mathematical  formalism  set  within  a  bounded  area  of  the  electrical  and  
magnetic   experiments   performed   by   major   scientific   players   such   as   Faraday,  
Oersted,  Weber,  Ampere,  Biot,  Savart,  and  Thomson,  among  others.  
It  was  around  this  time  that  the  trope  of  action-­‐‑at-­‐‑a-­‐‑distance  emerging  since  
Newton   and   Leibniz   took   a  more   practical   turn  whereby   non-­‐‑touching   bodies   are  
able   to   interact   in   such   a  manner   that  would   produce   observable   physical   effects,  
whereby  these  effects  may  occur  through  scalar  (non-­‐‑directional  magnitudes  such  as  
temperature  or  the  potential  between  two  charged  electrodes)  and  vector  fields  (that  
have  directional  magnitude   such   as  momentum  and   force).   It   is   important   to   note  
that   the  paradox  of  non-­‐‑local  mechanistic   interactions   is  not   restricted   to  epistemic  
developments  in  physics,  but  has  application  to  manner  in  which  the  techne  of  media  
is   conceived,   such   as   what   one   might   conceive   of   the   calculating   machine   of  
Babbage,  the  magic  lantern,  early  forms  of  photography,  and  the  automatons.  In  fact,  
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many   of   the   developments   in   optics   and   electrodynamics   that   fed   back   into   the  
development  of  these  objects  are  early  precursors  to  digital  media  objects.  
Through  the  developments  of  wave  theory  via  geometrical  optics  as  well  as  
field   theories   through   the   aforementioned   work   in   electrodynamics,   nineteenth-­‐‑
century   natural   philosophers-­‐‑turned-­‐‑scientists   were   able   to   piece   together   a   more  
complete  picture  of  the  science  of  energy  via  a  more  thorough  understanding  of  the  
mechanisms   of   heat,   power,   and   the   transformation   and   conservation   of   energy,  
since   all   of   these   observed   physical   phenomena   of   electricity,   magnetism   and  
thermodynamics  could  now  be  seen  as  manifestations  of  multifaceted  properties  of  
energy   at   different   spectrum.   All   were   the   result   of   extensive   works   by   natural  
philosophers/scientists   such   as   Rankine,   Joule,   Carnot,   Clapeyron,   and   Kelvin.   In  
fact,   the   work   done   on   transformations   between   forms   of   energy,   and   their  
conservation,  becomes  more  crucial  once  physics  move  from  the  realm  of  the  macro  
to   the   micro-­‐‑world   of   the   subatomic   particles,   and   particularly   after   quantum  
mechanics,  with  its  challenge  on  absolutism,  enters  the  story.  
The  development   of   scientific   fields   in   the   nineteenth   and   early  part   of   the  
twentieth   century   were   not   only   influenced   by   mechanistic   and   dynamical  
worldviews,   but   also   by   the   direction   in   which   specific   theological   beliefs   and  
political  philosophies  such  as  Marxism,   in  active  production  and  circulation  at   that  
time,  were  disseminated   among,   and   absorbed,   by   the   scientists.   These   ideologies,  
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while  not  influencing  directly  how  the  scientists  were  doing  their  scientific  work,  can  
have  a   less   indirect   influence  on  certain  choices   that   the  scientist  might  make  with  
regard   to   the   sort   of   interpretation,   or   even   mathematics,   that   they   preferred.2  
Moreover,   specific   ideologies   embraced   by   the   philosopher-­‐‑scientist   enabled   him  
(the  dominant   figure   in  most   history   of   science   narrative)   to   speculate   on   the   best  
explanation  for  his  theory  composed  of  his  physical  worldview  of  nature,  as  well  as  
the  multiplicity  of  representations  on  realism,  including  a  realism  that  may  be  veiled  
due   to   an   inadequately   prescribed   path   to   causality.   In   physics,   realism   is   the  
empirical  real  delimited  by  the  ability  for  current  scientific  models  and  experimental  
actualities  in  explicating  its  observable  and  non-­‐‑locally  observable  properties.  
Some   of   these   ideological   speculations   took   on   a   more   formalistic   outlook  
and   is   advanced   for   the   interpretation  of  physical   phenomena.  One   such   theory   is  
the  vortex  theory  of  the  atom,  conceived  as  a  solution  to  an  age-­‐‑old  problem  of  the  
constituent  of  matter.  The  vortex   theory  was  one  of   the  earliest  attempts   to   finesse  
the   paradox   of   the   split   between   the   atomistic   and   the   continuum   worldview   of  
                                                                                                             
2   It   was   also   around   this   period   that   one   sees   the   rise   of   functional   analytics   for   dealing   with   the  
question  of  conduction  and  transmission  between  different  physical  phenomena,  as  well  as  that  of  finite  
elements  and  statistical  mechanics.  The  previously  more  geometrical  dimensions  of  theoretical  physics  
was   also   beginning   to   take   on   a  more   algebraic   form  with   the   development   of   fields   and   particles,  
bringing   about   the   need   to   correlate   and   demonstrate   the   relationship   of   different   indeterminately  
related  properties  and  variables  to  each  other,  especially  within  different  physical  states.  Marx  himself  
was  interested  in  the  development  of  algebra  in  mathematics,  and  had  written  a  paper  on  the  expansion  
series   and   the   Lagrangian   (see   “Marx’s   Mathematical   Manuscripts   1881.”   Web.   10   Mar.   2013.   <  
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1881/mathematical-­‐‑manuscripts/index.htm>.  
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matter,   and   hence,   an   early   predecessor   to   the   concept   of   the   field   that   I   have  
discussed  in  the  previous  section.  The  theory  itself  was  advanced  through  the  work  
of  William  Thomson,   later   to  be  known  as  Lord  Kelvin,   for  whom   the   standard  of  
absolute   measurement   of   temperature,   kelvin,   was   named.3      The   same   group   of  
people  who  were   initially   interested  in  the  vortex  theory  of   the  atom  were  also  the  
people   involved   in   the   development   of   thermodynamics   where   questions   on  
freedom   and   constraints,   relating   to   the   question   of   positionality   and   movement  
through  time,  stand  for  the  point  of  departure  in  thinking  about  the  arrow  of  time,  
the  directional  flow  of  the  energy,  and  the  kinetic  motions  of  the  molecules.    
While  there  is  no  evidence  that  the  vortex  theory  is  embraced  widely,  it  was  
certainly  a  part  of  the  materialist  concept  of  science  that  would  have  some  impact,  at  
varying  degrees,  on  the  sciences  they  were  aware  of.  However,  it  would  appear  that  
much  of  the  interests  at  the  time  included  how  one  may  quantify  phenomena  such  as  
heat,   electricity,   magnetism   etc.   It   is   the   attempt   to   quantify   that   led   to   the   first  
version   of   a   unified   field   theory   through   the   work   of   scientist-­‐‑mathematician-­‐‑
philosopher,  James  Clerk  Maxwell.  
In  his  article  “On  Faraday’s  Lines  of  Force,”  Maxwell  is  interested  in  working  
out  a  more  mathematically   systematic  way   for   speculating  on   the   formation  of   the  
                                                                                                             
3  Kragh,  H.  "ʺThe  Vortex  Atom:  A  Victorian  Theory  of  Everything."ʺ  Centaurus  44.1-­‐‑2  (2002):  34-­‐‑113.  
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laws  on  electricity.4  His  earlier  work  contained  a  geometrical  outlook  that  conformed  
to   the  more  dominant  mathematical  discourse   for  privileging  geometrical   thinking  
over  analytical  subtleties.5  His  later  work,  influenced  by  the  concept  of  ether  and  its  
formulation  as  vortices,  was  drawn,  I  suspect,  from  work  on  eddy  currents,  current  
measurements,   magnetic   fields/forces,   and   from   Weber   and   Gauss’s   work   on  
electrodynamics   for  measuring   current   flows   of   positively   and   negatively   charged  
particle   flows.6   The   latter   work,   built   on   a   mechanical   viewpoint   driving   the  
dynamical  model   that   led   to   the   formation  of  Maxwell’s   four   famous   equations   of  
electromagnetism,  are  connected  to  changing  electric  forces  and  the  displacement  of  
electrical   current   observed   in   the   work   of   Faraday,   Ampere,   as   well   as   Biot   and  
                                                                                                             
4  See  “On  Faraday’s  Line  of  Force”   in  Thomas  K.  Simpson’s  Maxwell  on  the  Electromagnetic  Field.  New  
Brunswick:  Rutgers  University  Press,  1997.  55-­‐‑138.  
5  See  Richards,  Joan  L.  “The  Geometrical  Tradition:  Mathematics,  Space,  and  Reason  in  the  Nineteenth  
Century”   in   volume   five   of   The   Cambridge   History   of   Science:   the   Modern   Physical   and   Mathematical  
Sciences.  
6   This   has   its   quantum   analogy   in   the   form   of  Dirac’s   sea,  which   is  Dirac’s   theory   of   the   ‘hole’   that  
predicts  the  existence  of  holes  or  ‘positrons’  as  a  positively  charged  equivalence  of  the  electron,  within  a  
sea   of   negatively   charged   particles.   The   positron   was   predicted   before   its   eventual   experimental  
confirmation   in   1932.   Nineteenth   century   scientists   such   as  Weber   were   already   speculating   on   the  
possibility   of   the   electricity   current   as   a   double-­‐‑stream   of   positive   and   negative   charges,   flowing   in  
directions  opposite  to  each  other.  Coulomb’s  law  on  electrostatic  attraction  and  Ampere’s  law  of  current  
elements  supported  Weber’s   theory.  See  more  in  “Electrical  Theory  and  Practice”  by  Bruce  J.  Hunt   in  
the  same  volume  of  the  Cambridge  History  of  Science.  
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Savart.      These   equations   were   first   articulated   in   his   Treatise   on   Electricity   and  
Magnetism7.  
Beyond  the   interacting   force   fields  came  parallel  developments   in  electrons,  
protons,  and  neutrons  taking  place  in  Britain  around  the  late  19th  century,  such  as  the  
famous   ‘plum   pudding’   model   of   the   atomic   structure   of   J.J.   Thomson,   who   had  
discovered   the  electron  before   the  nucleonic   structure  was  known.  Over   in  France,  
radioactive   physics   grew   through   the   work   of   the   Curies.   By   then,   developments  
were   made   concurrently   in   algebraic   geometry   in   Germany,   and   the   Germans,  
through   under-­‐‑acknowledged   women   scientists   such   as   Marietta   Blau,   extended  
work   already   underway   that   pushed   for   thinking   about   radioactive   elements   as  
particles,  such  as  the  then  already  discovered  protons  and  neutrons,  by  developing  
heavy  nuclear  emulsions  to  detect  and  measure  them.    The  nuclear  emulsions  were  
also   used   as   photographic   techniques   to   observe   nuclear   disintegration  due   to   the  
cosmic  rays.  
The   cosmic   rays,   as  we  will   see   in   the   next   section,   represents   the   turning  
point   in   physics   whereby   particles   of   properties   not   seen   before   are   constituted  
                                                                                                             
7   However,  Maxwell’s  work  was   less  well   understood   during   his   lifetime,   and   it   was   only   after   his  
death   that   his   work   was   furthered   by   a   group   of   younger   ‘Maxwellians,’   many   of   whom   made  
important  contributions  to  developments  in  field  theory,  especially  how  measurements  (such  as  length  
and  velocity),  can  be  made  in  the  theory  of  relativity  developed  by  Einstein.  H.A.  Lorentz,  for  instance,  
had  the  hypothesis  that  matter  contains  enormous  numbers  of  tiny  charges  able  to  move  freely  within  
conductors,  but  is  bounded  by  material  dielectric  (Hunt  324).  
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through  forms  of  experiments  that  can  be  considered  as  speculative  mainly  because  
the  scientists  constructed  an  experimental  apparatus  to   investigate  physical  entities  
that   they   could   only   vaguely   conjecture.   The   entities   were   detected   because   of  
unexplained   anomalies   that   occurred   with   one   of   the   other   instruments   that   had  
been   constructed   for   a   different   experiment.      The   properties   of   these   unknown  
objects  could  not  be  comprehended  due  to  an  almost  non-­‐‑existent  understanding  of  
the  connection  between  the  particles  inhabiting  the  microscopic  world  with  physical  
phenomena  manifested  extra-­‐‑terrestrially.    
A.1 Cosmic Rays and the Particles of the Standard Model 
Cosmic   rays   are   high-­‐‑energy   charged   particles   that   have   their   origins   in  
extra-­‐‑terrestrial  and  extra-­‐‑galactic  sources.  However,  upon  entering  the  atmosphere  
of   the   earth,   showers   of   particles   are   produced   through   the   interaction   with   the  
atoms   of   the   atmosphere,   which   are   then   captured   by   ground-­‐‑based   detectors.  
Nevertheless,   there   is   still   a   layer   of   mystery   about   the   rays   that   physicists   are  
attempting  to  understand  better,  although  their  knowledge  is  continually  improved  
through  deep  studies  of  the  data  obtained  from  research  in  high-­‐‑energy  astrophysics  
and  particle  physics  when  these  data  are  re-­‐‑contextualized  against  new  information.    
Neutrinos   can   come   from   cosmic   sources   such   as   the   supernova   of   dying  
stars.  Interest  in  neutrino  physics  came  about  as  the  result  of  physicists’  attempts  at  
resolving  the  enigma  surrounding  the  conservation  of  momentum  and  energy,  and  
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neutron   decay   to   protons   and   electrons.   Physicists   found   that   the   laws   of  
conservation   of   energy   and   momentum   were   apparently   violated   because   of   the  
possible   existence   of   a   third  particle   that   carried   away   some   of   the   energy.   Enrico  
Fermi  named  this  new  particle,  which  exhibited  zero  mass  and  zero  charge  (a  type  of  
‘virtual’   particle   at   the   time)   so   as   to   counteract   the   ‘shortfall’   that   would   have  
resulted  from  the  proton  and  electron  not  being  consistently  emitted  as  a  ‘neutrino.’    
Such   experiments   involving   the   disintegration   of   neutrons   are   a   result   of  
beta-­‐‑decay   (which   is   the   decay   of   any   ‘parent’   particle   to   ‘child’   particles   that   can  
include  an  electron).    Chadwick  discovered  that  the  electrons  he  was  analyzing  from  
neutron  decay  showed  a  continuous  energy  spectrum  and  that  a  ‘neutrino’  might  be  
the   possible   cause   for   it.   Neutrinos   are   produced   as   a   result   of   the   electroweak  
interaction,  an  interaction  arising  from  the  unification  of  electromagnetic  and  weak  
forces.  
The  work  on  neutrinos   led   to   interest  by  physicists   to   contemplate,   further,  
the   possibility   of   colliding   beams   involving   the   ‘anti-­‐‑electrons’   (positrons)   and  
electrons,   in   the   1950s   and   60s,   despite   the   technical  difficulties   since   the   colliding  
beams  would  have  to  be  injected  from  directions  opposite  to  each  other.8  However,  it  
                                                                                                             
8  Another   experiment   that   interested  physicists   but  which   they  were   skeptical   of   is   connected   to   the  
positron,  which  is  an  outcome  of  work  on  the  Dirac  hole,  symmetry,  and  the  concept  of  the  neutrino.  
Burton  Richter  of  the  Stanford  Linear  Accelerator  Center  articulated  some  of  the  problems  involved  in  
his  piece  “Colliding  Beam  Experiments”  in  the  proceedings  of  the  International  Conference  on  Theoretical  
Aspects  of  Very-­‐‑High-­‐‑Energy  Phenomena,  Geneva  1961,  pp.  62-­‐‑3.  
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was   an   important   realization   of   Fermi’s   dream  project,   and   of   the   Italians,   via   the  
Laboratori  Nazionali   di   Frascati   that   is   25   kilometers   from  Rome.   The   experiment  
has   to   do   with   the   exploration   of   collisions   at   the   center-­‐‑of-­‐‑mass   region   of   the  
collider   and   certain   physical   theories   in   circulation   at   that   time   such   as   the  
dispersion   relation   of   particles   stemming   from   their   collision-­‐‑based   interaction.9  
More   importantly,   the   development   of   colliding   beams   in   the   form   of   electron-­‐‑
positron  was  itself  a  form  of  speculative  endeavor  for  there  were  many  reservations  
concerning  the  plausibility  of  its  design,  especially  since  some  changes  in  the  design  
would  be  required  to  allow  one  beam  to  be  coming  from  the  opposite  direction  from  
the  other  beam  while  still  able  to  track  their  collisions.10  
The  development  of  the  electron-­‐‑positron  annihilative  interaction  (seen  as  an  
interaction   between  matter   and   anti-­‐‑matter)   enabled   the   experimentalists   to  move  
from  these  lighter  leptonic11  collision  experiments  to  experiments  involving  collisions  
                                                                                                             
9  See  Bernardini,  C.  “AdA:  The  First  Electron-­‐‑positron  Collider.”  Physics  in  Perspective  (PIP)  6.2  (2004):  
156–183.   Accessed   1   Jan.   2013,   for  more   details   on   the   development   of   the   earliest   electron-­‐‑positron  
collider.  
10   According   to   Burton   Richter   in   the   same   report   for   the   International   Conferences   on   theoretical  
Aspects  of  Very  High-­‐‑Energy  Phenomena  in  Geneva  in  1961,  the  (electron-­‐‑positron)  beams  must  still  be  
prevented  from  colliding  head  on  for  the  same  reasons  as  in  the  electron-­‐‑electron  scattering  experiment.  
RF   cavity   and   the   interaction   region  must   be   shifted   so   that   they   are   opposite   to   each   other.  A  new  
steering   and   inflecting   system   to   control   the   beam  must   be   constructed,   and   a   new   counting   system  
required.   Positron-­‐‑electron   experiment   was   incompatible   with   the   then   available   electron-­‐‑electron  
experiment.  More  understanding  about  the  storage  of  the  beam  was  required.  
11   Leptons   are   subatomic   particles   forming   part   of   the   Standard  Model,  which   are   involved   in  weak  
interactions.  While  the  electron  is  the  most  common  and  also  representative  of  the  first  generation  (or  
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between   heavier   hadrons,   thus   providing   more   energy   during   the   collision.12  
Through   searches   involving   heavy   leptons,   physicists   were   able   to   connect   the  
differences  in  the  length  of  the  chain  of  decay  of  the  leptons  from  that  of  the  hadrons:  
there  are  not   too  many  steps   in   the   chain  of  decay  between   the  very   light  electron  
and  its  leptonic  counterpart,  the  very  heavy  muon.  Nevertheless,  the  physicists  may  
have  to  deal  with  the  possibility  of  misidentification  of   the   lepton  in  the  process  of  
working  out  the  relationship  between  the  electron  and  the  muon.13    
There   are   some   important   lessons   to   be   learnt   here   about   how   speculation  
takes  place   in   the   lead-­‐‑up   to   the  discovery   of   the   tau   lepton,   the  heaviest   leptonic  
particle,   at   the   theoretical   and   experimental   level.   The   discovery   of   the   tau   lepton  
completes   the   theoretical  prediction  made  of   the  entities   in   this  particle  group  and  
was   accomplished   due   to   advancement   in   the   fine-­‐‑tuning   of   the   experimental  
apparatus.   Initially,  physicists  had   to  make  use  of  what  was   already  known  about  
                                                                                                             
  
flavor)  of   the   lepton,   the   leptons  constitute   three  generations;  electronic   leptons,  muonic   leptons,  and  
tauonic  leptons.  
12   Hadrons   are   subatomic   particles   constituting   the   Standard   Model   that   is   made   up   of   baryons  
(particles  with   three  quarks)   and  mesons   (particles  with   two  quarks).  There   are   important   for   strong  
interactions  and  for  later  developments  in  quantum  chromodynamics  involving  gluons,  which  are  used  
to  explain  that  boundedness  of  quarks  and  the  non-­‐‑existence  of  a  free  quark.  
13   By   working   out   the   events   produced   in   that   annihilation   between   the   positron   and   electron,  
physicists  attempt  proper  identification  by  positing  that  the  positron-­‐‑electron  interaction  leads  to  both  
the  production  of  the  electron-­‐‑muon  pairing  (which  include  the  neutrino)  and  the  muonic  and  hadronic  
pairing  within  the  same  energy  spectra.  This   led  to   the  production  of   the  heavy   lepton  that  was   later  
known  as  the  tau.    
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the   lepton-­‐‑lepton  and   lepton-­‐‑hadronic   interactions  which  also  meant  working  with  
the   possibility   of   misidentifying   hadrons   for   leptons   that   would   then   had   to   be  
noted,   just   in   case,   as   these   are   regular   occurrences   in   the   ‘anomalous’   hadronic  
interactions   back  when   the   existing   infrastructure  was   not   sufficiently   sensitive   in  
detecting  the  differences.  It  was  only  later,  when  a  muon  tower  was  added  into  the  
existing  SLAC-­‐‑LBL  detector,  that  misidentification  could  be  corrected  and  the  crude  
detector  was  vastly  improved.      
By   the   end   of   1978,   it   was   confirmed   that   electromagnetic   interaction  
produces  tau  lepton  while  the  weak  interaction  is  what  produces  the  decay.14  One  of  
the   interesting   aspects   of   the   experiments,   and   similar   future   experiments,   is   the  
need   to   produce   theories   that   could   possibly   account   for   the   excess   of   events   not  
easily   explicable   within   existing   known   interactions.   Hence,   as   is   often   the   case,  
speculation   takes   place   by   setting   aside   the   ‘excesses’   of   the   known   and   then  
modeling  them  within  the  parameters  of  what  is  known,  even  if  that  meant  locating  
their  presence  rather  imprecisely.  What  matter  is  that  care  be  taken  when  noting  the  
problem  of   that   ‘excess’   and   their   observable   characteristics,   particularly  when   the  
latter  are  located  within  impoverished  explanatory  frameworks.  
                                                                                                             
14  See  Perl,  Martin.  “The  Discovery  of  Tau  Lepton”  The  Rise  of  the  Standard  Model:  Particle  Physics  in  the  
1960s  and  1970s.  Eds.  Lillian  Hoddeson,  Laurie  Brown,  Michael  Riordan,  and  Max  Dresden.  Cambridge:  
Cambridge  University  Press,  1997.  79-­‐‑100.  
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A.2 The Metaphysics of the Gauge Entities 
Now,  we  should  delve  into  the  theoretical  structures  undergirding  the  events  
just  described.  One  of  them  is  the  development  of  quantum  electrodynamics  (QED),  
which   represents   the   final   vestiges   of   the   ‘old’   physics   theories:   it   is   basically   the  
quantum  version  of   the  previously  discussed  classical  electrodynamics  of  Maxwell.  
QED   is   one   of   the   primary   and   earliest   constituents   of   the   Standard   Model.  
Schweber’s   QED   -­‐‑   And   the   Men   Who   Made   It:   Dyson,   Feynman,   Schwinger,   and  
Tomonaga  provides  a  more  thorough  explication  of  QED’s  extensive  epistemological  
and  political  history.  For  the  purpose  of  this  chapter,  I  would  just  state  that  QED  is  
important   for   thinking   about   the   interaction   processes   between   photons,   protons,  
electrons,   and   other   leptons.   It   is   also   the   theoretical-­‐‑predictive   framework   for  
describing  the  movement  of  electromagnetic  particle-­‐‑waves  from  a  four-­‐‑dimensional  
perspective  of  field  theory.    
The   double-­‐‑slit   experiment   of   subatomic   particles   provides   a   simple   and  
elegant   explication   of   the  development   of  QED.  However   before   going   into   that,   I  
would   like   to   discuss   the   photoelectric   effect,   which,   due   to   its   connection   to   the  
history   of   the   electromagnetic   field,   is   a   good   entrée   into   understanding   the  
background  of   the   ‘paradox’  of  particle-­‐‑wave  duality  demonstrated  by   the  double-­‐‑
slit  experiment.  The  photoelectric  effect  is  an  observable  phenomena  of  photo  (light)  
emission   caused   by   light-­‐‑waves   pushing   through   the   surface   of   a   solid   to   free   the  
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electrons  at   the   surface.  This  has  been  observed  since  1887  by  Heinrich  Hertz,   and  
was   later   further   studied   by   J.J   Thomson.  While   it   is   not   hard   to   explain  why   the  
light  of  particular   frequency   that   is   shined  onto   the   surface  of   a   solid  with   loosely  
bounded   electrons   could   lead   to   their   being   freed,   what   could   not   be   easily  
explicable   is   the   level   of   threshold   frequencies   required   of   the   light-­‐‑waves   for   the  
electrons  to  be  tipped  over  and  out  of  their  bounded  regions,  and  how  the  threshold  
is  different  for  different  sets  of   light  waves  even  when  the  energy-­‐‑frequency  for  all  
the  light  waves  across  the  spectrum  remains  the  same.    In  other  words,  in  a  curved  
graph,   they  all  have   the  same  slope,  showing  how  the  energy-­‐‑frequency  relation   is  
constant,  and  this  constant  is  the  Planck  constant.    
The   photoelectric   theory,   as   explicated   by   Einstein   in   1905,   had   its  
background   in   the   development   of   thermodynamics   (such   as   the   blackbody  
radiation  that  posits  that  light  can  only  exist  as  discrete  bundles  of  energy)  and  the  
particulate   model   of   the   atoms,   which   posits   that   light   contains   particle-­‐‑like  
properties   in   the   form   of   the   photons.   This   is   because   the   energy   of   the   ejected  
electrons   is   proportional   to   light   frequency,   even   as   the   ejection   energy   is  
independent  of  the  total  energy  of  illumination.15  
                                                                                                             
15   More   can   be   found   at   <http://physics.info/photoelectric/>   and   <http://hyperphysics.phy-­‐‑
astr.gsu.edu/%E2%80%8Chbase/mod1.html#c3>.  
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  In   the   double-­‐‑slit   experiment,   we   consider   a   photon   or   electron   colliding  
with   the  screen  after  entering   through  either  slits  of   the   two-­‐‑slit  diaphragm  placed  
between   the   particle   source   and   the   screen.   The   physical   effects   observable   after  
collision  with   the   screen   confirms   the  wave-­‐‑like   properties   of   the   photon/electron  
because   the   resulting   interference   pattern   on   the   screen   strongly   hints   on   that  
possibility;   furthermore,   the   pattern   of   interference   suggests   a   probabilistic   range  
since  one  is  not  able  to  determine  with  absolute  certainty  as  to  where  on  the  screen  
the  particle  would  show  up.  Hence,   the  particulate  electron  now  has  demonstrable  
wave-­‐‑like  qualities.  What   is  seemingly  paradoxical  about  wave-­‐‑particle  duality  can  
be   resolved   if   we   begin   thinking   about   the   photons   and   electrons   within   the  
framework  of  a  field.  
While   the   concept   of   fields   is   not   new   in   classical  mechanics,   it   takes   on   a  
different   dimension  when   considered   at   the   level   of   quantum  mechanics,   for   it   is  
now   use   to   represent   the   probabilistic   uncertainty   in   the   observation   of   particles  
moving  at,  or  close  to,  the  speed  of  light.  The  conceptualization  of  the  field  allows  us  
to   think   about   the  multiplicity   of  dimensions,   and  phenomenon,   by  which  we   can  
view   the   interaction   of   a   single   particle,   while   also   formally   accommodating  
interactions  beyond  a  single  particle.16  Hence,  as  we  move   from  thinking  about   the  
                                                                                                             
16   Also   known   as   quantization   (quantum  mechanical   calculations   of   a   single   or  many-­‐‑body   particle)  
beyond  the  first  order.  
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isolated   interaction  of  a  single  particle  with   the  screen   to  considering   the  collisions  
between  particles,  the  particle’s  fundamental  ontology  remains  the  same,  even  if  the  
phenomena  manifested  are  different.    
At   this   stage,   the   local  qualities  of   the  particles   change  when  an   interaction  
takes   place   between   them.   To   provide   a   clearer   picture   of   what   I   mean,   let   us  
consider   the   interaction  of  macro-­‐‑level  particles,   such  as   two  billiard  balls,   as   they  
collide  with  one  another.  At   the  point  of  collision,  which  could  be  elastic   (the  balls  
bouncing   off   each   other)   or   inelastic   (the   balls   sticking   together),   energy   and  
momentum  is  always  conserved.  This  is  because,  considered  overall,  the  collision  is  
not  happening  at  a  sufficiently  high  enough  velocity  to  cause  any  major  disturbances  
to  the  intrinsic  energy  level  of  the  ball,  nor  would  the  collisions  change  the  internal  
characteristics  of  the  ball.    
However,  when  a  photonic  laser  beam  is  directed  at  one  of  the  balls,  the  high  
intensity  of  the  beam,  with  the  ray  of  photons  operating  at  the  speed  of  light,  causes  
the  billiard  ball   to   alter   the  very  nature  of   its  macro-­‐‑physical   structure,   altering   its  
innate  properties  altogether.  This  is  because  the  interactions  are  now  taking  place  at  
the  level  where  the  properties  of  each  atomic  and  subatomic  particle  making  up  the  
ball  matter,  as  do  the  individual  spin,  momentum,  and  rotational  direction  of  each  of  
these  particles.  The  highly  energetic  beam  also  breaks  down  the  atomic  particles  into  
its   more   fundamental   constituents   via   decay   while   recombining   these   subatomic  
  321  
particles   into   less   naturally   common   atomic   composites   (fusion).      The   process   of  
interactions  are  mediated  by   the   forces  between   these  micro-­‐‑entities,   similar   to   the  
kind   Newton   had   once   predicted   concerning   two   gigantic   bodies   operating   at   a  
considerable  distance  from  each  other  (such  as  two  planetary  objects).  Depending  on  
what   the   particles   are,   and   the   range   of   action   between   them,   these   forces   can   be  
either  weak  or  strong.    
After  the  discovery  of  the  electromagnetic  force  by  Maxwell,  the  second  force  
to  be  discovered,  through  work  in  nuclear  and  radioactive  physics,  is  the  weak  force.  
This  is  because  the  earliest  experiments  involved  protons,  electrons,  and  the  muons;  
they  are  known  as  the  fermions,  which  are  categories  of  particles  that  obey  specific  
statistical   distribution   known   as   the   Fermi-­‐‑Dirac   statistics,   where   the   weak  
interacting   forces   are   detected.   These   forces   are   basically   part   of   a   theoretical  
structure   used   to   systematically   organize   the   fundamental   entities   and   forces   of  
nature  to  achieve  unitarity,  and  through  that,  symmetry.  Hence,  the  particles  that  are  
part   of   the   interactional   processes   of   the   force   are   what   constitute   the   Standard  
Model.  There  were  also  later  attempts  to  unify  the  electromagnetic  with  weak  forces,  
bringing   about   the   electro-­‐‑weak   force.17   With   the   unification   of   these   forces,  
                                                                                                             
17  I  will  not  attempt  a  mathematical  dissection  of  this  since  it  would  merely  become  too  involved  and  
convoluted.  Suffice  to  say  that  the  mathematics  is  a  very  specific  form  of  group  theoretical  algebra  that  
has   had   its   earlier,   and   less   complex,   incarnation   in   classical   mechanics.   Hence,   the   quantum  
mechanical  version  maintains  the  same  mathematical  ontology,  but  with  greater  degree  of  complexity  
since   we   now   have   to   move   from   thinking   about   the   more   ‘global’   and   ‘neat’   interaction   between  
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physicists   also   began  working   on   experiments   that   could   indicate   the   existence   of  
specific  bosonic  particles  known  as  gauge  particles.    
Now  that  I  have  discussed  the  electroweak  force,  the  next  important  force  to  
be  considered  is  the  QCD  (quantum  chromodynamics),  a  strong  nuclear  force.  Prior  
to   the   introduction   of   the   quark   theory,   the   bound   state   of   a   nucleon  was   studied  
mostly   in  nuclear  physics,  but  not  given  as  much  attention   in  particle  physics.  The  
binding  energies  studied  in  nuclear  physics  involve  the  decay  of  heavy  nuclei  in  the  
form   of   protons   (and   neutrons)   at   non-­‐‑relativistic   level   energies,   while   the   high-­‐‑
energy  physics  of  quark  operates  at  a  relativistic  level.    
Much  of   the   early  developments   in  QED  concentrate  on   the   free  particle   in  
the  form  of  electrons  and  muons,  although  the  bound  state  of  the  nucleon  (where  the  
protons  and  neutrons  reside)  would  also  become   important  due   to   the   interactions  
between  a  proton  and  an  electron.  In  the  early  years  of  the  development  of  the  quark  
theory,  QED  is  used  to  discuss   interactions  between  hadronic  particles  and  leptons  
even  if  the  flavor  of  the  quarks  are  not  conserved  in  the  weak  interactions.  In  other  
words,  quarks  develop  lepton-­‐‑like  qualities  in  weak  interactions.    
                                                                                                             
  
billiard  balls  to  a  ‘messier’  local-­‐‑level  interaction  between  subatomic  particles.  However,  mathematical  
symmetry,  and  thus  physical  symmetry,  is  always  an  epistemic  priority.  
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While  I  have  concluded  my  discussion  into  the  known  forces  that  are  part  of  
the  Standard  Model,  there  is  still  another  force  not  featured  here  because  much  of  its  
properties  have  not   been   finessed   and   also  because   there   is   a  problem   in  unifying  
relativity   and  quantum  mechanics   conclusively,   notwithstanding   the   semi-­‐‑classical  
attempts   that   one   finds   in   quantum   field   theories.   In   fact,   one   could   say   that   the  
theories   of   the   gravitational   force   have   remained   a   product   of   speculation   for  
decades,   appearing   both   in   speculative   scientific   retellings   and   also   in   science  
fictional  works.  In  the  following  section,  I  will  discuss  a  development  in  the  strong  
nuclear  force  that  has   itself  been  a  product  of  skepticism  and  speculation  for  many  
decades  prior  to  its  final  confirmation:  the  quark.  
A.3 The Enigma of the Quark 
Even  as  the  quark  model  was  increasingly  better  understood,  there  was  still  a  
problem  in  its  inability  to  explain  why  the  flavor  (up,  down,  strange,  etc)  properties  
of   the   quarks   can   be   transformed   during   the   process   of   decay.   This   was   only  
resolved,   in  a  manner  of  speaking,  with   the  application  of  a  mechanism,  known  as  
the  Cabibbo  mechanism,  to  the  neutral  processes  proposed  by  Glashow,  Illiopoulos,  
and  Maiani   (also   known   as  GIM)   in   1970,   and   then   extended  down  by  Kobayashi  
and  Maskawa   (KM)   through   all   the   three   generations   of   quarks   known   by   1973.18  
                                                                                                             
18  For  more  information,  see  David  Griffith’s  Introduction  to  Particle  Physics.  New  York:  John  Wiley  and  
Sons,  1987.  See  chapters  two  and  ten.    Even  though  there  are  not  as  much  updates  on  the  properties  of  
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These   suggested  mechanisms   solved   the   paradox   of   non-­‐‑conservation   through   the  
utilization   of   linear   algebra.   The   GIM   scheme   would   become   useful   for   thinking  
about   the  different  handedness   (left  or   right)  of   the  quarks,  which  are   intrinsic  not  
only   to   the   constitution   of   the   Standard   Model,   but   also   in   understanding   how  
symmetry  is  maintained  in  the  process  of  transformation  and  rotation  of  the  particle  
through  real  space.  The  Standard  Model,  after  all,  is  constituted  of  chiral  symmetry.  
If   electric   force   in  QED   is   carried   by   the   photon,   in   the   nuclear   force,   it   is  
represented   by   the   pion   exchange,   which   was   first   predicted   by   Yukawa   as   a  
nuclear-­‐‑force   counterpart   to   the   beta-­‐‑decay   for   the   ‘free’   electronic   and   neutrino  
particles  described  above.  According  to  Robert  Oerter,  
Yukawa  has  been  struggling  with  the  nature  of  the  nuclear  force  holding  the  
protons   together.   Several   years   before,   Heisenberg   had   suggested   that  
nucleus   was   held   together   by   an   exchange   of   some   particle   among   the  
protons  and  neutrons,  rather  like  the  electric  force  is  carried  by  exchange  of  
(virtual)   photons.   Yukawa   realized,   as   Heisenberg   had,   that   the   particle  
being   exchanged   could   not   be   an   electron,   for   the   same   reason   as   in   beta  
decay   –   the   spins   wouldn’t   add   up.   Finally,   after   hearing   about   Fermi’s  
theory  of  beta  decay  and  the  invention  of  a  new  particle,  Yukawa  decided  to  
assume  the  nuclear  force  was  caused  by  the  exchange  of  some  particle,  which  
came  to  be  called  pion…”  (Oerter  140)  
The   decay   of   the   pion,   either   in   its   negative   or   positive   condition,   provides   the  
‘hidden’  explanation  and  balance  for  the  two-­‐‑way  transformation  between  a  proton  
                                                                                                             
  
the  interactions  I  refer  to  here,  one  can  still  check  out  the  second  edition  of  the  book,  published  in  2008,  
for  the  other  updates.  
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and  a  neutron.  This  virtual  particle  holds  for  nuclear  force  what  the  ‘virtual’  photon  
does  for  the  electron.  Unlike  the  photon,  however,  the  pion  has  mass  and  must  hence  
borrow  its  energy  from  a  particle   that   travels  at   the  speed  of   light  and  crosses   into  
the  nucleus.  What  is  interesting  about  the  prediction  and  discovery  of  the  pion  in  the  
photographic   emulsions   stemming   from   a   study   into   the   cosmic   rays   was   how   it  
became   the   precursor   to   understanding   quarks   and   symmetry   breaking,   the   latter  
important   in   the   story   of   the  Higgs   boson.   The   pion   began   life   as   a  mathematical  
construct  of  particular  properties   that  are   then  fitted   into  material   traces  exhibiting  
particular  properties  that  bear  relationality  to  theoretical  predictions,  not  unlike  the  
case  of  the  quark.  
If  the  cosmic  ray  experiments  of  the  1930s  provided  the  first  plausible  hint  of  
other  leptons  beside  the  electron,  it  was  only  with  the  improvement  in  the  sensitivity  
of   the  detection  methods,  and   techniques   that   could   function   independently  of   the  
presence  of  the  experimenters,  that  the  first  evidence  of  the  pion  was  detected  from  
the   spray  of  particles   coming   from  cosmic   rays   (a  particle  of   spin  0   and  about   270  
times   heavier   than   the   electron   mass).   By   the   1950s,   many   of   these   pions   were  
produced  through  the  machine-­‐‑mediated  collisions  of  nucleonic  atoms  (the  nature  of  
the   strong   force  was   still   not   completely   understood   at   this   point   in   terms   of   the  
quark  model  and  gluons)  and  play  an  important  role  as  the  ‘virtual’  mediator  for  the  
electron-­‐‑positron  collisions.  The  discovery  of  the  pion  was  a  start  to  uncovering  the  
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identity  of   ‘strange’  particles   that  were   later  known  as  quarks.  But  before   that,  one  
must   understand   the   beginnings   of   the   composite  model   of   point-­‐‑particles   (which  
would   be   later   be   called   the   quark  model)   through   the   narrative   of   the   Eightfold  
way.19  
The   Eightfold   way   was   to   the   subatomic   particles   what   the   Mendeleyev  
periodic   table   was   to   chemistry.   Murray   Gell-­‐‑Mann   first   drafted   a   version   of   the  
Eightfold  way   in   1961,  where   a   particle   isospin,   the   abstract   ‘imaginary’   spin   that  
behaves  differently  with  each   force  of   the  Standard  Model,  was  plotted  onto  an  x-­‐‑
axis.   The   isospin   has   nothing   to   do   with   space   and   time,   but   rather,   with   the  
relationships  between  the  different  particles  referred  to  as  internal  symmetry.  There  
is   also   the   concept   of   strangeness   on   another   axis,   and   a   hexagon   of   particles  was  
plotted   in,   giving   us   the   Eightfold   way.   Strangeness   is   a   property   of   a   strange  
particle  that  decays  either  into  a  normal  (such  as  a  proton  or  anti-­‐‑proton),  or  another  
strange   particle   (xi-­‐‑minus   and   xi-­‐‑positive).20   Nevertheless,   there   were   teething  
                                                                                                             
19   Just   to   note   that   the   ‘particle,’   used   in   physics,   represents   the   best   conceptual   way   of   describing  
fragments   and   fractions   of   matter   of   the   atom   or   subatom;   it   is   not   meant   to   represent   a   literal  
embodiment  of  a  particle.  As  with  any  historic  terms  in  science,  and  an  issue  that  would  be  raised  in  all  
the  chapters  of  this  dissertation,  there  are  always  misnomers.  
20   The   Eightfold   way   went   from   a   hexagonal   to   an   octuplet   representation,   thanks   to   Gell-­‐‑Mann’s  
discovery   of   an   algebraic   group   theory   known   as   the   Lie   group   that   later   became   the  mathematical  
foundation  of   symmetry   in  particle  physics,   and  of   the  unitary  groups   that  we   see  manifested   in   the  
form   of   U(1),   SU(2)   and   SU(3)   for   representing   electromagnetism,   weak   interaction,   and   strong  
interaction.     However,   the   octuplet  was   soon   upgraded   to   the   decuplet,   and  Gell-­‐‑Mann  was   able   to  
predict  the  existence  of  yet-­‐‑to-­‐‑be-­‐‑discovered  particles,  such  as  the  Omega-­‐‑minus.  
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problems  during  the  earliest  days  of  the  model’s  formation  that  could  only  be  dealt  
with  over  time.    
The   first   three   quarks   to   be   discovered   by   1964  were   the   up   quark,   down  
quark,  and  strange  quark.  Quite  some  years  later,  they  were  followed  by  the  charm,  
bottom,   and   top   quark;   with   the   latter   two   quarks   extensively   studied   at   the  
experimental   level   due   to   the   unknowability   and   greater   complexity   of   their  
qualities.  The  final  two  known  quarks  were  discovered  at  a  time  much  closer  to  the  
present   than   the   1960s   (the   bottom/beauty   quark   discovered   in   1977   and   the   top  
quark   in   1995).   Nevertheless,   the   quark  model   provides   the   complete   explanation  
needed   to   speculate   more   intelligently   on   the   observed   properties   of   subatomic  
particles   mentioned,   especially   the   pion-­‐‑exchange   process   that   is   integral   for  
understanding  how  a  proton  becomes  a  neutron,  and  vice  versa.    
An   inelastic  collision  process  between  the  protons  and  electrons,  performed  
in   varying  degrees   of   sophistication   at   different   accelerators   on   the  East   and  West  
coast  of  the  US,  is  known  as  scaling  and  said  to  provide  the  earliest  indication  of  the  
constitution  of  a  proton  as  point-­‐‑like  composites  of   the  quarks.  The  scaling  process  
(sometimes   referred   to  as  Bjorken   scaling)   refers   to  how,  at   a  high  enough  energy,  
the  scattering  condition  of  the  quarks  are  no  longer  dependent  on  energy  loss.  One  
has  to  do  with  the  fact  that  a  free  quark  has  never  been  noted,  even  though  the  idea  
of  scaling  is  premised  on  the  assumption  that  the  quarks  are  not  strongly  bound  to  
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each  other.  The  other  has  to  do  with  the  physical  impossibility  of  having  all  quarks  
of  similar  spin  state  aligned  with  each  other.    
Therefore,  Gell-­‐‑Mann  and  his  colleagues  attempted  to  solve  the  problem  by  
constructing  the  idea  of  three  colors  for  each  flavor  of  the  quarks.  The  ‘colors’  were  
arbitrarily  given  the  color  of  the  primary  colors:  blue,  green,  and  red.  The  plan  is  not  
to   insinuate   that   the  quark   flavors  come   in  colors,  but   to  demonstrate   the  need   for  
another   property   in   order   to   explain   away   the   paradoxes   of   the   quark   model,  
paradox   that   stems   from   our   insistence   at   finding   the   most   elegant   solution   to  
pressing  ontological  dilemmas.21  The  addition  of   the   color  properties  helps  explain  
why  it  is  possible  for  three  strange  quarks  with  similar  flavors  and  spin  direction  to  
exist.  The  color  describes  the  force  that  keeps  the  quarks  bound  into  a  hadron,  such  
as  a  proton.  The  theory  predicts  that  a  force,  behaving  like  glue  that  holds  the  quarks  
together,   is  carried  by  a  set  of  massless  particles  referred  to  as  gluons.  More  of  this  
will  be  discussed  as  I  move  on  to  an  elaboration  of  QCD  below.  
Before  we  enter  more   extensively   into   the   current-­‐‑day  quark  model   and   its  
place   within   the   quantum   chromodynamics   network,   let   us   take   a   step   back   and  
consider  the  gauge  principle  that  is  the  basis  of  the  relativistic  quantum  field  theory  
of   the   original   classical   Maxwellian   electromagnetic   equations.   However,   the  
                                                                                                             
21   See  more  of   this   in  Sheldon  Lee  Glashow’s  1975  Scientific  America  article  “Quarks  with  Color  and  
Flavor,”  pp  38-­‐‑50.  
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Maxwellian  equations  have   to  be  modified  using  Dirac’s   equations   so  as   to  ensure  
that  the  evolution  of  the  electron  for  compliance  with  experiment.  In  order  to  do  so,  
the   equations   for   conserved   current   are   utilized   to   construct   a   wavefunction   of  
electrons  in  a  four-­‐‑vector  form  that  takes  into  account  three  spatial  dimensions  and  
time  while  considering  the  intrinsic  properties  of  an  electron  such  as  spin.    
Without   going   into   too   many   details,   the   gauge   principle   is   needed   for  
creating   the   mathematical   foundation   for   demonstrating   the   different   physical  
properties   of   the   particles   situated   within   the   Standard   Model,   and   for  
understanding   the   properties   of   the   quarks.   The   Glashow-­‐‑Weinberg-­‐‑Salam   (GWS)  
model   for   weak   interaction   is   also   used   for   describing   the   interactions   of   leptons  
with  that  of  the  hadrons.  While  the  weak  interaction  properties  (including  the  flavor  
symmetries)  and  certain  aspects  of  the  electromagnetic  properties  of  the  quarks  were  
understood,   the  strong   interactional  properties  were  not  properly  understood  until  
after   the   November   revolution   of   1974;   after   the   discovery   of   the   J/psi   mesons,  
neutrinos,   Drell-­‐‑Yan   process   of   the   quark   and   anti-­‐‑quark   annihilation   process,  
composite  quark  model  of  the  hadrons  sometimes  referred  to  as  the  partonic  model,  
as   well   as   the   transverse   momentum   of   the   hadronic   particle   so   intrinsic   to  
experimental  high-­‐‑energy  physics  and  to  the  foundation  of  QCD.    
According   to   QCD,   color   can   be   changed   when   a   quark   emits   a   gluon:   a  
gluon  has  to  carry  two  colors  -­‐‑  the  color  of  the  incoming  quark  and  the  anti-­‐‑
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the  outgoing  quark.  While  QED  and  QCD  are  structurally  quite  similar,  the  emission  
of   the   gluon   is   what   differentiates   QCD   most   strongly   from   the   QED.   Another  
difference   is   that,   in   QED,   the   photon   that   mediates   between   electrically-­‐‑charged  
particles   is  not   itself  electrically  charged,  while   in   the  QCD,   the  gluon   itself   carries  
color   (which   is  equivalent   to   the  charge   in  QED),  meaning   that  gluons  can   interact  
with   each   other   while   the   photons   could   not.   Hence,   we   have   quarks   with   six  
flavors,   each   with   three   different   colors,   bringing   us   to   18   quarks   (not   all   are  
depicted   in   the   usual   Standard   Model   diagram)   given   that   each   quark   has   an  
antiquark,  so  there  are  18  antiquarks  as  well.  
Another   main   difference   between   QCD   and   QED   related   to   the   first  
difference  is  the  existence  of  the  asymptotic  freedom  in  the  latter.  In  QED,  there  is  the  
screening   effect   of   the   cloud   of   particles,   not   unlike   the   screening   effect   that   one  
might  have  encountered  in  high  school  chemistry  or  the  discussion  of  electron  shells  
in  physics.  However,   this   can  be   circumvented  when  higher  energy   is   exerted  and  
one  is  able  to  penetrate  deeper  into  the  cloud,  leading  the  electric  force  to  increase  as  
well.  The  opposite  is  true  for  QCD  as  higher  energy  and  shorter  distances  decrease  
the  strength  of  the  color  forces  (Oerter  180).    
The  Feynman  diagram  is  the  best  way  for  demonstrating  this  feature  because  
calculations  can  become  messy  when  attempted  algebraically.  However,  as  a  single  
diagram   demonstrates,   the   more   interactions   there   are,   the   messier   their  
  331  
representations  become.  Further,   the  greater  number  of   interactions  within  a  single  
diagram  also  means  that  the  effect  of  the  diagram  on  the  overall  result  of  the  QCD  
interaction,  especially  at  high  energies,  decreases.  The  quark-­‐‑quark   interaction  also  
becomes   weaker,   causing   them   to   become   increasingly   likely   to   behave   as   free  
particles  (Oerter  285-­‐‑88).    
Up   to   this   point,   I   have   provided   an   overview   to   the   development   of   the  
mechanics   influencing   the   development   of   the   Standard   Model   while   discussing  
briefly   all   the   important   components   that  make   up   the   table:   the   leptons,   quarks,  
forces  (electromagnetic,  weak,  strong,  but  excluding  the  gravitational  force),  and  the  
bosons.  The  bosons  are  known  also  as  intermediate  vectors  and  force-­‐‑carriers:  their  
existences  are  needed  to  explain  why  the  other  entities  behave  the  way  they  do.    
The  known  mediators  of   the   three   forces   include  one  photon,   eight  gluons,  
and  three  weak  bosons  known  as  ±W  and  the  Z.     Of  course,  we  also  now  have  the  
Higgs  boson,  whose  properties  are  still  being  studied.  While   the  spin  properties  of  
these   bosons   matter   in   the   physics,   it   is   less   important,   for   the   purpose   of   my  
dissertation,  to  go  into  the  details  of  their  technical  characteristics.  Nevertheless,  they  
are  important  for  QED-­‐‑related  interactions  and  validity  tests.  It  has  been  a  puzzle  as  
to  why  a  photon  would  not  have  mass  while  W  and  Z  do.     The  Higgs  mechanism,  
which  also  predicts  the  possibility  of  a  new  particle  called  the  Higgs  boson,  seeks  to  
explain  this.    
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The  Higgs  mechanism   introduces   a   new  kind  of   field,   known  as   the  Higgs  
field,  that  is  over  and  above  the  known  forces.  The  purpose  of  the  mechanism  is  to  
provide   plausible   explanation   for   the  mass   of   bosons  without   leading   to   infinitely  
huge  divergences  that  could  quickly  turn  ugly,  mathematically-­‐‑speaking.  The  Higgs  
mechanism  attempts  to  introduce  a  scalar  field  that  would  enable  the  Higgs  field  to  
interact  with   all   particles,   bringing   about   the   aforementioned   symmetry   breaking,  
which   is   necessary   for   attributing   mass   to   each   of   the   interacting   particles.      The  
Higgs   field   starts   out   the   journey   of   fundamental   inquiry   that   now   can   possibly  
extend  beyond  the  Standard  Model,  and  thus  into  an  area  that  is  ripe  for  systematic  
consideration  of  various  emergent  theoretical  models.  
A.4 Beyond the Standard Model 
There   has   been   a   definite   difficulty   with   the   Standard   Model,   which   has  
caused  physicists  to  return  to  the  drawing  board  to  work  out  the  problems  that  the  
model   has   not   been   too   able   to   resolve   thus   far.      In   the   chapter   of   “Beyond   the  
Standard  Model”   of   his   2010   Introduction   to   Particle   Physics   and   the   Standard  Model,  
Robert  Mann  outlines  what  he  considers  to  be  the  three  main  reasons:  
1.  Too  many  adjustable  parameters:   too  many  constructions  of   the  particles,  
geometrical  presumptions,  and  mathematically  adjustable  possibilities.  There  are  18  
arbitrary  parameters  that  have  not  been  predicted  that  are  mathematically  valid  and  
theoretically   self-­‐‑consistent   in   that   the   mathematical   manipulations   performed   to  
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extract   the   physical   predictions   from   the   Standard  Model   are   as   valid   as   if   other  
values   have   been   used   for   these   parameters.   There   are   just   too  many   possibilities  
that  have  not  been  confirmed  as  implausible,  leaving  the  model  open  to  subjectivity.  
2.   There   are   also   problems   with   including   gravity   with   the   other   three  
interactional   processes.   The   quantum   corrections   to   the   gravitational   processes   are  
infinite  and  do  not  lend  themselves  to  possible  resolutions  to  these  infinities.  To  do  
that  would   require   the   redefinition   of   every   possible   physical   quantity   in   physics.  
Moreover,  time  has  a  different  ontology  in  gravity  and  causality  is  uncertain.22  
3.  Our  universe  is  biophilic  in  that  it  supports  life  but  the  Standard  Model  is  
unable  to  explain  why  the  existence  of  life  is  so  tightly  connected  to  the  parameters  
that  have  been  predicted  by  the  elementary  particles,  or  why  any  adjustments  to  the  
parameters  as  we  know  it  would  render  life  impossible  in  our  Earth  (483-­‐‑5).  
4.   The   impossibility   of   the   Grand   Unified   Theory   where   all   the  
aforementioned  forces,  plus  gravity,  would  be  unified  to  create  one  simple  scheme,  
and  one   coupling   constant,   that  will   provide   an   elegant   explication   as   to  why  our  
universe  is  the  way  it  is.  
                                                                                                             
22  I  have  recently  reviewed  a  book  that  discusses  the  problem  of  timelike  and  spacelike  in  general  
relativity,  in  my  review  of  Tim  Maudlin’s  Philosophy  of  Physics:  Space  and  Time.  See  the  review  
“Philosophical  about  Space-­‐‑Time”  in    
<http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/indepth/2013/jan/24/philosophical-­‐‑about-­‐‑space-­‐‑time>.  This  will  
help  address  some  of  the  problems  of  general  relativity  as  existing  in  a  different  ontology  from  
quantum  mechanics  that  I  will  not  be  going  into  detail  here.  
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Dark   matter,   as   much   of   cosmological   as   it   is   of   science-­‐‑fictional   interest,  
demonstrates  the  failure  of  the  Standard  Model  to  explain  the  existence  of  a  form  of  
matter   that   is   weakly   detected   and   whose   properties   are   not   readily   observable.  
Evidence   for   the   existence   of   dark   matter   stems   from   the   observation   of   what  
gravitational  effect  has  on  the  motion  of  the  stars  in  galaxies,  of  how  the  clusters  of  
galaxies   are   moving,   and   of   the   still-­‐‑speculative   theory   on   the   expansion   of   the  
universe   which   supposedly   has   found   confirmation   through   the   observation   of   a  
supernovae  that  earned  three  physicists  a  shared  Nobel  Prize  in  physics  in  2011.    
In  the  first  instance,  the  motion  of  stars  is  detected  by  measuring  the  shifts  of  
light  within  the  electromagnetic  spectrum  (the  shift   is  known  as  the  Doppler  shift).  
By  comparing  light  from  one  edge  of  the  universe  to  that  of  another,  one  is  able  to  
measure  the  rotation  of  the  galaxies.  By  using  the  Newtonian  gravitational  calculus  
to  measure  the  speed  of  the  stars  as  one  moves  further  away  from  the  center  for  the  
galaxy,  assuming  that  there  is  no  friction  caused  by  other  matter  in  space,  the  speed  
of   the   stars   at   the   outer-­‐‑region   of   the   galaxy   should   therefore   decrease   since   the  
number   of   stars   pulling   inward   to   the   center   would   decrease.   However,   it   was  
discovered   that   this  was   not   the   case;   instead,   the   speed   stabilizes   into   a   constant  
value.   In   addition,   the   stars   are   also   moving   too   quickly,   lending   to   the  
destabilization  of   the  galaxy  due   to   insufficient  mass   for  holding   it   together  under  
such  high  speed.    
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The   same   light   shifts   for   measuring   the   motion   of   the   stars   are   used   for  
measuring   the   rotation  of   the  galaxies.  An  example  of   this   is   the  nearest  galaxy   to  
our   Milky   Way,   the   Andromeda   galaxy.   Measurements   have   indicated   that  
Andromeda  is  moving  towards  the  outskirt  of  galaxy  at  100  kilometers  per  second,  
which   takes   place   at   a   rather   large   speed.   Andromeda   would   have   left   the   local  
cluster  were  it  not  for  the  pull  of  the  other  members  of  the  galaxies  within  the  same  
cluster.  A  problem  arises   because   our   sun   orbits   the   center   of   the  Milky  Way   at   a  
distant  of  20000  light  years  at  a  speed  of  about  200  kilometers  per  second.  However,  
the   Andromeda   galaxy   is   1100   times   further   away   from   the   center   of   our   galaxy,  
with  half   the  speed,  and  yet  contains  sufficient  gravitational   force   to  hold   it  at   this  
distance  to  enable  the  Andromeda  to  remain  at  the  cluster.    
The  dark  matter,  as  it  is  predicted  now,  are  thought  to  be  constituted  Weakly  
Interacting  Massive  Particle   (WIMP)  considered  as  part  of   the  weak  interaction  but  
escaping   accelerator   detection   due   to   their   very   large   mass.   More   recently,  
experiments   from   a   satellite   known   as   Planck   has   semi-­‐‑confirmed   that   neutrino,  
which  was  once  considered  a  candidate  for  explaining  dark  matter,  may  not  possibly  
exist.23    
                                                                                                             
23   See   more   details   at   <   http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/2013/03/22/cosmos-­‐‑study-­‐‑
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